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Abstract 
Third Sector Employment and Training Initiatives: An analysis 
of Institutional influences on success and failure 
Richard Bromiley 
PhD Thesis, University of Durham, Department of Geography, 2001 
This thesis presents a multi-scalar analysis of the institutional influences upon Third 
Sector Employment and Training Initiatives (TSEIs) which have become de rigueur 
as a response to the seemingly intractable unemployment problems of many 
localities in the UK. To address the efficacy of third sector initiatives in the 
development of local economies, previous evaluations have attempted to define the 
features of 'best practice' initiatives in the UK. However, such analyses focus upon 
the internal organisation of TSEIs and are biased towards what are regarded as 
successful organisations while neglecting the impacts of failure. Consequently, this 
thesis addresses the institutional influences upon TSEIs within a comparative 
analysis of successful and failing initiatives, while recognising that 'success' and 
'failure' are relative rather than absolute concepts. The thesis combines 
approaches from the social sciences in order to create an informed theoretical 
basis which is able to incorporate broader explanatory issues of social change and 
structure that are explored through empirical study. An approach is therefore 
applied which emphasises the multiple scales at which theories operate, from the 
essentially grand meta-theories of the regulation approach to the more locally 
contingent theories of governance and institutions. This subsequently informs the 
debate into changes in economic, social, political and governance structures which 
affect labour markets and job creation strategies in the UK. The thesis suggests a 
number of common factors which influence the development of TSEIs, allied to a 
number of specific factors which are related to the aims of particular initiatives. The 
need for flexibility within frameworks leads to a conceptualisation of the key 
organisational factor influencing TSEIs as Structured Flexibility. From this, I 
suggest a number of policy directions which ought to facilitate the third sector's 
attempts to develop local economic growth. 
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Third Sector Employment and Training 
Initiatives: an Analysis of the Institutional 
Influences on Success and Failure 
Introduction 
The last quarter of the 20 t h Century has witnessed a dramatic change in 
the level and hence political focus on unemployment and job creation 
throughout Europe. The era of full employment experienced in the post-war era 
is behind us, and a systemically produced lack of work is producing intense 
spatial concentration of unemployment within and between cities and regions. 
Despite the elevation of unemployment issues to the top of the political agenda 
(see for example European Commission, 1994, 1998), the structural 
readjustment of the majority of Western Economies has resulted in a general 
deepening of the unemployment rates both at the macro-scale and at the more 
local level. As older and less dynamic industries such as coal, steel and 
shipbuilding have been in relative decline, so some of the local economies 
dependent upon them have entered into a vicious circle of job losses and 
closures. As levels of unemployment have remained persistently high, 
successive governments have felt pressure to introduce new schemes and 
initiatives to tackle this problem and its consequence for localities. 
The focus of current UK government job creation schemes rests 
primarily on economic regeneration through the creation of jobs in the formal or 
private sector, often depending on inward investment from multinational 
corporations (Cooke 1995), with the multiplier effects supposedly "trickling 
down" to help to revive or sustain community development. However, the 
premise that individual communities will gain maximum benefit through job 
creation in the formal sector has been challenged by third sector initiatives 
which attempt to utilise the resources available to the community in such a 
manner as to improve quality of life via the creation of alternative forms of 
work. This policy shift away from reliance upon inward investment schemes and 
macro-scale employment policies has recently been noted by a broad consensus 
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of academics and policy makers (see for example Cooke and Morgan 1998; 
Lovering 1999; Lagendijk and Cornford 2000). Parallel to this, there has been 
an upsurge in interest in community-based regeneration as an innovative and 
effective way to deal with social and economic exclusion (see for example SEU 
1998; Amin 1999). 
Two trends are clear here, and these will form the basis of this 
introduction. First, I argue that economic expediency has been the impetus for 
change in the face of growing global economic pressures. Governments in the 
developed world now seek primarily to achieve economic growth via the 
conduit of competitiveness in a global marketplace, thus providing the impetus 
for shifts seen in political and social environments. National governments 
perceive themselves to be losing the absolute control over their economic 
destiny, leading to a reassessment of the role of the state as a means to pre-empt 
potential crisis tendencies associated with the shift from Fordism to post-
Fordism. However, the variable ability to adapt to the evolving economic 
environment has shown itself in the differential impact on regions and localities. 
Consequently, there is a renewal of interest in the locality (or community) as a 
new scalar fix at which to tackle economic problems as opposed to the 
predominantly national scale of Keynesian demand management and blanket 
regional-scale policy tools (see for example Goetz and Clarke 1993). 
Second, there is a political interest in the Third Sector as a means for 
economic renewal. This has been given weight in the UK through the writings 
of Giddens (1998, 2000) amongst others, providing a philosophical reasoning 
for a revised relationship between state and civil society in which rights and 
obligations are expected to be reciprocated. This is evident in the development 
of policies which are directly targeted in order that the government may be seen 
to be acting, while concurrently placing the emphasis upon society in an explicit 
rejection of the individualism of the Thatcher years and the statism of 'Old' 
Labour (see for example Gordon Brown 2000). It is these economic and policy 
themes which have developed in the late 20th century, culminating in the 
policies of the New Labour government elected in 1997, which sets out the basis 
for the study of Third Sector Employment and Training Initiatives (known 
hereafter as TSEIs) which I will elucidate further in this thesis. 
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The reasons behind the decline in the traditional manufacturing bases of 
Western economies are many-fold, but the globalisation of economic activity has 
undoubtedly played its part. Drawing on neo-Marxist analyses, it is possible to 
suggest that the globalised capitalist economic system has the impact of 
concentrating wealth and poverty not only on a global scale but also at the 
national and regional levels as the structural aspects of regional economies lead 
to differential abilities to adapt to the global economy. As a result, "the islands of 
prosperity are growing steadily smaller in an otherwise sick, dilapidated and 
hungry world" (Douthwaite 1992: 95). While some countries and regions are 
favoured by the second industrial divide (Piore and Sabel 1984) and are able to 
adapt to the evolving economic structure, others have suffered economic decline 
at the same time as the welfare state has been to some extent withdrawn 
(Mingione, 1991: 462). Recent closures have demonstrated that even those areas 
which have attempted to re-establish their economic bases via inward investment 
in the so-called 'sunrise' industries of the high-tech electronics sectors are 
subject to global economic forces.1 
Allied to the analysis of globalisation of economic activity, there has 
also been a political shift which has become associated with the shift from 
Fordism to post-Fordism. In the light of this, chapter 3 attempts to employ a 
regulationist approach (RA) to analyse the contemporary change in economic, 
political and social structures associated with the movement from Fordism to 
post-Fordism. The UK has experienced its own version of this shift. Alongside 
shifts in the mechanism of capitalist production, strategic and structural change 
within the state was given impetus in the UK by the ideological position of the 
Conservative government of 1979-1997, whose perception of an over-
paternalistic state which was stifling entrepreneurial activity led to attacks on the 
state mechanism (Cochrane 1993).2 Chapter 3 wil l therefore seek to address, via 
the regulation approach, the macro-scale change which influences the structures 
around TSEIs which will be addressed in the later chapters. 
The speed and scale of changes in the state structure in the 1980s 
onwards has to some observers been a reorganization of the state, of which the 
1 This has been demonstrated by the recent closures of Siemens and Fujitsu factories in North-East 
England. 
2 See also, for example, Deakin 1987, Johnson, 1990, Hills, 1990, Lowe 1993 
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rolling back or 'hollowing out' of the state has been one movement (Jessop 
1990a, 1994a, 1997b). However, macro-scale economic and political change has 
therefore had an impact upon the structure of governance in the UK, 
encompassing a perceived shift away from the direct control of central and local 
government towards a broader range of governance institutions. These 
governance institutions operate without the democratic accountability of the 
local government, but adhere to stricter financial accountability criteria to 
compensate. 
While chapter 3 sets the political, economic and social background for 
TSEIs, chapter 4 wi l l outline the historical development of TSEIs as a response 
to the perceived economic problems of the late 20 t h Century and an alternative 
means through which to address these problems. This will concentrate upon the 
policy shift away from reliance upon inward investment schemes and macro-
scale employment policies which is supported by a broad consensus of 
academics and policy makers who regard community-based regeneration as an 
innovative and effective way to deal with social and economic exclusion (see for 
example Birkholzer 1998; Twelvetrees 1998). There is an increasing acceptance 
that excluded or economically underdeveloped communities are structurally and 
institutionally differentiated and as such may not respond in the same way to 
traditional trickle-down regeneration schemes. As a result, there is a need for 
more spatially targeted regeneration strategies, to achieve a 'direct rather than 
trickled-down contribution to economic and social well-being' (EC 1996:18; see 
also Twelvetrees 1998; Adamson 1998b; Amin et al 1999). As part of this, the 
third sector (also referred to as the social economy or more narrowly 
Community Economic Development) has therefore attracted attention as it is 
perceived as offering a more appropriate scale for regeneration schemes in 
contrast to top-down export-base led models of development (Goetz and Clarke, 
1993; Birkholzer 1998). 
This acceptance of the third sector as the primary basis for regeneration 
activities is based in two notions. First, the policies pursued which are either 
wholly state or market oriented are inadequate to meet the employment needs of 
economically excluded communities. Second, and more positively, there is a 
role to be played by third sector organisations and more broadly civic society in 
bringing about economic and social change. As Hargreaves (1998) notes, 
4 
"Given the right financial and legal framework, it [the third sector] is 
capable of a level of flexibility and innovation - often operating at a very 
small scale but capable also of managing large systems - that too often 
eludes the governmental machine. At the same time, it is morally 
motivated to tackle what the private sector shuns: difficult social issues 
and unpromising locations. In the deprived urban community, good, 
entrepreneurial third sector organisations can get closer to the problem, 
communicate better with people and negotiate permission to act" 
(Hargreaves 1998: 31). 
Taken together, these two bases provide a philosophical and economic 
rationale for the propagation of the third sector and the 'Third Way' as a 
cornerstone of New Labour Policy in the UK (see chapter 6). However, the pre-
eminence of the Third Sector as the desirable, indeed only solution for some 
communities, wi l l be evaluated throughout this thesis. I argue that to confer the 
status of saviour for economically restructuring communities upon the third 
sector is both politically driven and economically unsound. Whilst the third 
sector may have some impact on the economic fortunes of economically 
restructuring localities, I urge caution at this stage against a view of its worth as 
a panacea with which to solve the ills of all underdeveloped or lagging 
communities. Crucially, the academic and policy lessons which have been 
gleaned from a relatively small number of case studies are not necessarily 
immediately transferable. Localities differ and as such must be viewed as 
historically and culturally constructed entities which mediate pressures to 
produce divergent outcomes. As such, care must be taken with knowledge not to 
assume the blanket applicability of 'one size fits all ' solutions, nor must research 
be blind to the qualities of localities which produce such outcomes. 
The role of the third sector in employment creation is therefore 
dependent upon the institutional structures within any area, in particular the role 
and attitudes of the local authority towards the third sector. However, the 1990s 
in particular have seen a shift away from the predominance of the local state 
towards one in which governance, as opposed to government, has emerged as 
the conceptual framework through which to study the institutional milieux in 
which Third Sector Employment and Training Initiatives (TSEIs) are located. 
Moving beyond narrow notions of government, there is the potential to address 
the variety of state, quasi-state and partnership institutions which develop in 
particular regions and localities, and which subsequently influence the 
institutional context for TSEIs. This is in part to study, as Painter and Goodwin 
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note, "how the social practices of local governance are constituted in 
geographical and institutional contexts, and how these contexts influence that 
constitution" (Painter and Goodwin 1995: 354). 
This shift in the role of government within the UK has precipitated a re-
working of the roles of the state, private and third sectors. There has been a 
formalisation of this relationship through the Compact on Relations Between 
Government and the Voluntary and Community Sector (Home Office 1998), 
which has attempted to set out the responsibilities and obligation of the parties 
involved in the context of a pluralist delivery of welfare services. This is a 
continuation of the 'enabling' state concept introduced by Margaret Thatcher 
and Nicholas Ridley, in which services are organised and monitored, with direct 
provision of services carried out by other agencies (see for example Cochrane 
1993). Such an approach was predominantly brought about by New Right 
thinking in the 1980s, and involved a radical re-appraisal of the role of the local 
state and the services it provides, particularly within a harsher funding climate 
(see for example King, 1987).3 
The resulting pressures on local authorities to become 'enablers' has 
had uneven spatial and social consequences. As noted above in the discussion of 
regulation theory, historical attitudes and political mediation have an impact 
upon the actually existing mosaic of service provision. As a result, there is a 
range of resulting patterns of provision; authorities "can be placed at points 
along a dimension or continuum, the ends of which can be seen as ideal types 
against which the real world might be examined" (Goodlad 1994: 578). At each 
end of the spectrum are the extreme positions, which may be described a 'top-
down' or 'interventionist' provision as opposed to 'bottom-up' or more recently 
'community-based' or 'grassroots' provision.4 
This local5 variation in the response to national policies and pressures 
demonstrates that the spatially configured mosaic of regulatory frameworks is 
3 For a fuller analysis of the ideas involved in 'enabling' see Cochrane 1993, ch 4 
4 For a fuller discussion of the role of'bottom up' force in local government relations in the UK, see for 
example Harding 1990; Roberts, Russell, Parkinson and Harding 1994; Bailey, Barker and McDonald, 
1995 
5 Within this thesis, I employ the term 'local' to refer to a scale of enquiry and process which I regard 
along with the general vernacular, as being a sub-unit of the (regional) scale (in this case north-east 
England and South Wales). Local therefore addresses a scale of enquiry which refers to neighbourhoods up 
to a scale of local government, as opposed to Swyngedouw's definition of local as sub-global. I accept the 
lack of a clear definition here, a fact which has led to the now-common (and at times utterly meaningless) 
usage of the phrase 'local communities' in policy and journalistic vernacular. 
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crucial, and the local state is perhaps the most important element by which 
national regulatory processes are mediated and put into practice at the local level 
(Lipietz 1988). As Goodwin et al (1993: 73) state, at the "local level the local 
state becomes a vital instrument in these processes, and plays a key role in 
attempting to maintain these local spaces of regulation, both socially and 
economically." 
These key contextual factors, alongside the areas for research, form the 
basis for the methodological analysis in chapter 5. Chapter 6 subsequently 
analyses the actually existing contexts in which the case study research for this 
thesis was undertaken. This focuses upon the policy context of the 1990s and the 
subsequent focus of the New Labour government elected in 1997. Allied to this, 
the regional and local characteristics of the case study localities wil l be outlined, 
notably in terms of the governance structures which exist in the regions. 
Beyond this, there is a need to address not only the formal institutional 
context as defined by studies of governance but also the informal institutions, 
attitudes and ethoses which form the social basis for TSEIs. This, as wil l be seen 
in the following chapter, can be viewed through the lens of institutional theories 
which focus on forms of social capital as the basis for economic interactions and 
which may the be used to analyse the third sector. Through the analysis of the 
manner in which locally formed and historically influenced attitudes develop, 
this wil l provide a key to the understanding of the potential of TSEIs to address 
the economic problems described here. It is this key role of local institutions 
which gives rise to the basis for the empirical studies undertaken in chapters 7 
and 8. 
The review of literatures outlined here will provide the theoretical 
context in which to analyse empirically the role of third sector partnerships in 
job creation and training as a response to the unemployment crisis of the late 
20th century. To achieve this, chapters 7 and 8 will address the structures and 
processes which influence, without determining, the potential success or failure 
of TSEIs. This will focus upon two main themes: the 'external' governance 
structures supporting third sector employment initiatives (chapter 7), and their 
internal organisation (chapter 8). By studying TSEIs in situ, the importance of 
local dynamics both within and around initiatives can be analysed. This will be 
done in a manner which emphasises not only the effects of potentially 
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supportive but also of the unsupportive environments,6 examining the potential 
of the third sector to provide beneficial outcomes for excluded communities and 
the lessons which may be learned. Consequently, this problematises the notions 
of 'success' and 'failure' which are addressed here. This will produce some 
answers to the analytical questions raised by the literatures, which I wil l now 
discuss in detail beginning with the institutional framework for the thesis in 
chapter 2. 
6 See chapter 5 for a more detailed explanation of this methodological viewpoint 
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Chapter 2 
Institutional Theory and Third Sector 
Employment and Training Initiatives 
Introduction 
Establishing the crucial dynamics which influence the potential success or 
failure of third sector initiatives has become a key element of research. 
However, despite this interest there is currently a paucity of study into the 
processes through which certain initiatives succeed despite appearing to have 
significant factors undermining their chances of success. Consequently, this 
thesis aims to f i l l this niche by studying the processes which help to overcome 
institutional obstacles, thus revealing the organisational structures which offer 
resilience in the face of unpropitious circumstances. These structures may be 
particularly significant in areas in which the institutional structures to support 
third sector organisations are at their weakest. In particular, areas of the highest 
unemployment, and therefore where the need is greatest due to the inadequacies 
of private sector employment, may demonstrate the best of institutional 
configurations to support TSEIs.7 I intend here to address these structures 
through the notions of 'institutional thickness' and social capital. 
The 1980s and 1990s have seen an 'institutional turn' within the social 
sciences in part as a means to analyse spatial inequalities in economic 
development as crucial dynamics of national and regional economies 
undergoing industrial restructuring (see for example Storper 1997). Alongside 
this, the study of the role of institutions in economic development has re-
emerged from a number of distinct, yet complementary, disciplines, in the main 
''Institutions' refers not only to the formal, observable organizations of government and commerce but also 
to the informal institutions of society. Healey et al (1999) note that, "The term 'institution' is given a 
sociological meaning as an 'enduring feature' of social life, giving 'solidity' across time and space' 
(Giddens 1984: 24), that is, it extends beyond formal organisations, to encompass cultural patterns (such as 
kinship relations, religious life, other 'moral communities' and informal civic associations of all kinds)" 
(1999:119). 
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derived from institutional economics and economic sociology (see for example 
Smelser and Swedburg 1994, Samuels 1995, Hodgson 1998). This body of 
literatures draws on many key ideas, based in the notions of social 
embeddedness of market activity and the role of locally configured institutions 
in creating historically contingent development paths for regional economies. 
This constitutes the notion that regional economic development is contingent on 
the institutional context in which firms and labour markets operate. 
It is this re-emphasis on formal and informal institutions which I will draw 
upon as a tool for developing an understanding of the elements of the external 
environment which lead to propitious (or unpropitious) circumstances for the 
creation and development of TSEIs. The fusion of economics and sociology has, 
I believe, significant potential to extend beyond its relatively narrow recent use 
within studies of the firm and regional economic development. In this chapter, I 
adopt this theoretical framework to analyse the nature and circumstance under 
which third sector initiatives are likely to be pursued, and then to succeed or fail. 
This has been done for three reasons. First, it places the development of TSEIs 
within the socially and economically contingent institutional framework in 
which actors operate to produce outcomes. Second, it is able to locate the 
milieux in which TSEIs find themselves within the historically contingent and 
path-dependent nature of the industrial and social attitudes prevalent within 
localities. It is these particular milieux, incorporating the spheres of private, 
public and civil society, which produce and reinforce the dominant economic 
and social imperatives at the local and regional scales, thus creating a particular 
environment for TSEIs. Third, institution-based theories are able to examine the 
ability of institutions to adapt to evolving economic circumstances and to 
influence the path of local development in such a manner as to privilege or 
undermine third sector initiatives as a means of economic development. This 
section wil l unpack these key features of this renewed interest in institutional 
economics and sociology to conceptualise and contextualise the environment of 
TSEIs in responding to, and contesting, path-dependent economic development. 
MacLeod (2001) notes several aspects of the current turn towards 
institutionalism which are pertinent in the discussion here. This seeks to address 
the use of an institutionalist framework as the key structural factor in seeking to 
define the elements which lead towards the success or failure of TSEIs. I wil l 
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seek to address these critiques by first of all presenting the received notion of 
what an institutionalist approach entails. I wil l then introduce the critiques of 
such an approach, before examining the manner in which the approach I have 
undertaken seeks to transcend those critiques. 
Institutionalists reject the tendency of neo-classicists to isolate the truly 
economic, instead, they "seek to redefine what is considered to be 'the 
economic' through the progression of an emerging socio-economics" (MacLeod 
2001:1147). Jessop (2001) notes the three potential facets to this institutional 
turn: a thematic and methodological turn have been noted; whether this extends 
to an ontological turn is less clear. Overall, Hodgson (1998) notes that, 
"institutionalists bring a different perspective to the analysis of learning by 
seeing it, in part, as a transformative and reconstitutive process, involving the 
creation of new habits propensities, and conceptual frameworks" (Hodgson 
1998: 175). 
From this original conception of the institutionalist approach, Wood and 
Valler (2001) have outlined the more recent developments in the institutionalist 
approach. They note 5 common methodological developments. 
1. Recent literature has problematised what is meant by institutions, by 
extending the focus of regional analyses into the range of additional ordering 
structures as well as the formal concrete organisations whose geographies 
have been analysed. This serves, according to Wood and Valler, to 
recognize, "the importance of extra-economic structures and institutions in 
accounting for economic change" (Wood and Valler 2001: 1140). Indeed, 
this view of economic practices and forms as embedded in broader social 
and cultural relations is one of the hallmarks of recent institutionalist work, 
o 
although such ideas clearly have a long lineage, to Polanyi and beyond. 
2. The institutional framework offers a shift from a traditional concern with 
single individual organisations or institutions to a more complex institutional 
ensembles and regulatory networks (Valler et al 2000: 417). This concern 
8 This parallels with a lively contemporary debate in geography ( i f not economics) on the relationship 
between culture and economy (see for example Amin and Thrift 2000) 
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therefore links to a revitalised interest in the scale of interactions between 
different institutions, which offer a network of resources and powers which 
are not linked to one single location. 
3. This is "also coupled with a concern for questions of governance and the 
manner in which institutional ensembles regulate, order, and steer economic 
practices and relations." (Wood and Valler 2001: 1140). This interest in 
governance has emerged from a number of intellectual backgrounds (see 
chapter 4), but have synthesised tighter to broaden the range of 
organisational forms for enquiry, while adding a specifically geographical 
edge to that enquiry. 
4. In addition, there has been a move "from questions of institutional form and 
configuration to a concern with processes of institutionalisation and the 
constitution, construction, and performance of institutions" (Wood and 
Valler 2001: 1140-1141). This therefore seeks to analyse the process through 
which such institutions are created and reflexively reinforced by the 
dominant institutional framework. 
5. Wood and Valler note the "wider recognition of the mutual constitution and 
evolution of economic, cultural, and political forms and practices and their 
varied institutional expressions" (Wood and Valler 2001:1141). 
Together these five elements produce two potential strengths of the 
institutional forms, and it is these that I wish to draw upon in this thesis. First, it 
offers the prospects of a multi-scalar approach, which views the institutions 
themselves as multiply scaled. In addition, the approach allows for some 
explanatory leverage to address questions of the historical development of 
institutions and institutional changer. It is these two concepts which I bring 
forward to produce the conceptual framework and theoretical and 
methodological lenses which I employ in this thesis. 
However, MacLeod (2001) notes two key critiques of the institutional turn 
as it stands today, based in the conceptual difficulties of institutionalism which 
developed without adequate critical revision. First, he notes a tendency towards 
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a thin political economy, with a potential lack of appreciation of the role played 
by the state in shaping governance. Second, he notes the danger of 'soft 
institutionalism', in which the mere presence of institutional 'thickness' (Amin 
and Thrift 1994) or social capital is in itself adequate to explain economic 
development. 
However, despite these significant criticism of the body i f work 
produced recently within the institutionalist paradigm, I feel it retains a 
usefulness both in terns of its ontological stance ad the potential it has for a use 
as a tool through which to analyse and examine real-world phenomena. As a 
result of this, I intend to use a number of theoretical perspectives centred around 
the Regulation Approach (RA) a means for institutionalists to conceptualise the 
relationship of economy, politics and society. 
MacLeod suggests the RA as a key framework for institutionalists to 
view the economy. However, there are a number of conceptual frameworks 
which I feel it desirable to address, and which offer the potential to synthesise as 
a complete institutional framework. These are, most notably, the RA and the 
literatures relating to governance as the manifestation of structurally produced 
and local mediation of the exercise of power. In addition, I seek to employ the 
literatures on social capital which have emerged vigorously over the past decade 
to address the unevenness of economic development. 
As MacLeod notes, these perspectives "draw us deeply into the nature of 
the governance organisations and 'soft' geographically embedded institutions 
that help to shape the economic process" (MacLeod 2001: 1153). As part of this, 
I wish to adopt a multi-channel research posture which is able to embrace a 
multitude of theoretical perspectives in order to appreciate the intricacies of the 
institutions which help to shape economic, and hence, social, processes. 
Despite this, academic and policy evaluations of TSEIs have emphasised 
the internal governance processes which can lead to success in separation from 
the environment in which initiatives are embedded. In contrast, existing notions 
of social capital (see for example Putnam 1993) and institutional governance 
have the shortcoming of privileging the territorial aspects of any locality over 
the internal governance structures within any TSEI. As such, ideas of social 
capital or internal governance are both individually necessary, but by themselves 
inadequate, to provide a comprehensive understanding of the causal mechanisms 
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and processes which lead to the successful governance of TSEIs. Consequently, 
there is an academic imperative to gauge the success and failure of initiatives 
within the framework of the dynamic interaction of these two levels of process. 
It is this interaction of territorially distinct configurations of social capital allied 
to the initiative-specific governance mechanisms which forms the basis of 
empirical research outlined in this thesis. This chapter aims to provide a 
theoretical grounding for the manner in which the levels (regional, local and 
intra-initiative) interact to produce beneficial outcomes. 
TSEIs and Internal Governance. 
Academic and policy evaluation of third sector initiatives has thus far 
focused on the internal workings of initiatives as the crucial level at which 
success and failure is determined. This analysis is informed through a synthesis 
of sociology, economics and management studies which draws upon theories of 
the firm to suggest the intra-firm dynamics which lead to success through the 
development of a dynamic, competitive and learning-based environment. Firm-
centred research (see for example Foss 1993, 1996; Hodgson 1998) suggests 
that it is not just the contractual nature of firms but the competence of firms in 
terms of adopting and adapting the abilities of employees to produce successful 
outcomes. While TSEIs have their own managerial and legal structures, due to 
their particular funding and output criteria, their operation in terms of employees 
and often size is often comparable to that of formal sector SMEs. The ability of 
TSEIs to adopt particular management strategies to produce the best possible 
outcomes within the restrictions imposed therefore depends on several 
organisational factors which have been posited in the management literatures 
and theories of the firm. 
Firms may be categorised as 'cognitive' or 'learning' organizations, the 
basis of which emanates from an organizational culture and style of 
management which seeks to unlock this potential. To do so, firms seek to 
promote corporate cultures in which knowledge (which may be tacit- Polanyi 
1967; see also Maskell et al 1998) can be shared and utilised. More specifically, 
Hodgson notes that through the "shared practices and habits of thought it 
[corporate culture] provides the method, context, values and language of 
learning and the evolution of both group and individual competences" (Hodgson 
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1998: 190). To address the influence of corporate culture in explaining 
differentiated success and response to change, Schoenberger (1997) studied 
corporate cultures at the firm level in California. While of limited application 
through its inability to look beyond the managerial levels in the firm as the site 
of contestation, Schoenberger nonetheless noted the managerial identities which 
"structured and narrowed the possibilities of transformation" (Sadler and 
Thompson 1999: 2). Consequently, we can imply that the managerial ethos is 
key to understanding the possibilities of success and failure of TSEIs within a 
structured context. 
Harrison (1997) suggests that third sector initiatives may adopt lessons 
from the managerial literatures to form development strategies based on the 
benefits of cohesion and learning. She suggests that third sector initiatives may 
advance themselves through a number of intertwined philosophies and 
processes: 
• A philosophy based in mutuality of endeavour, of interest and of benefit. 
• A philosophy that does not favour one kind of knowledge over another 
• A recognition that knowledge is embedded in a community's grass roots 
« A recognition that learning must be a shared task 
• The presence of local champions who are respected in the community 
• A continuous search for best practice, outside as well as within the firm 
« A commitment to being ' in it for the long haul' 
• Continuous, incremental and integrative expansion of individual and 
collective capacity and competence 
• A durable infrastructure to ensure stability. 
(Adapted from Harrison 1997) 
While this set of ideas offers a broad template, this cannot be considered a 
comprehensive analysis as it inevitably involves a degree of abstraction of 
themes from a limited empirical study. In practice, as will be seen in chapter 8, 
the complexity of organisational aims and the structures required to meet those 
aims influences the management ethos. Crucially, this is where empirical 
evidence is required to identify the governance structures within particular 
initiatives which lead to success in relation to aims. However, an analysis based 
on the internal workings of any third sector initiatives in a similar vein to those 
performed on formal sector firms is, while necessary, inadequate to fully 
understand the reasons why TSEIs may succeed or fail. 
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Third sector initiatives depend heavily upon the operation of funding and 
support networks; the presence and/or absence of elements of such networks 
may help to influence success or failure. These structures are in part a function 
of the formal and informal institutional environments which operate at the 
national, regional and local scales. The recognition of institutional factors 
operating beyond the firm has drawn attention to the significance of territory 
and proximity in learning processes, principally studied in relation to regional 
economies. Notions of a 'learning economy' or 'learning region' (Morgan 
1997) have been suggested where the capacity to learn and the employment of 
knowledge as a strategic resource are seen as critical to economic success. This 
form of learning is therefore seen as territorially bounded, based on the 
significance of ostensibly non-economic resources to produce outcomes which 
aid regional economic development. This feature wil l now be discussed in 
relation to notions of social capital from the studies of regional economies. This 
in turn, later in the chapter, will be allied to notions of the third sector and the 
manner in which 'social capital' or learning may produce beneficial structures or 
attitudes to aid third sector development. 
Economic Sociology, Institutional Economics and 
Embeddedness 
It has become accepted that capital accumulation produces national, 
regional and local economies which differ in terms of their abilities to adapt to 
evolving economic circumstances (see for example Amin and Thrift 1994). This 
has led to significant bodies of academic literature which have analysed the 
processes which are responsible for the variety of distinct, yet contested and 
time and place-specific configurations of economic success. Mainstream 
economics (within the neo-classical school) focuses upon the rationalities of 
action and models to explain path-dependent growth. This has a theoretical basis 
in the free movement of factors of production and hence suggests that, in a pure 
form, regional inequality wil l be eventually resolved through the free hand of 
the market. However, this view represents an inadequate reflection of the real 
world through its abstraction of place and space onto a simple plane of 
reference. As such, there has been a shift towards acceptance of variable 
rationalities and societal values as key to stimulating economic fortunes (see 
16 
table 1.1). This is by no means new, but represents a 'reawakening' from a 
slumber of fifty years which can be traced to the (artificial) separation of 
economics and sociology emanating from the work of Parsons and Robbins (see 
Velthius 1999 for a review) 
Table 1.1: Comparison of Economic Sociology and Mainstream Economics 
Economic sociology Mainstream economics 
Concept of the actor The actor is influenced by 
other actors and is part of 
groups and society 
The actor is uninfluenced 
by other actors 
("methodological 
individualism") 
Economic action Many different types of 
economic action are used, 
including rational ones; 
rationality as variable 
All economic actions are 
assumed to be rational; 
rationality as assumption 
Constraints on the action Economic actions are 
constrained by the scarcity 
of resources, by the social 
structure, and by meaning 
structures 
Economic actions are 
constrained by tastes and 
by the scarcity of 
resources, including 
technology 
The economy in relation to 
society 
The economy is seen as an 
integral part of society; 
society is always the basic 
reference 
The market and the 
economy are the basic 
references; society is a 
"given" 






Method used Many different methods 
area used, including 
historical and comparative 
ones; the data are often 




building; no data or 





classics are constantly 
reinterpreted and taught 
Smith-Ricardo-Mill-
Marshall-Keynes-
Samuelson; the classics 
belong to the past; 
emphasis is on current 
theory and achievements 
(Source: Smelser and Swedburg 1994: 4) 
The separation of economics and sociology, whereby economics has 
become the study of the 'process' and sociology as the 'values behind the 
process' of economic decision making led to the sidelining of Weberian 
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Institutional Economics until the last quarter of the 20 t h century.9 However, this 
period has seen the re-emergence of institution-centred research, in either the 
study of Institutional Economics or Economic Sociology. Institutional 
Economics suggests the notion of the social embeddedness of economic activity 
within institutions as the embodiment of values. Economic Sociology, in a 
similar vein, stresses the manner in which markets are socially constructed 
(Amin 1999) through a network of cultures and norms which actively shape 
economic outcomes (see for example Dore 1992; Granovetter 1985; Grabher 
1993; Smelser and Swedburg 1994). It is this new economic sociology that 
Swedburg (1997) refers to as "[o]ne of the most important developments in 
modern social science...the race to fill the void created by mainstream 
economics' failure to do research on economic institutions" (Swedburg 1997: 
161). 
These two interconnected disciplines, "stress that economic life is both an 
instituted process and a socially embedded activity and therefore context-
specific and path-dependent in its evolution" (Amin 1999: 366). This 'new 
synthesis' (Krier 1999) therefore has the potential to provide a reading of the 
institutional literatures to produce an eclectic but coherent institutional paradigm 
in which to study the intersection of economic and sociological phenomena.10 
The renewed interest in the relationship between market and society can 
be in part traced to a reinterpretation of Karl Polanyi's writings on the 'Great 
Transformation' (1944). Polanyi's analysis of the historical relationships of 
markets and society suggests that pre-industrial economies were embedded 
within societal structures which were given cohesion through collective forces 
and frameworks which therefore maintained a dominance of society over the 
'tyranny' of the economy. However, what Polanyi refers to as the 'Great 
Transformation' broke this notion of market being contingent upon social 
structures by disembedding itself from the structures of society. The market 
system subsequently attained a dominance over society such that society, rather 
than providing a framework for reference, is now re-embedded and reconstituted 
as a component of the market-driven economy. While this transformation did 
9 I note Weber here as key to the discussion of Institutional Economics despite Granovetter (1990) being 
scathing of Weber's unwillingness to attack the central tenets of the mainstream economics. 
1 0 Krier (1999) is wary of the hitherto economic nature of the 'new synthesis' which lacks analysis of the 
traditionally sociological themes of class, exploitation and inequality 
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not occur without significant contestation, the economy has achieved a 
hegemonic position such that politics and society are subordinate to i t ." 
Crucially, this does not deny the importance of socially embedded institutions in 
shaping the dominance and path of the capitalist economy, yet it accepts this as 
a predominantly economic rather than a social process. How these economic 
processes are mediated and re-articulated through societal processes will now be 
discussed in relation to institution-centred theoretical accounts. 
Capacity, Capital and Actor Rationalities 
The revision of the relationship of economy and society within the 
institutional paradigm has led to a resurgence in the study of the formal and non-
formal structures which can influence the development of regional and local 
economies. Spatially differentiated economic outcomes may be produced 
through the influence of what Storper (1997) refers to as 'relational assets' or 
untraded interdependencies', while Putnam's (1993) studies of Italy led him to 
conclude that the key factor in developing successful economies is what he 
refers to as 'social capital' embedded within civic institutions. The evolution of 
such structures similarly has implications for the types of assets which can 
produce supportive environments for TSEIs 
These institutional assets are complex, being formed at many different 
scales through attitudes and social norms as well as through the formal legal and 
institutional structures. To clarify this, Healey et al (1999) note that there is a 
potential separation of the concepts of institutional capacity and capital. The 
first of these, institutional capacity, is defined as a web of relations which 
provide the linkage between the formal institutions which participate in 
governance, whether they be public, quasi-public, private, or voluntary sector. 
This suggests an archive of knowledge (Amin and Thrift 1994) embedded 
within institutions which affects their ability to produce successful outcomes. 
Drawing on Amin and Thrift's (1994, 1995) notion of institutional thickness, 
Healey et al note four characteristics of the institutional capacity of localities 
which could produce this beneficial synthesis: 
For a more detailed discussion of the basis of Polanyi 's assertions regarding the Great Transformation, 
see Olofsson (1995) 
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".. .a plethora of civic associations, a high level of interaction between social 
groups, coalitions which crossed individual interests, and a strong sense of 
common purpose" 
(Amin and Thrift 1995: 101, cited in Healey et al 1999: 119) 
However, the existence of webs and networks of relations is not sufficient 
to produce successful outcomes per se, and is in part a function of the 
institutional or social capital of a locality. This is what Putnam et al (1993) refer 
to as a 'stock of capital' which is constructed through trust, social networks and 
social interactions.12 In contrast to the notions in economics of the autonomous, 
material-advantage maximising rational actor, Healey et al (1999) suggest that 
individuals nonetheless, 
"...depend on and value social relations with others, into which they are 
bound by relations of reciprocal trust (in families, religious groups, friendship 
networks, craft work groups etc.). These relations are infused with moral 
conceptions and draw on often deep-rooted traditions which shape, typically 
implicitly, cultural expectations. The term 'social capital' refers to these 
relational webs, or networks, and the ways of thinking and acting which bind 
them together." (Healey 1999: 120) 1 3 
These positive forms of human capital equate to a social 'glue' which can 
help to produce socially cohesive milieux; conversely, a paucity of human 
capital may lead to disruptive milieux which produce unpropitious environments 
for economic development. However, there is a need to deconstruct what is 
mean by the rather eclectic term 'social capital'. This does not emerge as a 
particularly coherent form of analysis; nor does it represent a fully developed 
means through which to identify the mixture of capitals which have emerged-
social, physical, and human, both collective and individual, as an unproblematic 
schema for addressing real world examples. 
Woolcock (1998) notes 4 potential critiques of the set of theorisations of 
social capital in recent academic literatures. First, he notes the problem of 
rationalities, suggesting that different conceptualisations and applications 
stemming from social capital suggest it must have various forms or dimensions. 
Second, he notes a difference in whether social capital represents 'ties' and 
norms within large organisations or institutional realms or a moral or trust 
resource- a cultural mechanism. Third, he notes the all-encompassing potential 
1 2 Despite Healey et al's (1999) separation of the concepts of capital and capacity, I feel it desirable here to 
employ the generic phrase 'social capital' emanating from Putnam's work, to define the myriad of formal 
and informal institutions which have been studied at the regional scale. 
1 3 See also Fukuyama's equating of culture and social capital (1995) 
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of social capital as a means to justify contradictory public-policy measures. 
Fourth, most discussions of social capital regard it as an unqualified 'good' an 
therefore do not adequately address potentially negative forms of social capital 
or the need to optimise as opposed to maximise the presence of social capital. 
However, this is not to say that social capital has emerged as a 
meaningless concept with a lack of conceptual rigour. Indeed, Woolcock notes 
that, "Social capital provides sociologists in particular with a fruitful conceptual 
and policy device by which to get beyond exhausted modernization and world-
systems theories and make potentially important contributions to questions of 
economic development, contributions that complement orthodox economic 
approaches in some respects and challenge them in others. Social capital's 
greatest merit, however, is that it provides a credible point of entry for 
sociopolitical issues into a comprehensive multi- and interdisciplinary approach 
to some of the most pressing issues of our time" (Woolcock 1998: 188). 
As a result, I seek to employ the notion of social capital as just one 
explanatory element of the study of the institutional structures which operate 
around TSEIs. To do this, I find the template drawn up by Healey et al (1999) to 
be a useful framework in which to place the interactions of social, human and 
physical capital in its influences on TSEIs. In parallel to this discussion of 
institutional capacity and capital, I will draw upon the notion of social capital 
within the social sciences to help produce a framework for the empirical work 
studied later. 
The manner in which these connections and networks are employed by 
individuals to make sense of economic connections depends upon the power of 
individuals and the manner in which power is expressed. This may be allied to 
notions of 'institutional embeddedness' of inter-organizational relations (cf. 
Grabher, ed., 1993). As such, the economic sociologists are drawing upon the 
work of evolutionary and cognitive psychology (Cosmides and Tooby 1994; 
Plotkin 1994) to understand the manner in which different rationalities, bounded 
by social structures, can produce different forms of decision making and 
behaviours (see Amin 1999: 367).1 4 Saxenian (1994) notes the values of 
different cultural contexts as key to the development of inter-firm trusts and 
See also the concept of Actor-Network Theory (Callon 1998) 
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collaboration, and hence contrasting economic performance. Through her 
studies of firms in the Silicon Valley and route 128 near Boston, she noted the 
regionally-specific variations in trust and co-operation which add potential 
economic benefits to the firm involved. 
These concepts of social capital and capacity, or the 'informal 
institutions' allied to the formal institutions of governance, have been brought 
into focus through their usage to explain to some extent the economic successes 
of particular regions within Europe (see for example Maskell and Malmberg 
1997). Exactly how the presence of particular institutional features can produce 
beneficial outcomes wil l now be discussed in relation to regional economic 
development, leading to a discussion of the implications of the lack of particular 
institutional forms, or more importantly the presence of blocking forms, for the 
development potential of the region. However, I also believe this institutional 
analysis may also offer a new paradigm in which to address the key factors 
which produce successful or unsuccessful TSEIs. In the next section, I wish to 
address how the notion of social capital is applied to regional economic 
development. These lessons will then be employed as a new facet of third sector 
research later in the chapter. 
(Re)Integrating Geography: Regional Economic 
Development and Social Capital 
The studies emanating from the new synthesis of economics and sociology 
are informed by an empirical grounding in key case studies of regions such as 
the industrial districts of the Third Italy (Amin and Thrift 1994), Emilia-
Romagna (Cooke and Morgan, 1991) and Silicon Valley and Boston (Saxenian, 
1994). This has led to an interest in the particular formal and informal 
institutional configurations as qualities within milieux which are able to create 
propitious environments for economic development.15 Sadler and Thompson 
(1999) note that this notion of embeddedness, which they cite as, "key to 
rediscovery of the region as an object of analysis - has shifted over time from 
economic factors (including the vertical disintegration of the division of labour) 
1 5 Indeed, which may be a product of economic development. 
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to social and cultural explanations...In short, there is now a view that 
understanding regional success involves - at least in part - acknowledgement of 
a region's social atmosphere, built around a series of inherited traditions and 
practices which have created both tangible and intangible institutional 
characteristics"(Sadler and Thompson 1999: 2). 
Consequently, Amin and Thrift's (1994) notion of 'institutional thickness' 
provides a conceptualisation of such institutions as a means to influence and 
steer the development of regional economies. From this, notions of 'institutions' 
as a key element of regional competitiveness have led to their use as a means to 
reinvigorate less favoured regions. This focus on institutions is, according to 
Amin (1999), a response to regional policy devices which have been "firm-
centred, standardized, incentive-based and state-driven" (Amin 1999: 365) and 
which have been "modest in terms of stimulating sustained improvements in the 
economic competitiveness and developmental potential of the LFRs [less 
favoured regions]" (Amin 1999: 365). The inadequacies of the 'regional policy' 
approach to regional economic development within the UK and more broadly 
within Europe has therefore led to an (incomplete and geographically 
concentrated) shift towards more 'bottom-up' approaches to economic 
development which stress long-term capacity building as key to growth and 
regional adaptability.16 
Amin (1999) notes five key policy actions to develop the capacity of 
regions to adapt and respond to the pressures of an evolving economic context: 
1. A preference for policy actions designed to strengthen 
networks of association, instead of actions which focus 
on individual actors alone 
2. Encouragement of voice, negotiation and the emergence 
of procedural and recursive rationalities of behaviour, in 
order to secure strategic vision, learning and adaptation 
3. Mobilization of a plurality of autonomous organizations, 
since effective economic governance extends beyond the 
reach of both state and market institutions 
4. Stress in intermediate forms of governance extends to a 
preference for building up a broad-based local 
'institutional thickness' that might include enterprise 
support systems, political institutions and social 
citizenship 
1 6 This is an exemplar of the shift which reflects the institutional turn in the social sciences, and which has 
become a persuasive force in the development of policy (see for example MacLeod 2001) 
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5. Solutions have to be context-specific and sensitive to 
local path-dependencies. 
(adapted from Amin 1999: 368) 
However, such a use for social capital is problematised by Fine (1999). He 
notes the use of social capital is distinguished from physical, financial an human 
capital, with these "generally being interpreted from within neoclassical 
orthodoxy. Although it can require the use of economic resources, it has to be 
able to be anything ranging over public goods, networks, culture etc. The only 
proviso is that social capital should be attached to the economy in a functionally 
positive way for economic performance, especially growth" (Fine 1999:5, 
emphasis original). 
Fine is also critical of the manner in which individual attainment is 
perceived to be affected by "family or other aspects of the micro-social 
environment, readily interpreted as (individual possession of) social capital" 
(Fine 1999: 5). Fine is also critical of the use of essentially mathematical models 
to define and quantify social capital, noting that "such endeavours have nothing 
new to contribute through appeal to social capital which merely serves as a 
convenient peg on which to hang collections of dull and mechanistic 
empiricism" (Fine 1999: 6). 
Fine is therefore wary of the uses of social capital to 'explain' or be the 
'vital ingredient' in economic development around the world. This is essentially 
problematised where imprecision exists due to the notions of what constitutes 
'social and capital' is present. This is in part due to the theoretical positions, and 
the policy actions attached to them, emanating from a set of case studies which 
focus on the more economically successful regions of the EU and North 
America and which emphasise the positive roles of formal and informal 
institutions. These case studies therefore demonstrate the validity of social 
interactions as a means to facilitating economic growth in particular contexts. 
However, the transferability of lessons gleaned from a set of successful case 
studies has been called into question due to the inherently path-dependent nature 
of institutional growth. 
Intuitively we realise that regions have distinct institutional 
configurations, which are the legacies of past industrial and social development. 
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Therefore, the ability of regions to come to terms with economic circumstance is 
dependent upon what Grabher and Stark (1997) refer to as the notions of 
adaptation and adaptability. Sadler and Thompson (1999) suggest that 
adaptation "signifies a capacity to change incrementally within a framework of 
relatively narrow and largely unquestioned parameters (to adapt to change 
without posing deep questions), whilst [adaptability] denotes the ability to ask 
radically different questions and to experiment with different responses" (Sadler 
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and Thompson 1999: 3). Regions which possess an adaptability to new 
circumstances (such as those posited by the globalisation of economic activity) 
therefore possess a long-term versatility which will produce potentially 
proactive rather than reactive responses to change as suggested by adaptation. In 
contrast, a highly developed yet inappropriate institutional framework and social 
ethos may attempt to evolve through adaptation and hence not ask deep 
questions of the economic framework. This may potentially stifle or suppress 
efforts to attain economic growth through the types of institutional forms 
demonstrated in the currently 'competitive' regions of Europe. It is this potential 
of formal and informal institutions to encourage, block or slow economic 
adjustment which will now be discussed in terms of the 'older' industrial 
regions which form the basis for empirical study in this thesis when applied to 
TSEIs. 
Institutions Within Older Industrial Areas 
Institutional legacies are key elements of 'older' industrial areas, whose 
institutional matrix has been reinforced and layered over a number of years to 
produce and reflect systemic dependencies at the local level. The localised 
nature of institutional forms produces configurations which may be finely 
adapted to certain industrial forms. As such, the lack of adaptability towards 
new challenges of the global economy calls into question the blanket application 
1 7 This therefore parallels the arguments put forward by organizational learning theorists regarding the 
existence of single and double-loop learning. In this, single loop learning refers to a form of organisational 
learning which changes the strategies of action or the assumptions underlying these without challenging the 
actual theory of action behind these. As such, errors or failures in the regional economy are addressed 
within the parameters set out and as such do not fundamentally examine the values behind that strategy of 
action. In contrast, double-loop learning refers to organisational learning which changes the values of the 
theory in use, as well as the strategies and assumptions (see of example Argyris and Schon 1978; Hodgson 
1998) 
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of policies seeking to apply lessons gleaned from more successful regions. A 
need remains to find the particular intersection of industrial and institutional 
configurations most suited to the historical path of any locality to promote 
development (Gertler 1997; Hudson 1997; Morgan 1997). This section wil l 
analyse how locally-produced institutional configurations potentially differ from 
the classic case studies cited above, and will discuss the implications of this for 
analyses of social capital in regional development studies. As Amin (1999) 
notes, it is the "enduring ability and framing influence on action by individuals 
and actor networks that force recognition of the path- and context- dependent 
nature of economic life, or, from a governance perspective, the wide field of 
institutions which need to be addressed by policies seeking to alter the economic 
trajectory" (Amin 1999: 367). 
This localism is typified within the older industrial areas of the UK, which 
were (and still are) typified by the deeply embedded industrial (or firm) cultures 
where "dominant capitalist firms developed institutional forms and linkages 
through which their interests could be organized and relationships between them 
regulated" (Hudson 1994: 196). Consequently, the 'institutional tissues' 
(Hudson 1994) created a bounded relation in which the dominant industrial 
ethos delineated the bounds of accepted behaviour and practice. However, this 
relation was embedded beyond the workplace within the social and government 
spheres to produce an all-encompassing reflection of the industrial-social 
complex. Martin et al (1996)note that, 
"The union and industrial relations traditions of key groups of 
workers, firms and industries in a region are not self-contained, but rather 
generate spillovers to other workers, firms and industries in the region 
through the course of time. Although the specific mechanisms involved 
are complex and are themselves influenced by the process and path of 
local economic development, the result is that the attitudes, expectations 
and behaviour of employees and employers in other industries in the 
region are influenced by the historical traditions and contemporary 
proximity of those locally dominant industries and their 
workforces...[O]nee this regional externality effect begins to develop, it 
becomes self-reproducing through a process of local institutionalisation 
and socialisation, thereby generating a regionally embedded set of 
industrial relations traditions and cultures" (Martin et al 1996: 118-9). I S 
1 8 Similarly, Hudson (1994) states that, "the often profoundly paternalistic social relationships within the 
workplace became extended into mechanisms for social ordering and control in the community beyond the 
workplace, transmitted and communicated through the institutions of local civil society and/or the state. In 
this way, a social fabric of community evolved, with its constitutive institutional tissue, through which 
people came to know and understand their area, the world around them, and their place within it as wage 
workers or dependants of wage workers" (Hudson 1994: 197). 
26 
As a result, the collective response of populations towards third sector 
activities or entrepreneurialism may be conditioned by this industrial heritage 
(see for example Strangleman et al 1999). The implication of this typology of 
older industrial cultures, while generalistic, is that such socio-political 
settlements are suited to and configured by particular industrial uses. With the 
removal or decline in dominance of the economic base through an evolution in 
economic (or more pertinently) political attitudes, the ability of the socio-
political configurations to adapt to this new environment has been called into 
question. It seems unlikely that an industrial heritage with its particular 
configuration of institutions wil l be able to adapt to new economic 
circumstances and opportunities such as the knowledge-based economy. Hudson 
notes evidence from Derwentside, County Durham, which suggests that, "The 
particular types of thick institutional structure that had been evolved within them 
were simply not appropriate, repelling rather than attracting such activities" 
(Hudson 1994: 198). As such, a 'thick' institutional tissue associated with 
dominatory local elites may stifle economic innovation. As Healey et al note, 
"Some qualities of institutional thickness/richness thus seem to promote 
economic growth and innovation." They continue to note that in contrast, 
"Others may be more effective at fostering social cohesion" (Healey et al 1999: 
119-120). 
Two points are raised here. First, Healey et al are suggesting that there is a 
trade-off between an innovative milieu and social cohesion. While some may 
suggest this is the case under a capitalist structure, I regard this as a simplistic 
argument and believe there is no functional separation of development and 
cohesion. Second, Healey et al suggest there are institutional structures, both 
within favoured and less favoured regions, which may support the development 
of alternative forms of economic growth. Conversely, there will be institutional 
arrangements which are less effective at creating alternative development. There 
is a potential separation of the form of industrial and social capital which 
promotes the development of the private and third sectors. Consequently, 
support for TSEIs as a means to aid economic renewal within LFRs may also be 
dependent or upon the institutional legacy and willingness to adapt. 
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It is under these conditions, Hudson suggests, that this deeply embedded 
and interconnected legacy of networks may have two results. First, it may stifle 
attempts to create a radical alternative through the exploration of alternative 
economic trajectories. Second, it wil l shape and form new institutions which are 
tasked with the challenge to renew the economic base of the region. These two 
factors can combine together as the phenomenon of'institutional blockage' (see 
for example Hudson 1994; Sadler and Thompson 1999). In this, the institutional 
structures which have evolved for a particular industrial or political purpose 
become agents to narrow the potential development path of a region or to slow 
the process of adjustment to evolving economic circumstances. This, notes 
Cooke's study of the rustbelt of North America, is based on a "culture of 
defensiveness and dependence [derived] from long years of class-based 
solidaristic struggle". He identified a need for, "cultural change in the 
mentalities of members of civil society, their elected representatives and 
managers of business enterprises" (Cooke 1995: 245). Consequently, the 
institutional inability to adapt successfully to new economic circumstances may 
be hindered through a level of 'blockage' formed through the peculiarities of the 
political-economic system. The result, notes Hudson, could be that "localized 
institutional thinness may have held greater emancipatory and radical 
transformatory potential" (Hudson 1994: 212).1 9 
Through the co-operative or corporatist configurations of trade unions, 
industrial and political forces, dominant industrial cultures have been able to 
strongly condition the path of local institutional development. This moved 
beyond the workplace into social spheres, which were deeply embedded within 
the local ethos of the industrial culture. As a result, the dominant interests could 
be maintained, with a potentially detrimental impact upon the vibrancy of local 
democracy.20 The existence of tightly bounded social structures, whether 
dependent upon the formal institutions of the local state or regulated social 
interaction can reduce the potential for positive expressions of activity, such that 
1 9 The potential resonance of this discussion has been informed by a number of case studies which have 
attempted to analyse the local dynamics of institutions (see for example, Hudson and Sadler 1989; Dicken, 
1990; Beynon and Hudson 1993; see also chapter 7 for specific case studies of the North-East of England 
and Wales). 
2 0 The denotation of industrial cultures as inclusive, yet potentially stifling, cultures has leads to a potential 
discussion of the role of interstices, described as the spaces in which there is a weakness of the dominant 
ethos, leading to a resistance to this culture in a manner which contests and contends the local hegemony 
(Mann 1986; Amin 1996) 
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"Putnam's good citizenship ends up, perhaps inadvertently, as a denial of civil 
society as an arena of social contestation" (Amin 1996: 327). There is therefore 
a potentially positive role for contestation to reduce associationalist trends 
towards elite hegemony within and embedded in localities. As a democratic 
movement, these oppositional movements represent a challenge to the notion of 
civil society as embedded in the industrial complex as a single uncontested 
movement. Amin (1996) suggests that in contrast to Putnam's notion of civil 
society, contestation can be an essential element of civic virtue, when allied to 
tolerance and democracy, producing a dynamic yet progressive social 
environment. As such, Amin contests that "Putnam may well be right in 
asserting that 'building social capital ... is the key to making democracy work', 
but then why not look at movements... as incipient forms of social capital? Does 
social capital have to take only the form of 'choral societies and soccer teams 
and bird-watching clubs and Rotary clubs'" (Amin 1996: 329-330). This implies 
that certain forms of civil society, bounded within industrial movements, may 
have significantly differing potential in terms of their transformative power and 
ability to produce vibrant third sector institutions. Exactly how this social ethos 
may lead to participatory norms in which the presence of a form of civil society 
benefits the third sector or individualist/passive norms in which there is less 
engagement with the third sector is a key site for empirical enquiry in chapter 7. 
Institutional Economics and the Third Sector. 
From the institutionalist perspective, studies of social capacity and capital 
within regions are useful for providing a potential framework for understanding 
why certain institutional configurations should support a particular industrial 
complex. However, they fail to study how such institutional frameworks may 
aid or negate the possibilities of other economic configurations involving 
private, public and third sector agencies coming to the fore. The literatures 
relating to the importance of social capital involve the making of a value 
judgement, in which the industrial form of development is given precedence 
over others as the means to producing successful regional economic 
development strategies. However, this privileges the formal economy over the 
possibilities of the informal, third sector as a means to developing endogenous 
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growth within regions. Empirically, this provides a basis of the study of regions 
to determine whether there is a potential match or mis-match between the 
vibrancy of the institutional structures and social capital allied to particular 
industrial-social complexes and the vibrancy of the third sector. The same 
institutional configurations which flourish around a particular industrial base 
may support or negate the ability of the third sector to achieve its potential as a 
means to economic development either as a complement to the formal economy 
or as a substitute in particular circumstances. As such, the challenge is to 
determine the crucial dynamics of institutional configurations which create 
propitious environments for TSEIs to flourish. 
Conclusions 
The above discussion of the institutional configurations leading to the 
'uniqueness' of places suggests that "questions of contingency, contextuality, 
and cultural complexity when analyzing space, place and locality" (MacLeod 
1999: 248) must be adhered to (see also Beynon and Hudson, 1993; Warf, 
1993). Informal institutions, constituted as social capital, therefore must be 
acknowledged due to their key role in shaping the context in which TSEIs 
operate. However, this context is also produced by the configuration of formal 
institutions of government (and more recently, governance) at the national, 
regional and local scales. Governance is therefore an element of the localised 
contingency which underlies concerns regarding social capital as an element of 
economic (and by implication political) performance (Putnam, 1993). In the 
following chapter this role of local governance in producing locally-specific 
outcomes will be placed within the context of globalisation and the consequent 
economic imperatives of the state. 
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Chapter 3 
The Post-Fordist State: Contextualising 
Governance 
Introduction 
In chapter 2, the case was put for the analysis of institutions, both formal 
and informal, as key to understanding the frameworks in which TSEIs operate. 
However, such an analysis draws upon limited empirical evidence, notably in 
relation to the scale of institutional alliances and pressures. The discussion of 
social capital and institutional approaches provides a framework to analyse 
inter-personal and inter-institutional relations within a regional context. These 
interactions are placed within the institutions of the territorially and historically 
bounded 'region1 and as such give little acknowledgement of multi-scalar 
influences upon these relations. To do this, I will now outline a parallel trend 
within the social sciences which is concerned with structures (operating in a 
neo-Marxist sense) which influence (or at the extreme, control) individual 
actions and hence social relations within localised contexts (see for example 
Sayer 1984, 2000; Cooke 1997). I suggest here that a key structural factor has 
been the impact of globalisation and the allied change in the structure of the 
state in a post-Fordist, post-Keynesian capitalist system. It is the articulation of 
such processes at the national, regional and local scales which ultimately may 
influence the environments in which TSEIs operate, and as such it wil l form the 
basis for this chapter. 
Globalisation, a much used (and abused) term within the social sciences 
of the late 20 t h Century, is employed to denote a perceived up-scaling of activity 
in the understanding of contemporary change in economic, social, political and 
landscapes. Broadly constructed, globalisation can be construed as a shift away 
from an emphasis upon the mechanism of the nation state as the sole arbiter of 
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its own space and represents increased permeability of political, economic social 
and legal structures (see for example Meiksins-Wood 1997). The nation state 
within this globalisation 'process' or set of 'interrelated tendencies' (Dicken et 
al 1997: 159) is destined to undergo revision under the force of these pressures. 
Despite lacking a clear and coherent trend of substantive processes which 
operate at a number of scales, globalisation's potency as a cognitive concept has 
been noted (Cameron 1999). Through a reflexive loop of substantive and 
speculatory leaps, the globalisation thesis has achieved the status of a 
(perceived) trend or project which nation states feel obliged to counter or adapt 
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to. This breakdown of the dominance of the nation state has led to a perceived 
(though contested) reduction of its role as the prime site of regulatory practices. 
As part of this, the state mechanism has been referred to as being reorganised or 
'hollowed out' (Jessop 1994a, 1997b), as powers have been devolved to both 
upper- and lower-level institutions both within and external to the state 
mechanism. 
This having been said, this chapter does not regard globalisation as an 
autonomous process which operates upon nation states, but more as a process 
which is mediated and challenged at a number of scales. From this starting 
point, I employ the regulation approach, which owes its modern origins to the 
French School of political-economic research (Aglietta, 1979, see also Boyer 
1990; Jessop 2001a) " to provide a theoretical grounding to the discourses of 
globalisation briefly outlined above. As a (contested and as yet incomplete) 
theoretical standpoint it is concerned with the manner in which capitalist 
accumulation may, despite its contradictions, continue in a form which retains or 
cements the hegemonic status of capital. This is achieved by the regulation or 
normalisation of relations between capital, labour and the factors of production 
to permit the conditions for continued accumulation. Through political, 
economic, legal and welfare structures discontent in the system may be 
tempered until a new perturbation or crisis is reached and the capitalist system 
has to realign itself to create the conditions for a potentially new phase of 
2 1 Sayer (2000:25) notes "some commentators argue that globalization is not so much an inexorable force 
impinging on national governments but a discourse used by those governments to reduce their 
responsibilities...realists...do not reduce globalization to nothing more than a discourse, but argue that at 
least in part the discourse is dealing with something real." 
2 2 See also the American SSA (Social Structure of Accumulation) school (Jessop 1990b, 2001b; Kotz et al 
1994). 
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accumulation. Consequently, "expanded social reproduction of capitalism is 
never guaranteed, but has to be continually secured thorough a range of social 
norms, mechanisms and institutions which help to stabilise the system's inherent 
contradiction around a particular regime of accumulation" (Goodwin et al 1993: 
68). Such mechanisms and institutions, known broadly as the MoR (Mode of 
Regulation)23 act to (temporarily) counterbalance the crisis tendencies of 
capitalist accumulation. This chapter will discuss the main tenets of the 
regulation approach, before applying these concepts to contemporary social and 
political changes in relation to the governance of economic development 
strategies and by extension TSEIs. 
Parallel to these concerns with the influence of global forces upon 
national-scale structures, there have been significant strands within the social 
sciences situating the importance of the specificities of localities within the 
global (See for example Swyngedouw, 1992; Amin and Thrift 1994, MacLeod 
1999). How these broader tensions are articulated at the regional and local 
levels, through a reflexive process of challenge and mediation, may be key to 
the production of territorially specific institutional forms as seen in chapter 2. 
Keil (1998) notes that the acceptance of the importance of the local does not 
remove the national state as an institution, but rather transforms its scalar 
functions. As such, the state does not disappear under globalisation; it remains 
the primary social, political and economic spatial scale at which regulation is 
articulated (Dicken et al 1997). It is therefore the task of this chapter to integrate 
"elements of state theories with regulationist perspectives [to] allow a fuller and 
more nuanced understanding of capitalist states, their policies, and limits to them" 
(Hudson 2001: 92). 
Local governance forms wil l be analysed through the lens of neo-
Gramscian studies (for example Jessop 1990a, 1997a), which suggest that local 
governance forms are a reflection of national state structure In contrast, 
Foucauldian-inspired analyses focus on the capacity of the state to steer local 
institutional forms through the employment of managerial technologies 
(MacKinnon, 2000), via the crucial notion of governmentality. This provides a 
This is alternatively known as the Mode of Social Regulation (MSR). 
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basis for the understanding of formal state and governance institutions and how 
they affect TSEIs. 
This chapter will briefly assess the theoretical and substantive 
characteristics of the concept of post-Fordism in the social science literatures to 
provide a basis for the discussion of the manner in which national states and 
localities mediate and reflexively shape multi-scalar pressures through 
regulatory processes. Finally, the application of the new urban political theory of 
regime theory and its antecedents in elite theory and pluralism will be assessed 
as an analytic tool to understand empirically the locally formed governance 
structures which may create the specific environment in which TSEIs succeed or 
fail. 
The Regulation Approach and the Post-Fordist 
State 
The regulation approach has the potential to provide a theoretical 
underpinning for the manner in which global, national, regional and local 
systems combine to produce observed outcomes (see for example Aglietta 1979; 
Boyer 1990; Jessop 1997c, 2001a, b). The theoretical underpinning provided by 
a regulation-theoretic approach suggests that capitalist forces produce a dynamic 
and contested framework into which observed phenomena may be placed. Far 
from being a homogenous experience, contestation and mediation lead to a 
situation where there are "critical variations in the ways in which these [are] 
transmitted and felt at the local level" (Goodwin et al 1993: 69). On this scale, 
political mediation and social and institutional structures define the exact impact 
of regulatory pressures upon economies at all scales. This section will utilise this 
theoretical framework to create an understanding of the regional and local 
factors which produce a contested economic, social and political context in 
which TSEIs operate. 
The notion of 'regulation', as a translation of the French reglementation, 
refers to a 'regularisation' or 'normalisation' of relations between capital and the 
agents of production. It therefore addresses the manner in which institutions and 
social norms are configured in such a way as to maintain the interests of 
capitalist accumulation. This therefore refers to the "prevailing or dominant 
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institutions and practices sustaining this; those, for instance, of exploitation, 
authority, and negotiation in the workplace, of exchange and contract in the 
market, of family in the home, and of citizenship and equality in the 
state"(Goodwin et al 1993: 71). As such, this represents a view of the state in its 
inclusive senses (Gramsci's Economie Integrale) which encompasses all the 
elements of the state. 
The regime of accumulation has two distinct parts: the Mode of 
Production and the Mode of Regulation (MoR). The mode of production refers 
to the methods of production themselves, be they Fordist or Taylorist mass 
production or another form in the post-Fordist era (Just-in-Time as opposed to 
Fordist Just-in-Case, CAD, numerical and functional flexibility; see for example 
Amin (1994)). However, to sustain any regime of accumulation, a Mode of 
Regulation is required to balance the contradictions inherent within the mode of 
production. This notion of the MoR is defined by Aglietta (1979) as "a codified 
set of relations which have the effect of guarding and sustaining the 
accumulation process" (Aglietta 1979: 382). Jessop (1992) similarly defines the 
MoR as the social context in which expanded economic reproduction occurs. 
Such definitions are vague as to the mechanisms which are operating, and Peck 
and Tickell are thus conscious of this when they define the MoR as "state forms, 
social norms, political practices and institutional networks" (Peck and Tickell 
1995: 357-358) which are operating to maintain the dominance of capitalism. 
Jessop (1990b) suggested that regulation has two parts, referred to as 
the structural and strategic elements of regulation; "the former [structural] refers 
to the actual organisation^], the latter to the strategic perspectives and 
discourses which are currently dominant" (cited in Goodwin et al 1993: 71). 
Regulation is not therefore purely concerned with economics; it lays equal 
emphasis upon the social conditions which are necessary for capitalist 
reproduction. While the structural elements refer to the day-to day means for 
expanding welfare services and allowing growth (perceived here in a Fordist 
socio-political framework), the strategic elements refer to the acceptance of 
public services provided within the regime of accumulation. 
The MoR therefore reproduces the norms and social practices which 
support and permit a regime of accumulation. Hudson (2001) notes that the 
"'problem' for the state is to 'discover' or invent a mode of regulation appropriate 
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to a particular macro-economic growth model, a particular regime of 
accumulation" (Hudson 2001: 60). This support is essential because the state is 
"neither an arbiter, nor a regulator nor an uncritical supporter of capitalism but it is 
"enmeshed" - and unavoidably so - in its contradictions (Held, 1989: 71)" (Hudson 
2001: 63). 
MacLeod (2001), drawing on the work of Boyer (1990), Jessop (1997d) 
and Swyngedouw (1997) brings together five core, interconnected levels of the 
MoR: 
1. The wage relation (or wage nexus) which abstracts relations between 
the labour process, labour-forces reproduction, labour market 
governance, and lifestyles; 
2. Forms of competition, or relations between autonomous and 
fragmented centres of accumulation and how this manifests as 
corporate ties and links to banking capital; 
3. Monetary and financial regulation vis-a-vis the dominant banking and 
credit system and the relative allocation to sectors; 
4. The state and governance including the state's internal structures, its 
system of representation, patterns of intervention ( for example public 
versus private) and the instituionalization of its social bases of 
popular support; 
5. The international regime or the way in which trade, investment, 
monetary settlements and political arrangements help to integrate 
national and regional economies, nation-states, and the world system. 
Together, these factors of the MoR seek to avert crisis and to maintain 
the legitimation of the regime of accumulation and the politico-economic 
structures which underpin it. As Hudson (2001) notes, "Resolving fiscal crises is 
perhaps the most difficult operation in crisis avoidance and management but one 
that must be attempted; otherwise, there is a risk that burgeoning state borrowing 
or public expenditure could trigger a much more generalised economic crisis" 
(Hudson 2001: 63). However, Hudson notes that the partial retreat of the state 
from the spheres of economy and civil society in the last quarter of the 20 t h 
century demonstrates the limits to the capacities of national states to manage and 
resolve such crises.24 
This, however, is not consistent as has been shown over the past decade. The extent to which state-run 
public services ought to constitute a part of the state system has been questioned, with successive right-
leaning Conservative governments portraying the 'nanny state' as inefficient and wasteful, a drain on the 
entrepreneurial economy (Goodwin et al 1993: 71. See also Jessop 1995 for a discussion of this element; 
Peck and Tickell 1995; Taylor-Gooby 1997). 
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However, capitalism, as noted by Marx and Engels, is a dynamic system. 
Periodically, regimes of accumulation may enter stages of crisis which require a 
new institutional fix to allow the resumption of accumulation. Hay (1995) notes 
that crisis is a moment of decisive intervention, ruptures and transformation. 
However, this is not always the case: failure may be perceived by those in power 
so that remedies to crises are implemented before crisis point is reached. Hay 
therefore states that "Crisis refers to failure perceived, and hence failure 
politically motivated" (Hay 1995: 389, emphasis original). Crisis tendencies and 
the response of institutions to the challenge to the dominance of the Fordist 
MoR will now be discussed. 
Fordist Regulation and After-Fordist Crisis 
In recent years, much debate has focused upon the use of Regulation 
Theory to attempt to make sense of contemporary change in economic, political 
and social structures which have been described as the move from Fordism to 
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post-Fordism. Concentrating analysis within the notion of Fordism as a mode 
of regulation, (Goodwin et al 1993: 70), it is possible to study the regulatory 
aspects of the UK post-war settlement. Taking as a point of departure 
Poulantzas' notion that the post-war state and capitalism were 'immanent and 
mutually constitutive' (1978: 17), subsequent process and regulation can be 
structured within this context. Poulantzas suggests that the extension of the 
power of the nation state within bounded territorial spaces was a necessary step 
to overcome the crisis of regulation within a national Fordist context as opposed 
to previously local, feudal economic context. 
Fordism required a transformation of the social consumption norm to 
one of mass consumption (Painter 1991: 29). As such, the Mode of Regulation 
sought to institutionalise class structures, in such a way that wage earners 
purchased as the means of consumption (Painter 1991: 25). To do this, the 
economic system was seen to be underpinned by a welfare state which could 
appease and temper class struggles to ensure the continuation of growth. As a 
result, under the post-war consensus, public services and expenditure were 
2 5 However, MacLeod (2001: 1156) notes that, "the RA was neither predictive of nor reducible to the thesis 
of post-Fordism." 
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dramatically increased to maintain the hegemony of the Fordist regime of capital 
accumulation. This involved the active participation of the state to provide 
services and to justify them. As David Harvey notes, "Fordism depended, 
evidently, upon the nation state taking - much as Gramsci predicted - a very 
special role within the overall system of social regulation" (Harvey 1989: 135). 
The Fordist MoR was broadly able to cope with the contradictions of the 
mode of production, alleviating serious crisis tendencies until the 1970s. Since 
then, much research as been done into the perceived shifts in economic and 
institutional structures from the Fordist system to a new 'post-Fordist' regime 
(see for example Painter 1991; Peck and Tickell 1992, 1995; Jessop 1995). This 
new shift has been central to developments of Regulationist debates, and 
renewed interest in the regulation approach has been put down to its being 
"closely related to the crisis in Atlantic Fordism and the search for a new social 
mode of regulation" (Jessop 1995: 311). 
The interest in post-Fordism prompted Aglietta in 1979 to note that a 
"new cohesion" would be the result of the transitional phase from Fordism to a 
post-Fordist structure for capitalism. Aglietta noted that this would not purely 
entail a shift in production methods but also a great change to the role of public 
services in the new regime (Aglietta 1979: 385). Hoggett (1987) similarly noted 
that in what he refers to as neo-Fordism, decentralisation and organisational 
change in both the public and private sectors occurred. However, whether this 
represents Aglietta's 'new cohesion' or whether this is, as David Harvey (1989) 
puts it, 'crisis rescheduled' is open to question. 
The notion of a new economic and social order which constitutes a 
coherent regime of accumulation has been criticised by a number of authors (see 
for example Painter 1991; Peck and Tickell, 1992, 1995; Jessop 
1992,1995;Goodwin et al 1993). Peck and Tickell refer to contemporary 
changes as the After-F ordist crisis, where crisis tendencies have not yet been 
fully resolved to create a new stable regime of accumulation. They note, "We 
cannot, therefore, speak of a post-Fordist regime of accumulation because such a 
system has yet to be comprehensively identified"(Peck and Tickell 1995: 358, 
emphasis original). They also state that "prevailing conceptions of post-Fordism 
are straightforwardly inconsistent with the central tenets of a regulationist 
method" (ibid: 357, emphasis original). As such, current changes are 
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inconsistent with a new regime of accumulation, with Peck and Tickell noting 
that recent years have been a period of sustained crisis; what is required is "not 
only a new macro-economic regime but, crucially, a new 'institutional 
fix"'(ibid, p357). These are the geographies of crisis, with no stable form to 
maintain an order required properly to identify a post-Fordist regime of 
accumulation. Indeed, further destabilising forces may be further reducing the 
likelihood of the emergence of a new stability; tensions from both globalisation 
of economic and political activities, alongside localisation of some aspects, may 
maintain the transitional stage. With neo-liberal economics remaining in the 
ascendancy, Peck and Tickell note, "the geography of glocalization is the 
geography of the o/fer-Fordist crisis, not the geography of stable post-Fordism" 
(1995: 381, emphasis original).2 6 
Similarly, Hiibner (1991) suggests that regulatory bodies (supra-national 
and international institutions which have neo-liberal agendas) will lead to 
greater economic instability. This suggests that these will be the destabilising 
forces of the future, with rapid changes in the economic and political 
environment delaying a truly stable post-Fordist regime of accumulation. This 
will require a full reassessment of the MoR, not just the shift in production 
techniques which for some observers equated to a post-Fordist system. As 
Rustin suggests, stable post-Fordism will occur due to, "the resolution of 
conflicts at the level of social relations, not as the automatic outcomes of the 
technological imperatives of 'mass production' or its information based 
successor" (Rustin 1989: 63). The search for a post-Fordist mode of regulation 
therefore still remains, but the continued crisis of after-Fordism demands an 
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analysis of the impacts of the neo-liberal agenda at various spatial levels. 
This inadequacy requires analysis due to the assertion that national and 
regional government, as part of the broader institutional framework outlined 
above, are not benign agents but also help to shape the regime of accumulation 
themselves. As MacLeod notes, "the local does not merely react to global 
economic 'realities'" (MacLeod 2001: 1151). As such, institutional and 
geographical variability within regions leads to a mosaic of MoRs which may be 
For a more detailed study of Glocalisation debates, see Swyngedouw 1992. 
2 7 See chapter 6 for a discussion of the continued ascendancy of the neo-liberal economics within the UK 
context. 
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very diverse (Jessop, 1992). By extension, the mediation of regulatory processes 
refers not only to the process of government but also of governance of local 
institutional and industrial structures. It is this emphasis within the regulation 
approach upon regulatory frameworks aligned to the interplay of global forces 
and local units which I will now discuss. 
Governance and the Post-Fordist State 
The regulation-theoretical approach outlined above presents an 
analytical tool with which to analyse at a relatively abstract level the meta-scale 
change associated with globalisation. However, as Jones (1997) notes, the 
regulation approach, in its earlier readings, presented an inadequate 
conceptualisation of the state (see also Jessop 1990b). Hay (1995: 401) also 
notes that regulation theory can be seen as inadequate, noting that it is "not, and 
further lacks, a theory of the state". As regulation theory is "necessary, but 
insufficient to explain new modes of local governance" (ibid, 1995: 403, 
emphasis original) a new mode of regulation theory is required which is able to 
theorise the state and its influences (see for example Painter and Goodwin 
1995). To f i l l this theoretical gap, Jessop (1995: 398) suggests that the 
regulation approach and theories of governance are similar enough for 
comparison and complementary use, although he also notes problems in 
combining notions of Fordism and post-Fordism with new forms of economic 
and political governance. This notion is countered by Jones (1997) who suggests 
that the 'third level' of regulation theory applies a more concrete and complex 
level of abstraction, concerned with the state, political factors and the role of 
space28. As such, Jones argues, there is a need to analyse the state in more 
concrete terms to understand the nature and dynamic of the political economy of 
the state. Here I intend to elaborate on this by analysing the academic writing on 
state restructuring informed by post-Fordist, neo-Gramscian and neo-
Foucaultian writings. This re-formulation of the state apparatus will be 
elaborated through a discussion of the key tenets of this shift, at the national, 
regional and local scales, followed by a discussion of regime theory as a tool to 
Jones notes the 1st level was concerned with national accumulation, the wage relation, and competition. 
The 2 n d level was more complex level of abstraction based on international regulation and nation-states 
(Jones 1997). 
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understand the nature of the emergent coalitions and partnerships at the local 
level which can influence the operation of TSEIs and regeneration strategies. 
Fordism, Scale and Politics 
The shift to post-Fordism attributed in part to globalisation has 
significantly impacted on the function of the state. MacLeod (1999) notes the 
multitude of analyses of the reconfiguration of the state in the form of 
'hollowing out ' (see Jessop, 1994a; 1997b), Marks'(1993) 'multi-level' 
governance, or Tommel's (1997) 'three-tier system' of regulation (MacLeod 
1999: 231). The current interest in multi-level governance has emerged thanks 
to the writings of Marks (1993), and followed up in Hooghe and Marks (2000). 
Briefly, multi-level governance describes a complexity of scale in the creation 
of policies, their implementation and the accounting process to underpin their 
use. This has involved the movement of some key aspects of policy making 'up' 
to the regional level Euro-level institutions. Concurrently, a greater 
regionalisation has shifted authority away from national to subnational levels of 
government. 
The very core of this argument, that the twin processes of Europeanisation 
and regionalisation are occurring, is contested due to the problem that authority 
cannot be observed directly. However, the notion of multi-level governance, 
contrasted with its alternative of state-centrism, has emerged. The result, 
therefore, is the need to determine the permeability of state governance and the 
consequence of restructuring on the forms of governance which operate at local 
scales. Through the lens of the regulation approach, it is therefore necessary to 
analyse this multi-level governance structures which operate and which 
influence the development of TSEIs. 
Key debates also revolve around Jessop's (1994a; 1997b) notion of a 
'hollowed out' state in which the central functions remain, yet are limited in 
capacity through a "complex replacement of powers" to both the market and the 
supra-national level (Keil 1998). This 'hollowing out' thesis reflects a growing 
malcontent with the analysis of the 'nation' state as the key (or only) frame for 
reference for academic enquiry. The central notion is that the power once held 
by and employed by the 'monolith' of the state is undermined by globalisation 
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and associated regulatory crises, leading to a displacement of functions to upper 
and lower-level bodies. As such, the state is being "reincarnated in myriad forms 
on many spatio-social levels" (Keil 1998: 617). He continues to argue that 
globalisation "makes states, but different kinds from the ones we have been used 
to" (ibid: 617). 
However, this notion of hollowing out does not imply that the state has 
disappeared, nor become redundant as an object or scale of enquiry (see 
Anderson 1995; Aglietta 1999). Hudson therefore notes that, "The 'hollowed 
out' metaphor is a partial account of a shift in, rather than a diminution of, the role 
of the national state, with complex new relationships emerging between and within 
different institutions at different scales" (Hudson 2001: 72). 
As Peters (1998) notes, "The fundamental argument put forward here is 
that the State is not dead but rather remains a useful analytic concept, as well as 
a viable actor in the governance of society. Again, this is not to deny that there 
have been significant changes in our understanding of the role of the state, along 
with some real changes in the way in which governance functions".29 Similarly, 
Jessop notes that changes, 
"Do not exclude a continuing and central political role for the national 
state. But it is a role which is redefined as a result of the more general 
rearticulation of the local regional, national and supranational levels of 
economic and political organization. Unless or until supra-national 
political organization acquires not only governmental powers but also 
some measure of popular-democratic legitimacy, the national state will 
remain a key political factor as the highest instance of bourgeois 
democratic political accountability" (Jessop 1997b: 576). 
The changes referred to by Jessop are informed by a rearticulation of this 
'hollowing out' thesis, in which Jessop (1997b) notes three distinct yet 
interconnected trends which are combining to re-make the nation state. First, he 
notes the denationalisation of the state, in which hollowing out is the key 
process, wherein the state apparatus is being "reorganized territorially and 
functionally on sub-national, national, supranational and Trans-local levels" 
(Jessop 1997b: 573-574). Second, he notes the intemationalisation of policy 
regimes. Third, there has been a destatization of the political system, reflected 
empirically in the move from government to governance wherein the centrality 
Peters (1998), available online at http://www.iue.it/RSC/Peters.htm. 
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of the state as the sole site of political and managerial power has been 
undermined. Hudson (2001) goes on to state that, "Regulatory capacities have 
been shifted "outwards" to non-state organisations, broadening the focus from 
issues of the state and regulation to those of social practices, civil society and 
governance" (Hudson 2001: 72). It is this shift in scales and from government to 
governance which influence the structures which exist around TSEIs, and which 
I wil l now address. 
Theorising Governance 
This shift from government to governance has been a key element of 
academic enquiry in the 1990s, most notably in the form of the Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC) - funded local governance research which was 
launched in 1993 (for reviews of the programme, see Rhodes 1996; Stoker 
1998). As part of an empirically- based attempt to understand the new state 
forms which result as states have responded to and mediated global pressures, 
the shift from government to governance achieved a dominance within political-
economic discourses such that it has become an 'intellectual commonplace' 
(Ward 1997). 
However, the academic roots of governance are varied and disjointed 
(Jessop 1995). Stoker (1998) notes theoretical roots from "institutional 
economics, international relations, organizational studies, development studies, 
political science, public administration and Foucauldian-inspired theorists" 
(Stoker 1998: 18). It therefore acknowledges, as do institutional economics and 
socio-economics, the complexity of economic interactions. Broadly, the term 
'governance' is employed to understand governing styles in which the 
"boundaries between and within public and private sectors have become 
blurred" (ibid: 17). Mayntz (1998) notes two broad shifts: 
1. A new mode of governing that is distinct from the hierarchical 
control model, a more cooperative mode where state and non-state 
actors participate in mixed public/ private networks. 
2. "Discovery" of forms of coordination not only different from 
hierarchy, but also different from the pure market form, that led to 
the generalization of the term "governance" to cover all forms of 
social coordination - not only in the economy, but also in other 
sectors. 
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Hudson therefore notes that, "There has been a change in the mode of 
operation of national states. Rather than directly (or indirectly) providing goods 
and services on a de-commodified basis for people, the state is now more 
concerned to provide an enabling and facilitating environment. This allows social 
partners to provide goods and services for themselves with state assistance and 
support. Such forms of self-help are partly a response to the void left by the retreat 
of the interventionist state, partly a response to new and previously unmet (and 
unarticulated) social needs" (Hudson 2001: 75). 
Defined in this way, governance therefore accepts the complexity of 
relations, beyond an explicitly state-imposed structure towards a more 
politically directed but diverse structure which is the result of the interaction of a 
multiplicity of governing forms and actors. The result is to produce an order 
which is a "restricting but also an enabling or reinforcing condition for social-
political action" (Kooiman and Van Vliet 1993: 64). 
Research into local governance has employed Neo-Gramscian state theory 
(see Jessop 1990a, 1997a) to provide a broader framework to understand how 
governance is "channelled and delivered through local state institutions" 
(MacKinnon 2000: 294; see also Jones 1998; MacLeod and Goodwin 1999a, 
1999b). Neo-Gramscian state theory provides a tool to analyse the shift from 
Fordist to post-Fordist regulatory mechanisms; the crisis of Fordism has wide 
ranging repercussions for the 'Economie Integrale' (the state in its most 
inclusive sense). As such an equally broad restructuring of the MoR, 
incorporating state mechanism and civil institutions is required to help foster a 
new and stable regime of accumulation. As part of a response to crisis through 
the application of neo-liberal economic policies, governments have sought to 
pre-empt governance failure through the creation of a new and accepted 
hegemonic economic and institutional ' f i x ' (Peck and Tickell 1995: 357; 
Hudson 2001) 
The shift from government to governance could therefore be regarded as 
part of this 'institutional f ix ' as attempts to are made to avert crisis in the regime 
of accumulation. This has been given impetus through the political wil l of 
governments in the UK to reformulate their roles as enablers of government 
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rather than all-encompassing service providers (see Cochrane, 1993). Similarly, 
the US has seen a 'reinvention of government' where it takes a catalytic rather 
than a direct provision role (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Stoker and Mossberger 
1995). The implication of this shift is a reformation of the relative powers of 
governing forces within the UK. This has subsequently influenced the 
development of 'partnerships', which have become a key element of 
government policies and which in turn have implications for the organisation of 
TSEIs in the UK, as will be seen in chapter 6. 
Governmentality and the Analytics of 
Government 
In contrast to neo-Gramscian theories, MacKinnon (2000; see also Rose, 
1999) suggests that the neo-Foucaultian notion of governmentality (a neologism 
for government rationality) may be employed to inform the managerial stance 
associated with the neo-liberal government politics. Foucaultian analyses of 
governmentality refer to the manner in which power is exercised through an 
ensemble of institutions, procedures and analyses. Dean (1999) notes some of 
the critical features of governmentality, which I aim to employ within this thesis 
to conceptualise the shifts within the role of the state and the relationship this 
has with the governmental technologies employed by the state in relation to the 
third sector. 
To understand governmentality, we must first define what we mean by 
government. Dean produces a catch-all definition that states, "government is any 
more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of 
authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of 
knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, 
aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse 
set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes" (Dean 1999: 
11). This notion of government is underlined by issues of human conduct, and 
the manner in which it can be framed as a moral and ethical considerations: the 
government of the self. The notion of government is also framed by an 
understanding of rationality, whatever form of rationality that may take. As 
Dean notes, "there is a multiplicity of rationalities, of different ways of thinking 
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in a fairly systematic manner, of making calculations, of defining purposes and 
employing knowledge" (Dean 1999:11). 
The result of this discussion, and the links is has to governmentality, is to 
note the practises concerned with the government of others, a narrower sense 
than the 'conduct of conduct' which encompasses more the practises of 
government of the self. However, this is not to overlook the manner in which 
practices of the self can be relatively autonomous from practices of government, 
and also means of resistance to forms of government. 
Government is therefore concerned with the shaping of human conduct, 
and hence the governed are therefore implicitly able to act independently. This 
is particularly the case with liberal modes of government, such that it can regard 
the freedom of the individual as one means to secure the ends of the 
government. Therefore, Dean notes that, "liberal mentalities of rule generally 
attempt to define the nature, source, effects and possible utility of these 
capacities of acting and thinking" (Dean 1999:13). Dean continues to note that 
this is a function of the conception of freedom; this is key to the discussion to be 
held later in that the freedom (and disciplines) of the market are key to 
understanding contemporary attitudes towards the third sector and the third way. 
A key element of this capacity to govern is the nature of and capacity for 
thought, and the manner in which this is exercised, individually and collectively-
namely, governmentality. Dean distinguishes two elements to this, the first 
dealing with the manner in which we think about governing. This notes thinking 
as a collective activity, one which is represented by the "bodies of knowledge, 
belief and opinion in which we are immersed" (Dean 1999:16). 
Thus, mentalities are bounded, not readily examined from within, and 
hence difficult to comprehend from within their own perspective. As a result, 
Dean suggests that mentalities of government emphasise "the way in which the 
thought involved in practices of government is collective and relatively taken for 
granted, i.e. not usually open to questioning by practitioners" (Dean 1999:16). 
This knowledge, particularly within a western liberal context, is drawn from 
economic discourses which emphasise specialist knowledge of economic 
theories, techniques, and modelling. However, underlying the potential choices 
in terms of the management of the economy through different techniques, it is 
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still understood and not questioned that the role of the state should be to seek to 
manage the economy in the first place. 
In contrast to studies of government and production of collective thought 
that emphasise the social, political and economic conditions of its production, 
governmentality is more concerned with how thought "operates within our 
organized ways of doing things, or regimes of practices, and with its ambitions 
and effects" (Dean 2000:18, emphasis original). Therefore, an analytics of 
government is concerned with how collective thought becomes embedded in 
programmes of government which seek to direct and reform conduct. The 
technical means therefore come to the fore, and the manner in which mentalities 
are made practical or put into operation is key. Therefore, I wish to focus on, in 
parallel with the studies of the regulation approach and governance, the manner 
in which policy choices have come to the fore as part of a broader government 
rationality. This, according to Isin, is bound up with a new regime of 
governmentality of 'advanced liberalism' whose "tactics, strategies and 
rationalities [are] 'neo-liberal'"(Isin 2000). 
This theoretical position suggests that through the technologies of the state 
mechanism, the political response to crisis can be directed to achieve a 
dominance of enterprise and competition as the key ethos of the state as opposed 
to the welfarism and corporatism of the post-war settlement (see chapter 6 for 
the empirical application of this in the UK). As such, the state is not completely 
disempowered and so may retain the capability to act directly through its 
institutions and indirectly through policy to direct the trajectory of policy and 
30 
institutions. 
Hindess notes that governing, "is not restricted to the work of the 
government and the agencies it controls. Much of it wil l also be performed by 
agencies of other kinds, by elements of what is now called civil society: 
churches, employers, financial institutions, legal and medical professionals, 
voluntary associations. The work of governing the state as a whole, then, 
By extension, there has been a concentration upon the 'local' as the site for intervention (see chapter 4) 
so as to address inequality. The irony is that the implications of competition and marketisation in the formal 
sector have suggested to some observers the need for Community Economic Development and Social 
Economy as a means to address the economic inequality produced. By introducing market principles and 
the mainstream into the third sector, the same forms of inequalities may present themselves. 
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extends far beyond the institutions of the state itself (Hindess 2000).31 This 
therefore corresponds to the creation and sustaining of a value system which 
informs and interacts with more explicit policy decisions. As will be seen in 
later chapters, this theoretical perspective can therefore inform the policy 
objectives and their underlying philosophies as a means to develop a governance 
framework beyond the limits of the policy process. 
Dean employs the notion of an analytics of government to examine "the 
conditions under which regimes of practices come into being, are maintained 
and are transformed" (Dean 1999: 21). He goes on to note that an analytics of 
government examines how a regime "gives rise to and depends upon particular 
forms of knowledge and how, as a consequence of this, it becomes the target of 
various programmes of reform and change. It considers how this regime has a 
technical or technological dimension and analyses the characteristic techniques, 
instrumentalities and mechanisms through which such practices operate, by 
which they attempt to realize their goals, and through which they have a range 
of effects" (Dean 1999:21). 
Of crucial importance here and in chapter 6 is the notion of how regimes, 
such as that of the calculation emanating from auditing and accountability have 
been able to subjugate other norms drawn form other professional fields. How 
such regimes of accountability have become dominant is key to the work of 
Power (1994), who notes that the system of auditing has become central to 
particular liberal rationality. This is particularly relevant to the discussion here 
of governmentality in that Power suggests that the audit and accountability 
mechanisms are technologies of a regime of governmentality. Audit sustains 
traditional hopes of control by a subtle translation: impossibly costly 
technologies of inspection are displaced by something more distant which acts 
upon local sub-systems of control. Audit has thereby become the 'control of 
control' and the constitutive principle of the audit society exemplifies certain 
postmodern motifs of the 'loss of reference'. As a result, audit is symptomatic of 
"centripetal pressures to retain control over newly autonomized services 
informing] a new governmental rationality in which intervention can be 
accomplished by indirect means" (Power 1994: 302). Consequently, audit is a 
3 1 Barry Hindess, Politics and Governmentality, available online at: 
http://www.cddc.vt.edu/workshop/hindessl.htm; see also Hindess (1997). 
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reponsibilising technology, one which will be analysed in more detail in section 
6 with reference to competitive funding, and in section 7 and 8 as a means 
through which central government influence is maintained upon TSEIs. 
Notions of governmentality may therefore conceptualise the basis behind 
the structures which are put into place to influence, directly and indirectly, the 
development of TSEIs and their legitimation.32 The consequence of this for the 
study of TSEIs is therefore to produce a focus upon the manner in which neo-
liberalism and the dominance of the scientific method in evaluation have 
become enshrined as the government technology. This acts alongside legislation 
to remove conflict and promote solutions (in this case the third sector) as an 
accepted means by which to undertake neighbourhood and community 
economic development. 
As wil l be seen in the following chapter, it is possible to note the schema 
through which some structures directly influence TSEIs, thus partly 
circumventing the mediatory factors at the regional and local government levels. 
As such, governmentality represents an implicitly political process by which the 
technologies of government influence the structures around TSEIs. However, 
this managerial stance is still subject to significant mediation at the local level. 
Regulating and Governing Localities 
Far from being a homogenous process which occurs at differing spatial 
scales, the regulation and governance of the post-Fordist political economy 
produces differing experiences dependent upon many local factors. What is 
happening is not one crisis of Fordism but "a multitude of nationally and locally 
mediated crises of Fordism" (Hay 1995: 391). This transition to new forms of 
state activity is taking on an uneven character, broadly informed at the national 
level but not nationally determined, in what Goodwin et al (1993) refer to as a 
"a series of diverse and contested changes in the form of local regulation, rather 
than...some nationally determined shift" (1993: 83). 
As a result, the concept of governmentality may stimulate research into the policy processes through 
which successive governments have been seen to employ government institutions, notably the Social 
Exclusion Unit, with specifically guided political, social and economic aims and remits. These therefore 
produce particular policies to deal with the real and perceived problems of social exclusion (or inclusion), 
by promoting and legitimising a particular conditioned and channelled response to these 'problems'. 
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Local institutions, therefore, have a significant impact upon the type and 
nature of any regulatory system operating on a local scale.33 At the local level, 
political mediation and social and institutional structures influence the exact 
impact of regulatory structures upon the local economy and population. These 
organisational forms may combine to create a 'structured coherence' (Harvey, 
1985) and result in the "local objectification of an abstract mode of regulation, 
based on an ensemble of cultural, economic, social, and political norms, as well 
as networks and institutions" (Goodwin et al 1993:73). This leads to what Peck 
and Tickell refer to as 'processes of local social regulation', which are the 
products of the dynamics of local production systems, leading to the formation 
of new social norms or the mobilisation of new political and institutional forms 
(Peck and Tickell 1992: 347). Regulation, therefore, is locally determined and 
mediated by political, economic and social characteristics as implied by 
institution-based theories. As noted in chapter 2, localities have historically 
distinct forms of institutional and societal attitudes which influence outcomes of 
crisis and contested economic and political pressures. Peck and Tickell (1995: 
264) note that "history, institutions and geography matter"; crises and regimes 
are therefore unique events, albeit simultaneously expressing structural 
processes. 
Local mediation of regulatory processes is therefore central to the 
outcomes of transitional processes. Painter and Goodwin (1995) suggest that 
regulation varies between spatial scales and that the resulting mosaic is therefore 
a "complex set of intersecting and overlapping geographies of regulation" 
(1995: 336). Regulation, therefore, combines a series of pressures and spatial 
scales to produce outcomes.34 As Goodwin et al state, "We cannot speak of 
some undifferentiated move away from one type of regulation and towards 
another. Instead, we need to conceive a whole series of movements between the 
differing structures and strategies of regulation operating at overlapping 
scales"(Goodwin et al 1993: 83; see also Peck and Tickell 1992). 
The concern with scale can be attributed to the fact that the local state is, 
according to Lipietz, the "most important element in mode of regulation" 
3 3 Indeed, even at the national scale discrepancies are found: there is no one global regulatory system 
within developed capitalist countries, but a series of'national Fordisms', whose regulatory theory and 
space varies form state to state (Peck and Tickell 1995: 373). 
3 4 Though whether such outcomes are observable depends upon ontological stances- see chapter 5. 
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(Lipietz 1988: 18) due to it being the means by which national regulatory 
processes are mediated and put into practice at the local level. As Goodwin et al 
(1993: 73) state, at the "local level the local state becomes a vital instrument in 
these processes, and plays a key role in attempting to maintain these local spaces 
of regulation, both socially and economically" (see also Duncan and Goodwin, 
1988; Painter 1991; Hollingsworth et al 1994). The local state therefore has an 
important role to play, although this impact may be gradually diminishing 
relative to new forms of governance which are gradually becoming more 
powerful. As Training and Employment Councils (TECs), Quangos and 
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) grow and become responsible for the 
distribution of funds and the implementation of national policies, the local state 
in its traditional form may be by-passed and its influence upon the local mode of 
regulation diminished. While suggestions that we are witnessing the 
development of a post-Fordist state form may be premature, this shift to a 
broader governance structure could potentially become part of a transitional 
phase towards some new regulatory system. 
Alongside this, the distinction of public and private is becoming blurred, 
with partnership schemes which employ private finance and contracts becoming 
widespread. What, therefore, does this mean for the local state? Painter (1991) 
suggests that new management ideologies are being introduced into the local 
state system, alongside their application in the private sector. Parallel to this, 
Painter suggests that democracy has been constrained in terms of local authority 
independence, and that as a result the local has been influenced more and more 
by the national government and regulatory mechanisms. 
However, suggestions that the national scale of regulation can dominate 
and subsume the local are premature. As noted above, the uneven development 
of regulation has occurred at many spatial scales, with the local state being the 
prime site of the mediation of regulatory pressures and their application as 
locally specific practices. Goodwin et al note that, "the local state [is] at once an 
agent and an obstacle to central government" (Goodwin et al 1993: 70). As such, 
the local state continues to be a key source of contention, with the decentralised 
local government tier having an impact upon the unevenness of regulation 
(Painter and Goodwin 1995: 336). The role of state and governance, therefore, is 
implicit in regulatory practices. However, a regulation theoretical account of the 
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local state is inadequate fully to understand the processes which are operating. 
There is therefore a need for a theoretical approach which can provide a more 
concrete analysis of the changes in the state governance mechanisms. Regime-
theoretical approaches will therefore be explored as a means to understand 
empirically observed change in governance at the local scale. 
Regime Theory 
Regime theory can be used to help understand meta-scale political and 
economic change in that it provides a link to both local and regional institutional 
configurations and the reorganising national state. It provides an analysis of how 
coalitions are formed at the local scale in particular configurations related to 
historically and territorially sited institutional forms, therefore permitting an 
understanding of how broader factors are mediated by local actors. By briefly 
outlining regime theory I seek to understand how notions of multi-scalar 
governance can be applied to the analysis of local governance and policy 
formation through the mediation of broader national and global change. This 
will subsequently provide a basis for understanding the actually existing 
structures which influence TSEIs. 
Regime theory originated as a one of the new theories of urban politics 
which attempt to circumvent the "stalled debates on conventionally 
conceptualised tensions like those between elite hegemony and pluralist interest 
group politics, between economic determinism and political machination, and 
between structural determinants and local choices" (Anttiroiko and Kainulainen 
I f 
1998). As such, regime theory has an advantage in that it can provide a basis 
for the assessment of the inter-institutional power relations within governing 
coalitions at the local level in non-urban contexts. 
Unlike elite theories of urban government and pluralist theories, regime 
theory is concerned with the capacity to act and how this is formed; how groups 
" Regime theory therefore provides a structured framework for the analysis of regimes in contrast to the 
'growth machine' thesis, which has a tendency to overemphasise the use of land by businesses and local 
growth elites, allied to the auxiliary agents of capital, politicians, media and quangos. 
3 6 Despite the empirical bases of a significant proportion of the governance literature in specifically urban 
contexts, 1 believe it provides a significant input into the conceptualisation of coalitions as specifically local 
or regional entities. I therefore intend to employ it to provide a grounding for the empirically observed 
configurations of local state, quangos and other interested parties to produce a context for the development 
of potential grounds for TSEIs. 
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emerge with power to do, rather than having power over (Stoker and 
Mossberger 1994).37 In contrast to elite theories, regime theory suggests that no 
group will be likely to exercise dominance; similarly, the regime perspective 
suggests that governance is not purely reactive to electoral demands. As such, 
coalition building is a core element and regime theorists therefore "emphasise 
how the structure of society privileges the participation of certain elements in 
coalitions" (Stoker and Mossberger 1994: 197). 
Regime theory provides a framework in which to understand in which 
contexts governing coalitions emerge, consolidate, and achieve dominant 
positions and transform themselves. Stoker (1995) notes that regime theory 
holds, 
"substantial promise for understanding variety of responses to urban 
change. It emphasizes the interdependence of governmental and non-
governmental forces in meeting economic and social challenges. This is 
why it pays attention to the problem of cooperation and co-ordination 
between government, business community, and the third sector or civil 
society" ( Stoker 1995: 54). 
As such, regime theory suggests that coalitions may be assembled to 
promote collective interests. The implication of this is that, unlike elite theory, 
local politics may play a role in defining and shaping rather than simply 
legitimising a decision-making nexus. However, Wolman (1996) and Stoker 
(1995) note the difficulty of any participant in actively defining their role and 
destiny in the complex dynamic of global economic restructuring and 
government change. 
This theoretical context requires a grounding in the actual regimes which 
exist to provide a template for the observed phenomena in chapters 7 and 8. This 
final section of the chapter will address this by defining and suggesting a 
categorisation of regimes to contrast with real-world types. A regime, notes 
Stone(1989) 
" is an informal yet relativity stable group with access to institutional 
resources that enable it to have a sustained role in making governing 
decisions" (Stone 1989: 4). 
See Mollenkopf (1983) and Stone (1989) for a critique of elite and pluralist theories of urban 
government. 
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As such, a regime may not necessarily be a coherent organisation or 
association, but a grouping of influential individuals and institutions with 
differing powers and interests, who may share some policy objectives 
(Anttiroiko and Kainulainen 1998). 
US work on coalition building suggests that two key participants may 
T O 
play a part in coalitions: elected members and business parties. However, there 
are also key powers brought to bear by community interests and by 'officials' 
(see Harloe 1990) who may be employed by elected local government or work 
for various non-elected agencies. It is the knowledge resource that they bring to 
bear upon the coalition which provides their power. As such, the internal 
dynamics suggest that a number of regimes may form, dependent upon the 
relative strengths and the 'selective incentives' (Deas and Ward 2000) which are 
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brought to regimes by particular institutions and members. 
Anttiroiko and Kainulainen (1998) note that regimes, as noted above 
with institutional configurations, cover a broad spectrum and are dependent 
upon local factors. Such interdependence leads to four key types of regimes: 
• Pluralist regimes in which strong political leaders bring together a 
mixed set of private actors. 
• Elitist regimes which are run primarily by cohesive business elite. 
• Corporatist regimes, which Anttiroiko and Kainulainen assume to be 
relevant in the context of Northern countries,40 combine both strong 
political leaders and a relatively unified business elite. 
• Hyperpluralist regimes in which any governing coalitions can hardly 
be identified. 
(adapted from Anttiroiko and Kainulainen, 1998)41 
As Jessop (1997c) notes, complexity is a key factor in the determination 
and outcomes of governance at the local level. There are complex webs and 
networks of relationships, with economic and political pressures from the 
global, national, regional and local levels challenging the nature of regimes and 
Stoker (1995) therefore notes that urban regimes are dominated by two groups- the business elite (where 
it has a coherent voice), and political forces which "operate within a wider institutional and corporatist 
setting" (Stoker 1995: 63). The implication of this for regime theory is that the removal of an active 
coherent business elite, albeit with a residual influence, can condition the local responses to broader 
pressures through the leadership of local government. 
3 9 Ward (1997) notes an observable hierarchy of partners: those outside Local Authorities, Chambers of 
Commerce and TECs are generally consulted later in the policy formation process. 
4 0 i.e. Scandinavian Countries^ 
4 1 Stoker and Mossberger (1994) also note a categorisation of regimes dependent upon targets: Instrumental 
regimes which have short-term goals related to concrete projects; Symbolic regimes which revolve around 
ideological or image-building concerns; Transformative regimes whose prime concerns are expressive. 
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limiting autonomy and authority at the local level. Stoker and Mossberger 
therefore note that "the wider political context is critical in determining the 
terms of the relationship. The central state can be oppressive, or it can be a 
resource allowing localities to escape other forms of dependence... this, in turn, 
depends on the weight of local elites in the national political system and their 
ability to forge coalitions to extract resources on their own terms" (Stoker and 
Mossberger 1994: 199). The notion of regimes, I believe, allied to broader 
change in the national state form, provides a potential conceptual tool in which 
to place the governance structures which are articulated on the ground to govern 
TSEIs. Alongside (and informed by) notions of social capital outlined above, a 
locally-based yet nationally and locally informed methodology can be 
formulated to understand the reasons why TSEIs succeed or fail. This will be 
analysed empirically in chapters 7 and 8. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined a multi-scale framework to analyse the 
political, social and economic environments which influence the operation of 
TSEIs at the local level. Such a framework is contested and mediated through a 
number of scales, resulting in the institutional environment which directly 
influences the TSEI being a local composite of these macro-scale pressures. By 
employing the regulation approach, I have outlined the academic basis for 
understanding the manner in which global pressures may be mediated through 
national structures to promote a particular context which attempts to maintain 
the interests of capital accumulation. In turn, the shifts in the regulatory 
mechanism associated with the move from Fordism to after-Fordism have 
influenced the style and form of governance which has emerged in developed 
economies. This subsequently influences the governance structures which both 
directly and indirectly influence the operation of TSEIs. This stems most 
notably from the manner in which states, "seek to support initiatives from within 
civil society to provide new sources of employment and service provision in 
interstices from which the state has retreated and which the private sector 
previously found unattractive" (Hudson 2001: 67). This framework, and the 
pressures and tensions which result from it, will now be applied to the 
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development of the third sector as both a response to crisis in local regulatory 
systems and as a means to develop local economies and civil society. 
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Chapter 4 
Community Economic Development and 
Third Sector Employment and Training 
Initiatives. 
Introduction 
The previous two chapters have suggested a broad framework in which to 
place the workings of the third sector, which I will now analyse in this chapter. 
Chapter two noted the institutional turn within the academic literature, and the 
application of institutional approaches within regional economic development, 
to explain the institutional focus which may aid development. This subsequently 
has an impact upon the types of structures which may benefit TSEIs. Chapter 
three attempted to outline the political, economic and social framework in which 
a complex dynamic of global, national and regional forces interact to produce 
observable outcomes. These have been most notably a shift in the form of state 
and political economy which have evolved alongside and in response to the 
legitimating crises of the state in an after-Fordist global economic context. This 
has subsequently led to a change in the desired function and form of the state, to 
produce a shift from government to governance. Together, these different 
strands produce an institutional framework for a dominant view of the desired 
form of economic development, in which the space-specific features of 
economies have been targeted. 
It is in this context that a perceived and indeed real interest has 
emerged in the local as a scale for economic development, particularly in 
economically underdeveloped or 'excluded' localities (see for example DETR 
1998b). This scalar shift is informed by the discussion of social capital and 
regulation theory which suggests that, in economic development, geography 
matters. The result of this, I contend, has been a re-scaling of economic 
development efforts towards the local scale alongside (and perhaps in response 
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to) the limited success of top-down, inward- investment-led models of economic 
development. This draws upon arguments in chapter two regarding the status of 
social capital as a key institutional factor in determining the likelihood of 
success of failure of TSEIs alongside the formal institutions of governance and 
the changes in the state. 
Parallel to this re-emphasis on the local scale has been a debate 
concerning the role of the state and the mechanisms of service delivery. As 
noted above, the hollowing out of the welfare state mechanism towards a more 
'enabling' notion of local governance has shifted emphasis away from elected 
government towards non-state units as conduit for economic development 
strategies. This in turn has led to a renewal of interest in local endogenous 
growth potential as a means to develop excluded communities. As a function of 
this, the third sector, and more specifically Community Economic Development 
(CED), have become prominent over the last 20 years as there has been a re-
scaling of attempts to create local solutions to problems which are perceived to 
be locally-based. 
Together, these factors represent a significant shift in the focus of 
economic development, borne out of economic expediency in the light of 
international and local pressures. As the regulation approach suggests, the shift 
towards the social economy and third sector as a means to regenerate localities 
may be as much a response to crisis tendencies as a tentative move to a locally-
specific alternative to the Fordist economic organisational forms. 
To understand this shift, the historical evolution of community 
economic development will be briefly outlined, concentrating on the 
configurations in the late 20 t h century as CED became a key tenet of public 
policy in the UK and Europe. First, the reasoning behind the renewal of localism 
as the key area for economic development will be assessed. Second, I wil l 
examine the development of the sector to examine how and why this sector has 
come to be at the forefront of policy within developed economies. Third, the key 
claims made for the third sector as a means to regenerate economies either as an 
alternative to or as part of the economic mainstream will be examined. As part 
of this, I will draw on discourses emanating from the regulation approach 
outlined in chapter 3, to examine the possibility of the third sector or community 
economic development as a means to create local regulatory mechanisms 
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Accepting a role for CED as a legitimate, i f confused, element of 
economic renewal requires a study of the key factors which influence the 
workings of the sector. The chapter will conclude with an outline of the current 
thought with regard to the factors which support CED as a means to spearhead 
community revival. It is this potential revival of the third sector as a key means 
of reinvigorating local economies which provides a theoretical and policy 
grounding for the empirical studies undertaken in chapters 7 and 8. 
Localism : the Re-Scaling of Economic 
Intervention 
The policy shift away from reliance upon inward investment schemes 
and macro-scale employment policies is supported by a broad consensus of 
academics and policy makers who regard community-based regeneration as an 
innovative and effective way to deal with social and economic exclusion.42 
There is increasing acceptance that excluded or economically underdeveloped 
communities are structurally and institutionally disadvantaged and as such may 
not respond equally to traditional trickle- down regeneration schemes. As a 
result, there is a need for more spatially targeted regeneration strategies, which 
are locally defined and responsive. As part of this, the third sector therefore has 
an attraction as a more appropriate sectoral focus for regeneration schemes than 
the top-down export-base led models of development (Goetz and Clarke 1993; 
Birkholzer 1998). It is this synthesis of a sectoral and scalar shift which I will 
investigate in the remainder of this chapter. 
There has recently been an observed shift from regional or nationally-
targeted regeneration policies in the UK towards locally- based (and 
predominantly urban) schemes such as City Challenge and Single Regeneration 
Budget (SRB). This concentration by government is underlined by a conviction 
that spatial targeting will help mitigate problems in areas facing extreme and 
highly localised unemployment (European Commission 1996). Similarly, at the 
European scale the European Commission's White Paper, Growth, 
Competitiveness, Employment (1994) cites the localised spatial nature of 
" The local scale is becoming increasingly important in employment policy - see, for example, O E C D 
(1998 1999), Commission of the European Communities (1998); Campbell et al (1998); Campbell (1999). 
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unemployment as a key element in increasing disparities throughout the EU. As 
such, the local has begun to head the top of the research and policy agenda, 
under the rationale that, "'people' and 'places' should be taken together in the 
context of activities to tackle the problem - and that addressing social exclusion 
at the local level is one of the principal keys to stimulating the reconversion 
process more generally...Tackling directly the internal regional geography of 
social exclusion should, therefore, have visible and significant results for the 
region itself (European Commission 1996: 17).43 The reassertion that 
'geography matters' is crucial in determining both the perceived political and 
economic necessity for a third sector approach and the policy environment in 
which TSEIs operate. 
Robertson (1993; 1998) notes that the centralisation (or more accurately 
the up-scaling) of powers associated with internationalisation may lead to a 
separation of production and managerial functions of capital. As a result, a 
polarised economic environment is being created within an EU context where 
crisis areas or 'losers' (Dunford 1994) form alongside and within a range of 
successful regions or 'winners' such as those described above in chapter two. 
While some regions are able to adapt to the evolving economic environment, 
others have been hit both by the twin processes of deindustrialisation and the 
dismantling of the welfare state (Mingione 1991: 462). 
Robertson suggests that this tendency of polarisation is exacerbated by a 
macroeconomic policy management which stresses international 
competitiveness as the key tool of economic regeneration. Informed by an 
emphasis on inflation as a key economic target, Robertson notes a lack of 
sensitivity to local problems, stating that this single level of control "cannot 
avoid imposing irrational, dysfunctional and inefficient dependencies and 
rigidities" (1998: 304). 
Similarly, Campbell (1999) notes 7 reasons for this renewed localism: -
« The empirical existence of extensive spatial variations in employment/unemployment problems, 
making it essential to align actions to local needs. 
• The need for local 'intelligence' in tailoring actions to meet local needs. 
• Enhanced focus, targeting and flexibility in approach. 
• Greater involvement of local actors, increased 'ownership' and legitimacy for actions taken. 
• 'Closeness' to target groups and understanding their needs. 
• Implementation benefits deriving from information exchange, development of trust relations, 
more effective networking and interaction between agencies/groups. 
• Development of partnerships to provide 'joined up' solutions to multidimensional problems. 
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The result, notes Robertson, is a need for a multi-scalar analysis of 
development policies which can incorporate not only macro-scale economic 
policy but also an acceptance of the local as a means to regenerate localities 
through a locally appropriate process. He states, "The solution depends on 
developing a multilevel system of macroeconomic management, at subnational 
and supranational levels, as well as the national level. A twin-track approach, 
localising and internationalising, is needed to make local economic wellbeing a 
goal of economic policy, and to help create a more sustainable world economy" 
(1998: 301). 
CED and more broadly the third sector therefore represent a means to 
achieve two aims. First, it relieves pressure on the state as the sole focus of work 
creation, something which has become both politically and economically 
unsustainable in the hollowed-out post-Keynesian state. Consequently, there is 
political backing for a project which is seen to represent an alternative to 
mainstream public sector provision and its associated political and economic 
costs. Second, it represents a more locally targeted employment of resources 
which parallels notions of the more minimal post-Fordist welfare state. By 
attempting to utilise the resources of the community, this also represents a 
locally-defined and applied form of development which is perceived to be 
responsive to local needs. Taken together this represents a potentially new local 
fix to go alongside the perceived or real crisis in the economic system under 
international pressures. 
Exactly what is meant by these local, community based development 
initiatives is crucial to the understanding of how this sector has grown and 
become a key facet of local economic strategies. In the rest of this chapter, I will 
assess the features of the 'third sector' and examine how it has entered the 
policy and popular vernacular. Second, I wil l examine the contribution of 
Community Economic Development - the process by which the potential of the 
third sector as an economic solution is put into practice. Following this, I will 
focus on the academic and policy claims behind third sector employment 
initiatives as a means to regenerate economies. 
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Defining the Third Sector 
This acceptance and propagation of the third sector as the primary basis 
for regeneration activities is based in two premises. First, policies which are 
either wholly state or market oriented are inadequate to meet the employment 
needs of economically excluded communities. The private sector will not 
rationally operate in the absence of profit as incentive. Consequently, Campbell 
(1999) suggests that, "Third System organisations, whose objective is not profit 
maximisation, have intrinsic advantages. They are able to internalise negative 
externalities and produce positive externalities- this applies both to its [sic] 
ability to stimulate and connect supply and demand in consumption and its 
ability to produce 'employability' as a result of its integration activities. In short, 
they tackle market failure" (Campbell 1999: 28; see also Hudson 1995; Anheier 
and Ben-Ner 1997). In addition, the perceived limitations of public sector 
agencies as efficient service providers is leading to governments wishing to 
delegate responsibility for the management of services. As an acceptance of the 
realities of the global economy and the crisis of the welfare state (see for 
example Esping-Anderson, 1990), this therefore provides a compelling rationale 
for policymakers to explore the potential of the third sector. 
Second, there is a notion that the third sector offers a qualitatively better 
means to deliver certain welfare services. There is therefore a perceived role to 
be played by third sector organisations and more broadly civil society in 
bringing about economic and social change. Taken together, these two bases 
provide a philosophical and economic rationale for the propagation of the third 
sector as a cornerstone of New Labour policy which be analysed in chapter 6. 
The 'third sector' is not a modern phenomenon; Hudson (1995) traces its 
origins back to early Egyptian ideas of a strong moral code founded on social 
justice.44 As a visible facet of altruism in the UK, typically church-oriented 
charities played a role in service provision up until 1948. However Hudson 
states, "as state provision expanded, the role of the voluntary sector was seen as 
supplementary to state provision and not as the parallel system that had been 
envisaged earlier...for a period the third sector played second fiddle" (1995: 24). 
It is not the intention to engage in an exhaustive account of the development of the third sector; for fuller 
accounts, see Anheier and Seibel (1990); Hudson (1995); Borzaga et al (1999). 
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This dominance of the state, as associated with a welfare settlement in the 
Fordist regime of accumulation, has been eroded for a number of reasons as 
demonstrated in chapter 3. Consequently, the "possibility of engaging with the 
third sector has depended upon the 'invention' or 'discovery' of such a 
grouping" (Kendall 2000: 555). 
The modern roots of the third sector emanate from US scholars in the 
1970s (for example, Etzioni 1973). The term 'third sector' was then given 
weight by the influential Filer Commission (1975) which was initiated by J.D. 
Rockefeller as a means to describe and bring into common usage the 2.2 % of 
the US GDP in the 1970s which was not accounted for by the public and private 
sectors (Anheier and Seibel 1990) 4 5 In the EU, Kendall and Anheier (1999) 
trace recent interest in the third sector to the so-called Fontaine report published 
in 1987 (EC 1987). This paved the way for the acceptance of the 19 fields of 
work which have been cited by the EU as potential job creation areas.46 
In the UK, Kendall (2000) notes that the third sector was re-discovered 
in the late 1970s in the language of a sectoral partnership, but this was only used 
by key officials and bodies at the periphery of power (Kendall 2000: 555). The 
subsequent growth of the third sector over the last 20 years in the UK has been 
matched by a confusion regarding the definitions of the aims, features and forms 
of the sector and its components. The features of the third sector are often 
difficult to define, as it encompasses a number of activities and organisations, 
which by definition are not wholly state or market-led, but which may combine 
elements of state, market and voluntary sector within them. As such, the sector 
contains a vast range of activities outside or at the boundary of the traditional 
(but over-simplified) state-market dichotomy. It is unhelpful to characterise the 
third sector as a separate sphere altogether, either between or adjacent to the 
public and private sectors. This definition is inevitably inadequate as it fails to 
comprehend the myriad of cross-sectoral linkages of organisations which do not 
fall wholly within the public or private sectors. 
As such the term 'third sector' is proscriptive in that it was rediscovered at a time "when politicians and 
policymakers in most Western societies began to reconsider the division of labor between the public and 
the private sectors, and to examine ways of reducing state responsibilities" (Anheier and Seibel 1990: 8). 
4 6 See Kendall and Anheier (1999: 287) for a chronological description of the key events shaping E U 
policy towards the third sector. 
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The third sector is therefore often conceptualised through a study of the 
types of organisations which it encompasses. However, the third sector is a 
varied and confused grouping of organisations with a variety of sizes, aims, 
historical development and alliances with the public and private spheres.47 Some 
such organisations may have primarily social functions, broadly intended to 
improve the quality of life within a community, however defined. Alternatively, 
organisations may have a role in enhancing the economic status of a community, 
be it through the creation of community businesses, services, support networks 
or directly via local job creation initiatives. However this remains inadequate 
as a definition as it does not fully comprehend the interrelationships of 
organisations across sectors. Indeed, the dynamic nature of each sector suggests 
that there is a fluidity of movement between and across sectors as policy 
changes, organisations change legal status, and contracting brings organisations 
towards public/private status. 
Consequently a workable definition of the third sector is difficult to 
establish, but Anheier and Seibel (1990) use the term third sector to "designate 
all organisations which are neither profit-oriented businesses nor governmental 
agencies or bureaucracies"(1990: 7). 4 9 This is similar in context to the US/UK 
definitions of the non-profit sector, located between private, for-profit and 
public sectors. In a European context, however, the definition of the third sector 
and its complementary facets varies significantly over space: each national 
version is dependent upon historical contingencies and legal structures. This 
complexity, note Kendall and Anheier (1999), stems from the fact that 
individual states have over time treated differently the organizations which fall 
between or outside the state and market. (For example, the Italian third sector is 
notable for its unique legal status - see Borzaga and Maiello 1998). As a result, 
this lack of precision necessitates a clearer definition of what is meant by the 
third sector. 
4 7 A vast array of organisations have been cited as being part of the third sector, including: charities, 
voluntary organisations, co-operatives, credit unions, L E T S , trade unions, church groupings, sporting clubs, 
community associations, tenants and residents organisations, ethnic or interest-based groupings (Hudson 
1995; Salaman and Anheier 1996). 
4 8 Hudson (1995) suggests that this incorporates 3 key overlapping areas: charities (as legally defined); 
voluntary organisations (as charities but not legally registered); N G O s which can be either voluntary or 
charitable. 
4 9 This residual view is slightly unsatisfactory as it defines the sector by what it is not. Kendall (2000) 
suggests that the third sector has "benefited in part by what it can claim not to be - neither the market not 
the state - rather than from what it is, or has actually achieved" (Kendall 2000: 555). 
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Substantively, Anheier and Seibel (1990) note 3 potential criteria by 
which to define third sector organisations. First, they note the Institutional 
Characteristics of Organisations through the criteria of private, not for profit 
and non-governmental sectors. However, such a definition, as Anheier and 
Seibel note, is difficult both due to the fact that societies define such sectors 
with different criteria, and to the shifting and contested place of organisations 
within these criteria, particularly organisations with several arms. 
Second, Anheier and Seibel draw on the notion of Organisational 
Rationale to place public and private sectors. They note that third sector 
organisations tend to be driven by altruism as a foremost but not overriding 
concern. Drawing on Reichard's (1988) 4 variables of means rationality, 
formality, solidarity, and type of exchange they suggest that "third sector 
organizations tend to be characterized by lower degrees of means rationality and 
formality, and higher degrees of solidarity and direct exchange" (Anheier and 
Seibel 1990: 12). 
Third, Anheier and Seibel note the Sectoral Function of the third sector 
as a means to supply goods and services which cannot or will not be provided by 
other sectors. Drawing on American micro-economic school (Hansmann 1987) 
they suggest that third sector organisations fill niches where market failure has 
shown the public and private spheres to be inadequate. Taking this argument 
further, Neo-corporatist theories suggests that the third sector offers a buffer 
zone to reduce tensions and societal conflicts. Through the third sector's 
particular organisational capabilities it can fill niches which are thought to be 
'unsolvable' by the public/private (and family) spheres.50 
An alternative description of the 'non profit' sector is provided by 
Salaman and Anheier (1996: 13-15): 
• The organisation is formally constituted, it has an 'institutional reality'. 
This does not necessarily imply legal incorporation but does imply a 
degree of organisational permanence. 
• It is organisationally separate from government and has the legal form of 
a private institution. 
• It is non profit distributing (this was originally defined as 'non profit-
seeking'). Profits can be made but are not distributed to its 'owners' or 
As such, the third sector is regarded as a key element in retaining social cohesion (see for example 
Anheier 2000). As an extension of this, see Rolfs (1995) on the role of U S non-profits as a placatory 
economic tool. 
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board. The organisation is in that sense non commercial in purpose, but 
rather seeks a wider 'public' purpose. 
• It is self governing. 
• It involves a degree of voluntary participation in its conduct or 
management 
The exact size of the non-state/ non market sector is hard to estimate due to 
these definitional problems. However, the provisional results from a CIRIEC 
report (April 1999) suggest that the overall contribution of cooperatives, mutuals 
and associations provides 1,681,500 jobs in the UK or 6.59% of employment.51 
In Europe, the influence of third sector activity on jobs is yet more significant: 
Hargreaves (1998: 30) notes EU estimates that one in seven new jobs in France 
and one in eight in Germany are created by the third sector. Salaman and 
Anheier (1996) suggest that in the period 1980-1990 the sector accounted for 
13% of all net new jobs created in the EU. 
It is this job creation role, in which the third sector is mobilised into a 
process to produce outcomes, that has been a key element of community 
regeneration initiatives over recent years. This is in part a recognition of the 
spatial inequalities and failings of current economic development policies. There 
has therefore been a focus upon the third sector as a tool of economic 
regeneration in policy statements, both from national government in the UK 
with the New Deal for Communities (DETR 1998b) and from European 
Commission in the form of the 'Era of tailor-made jobs' (CEC, 1998) and the 
'Third System and Employment' (EU 1999). These policies have at their root 
the conviction that the third sector has a role in either forming a bridge between 
welfare (and perhaps welfare dependency) and formal sector employment, or as 
an alternative economic space. How this translates into the process of 
community economic development will now be discussed. 
Community Economic Development 
CED has grown as a synthesis of Local Economic Development (LED) 
and Community Development (CD) (European Commission 1996). LED 
emphasises the encouragement of development through supply-side initiatives to 
Kendall and Almond (1999) suggest that, depending on definitions, the sector now employs between 2% 
and 6% of the U K paid labour force, and accounts for between 3% and 9% of Gross Domestic Product, if a 
value is imputed to account for the contribution of volunteers. 
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"foster conditions favourable to the attraction of inward investment and the 
creation and promotion of indigenous economic activity in all its forms" 
(European Commission 1996: 18). In contrast, Community Development refers 
to a broader concept of "social" development of communities, whether or not 
these are spatially defined communities.52 As part of the synthesis of these two 
ideas, CED offers a means to produce locally targeted outcomes within a 
framework which acknowledges the needs of communities to expand and adapt 
social capacities. As such, CED "acknowledges the mutually self-reinforcing 
links between the 'social' and the 'economic' in the endogenous process of 
community, local and regional reconversion" (European Commission 1996: 19). 
Consequently, by the early 1980s the notion of CED as "a more innovative, 
internally-oriented approach to local economic regeneration began to attract 
increasing support" (Twelvetrees 1998: 303). It has a particular attraction, notes 
Twelvetrees, because it, "aims to mobilise unused local resources- especially 
unemployed people- to meet local needs. It places emphasis of fostering a 
greater degree of internal economic self-reliance, rather than reinforcing 
external dependency" (Twelvetrees 1998: 303). 
As with the third sector, defining CED poses difficulties due to its 
evolution as an academic and policy construct with the associated attached 
agendas. However, for the purpose of clarity here I employ a definition of CED 
as, "the collective term for a number of strategies and activities which have as 
their aim an improvement in the economic and social health of a community" 
(European Commission 1996: 17). This works in three ways to encourage local 
communities to engage in the regeneration process: via capacity building, 
programme bending, and community linkage (European Commission 1996). 
The definition of TSEIs/CED reflects two strands of thought which 
have significantly affected the development of thought and practice within the 
sector. Broadly, these two typologies may be split in to the 'alternative' and the 
'stepping stone' typologies. First, the 'alternative' hypothesis, I contend, draws 
its base from an academic analysis which seeks to portray the potential of the 
third sector as a sustainable, separate alternative to the workings and edicts of 
5 2 The notion of community has a number of meanings, referring at once to spatial, ethnic, interest or 
demographic communities. In this context 1 wish to employ a predominantly spatial definition, as a means 
to address C E D as an inherently inclusionary process within territorial boundaries. This however, 
acknowledges the permeability of such spatial concepts. 
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the formal economy. Second, the 'stepping stone' typology is more favoured by 
the EU and many neo-liberal governments, whose primary lens on the economy 
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is through the formal sectors of the state and market. As a consequence, EU 
literatures regard TSEIs as additional but as yet underdeveloped arms of the 
mainstream economy. This typology consequently regards the third sector as a 
means to 'recolonise' spaces from which the state or market sector have 
withdrawn or in which they are inadequate. Consequently, the third sector and 
CED are placed firmly within the mainstream, or, more accurately, as means to 
reintegrate the 'excluded' economic spheres into the mainstream. It is this 
dichotomy I now wish to examine. 
CED : an Alternative to the Formal Economy? 
The proposal of the third sector as an alternative to the mainstream is 
couched in the notion that the third sector offers a conceptually different 
approach to economic development. As an academic exercise, this involves a re-
assessment of micro-economics to produce an approach which can offer 
sustainable development in a form which is not dependent upon the formal 
sector. Proponents of this approach include Birkholzer (1998) who suggests that 
the third sector has the potential to achieve a number of objectives which have 
been elusive to trickle-down based regeneration schemes. Birkholzer suggests 
that CED has the capacity to achieve the following which set it apart from other 
regeneration activities: 
• A New Economic Dimension, which relates needs, services and resources in 
a manner which allows the community to reach its endogenous potential: the 
notion of'local work performed by local people, using local resources'. 
• Social Investment: how effectively to allow the latent skills of the 
community to achieve personal and community development, thus requiring 
investment in human capital rather than solely in infrastructure 
improvements. 
• Employment as Unemployment: communities in which there is a high 
degree of unemployment have no lack of work to be done, yet the 
joblessness is structurally reproduced within the economy. 
5 3 Similarly, Williams et al (2001) suggest a twofold categorisation of the role of the third sector in the third 
way. They state, "First, there is the view that its key role is to create jobs, improve employability and thus 
fill the jobs gap left by the private and public sectors. Second, there is the view that its principal role is to 
facilitate community self-help in order to provide alternative means of livelihood beyond employment" 
(Williams et al 2001, available online at http://www.geog.le.ac.uk/ijccr/5no3.htm). 
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• Adjacent markets: Community Economic Development offers the possibility 
of a move away from the export base model of regeneration pervasive in 
Inward Investment-led regeneration policies. CED may provide a more 
appropriate scale for development, which does not leave jobs at the mercy of 
the globalised market-place and management decisions made by absentee 
managers in head offices. 
• CED offers the prospect of Sustainability: this marks a potential shift of 
perspective away from long term economic growth as the aim of 
development towards more ecologically and socially sustainable quality of 
life goals. 
Consequently, this conceptualisation of CED, adapted from Birkholzer 
(1998), begins from the premise that people in their local communities, however 
marginalized, have an unrealised capacity to contribute to an alternative sphere 
of economic activity (see also Friedmann 1992; Hudson and Weaver 1997). 
Beyond the narrow employment and training emphasis of the current 
policy environment, Williams et al (2001) suggest a move away form the notion 
of full employment towards one of full engagement. Full engagement is defined 
as "a situation in which all citizens who are able can engage in work (either 
employment or community self-help) in order to meet their basic material needs 
and creative desires" (Williams et al 2001).54 Williams et al continue to suggest 
that, "At the heart of this approach is thus an understanding of the need to 
reduce the perceived importance attached to conventional employment and 
recognise people's broader social contributions by valuing the vast and growing 
amount of self-help activity that takes place in society" (Williams et al 2001). In 
this sense, the third sector offers an opportunity to create the conditions for such 
self-help to develop. This subsequently produces the possibility of the third 
sector to promote self-help and employment both at the edges of and beyond the 
market economy. 
This Utopian image of the local economy, where local initiatives provide 
empowerment for communities to meet local needs via the use of unused or 
under-utilised resources, is a powerful vision. This represents a break from the 
mainstream economy in that it offers the potential of an alternative economy 
organised around different priorities, which may in the long run provide a more 
sustainable solution to some of the problems of excluded communities. 
W i l l i a m s et al (2001) , available online at: http:/ /www.geog.le .ac.uk/ijccr/5no3.htm 
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Taking this analysis beyond the economic sphere, the potential of CED 
to form a grounding for a new and localised form of regulation is explored by 
Filion (1998). He notes that CED is both a symptom of and a response to post-
Fordist notions of globalisation, hollowing out of the state, and 
internationalisation of capital. Taking on this argument, in a regulation-
theoretical approach, Filion (1998) suggests that the realities of CED and post-
Fordism could potentially synthesise to produce new regulatory spheres at the 
local level which are significantly non-dependent upon the mainstream 
economy. 
However, Filion (1998) suggests that the reality of post-Fordism acts to 
limit the potential of CED as a means to form the grounding of a local 
regulatory system. First, through limited capital availability, CED is currently 
restricted from providing the full range of services which are provided by the 
public or private sectors. Second, the linkages within CED, formed mostly on 
the basis of voluntary linkages, lack binding power. Consequently, the legal 
structures which are required to represent a comprehensive regime of 
accumulation and which characterised Fordism are unachievable. As a result, 
CED in its current form can be conceptualised more as a facet of the after-
Fordist regimes which are multi-scalar attempts to avert crisis emanating from 
the polarisation caused by the internationalisation of capital. This is not to deny 
the potential of local regulatory systems incorporating, but not wholly based on, 
the third sector. However, a comprehensive CED-led regulatory environment 
remains a distant aspiration for its proponents. 
CED as a 'Stepping-Stone' 
This conceptualisation of the potential of CED as an alternative to the 
mainstream is in contrast to the 'ladder' or 'stepping stone' approach into the 
mainstream. This views the third sector as "being able to help f i l l the jobs gap 
left by the public and private sectors" and which "dominates current discourse" 
(Williams et al 2001), appearing pervasive in much EU policy and literatures 
(see for example CEC 1998; EU 1999). Broadly, this approach regards the third 
sector as an additional arm of the formal economy or a springboard into 
employment (Williams et al 2001), which is able to produce positive outcomes 
in spaces which have been disadvantaged by the workings of the market 
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economy.55 From this standpoint the value of the third sector therefore "lies in 
its ability to generate jobs and improve employability so as to facilitate a return 
to full-employment" (Williams et al 2001). 
As such, this approach relies upon several key themes which aim to 
produce, via the third sector, stepping stones towards the re-integration of 
excluded and particularly unemployed people into the economic mainstream. 
Campbell (1999) suggests that this may be achieved by a number of flows: 
Fig 4.1 The Potential Contribution of the Third System to Employment and 










3. Job Creation 
2. Indirect 
Employment 
The typology introduced here is inevitably a simplification. The 
complexity of reality suggests CED, in its diversity, simultaneously represents 
an amalgam of the 'stepping stone' and 'alternative' themes. For example, while 
a third sector organisation may begin life as a proponent of the 'alternative' 
vision, reality may force initiatives to react to the necessity of funding regimes 
to ensure survival as a matter of economic expediency. Within any initiative, 
there may be a number of arms which have different objectives, from those 
which engage with the formal sector as community businesses to those which 
have contractual arrangements with the state or market to areas which are purely 
community-oriented alternatives to the market. As such when constructing a 
sampling strategy and methodology for the assessment of such initiatives in 
chapter 5, the acceptance of multiple objectives is crucial. 
5 5 Amin et note that "for many policy-makers, the social economy offers a means of easing the pressure on 
the exchequer and acts only as a bridge between welfare dependency and absorption into the 'mainstream 
economy'" (Amin et al 1998:3 ). 
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CED: An Incomplete Solution? 
The economic rationale for the concentration of resources towards the 
most excluded communities in order to regenerate the economic base is clear. In 
cost terms, the gross cost per unit or job created may be equivalent to those 
created by macro-scale regeneration policies, and indeed in terms of exchequer 
costs the net cost may be minimal due to increased tax returns and lower benefit 
payments. However, it is possible that the marginal benefit to community and 
economy of each job wil l be higher in economically depressed communities. 
What money is available may be redirected back into the community to enhance 
the multiplier effects of the available resources.56 However, CED schemes wil l 
constantly be subject to their own trickle-down effect, due to the nature of any 
development scheme. While CED may be more appropriate to the needs of the 
local community, monetary gains will be inevitably be restricted to a relatively 
select proportion of the community who find jobs or monetary benefit through 
regeneration schemes (Twelvetrees 1998). 
Alongside this, CED has the aim of improving the allocation of 
resources in such a way as to enhance quality of life in a broad sense. Through 
the adoption of policies which aim to stimulate the local economy through 
monetary intervention in the market or through matching of needs and resources 
as may be achieved with LETS schemes, CED has been held up as a means to 
help develop communities as a whole. As part of this, the supposed 
democratisation of the decision-making process has been key to notions of 
community empowerment (although see chapter 3 on governance, regime theory 
and their empirical analyses). 
Within the paradigm of CED, the role of community-based or third 
sector organisations has been brought to the fore as governments stress 
partnership and empowerment as the keys to regeneration. However, in contrast 
to the image of CED and third sector partnerships, Amin et al (1999) suggest 
that localisation of responsibility for regeneration is a double-edged sword. 
While CED may be a suitable means by which to empower communities to find 
self-help solutions to their problems, with empowerment comes the transfer of 
responsibilities towards such communities. The state may therefore use the third 
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sector as a means to rescind its own responsibilities to provide adequate services 
for the community, or attempt to use partnership with local partners as a means 
to produce a cut-price welfare state. 
Rather than the social economy [or CED] becoming the potentially 
innovative alternative to the strictures of the formal economy, Amin et al (1998) 
state that "the approach of the UK government seems to be that the social 
economy should serve as a subordinate, intermediary partner of the mainstream 
private sector economy and as a means of passing responsibility for certain 
aspects of welfare and regeneration out of the public sector" (Amin et al 1998: 
15; see also Amin et al 1999). What is being created, therefore, is a welfare state 
'on the cheap', which is attractive to policy makers and taxpayers alike. 
Despite these caveats, there is clear evidence that CED can have a 
significant role in ameliorating the quality of life and employment prospects in a 
qualitatively better manner than private-sector or supply-side local economic 
development schemes. Through its direct contribution to regional economic 
reconversion, social inclusion and sustainable development, CED can lay claim 
to represent a model for an alternative approach to "trickle down" (European 
Commission 1996). 
Whether or not CED has the potential to achieve a localised regulatory 
framework, it remains clear in the UK's most deprived communities that the 
influence of external pressures through the neo-liberal economic policies of the 
UK government still remains. As such, the CED remains one way to ameliorate 
local conditions alongside the mainstream economy. Combining this potential of 
CED and the debates concerning social capital and governance, the task is to 
determine exactly what the factors are which produce successful outcomes, and 
their limitations. Exactly how the interplay of organisational cultures, local 
factors and social capital produce successful outcomes wil l now be explored. 
CED and the Conditions for Success 
The third sector, in the form of CED, has been embraced as a means to 
counteract the potentially divisive impact of the market economy. However, the 
potential of CED to achieve its goals requires counterbalancing with the realities 
5 6 For studies of positive and negative multiplier effects involved in job creation or loss in the context of 
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of post-industrial regions with specific labour markets and institutional 
capacities. It is in this context that I wish to draw upon the claims made in 
chapters 2 and 3 for the impacts of local social capital and governance and the 
discussion of the potential of the third sector. From this, I will provide an 
overview of the current state of knowledge regarding the supporting factors and 
potential barriers which may or may not allow TSEIs to achieve their potential. 
However, it is not the intention here to provide an exhaustive account of the 
factors believed to be crucial in determining the success of TSEIs. Rather, by 
acknowledging that success and/or failure are a product of many interrelated 
factors, I will attempt to produce a conceptual basis for the study of the 
contextual factors which influence TSEIs. This will subsequently provide a 
template for the empirical work in chapters 7 and 8 which wil l assess the 
contribution of institutions and governance to the potential success of TSEIs in 
North-East England and South Wales. 
'External' Influences on CED 
The factors which influence the potential development of TSEIs can be 
broadly categorised as 'external' and 'internal' influences (see for example 
Campbell 1999). This categorisation, whilst inevitably attempting to simplify 
essentially fluid and overlapping analytic concepts, nonetheless provides a basis 
for analysing why certain initiatives succeed or fail. 'External' influences refer 
to those factors which are beyond the immediate control of the initiative itself, 
and which occur at a number of scales. These range from the EU level, where 
policy decisions relate both indirectly to TSEIs (via legal structures, competition 
policy), and directly via structural funds. While this may be a key organising 
factor at the European level, Kendall and Anheier (1999) note that the manner in 
which such aspirations are translated into the policy process at the national level 
is a function of national agendas. 
At the national level the macro-economic policies pursued shape the local 
labour, employment and training markets. These are of significant impact upon 
the economic context in which TSEIs find themselves located. More directly, at 
the national level, policies directly related to TSEIs such as Single Regeneration 
colliery closures, see for example Hudson et al (1984). 
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Budget (SRB), the Urban Programme and City Challenge in the UK find their 
political backing on the national scale while their impacts tend to be felt locally. 
Chapter 6 will discuss New Labour policies and their influence upon the 
political and economic context of the third sector regeneration and employment 
initiatives. 
National government also has a significant role in influencing the 
trajectory and capabilities of local governments, which have a role both in terms 
of local service delivery and also as key partners and funders of TSEIs (Taylor, 
1997; Balloch and Taylor 2001). As noted above in chapter 3, local government 
and its associated institutional forms have a role in determining the outcomes of 
pressures at the local scale. Through their influence in partnership working, 
local government and non-governmental institutions involved in governance 
have an increasing role to play in regeneration and in consequence CD and 
CED. Informed theoretically by the discussion of regime theory, the myriad of 
institutions which have become partners in regeneration (from RDAs to quasi-
state institutions and local government) shapes the decision-making and 
implementation process of regeneration policy through partnership. This 
relationship, recently formalised in the form of the Compact on Relations 
Between Government and the Voluntary and Community Sector (Home Office 
1998), and also elucidated by Taylor (1997), is a crucial factor in determining 
the likelihood of success and failure of TSEIs. 
However such concepts are to a significant degree dependent on the 
notions of local social capital outlined above in chapter 2. Through the 
configuration of attitudes, institutions (both formal and informal), skills and 
capacities, the development potential of the local third sector can be influenced. 
This influence may be either supportive in terms of key players who possess the 
capacities and linkages to produce successful outcome, or, in some cases, 
unsupportive through a mistrust of TSEI operations or a fragmented and divisive 
struggle within the community or any given project. 
Taken together these place-specific attributes of any locality, situated 
within a broader institutional and policy framework, provide a template for 
'external' factors which can propel a TSEI towards success or failure. The local 
Note for example the EU Objective One status ascribed to South Wales in 2000. 
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institutional facets are summarized by Healey et al (1999), who draw upon a 
case study of the Grainger Town initiative in Newcastle. They note that this 
broad-based definition of governance creates a series of influences on initiatives 
through what they categorise as knowledge resources, relational resources and 
mobilisation capabilities. These three concepts, they suggest, can be used as a 
template to understand the external pressures on third sector partnerships. Table 
4.1 summarizes the criteria by which each resource may be identified and the 
subsequent qualities of what they regard as successful initiatives. 
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Table 4.1: 'External' Influences on Third Sector Partnerships 
(Adapted from Healey et al 1999). 








• Access to and use of a rich range of knowledge. 
• Conscious reflection and development of frames of 
reference. 
• These are shared among a broad range of those involved. 
• The range and frames are continuously developed 
through introduction and invention of new ideas, and the 









• A web of relations involved in the initiative which is 
broad in the stakeholders it reaches and rich in the bonds 
which bind the networks. 
•Web-like patterns, but with clear nodal points, to which 
access from many points is possible. 
•Sufficient network integration channels that connections 
can be made between key locality-focused nodal points in 
'families' of networks. 
• Good links with regulatory and resource allocating 










• Be located in contexts where there are structural shifts 
which create opportunities for change and there should be 
some agreement about what are the best opportunities to 
target. 
• Have a capability to identify the arenas where key 
resource and regulatory power lies, and where real changes 
can be made (eg; by the development of new networks or 
lobbying capacity, or by generating significant shifts in 
frames of reference) and a capacity for sustained targeting 
of these arenas. 
• Possess a rich repertoire of mobilisation techniques to 
use and a capacity for explicit selection of appropriate 
techniques for specific situations. 
• Access to skilled 'change agents' to operate at critical 
'nodal points' on the routes to 'power', who can 
concentrate effort and avoid its diffusion, but the 
mobilisation effort should not be so dependent on them 
that it cannot survive beyond the individuals concerned. 
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'Internal' Factors Influencing CED 
The 'internal' attributes of TSEIs are similarly important in determining 
the success or failure of an initiative. This strand of enquiry draws 
predominantly upon the 'managerial' literatures emanating from public/private 
sector organisations although these have been adapted towards the specific 
needs of voluntary and third sector organisations' needs (See for example 
Hudson 1995; Billis and Harris (eds.) 1996; Leach and Unsworth 1999). As 
such, this significant body of work provides an outline of the managerial stances 
taken by TSEIs to produce desired outcomes. Hudson (1995: 39) suggests that 
the internal factors affecting third sector or non-profit organisations differ from 
those of the private sector due to seven key factors: 
1. It is easy to have vague objectives 
2. Performance is hard to monitor 
3. Organizations are accountable to many stakeholders 
4. Management structures are intricate 
5. Voluntarism is an essential ingredient 
6. Values have to be cherished 
7. There is no financial 'bottom line' to determine priorities 
Consequently, Borzaga et al (1999: 38) notes that third sector 
organisations differ in organisational form and therefore have particular needs 
and resources which can help to define success or failure: 
a) Their participatory structure (consumers and/or workers often directly participate 
in the decision-making process) and democratic management; they ensure not only 
trust relations but also strong stakeholder commitment to the organization's 
mission. 
b) Their multi-stakeholder nature, which guarantees either direct participation in 
management by several groups of stakeholders (for example, consumers and 
workers together, but also representatives of the local community), or other 
organizational devices designed to take account of the stakeholders' interests. 
c) The presence of voluntary workers who, as well as providing free work resources, 
also exercise control over the match between the activity carried out and the 
mission of the organization. 
d) Close links with the local community, its needs, but also its resources (human, 
technical, organizational, financial). 
e) A propensity to collaborate among new third sector organisations, and to create 
second-level (and, sometimes, third-level) organizations, also in order to overcome 
diseconomies of scale deriving from small size. 
Nutt (2000: 78) suggests that the organisation's role in society dictates the governance arrangements 
most suited to the aims of the organisation. Consequently, decision-making processes vary between and 
within sectors. 
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f) A strong propensity towards innovation and experimentation, in terms of both 
services provided and of the ways in which they are provided; donations and 
voluntary work reduce the costs and the risks of innovations. 
Hudson (1995) also notes Board Competencies as a key factor in 
producing successful outcomes. Drawing on the work of Chait (1991), he notes 
six dimensions of board structures which create positive environments (see also 
Billis and Harris 1996 for a discussion of management models). 
Table 4.2: Management Strategies for TSEIs (adapted from Hudson 1995: 
51) 
Competency Definition 
Contextual dimension The board understands and takes into 
account the values and beliefs of the 
organization it governs. 
Educational dimension The board ensures that board members 
are well informed about the organization, 
the profession and the board's role, 
responsibilities and performance. 
Inter-personal dimension The board nurtures the development of 
members as a group and fosters a sense of 
cohesion. 
Analytical dimension The board recognizes complexities in the 
issues it faces and draws upon different 
perspectives to find appropriate solutions. 
Political dimension The board accepts the need to develop 
healthy relationships with key 
constituencies. 
Strategic dimension The board helps ensure a strategic 
approach to the organization's future. 
However, as noted above, the 'loose and baggy monster' (Kendall and 
Knapp 1996) of the third sector and CED has a diversity of organisations, with a 
number of aims and objectives. Consequently, the complexity of reality requires 
a template which accommodates the managerial priorities of any organisation. 
Taken as a whole, the internal and external factors interact to produce specific 
outcomes. The barriers to the development of third sector organisations are 
summarised by Borzaga et al (1999), (table 4.3). 
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Table 4.3: Barriers to the Development of the Third System 
External Internal 
General 





- over-estimation of the roles of "the 
market" and of "the state" as institutions 
able to respond to economic and social 
needs. 
Environmental: 
- mismatch between growing demand for 
services and existing social policies, 
which mainly provide financial subsidies 
for families. 
- a too-stringent fiscal policy, which 
impedes the growth of private demand for 
services. 
Institutional: 
- lack of appropriate legislation on 
contracting-out procedures. 
- overlap between labour policies and 
social policies supporting TS 
development. 
Managerial: 
- lack of a labour supply possessing the 
managerial and professional skills needed 
to provide services. 
- lack of quality control systems for the 
social services provided by private 
organisations. 
Co-ord i nation/Competition: 
- lack of co-ordination and/or excessive 
price competition among organisations 
providing the same kinds of service 
and/or working for the same clients. 
Cultural: 
- preference for the bureaucratic 







of the TSOs) 
Cultural: 
- lack of a "TS" culture (which role for 
what aim) in society as a whole. 
- misunderstanding of the role of TS as 
social capital versus social services 
producers. 
Institutional: 
- lack of a clear legal definition/ 
framework for TS. 
- bureaucratic barriers imposed by public 
bodies. 
Competition: 
- unfair competition by the informal 
economy. 
- barriers to entry. 
Cultural: 
- lack of a "TS culture" (which role what 
aim) within the TS orgnisations 
themselves. 
Managerial: 
- client/service orientation or job 
creation/employability orientation? 
- lack of managers for the new TS. 
- difficulties in accessing financial 
resources, especially for investments, 
planning and partnerships. 
Co-ordination/Competition 
- lack of a well-developed system of 
second level TS organisations (for 
organisational, technical and financial 
support). 
- competition between traditional well 
established TS and new ones. 
Note: TS= Third System 
(adapted from Borzaga et al 1999: 38) 
However, despite such a core set of values which may help to determine 
the barriers to the success of TSEIs, there are significant international 
differences. There is scope elsewhere to analyse these in more detail; however I 
feel it appropriate here to note that there are many different types of structural 
mechanisms which operate at the national scale. As such, there are a multitude 
of differing forms of regulation which may be operating internationally, and 
which may not reflect the similar political, social and economic structures which 
I wil l outline later in the thesis. 
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Salamon and Anheier (1996, 2000) note the differing theories of the 
nonprofit sector, and as such provide a conceptual framework for the study of 
the nonprofit sector internationally. Salamon and Anheier note their 'Social 
Origins Theory of Nonprofits' to understand the nonprofit sector as opposed a 
number of theories outlined in economics and sociology. They suggest that the 
their approach to the development of the nonprofit sector, and one which has 
been drawn out here, that "treats the nonprofits sector not as an isolated 
phenomenon floating freely in social space but as an integral part of a social 
system whose role and scale is a byproduct of a complex set of historical 
forces"(Salamon and Anheier 2000: 21). 
What is more, it suggests that these forces are far from random. Rather, 
distinctive patterns are evident that can be analysed and compared. However, the 
complexity of local and national, as well as regional, influences upon the 
development of the nonprofits sector are acknowledged and the specificities of 
the sector and the institutional environment in which each initiative sits. 
Examples of the cross- national differences are key in the understanding 
of the nonprofit sector, and hence the need to understand the social, legal, 
institutional and governmental limits to the third sector. However, the inevitable 
complexity of situations mean that the complete analysis of the factors which 
internationally influence the development of the third sector and the 
employment function analysed here is difficult. 
More broadly, Salamon and Anheier note that there are 4 types of 
development forms for the nonprofits sector, dependent upon the synergy of 
state and society to enhance this. This work draws upon the categorisation 
undertaken by Esping-Anderson (1990) in reference to welfare states. This 
draws upon the cross-reference of the level of government social welfare 
spending and the scale of the nonprofits sector. This produces a 4-way model of 
non-profit regimes (statist, liberal, social democratic and corporatist). 
Individual country studies have been embarked upon to understand these 
local, regional and international influences upon the third sector, and hence the 
possibilities of the sector achieving some form of success or failure. It is not the 
place here to study in intricate detail the influences in detail, although an 
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Ecotec study does note that specialist market knowledge, wage subsidies, tax 
breaks and training subsidies can all help to develop third sector employment 
initiatives in Europe. However, national differences lead to the conclusion that, 
"the specificity of the support mechanisms in place (public subsidies, support 
structures etc), or the legislative framework make it difficult to transfer the 
model developed as such to another EU country." (Ecotec 2000:50)60 
Conclusions 
This discussion of the third sector and community development has 
outlined several key themes. First, the shift towards the local as the key scale for 
economic development has been noted. Parallel to this, the rapid 
(re)development of the third sector has been outlined, particularly in its guise as 
Community Economic Development. Second, the claims for and approaches to 
CED as either an alternative to the mainstream or as a key element of re-
integration into the formal economy have been examined. Finally, the key 
factors, both internal and external, which influence the development potential of 
the CED have been noted. However, up to this point one key ingredient has 
been neglected. Intrinsically, success and failure, i f measured by the mere 
survival of initiatives or raw outputs, is crucially dependent upon the level, 
accessibility and duration of funding available (or the ability to generate 
reserves). However, the funding of TSEIs also influences the manner in which 
evaluations take place and the dissemination of those evaluations as examples of 
best practice. There are significant omissions and methodological challenges to 
the body of knowledge which has been created, therefore providing a starting 
point for the empirical research carried out within this thesis. The 
methodological challenges this presents wi l l now be discussed. 
Ecotec Special Study of Third System Approaches to Service Provision and Job Creation. Available 
online at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/empl&esfy3systyspecialstudies2000_en.pdf 
6 0 Ecotec Special Study of Third System Approaches to Service Provision and Job Creation. 
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Chapter 5: Methodological Framework 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to outline briefly the central questions raised by the 
review of the relevant literature which forms the focus for the research 
undertaken into TSEIs. These theoretical issues will be discussed in the first 
part of this chapter, to clarify the theoretical underpinning for the research 
agenda. The object of the thesis is to investigate the internal organisational 
structures and the external institutional and governance structures which 
influence the success or failure of non-formal sector employment and training 
projects in the UK. This will be attempted through analysis of projects and their 
institutional contexts within contrasting localities in the UK. This theme is built 
around the notion that the processes involved in the operation of Third Sector 
Employment Initiatives involve a complex set of relations which are embedded 
in the institutional structures and relations within and around each project. To 
comprehend such processes fully, investigation needs to be made into the 
dynamic institutional configurations which, while varying spatially and 
temporally, regulate and mould the opportunities and limits within which such 
internal processes operate. From this, the aim is to identify both beneficial 
institutional configurations which may be applicable in other localities, and 
knowledge regarding possible organisational structures for initiatives which may 
be transferable between localities with similar contexts. 
In the second part of the chapter, the epistemological basis for the 
choice of research methodology wil l be discussed. This section will focus upon 
the theoretical debates regarding the usage of research methodologies, to form a 
coherent account and explanation of the methodologies employed in the pursuit 
of the objectives. A critical realist epistemology will be adopted, which I will 
put forward as the most effective and appropriate manner in which to 
conceptualise the empirical study of TSEIs. Finally, I outline the sampling 
strategy employed to underpin the research to provide a set of cases which 
answer the questions raised in the literatures. 
83 
Overview of the Substantive Issues 
As seen above in chapter 4, third sector initiatives may offer a 
possibility of a more spatially specific and innovative means for dealing with 
entrenched employment problems. This has been allied to a revision of the role 
of the public sector and a consequent reluctance to engage in public sector 
employment creation. Concurrently, the private sector has failed to engage in 
employment creation initiatives which operate with socially-defined as opposed 
to profit-motivated objectives. The third sector and the resurgent social economy 
therefore offer the hope of qualitatively different organisational structures which 
allow it to flourish and create positive outcomes in a socially inclusive manner 
as an alternative to the other sectors (Hargreaves 1998, Hargreaves and Christie 
1998). Such promises of a new and effective means to deal with deeply rooted 
social and economic phenomena have led to many initiatives being harnessed as 
pilot or experimental schemes to assess the viability and transferability of the 
third sector as a potential focus of employment creation.61 
However, I argue that the current crop of initiative-based studies provide 
a useful yet incomplete insight into the processes which operate, to produce 
particular propitious or unpropitious environments for TSEIs. Such studies also 
offer a significant lack of vision through the research methods and selection of 
case studies for enquiry. The role of evaluation and the accountability function 
which underlies this has thus far produced a focus upon particular initiatives for 
one of two reasons. First, the TSEIs may demonstrate outputs which may be 
perceived to be a sign of success, therefore demanding enquiry as examples of 
best practice. Second, key case studies have been gleaned from those initiatives 
which, through funding regimes, have an element of research and dissemination 
attached. The aim of this section is to address the methodological implications 
of this, and the broader elements of evaluation itself, to provide an 
understanding of the epistemological basis for the empirical research undertaken 
here. 
The rationale behind evaluation and accountability mechanisms has 
become established as part of the funding and assessment process. Bitel (2000) 
6 1 Examples of such schemes at the European level include ERGO, NOW, PETRA and Leader, which have 
been heavily funded by the European Social Fund, and which have undergone assessment from both 
participants and academics as part of a reflective and reactive means of policy formation. 
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notes that the concept has grown rapidly in the 1990s and that initial "reluctance 
and scepticism have been transformed into enthusiasm for evaluation". The 
reason for evaluation gaining ground has been its role in the funding cycle. Bitel 
notes, 
"Up to ten years ago, when NGOs applied for funding to grant givers, it was 
highly likely that a question on the application form would be "Do you 
evaluate your project or services? " This could be answered with a simple 
yes or no. Then about five years ago funders began to ask applicants "How 
do you evaluate your services? " It soon became apparent to many people 
that unless they could come up with some coherent explanation of how they 
would evaluate their programme, they would be unlikely to get funding" 
(Bitel 2000). 
Added to this stimulus for third sector organisations to develop 
evaluation frameworks, Kubisch et al (1995) note that, "Funders look for 
evidence that their investments are 'paying o f f , quite often within the time 
frame of their funding cycles".62 Because of this, evaluation has become 
established as a key part of the funding and accountability process to which the 
majority of TSEIs studied here must adhere. 
However, the reality of the evaluation process is that the subjects of 
evaluation are more complex than the simple output measures often used to 
define their success and failure. In the case of the TSEIs studied here, it could be 
the training and employment outputs, allied to the costs this incurs, which 
constitute the basic evaluation process. However, as Kubisch et al (1995) 
demonstrate with the case studies of Comprehensive Community Initiatives 
(CCIs) in the US, the task of measuring and evaluating such initiatives is 
substantial. They suggest this is because such initiatives, "aim for change at 
many levels (individual, family, personal network, institutional, and 
community), across many domains (economic, social, physical, and community 
building), and over different time periods (near-term, interim, and long-term or 
ultimate)" (Kubisch et al 1995). 
They suggest that CCIs have several features which raise questions for 
the evaluation framework. 
Kubisch et al (1995), available online at http://www.aspenroundtable.org/voll/index.htm 
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• Horizontal complexity. They work across multiple sectors (social, 
economic, physical, political, and others) simultaneously and aim for 
synergy among them. 
• Vertical complexity. They aim for change at the individual, family, 
community, organizational, and systems levels. 
• Community building. They aim for strengthened community capacity, 
enhanced social capital, an empowered neighbourhood, and similar 
outcomes. 
« Contextual issues. They aim to incorporate external political, economic 
and other conditions into their framework, even though they may have 
little power to affect them. 
• Community responsiveness and flexibility over time. They are 
designed to be community-specific and to evolve in response to the 
dynamics of the neighbourhood and the lessons being learned by the 
initiative. 
• Community saturation. They aim to reach all members of a 
community, and therefore individual residents cannot be randomly 
assigned to treatment and control groups for the purposes of assessing 
the CCI's impact; finding equivalent comparison communities is also not 
feasible. 
Source: Kubisch et al (1995) 
While the definition of CCIs does not relate exactly to the TSEIs as 
defined here, many of the TSEIs operate broader community development and 
regeneration activities beyond the pure job training or employment creation 
objectives, as is the nature of the third sector. As such, many of these difficulties 
are translated into the evaluation of TSEIs when seeking to identify first of all 
whether a TSEI is 'successful', and then subsequently the process which 
produces these beneficial trends. 
A useful quote to recall in the discussion of the evaluation of community 
development initiatives is Albert Einstein's assertion that, 'Things should be 
made as simple as possible - but no simpler'. However, the consequence of an 
epistemology which accepts and acknowledges the complexity of the evaluation 
requirements of TSEIs suggests that in Einstein's case, simple as possible will 
be inherently complex. Even where simplification occurs, most notably through 
the use of proxy measures to represent the impacts of an initiative, it is 
doubtable whether such proxy measures accurately reflect the actual nature of 
the outputs, outcomes and benefits of TSEIs. 
The evaluation of TSEIs, and community-based initiatives in general, 
relies upon the theories which underlie the evaluation and the basic premise on 
86 
which the TSEI started life. As Weiss (1995) notes, "social programs are based 
on explicit or implicit theories about how and why the program will work" 
(Weiss 1995: 66). The result is that a paradigm in which the TSEI operates and 
will be evaluated is already set and does not allow for a significant degree of 
lateral movement. Weiss (1995) goes on to note that the evaluation 
demonstrates, "which of the assumptions...break down, where they break down, 
and which of the several theories underlying the program are best supported by 
the evidence" (Weiss 1995: 67). 
Connell and Kubisch (1999) suggest a Theory of Change approach to 
evaluation can frame the actions which are undertaken. In this they suggest that 
a strong approach "requires starting with desired outcomes and working 
backward from there to design and initiate change" (Connell and Kubisch 1999). 
In contrast, a weak approach "begins with the change (programs, budgets, etc.), 
and then develops theories about how it will produce outcomes" (ibid). 
However, although Connell and Kubisch suggest a strong theory of change 
approach to be best, this is crucially dependent upon the desired outcomes of a 
community development process. 
This has crucial implications for the over-riding policy environment, and 
the theoretical approach to evaluation undertaken by those who demand and 
implement evaluation and assessment. However, as has already been seen, the 
development of desired objectives is itself dependent upon the political and 
policy environment at any given time. As seen with the period of study of this 
research, the emphasis has been upon work and paid work as the key objectives, 
evidenced by the trend towards the mainstreaming and formalisation of third 
sector work creation initiatives within the auspices of the formal sector. This, as 
has also been seen, has been underpinned by the dominant governmentality of 
accountability and the criteria which privilege the raw and accountable outputs 
above the less visible but still relevant outcomes. 
Pettigrew (1996) suggests that the theory of evaluation in the UK has 
been shaped by HM Treasury in that it regards evaluation as strictly summative. 
Pettigrew notes that the model is, "rationalistic, output focused and objectives 
led: evaluation begins by clarifying the overall aims of the initiative, analysing 
its intermediate targets and establishes the measures or indicators that will assess 
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performance with respect to intended outcomes"(Pettigrew 1996). " The result is 
a link with the move towards a managerialist culture with the public services, 
which Pettigrew suggests has fundamentally changed the role of evaluation. She 
suggests that, "now the emphasis is shifting from programmes to projects and 
downwards to smaller interventions and so further disembedding the 
evaluation's purchase on wider policy contexts"(Pettigrew 1996). This has been 
cemented in the UK by the government "explicitly including] evaluation as a 
core responsibility of NGOs in its compact between the Government and the 
Voluntary Sector. Evaluation and user consultation are also embedded in the 
Best Value initiatives of local government in England as part of their 
commitment to quality and driving up standards"(Bitel 2000).64 
A strong theory of change approach will therefore influence the form of 
evaluation undertaken, in that it works towards a set of pre-defined desired 
outcomes. In the UK, this has led to output-led evaluation and the subsequent 
formation of best practice examples from this. In this way, certain projects have 
been identified by their outputs as representing a more efficient allocation of 
resources and possessing the structures which enable success to be achieved. 
However, as wil l be seen later, the criteria set for such outputs may rarely 
represent the actual impact of a particular initiative upon its target population 
and may more accurately represent the means to survive and generate funding. 
The result may be that, " I f what is being disseminated as the 'best' is in fact the 
'most likely to get funded' or 'most attainable', and i f local specificity is lost at 
the expense of a few generalised 'models', then such examples may serve to 
stifle, rather than encourage, genuine alternatives to current public or private 
sector activities" (Amin et al, 1998: 14; see also Amin et al 1999). In contrast, 
little is done to study exactly what are the crucial factors which lead to the 
failure of projects, despite the potential for learning a great deal from the 
mechanisms which may cause failure (See Fig.5.1.). 
In addition, there has yet to be comprehensive study of the third sector 
initiatives in the UK, and as such those TSEIs whose evaluations come to the 
fore are those which have evaluation and dissemination as part of their funding 
" Pettigrew (1996), available online at: 
http://www.europeanevaluation.org/newslett/no3_96.htm 
6 4 Bitel (2000), available online at: http://www.europeanevaluation.org/pdf/l-3_bitel.pdf 
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streams. Logically these are the initiatives which have been best funded and 
supported through financial and institutional backing.65 Such evaluation 
procedures therefore tend to address most fully those projects which have 
supportive structures around them, thus masking the internal and external 
processes which are crucial to the understanding of the reasons for success 
and/or failure. 
The implication of these two suggestions is that best practice refers not 
to an objective notion of community benefit but to one which more accurately 
reflects funding regimes and their specified outputs. There has therefore been a 
neglect of those initiatives which do not have such potentially supportive 
funding structures; similarly, there is an unwillingness to study those initiatives 
which have been perceived to have failed in order to understand more fully the 
institutional factors which led to failure. 
Consequently, there appears to be a dearth of study into the crucial 
projects which succeed in some way despite appearing to have significant 
internal and/or external factors undermining their chances of success. While 
such projects may not show such handsome rewards in terms of their absolute 
outputs, their existence despite significant institutional obstacles can be 
potentially more enlightening particularly in terms of the organisational 
structures which offer resilience against unfavourable external factors. Such 
structures may be significant particularly in terms of their applicability in areas 
where institutional thickness and governance structures are at their weakest; 
these may be the areas of highest unemployment where other initiatives fail due 
to lack of structures, and therefore where the need is greatest. The task, 
therefore, is to, "make sure we can tell a good Third Sector organisation from a 
bad one, so that we can develop new institutional forms which reflect a wider 
sense of vision than that of the profit-maximising shareholder company" 
(Hargreaves 1998: 32). 
' Pettigrew (1996) also notes the influence of the aims of the funding body upon the aims of an initiative. 
Care must be taken to acknowledge the different strands of evaluation - who is undertaking it, how, for 
whom and for what purpose. 
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Fig 5.1: Likelihood of Success/Failure of Initiatives as Defined Through 
Internal and External Forces. 
'good' External Context 'bad' 
'good' 
A D / 
Internal 
Organisation s' / 
C / B 
'bad' 
Box Interpretation 
A Good external and internal structures; success not difficult. May be 
cited as best practice through outputs and achievements, regardless of 
the supportive structures aiding success. 
B Complete failures of projects: wrong place, wrong time... 
CandD Apparent contradictions as projects may succeed despite unhelpful 
context, or vice-versa. Also may succeed due to context, despite poor 
internal organisation. 
The placement of any project within the matrix in fig 5.1 is clearly 
contested, according to the positionality of those involved who may assess an 
initiative's success or failure quite differently with regard to its outputs. This 
wil l most likely depend upon the priorities given to each output or outcome by 
the person or organisation, such that certain outcomes may be regarded as 
representing success to some people yet may be regarded as unimportant to 
others, perhaps leading to an assessment of failure. 
Similarly, the reasons behind success and /or failure may be contested, 
with different parties emphasising the importance of certain variables as key 
factors in determining success or failure. The positioning of any project within 
fig 5.1 will therefore require an assessment of the trade-offs and contestations, 
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resulting not in a definitive placement but more a range of values which 
encompass the views on the project (see fig 5.2). 







\ n ) 
\ c 
Area Interpretation 
A All agree that the project is successful; some debate over the importance 
of external institutional factors in cementing success 
B Some believe to be successful, some failing; key reason for differences 
identified as being due to perceptions of the internal organisation of the 
project 
C Significant differences of opinion over the outcomes of project: some 
see project as successful whereas some see it as failing. Due to shape of 
shaded area, this may be due to both internal and external factors. 
D Al l agree that project failed, with broadly neutral views regarding the 
internal organisation, therefore blaming external factors for the failure 
of the project. 
To bring these notions of best practice and individual conceptions 
together, I find it useful to note Anheier and Moulton's (1999) definition of 
organisational failure: 
"Failure is a relative term in two senses. First, organizational failure is 
relative to notions of organizational success, and at the least, to some 
understanding of a normal state of affairs, however defined. What is 
more, the definition and managerial consequences of failure are relative 
91 
to the various interests and claims the various stakeholders put on the 
organization, leading us to ask, success for whom? Failure for whom? In 
other words, one person's failure may be someone else's success" 
(Anheier and Moulton 1999: 273-274). 
From this, the task of the research is to determine how the perceived 
factors interact, and the processes which operate within projects to create these 
configurations. The above discussion therefore suggests that those third sector 
employment initiatives which offer contradictory signals regarding their success 
and failure are of particular interest. 
Epistemological Issues 
It is not the intention here to participate in the wider debates over 
research methodologies, although these will be alluded to with regard to the 
choice of methodologies to be employed in this research. Whilst it is certainly 
the case that research methodologies must be defined with extreme care and 
concern for the debates which surround their usage, it is apparent that no 
methodology is without reproach; as such, it is the case that the most appropriate 
methodology should be chosen in order to achieve the research objectives 
outlined above. Knox and Hughes note that "there is no single definitive method 
or 'right way' to undertake an evaluation in social interventions such as 
community relations or the broader field of community development (1994: 
248). They cite Gallagher's work in schools in Northern Ireland, who states, 
"our role should not be one where we apply a selection from a magic box of 
methodologies and simply declare a programme a success or failure... we should 
be prepared to mould our methodological techniques in order to deal better with 
contexts and processes [we] are attempting to evaluate" (Gallagher 1990: 43). 
The choice of any research agenda and accompanying methodology is 
inevitably informed by the philosophical approaches of the underlying theories. 
As such, the broad confines suggesting which research methods are appropriate 
are to some extent established before research can be contemplated. However, 
such broad methodological paradigms are contested, with differing mechanisms 
and epistemological assumptions played out. As a result, the exact methods used 
for any research project must be defined and fully justified in the context of both 
the underlying theories which inform the research, as well as representing the 
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practical limitations of the research period and resources. Such a justification 
will now be discussed with regard to this particular research project. 
The focus of this research is upon both the institutions which support 
TSEIs and governance within the initiatives themselves. Consequently, I take an 
epistemological stance which views knowledge as socially embedded; since the 
object of study is deeply embedded in the processes, norms and structures of 
society, an approach which can understand these structures and the mediating 
role of agency is required.66 
I f we accept the complexity of social relations we require a complexity 
of methodology and ontology to understand the world. As such, I favour a 
methodology which transcends the limitations of totalising methodologies which 
have been so critiqued as to become individually inadequate. In this view, I 
support Hudson (2001), who notes that, "a continuing, constructive dialogue 
between different perspectives, informed by a heightened sense of 
experimentation and critical self-appraisal, is clearly preferable to a continued 
search for a single new all-encompassing paradigm" (Hudson 2001: 6; see also 
Clark and Wrigley 1995). Consequently, for the purposes of this study, I employ 
a critical realist standpoint. This, I believe, provides the most sensitive 
ontological and epistemological lens through which to view and subsequently 
construe the observed phenomena. 
Following Sayer (1984, 1992, 2000) and Bhaskar (1975) I suggest that a 
realist standpoint, when put into practice, allows for the identification of 
structures and more crucially, how these are activated. This is summarised by 
Sayer, who notes that, "Realists...seek to identify both necessity and possibility 
or potential in the world - what things must go together, and what could happen, 
given the nature of the objects. Whereas the real in this definition refers to the 
structures and powers of objects, the actual refers to what happens i f and when 
those powers are activated, to what they do and what eventuates when they do" 
(Sayer 2000: 1). 
Positivist ontologies, such as those employed by Empirical Realists, are 
inappropriate to the study of such real-world phenomena due to their inherent 
6 6 Hodgson et al (1994) note that an institutionalist approach works with a more organicist explanation of 
events, such that institutions become the main focus of analysis due to their inherent influence upon the 
interaction of economy and society. Similarly, an institutional approach retains a focus upon causal 
processes to explain and understand phenomena rather than identifying general trends. 
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tendency to reduce complexity to atomised variables. In contrast to the patterned 
and regularised conceptualisation of world offered by this perspective, I prefer 
an ontology which accepts the complexity of actions as informed but not 
causally defined by structures. It is this notion that causation is not, "understood 
on the model of regular successions of events, and hence explanation need not 
depend on finding them, or searching for putative social laws...explanation 
depends instead on identifying causal mechanisms and how they work, and 
discovering i f they have been activated and under what conditions" (Sayer 2000: 
14). 
I also note the flaw of positivism's dependency upon prediction through 
replication as a key facet of the methodology. As Sayer (2000) notes, such a 
methodological basis requires an assumption that phenomena being studied are 
both observable and replicable. In contrast, a critical realist methodology allows 
for the uncovering of structures which are implicit in ordering actions but which 
may or may not be immediately observable. Similarly, a critical realist 
methodology allows for the acceptance of structures which may be real in that 
they exist but which may not be actual in that they are not activated, at least 
perhaps not in a replicable form. 
A critical realist methodology also contrasts with the totalising 
assumptions of neo-Marxist methodologies which offer a high degree of 
structural conceptualisation but which are unable to fully integrate notions of 
individual agency into their ontological analyses. I do not wish to view 
structural factors as in a totalising Marxist sense as entities which determine the 
paths and actions of individuals. Rather I prefer a reading of social science 
which accepts these structural factors as guiding forces which are subsequently 
tempered by other forces. Hudson (2001) therefore suggests that a "more helpful 
perspective, drawing on critical realism, acknowledges that there are necessary 
causal structures which define particular types of society but that societies 
encompass multiple causal structures, not all of which in this sense are necessary 
and not all of which are equally powerful" (Hudson 2001: 9). Figure 5.3 
demonstrates how this critical realist stance can be schematically illustrated as a 
simplified relationship of structures and mediatory forces to produce outcomes. 
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Fig.5.3: Critical Realist View of Causation (Sayer 2000:15) 
Effect/Event 
Mechanism 
Structure Conditions (other mechanisms) 
Sayer suggests that Jessop's (1990a) notion of a strategic relational 
approach may be of use here to conceptualise how 
"actors, actions and contexts articulate. We need to know not only what 
the main strategies were of actors, but what it was about the context which 
enabled them to be successful or otherwise. This is consistent with the 
realist concept of causation and requires us to ask the kinds of realist 
questions about necessary and sufficient conditions noted earlier, so as to 
decide what it was about a certain context which allowed a certain action 
to be successful. Often the success or failure of agents' strategies may 
have little or nothing to with their own reasons and intention" (Sayer 
2000: 25-26). 
However, Sayer and Bhaskar's readings of critical realism suggest that a 
fuller analysis of social phenomena requires an acceptance and understanding of 
structural factors which are operating, whether real or actual. This provides a 
broader context for the understanding of how regional political-economic 
configurations develop to produce the framework for the study of the necessity 
for, and development of, TSEIs. 
To provide an understanding of the notions of structures and agency in 
the social sciences, I find it helpful here to emphasise Giddens's ideas on 
structuration (see for example Giddens 1984, 1993) and their echoes in critical 
realism.67 Briefly, structuration provides a theoretical basis to understand the 
manner in which meta-scale structural factors frame actions and the manner in 
which these structures are subsequently translated by human and institutional 
Various schools of sociological thought exist, roughly characterised under three broad categories: 
Structural-Functionalism, Symbolic Interactionism and Conflict. Structuration attempts to intertwine the 
key interaction of these extreme perspectives to produce a lens through which to view the world. 
6 8 Which we may take in this case to mean the global economy, government, as well as capital, gender and 
labour relations. 
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agency to produce outcomes. As such, I do not wish to view social phenomena 
as stable, non-altering subjects; rather structuration allows for a reading of 
phenomena as a reflexive meeting of structure and agency to produce an 
evolving social sphere. Such an approach helps define and justify the 
appropriate philosophical stance which may underline research work. In 
contrast, research philosophies that underscore economic rationality as a 
principal focus for analysing complex social phenomena, may fail due to their 
limited analytical nature. I therefore believe an integrated approach is required 
to provide adequate analytic tools to understand the multifaceted economic, 
social and political factors underpinning explanations and causalities present in 
such phenomena as Third Sector Employment and Training Initiatives (TSEIs). 
Whilst no epistemological stance is ever fully adequate to analyse all the 
structures and systems which may be operating, it is hoped that the approach 
considered here will facilitate the understanding of the key processes involved in 
such initiatives. 
Methodological Issues 
The theoretical underpinning outlined above suggests that the research 
lends itself to a qualitative and intensive research methodology. Such a 
methodology is justified due to the complex nature of the research topic, which 
requires the application of methods which can seek to uncover the causal 
structures and dynamic process involved in the operation of TSEIs. It is assumed 
that the causal structures, which are embedded within the economic and social 
relations between projects and their wider contexts, will be spatially and 
historically discrete. Therefore intensive research is required to uncover the 
institutional structures which provide the opportunities and constraints under 
which social and economic interactions occur. The context needs to be analysed 
at various levels: institutional relationships between projects and other 
institutions are most important, yet locally contingent factors in terms of 
traditions, historical practices, social conventions and political leanings must be 
incorporated. As a result, any research methodology must also be able to 
6 9 From a critical realist perspective, Hudson (2001) notes, "It is necessary to understand the ways in 
which individual and collective agency is both enabled and constrained by structures and at the same time 
has the effect (sometimes intended, often not) of helping reproduce them" (Hudson 2001: 10). 
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distinguish locally contingent circumstances from the object of study in order to 
attain a clear picture of the processes which are occurring, and which form the 
core of this research project (Sayer 1984, 1992). The implication of this is that 
any findings derived from such analyses of the institutional and governance 
context should be interpreted as data specific to that circumstance rather than as 
a basis for broader generalisation (see for example, Urry 1987; Duncan 1989). 
However, Hamel (1993) suggests that the construction of meaning via intensive 
research, in its identification of processes and relationships, may be able to 
represent social relations which are broader in scope than the specificities of any 
location. 
The extraction of such data from TSEIs requires intensive research 
methods to identify such causal relationships. Extensive methodologies, while 
better equipped to help understand broad general mechanisms and patterns at a 
macro-scale, have limitations as a means to achieve the levels of understanding 
of social phenomena required by this research. While statistical correlations and 
patterns may exist, the inference of causal process, the identification of which is 
crucial to this research, becomes problematic with social data obtained from 
extensive methodologies. However, some data collected via extensive 
methodologies, in the form of secondary sources which help to pinpoint trends 
and possible areas of study, will be employed. Table 5.1 demonstrates the 
comparison of intensive and extensive research methods. 
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Table 5.1 Intensive and Extensive Research: A Summary (adapted from 
Sayer 1992: 243) 
Intensive Extensive 
Research question How does a process work 
in a particular case or 
small number of cases? 
What produces a certain 
change? 
What did the agents 
actually do? 
What are the regularities, 
common patterns, 
distinguishing features of a 
population? 
How widely are certain 
characteristics or processes 
distributed or represented? 
Relations Substantial relations of 
connection. 
Formal relations of 
similarity. 
Type of groups studied Causal groups. Taxonomic groups. 
Type of account produced Causal explanation of the 
production of certain 




generalizations, lacking in 
explanatory penetration. 
Typical methods Study of individual agents 










Limitations Actual concrete patterns 
and contingent relations 
are unlikely to be 
representative, 'average' or 
generalizable. Necessary 
relations discovered will 
exist wherever their relata 
are present, for example 
causal powers of objects 
are generalizable to other 
contexts as they are 
necessary features of these 
objects. 
Although representative of 
a whole population, they 
are unlikely to be 
generalizable to other 
populations at different 
times and places. Problem 
of ecological fallacy in 
making inferences about 
individuals. Limited 
explanatory power. 
Appropriate tests Corroboration. Replication. 
As a result, in-depth interviewing and focus groups will be employed as 
the primary data collection tools to achieve the levels of understanding required 
by the research questions posed above. By delving deeper into the particular 
situations, events and processes occurring within and around TSEIs, an intensive 
interviewing methodology may be able to identify causal and contingent 
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relations operating. While localised factors may inhibit the transfer of 
knowledge produced, the aim of intensive methods is to produce knowledge 
within the context of the research agenda which will have greater significance 
than broad generalisations. 
Interviews, both formal and informal, structured and semi-structured, 
may be able to provide insights into the processes which are occurring at the 
local level with regard to the research agenda. While structured interviews may 
provide adequate responses to pre-defined topics, such interviews may lack the 
flexibility to incorporate forms of information and knowledge which may 
provide a broader and/or richer understanding of real-world events. Conversely, 
some information gleaned from semi-structured interviews has the occasional 
disadvantage of lacking relevance as the interview process is more fluid and 
may be unduly influenced by the agenda of the interviewee. However, the 
antithesis of this is that semi-structured interviews ought to be able to 
concentrate more fully upon veins of information which may provide a deeper 
(and perhaps unexpected) understanding of particular ideas. As such, semi-
structured interviews have significant merit as research tools which ought to 
provide information with the flexibility to pursue certain topics which are raised 
and may add to the knowledge (Fielding and Fielding 1986: 18). 
Regardless of how interviews are conducted, they are dependent upon 
the dynamic of the interviewer and interviewee as to what knowledge is 
produced, and how this is interpreted. However, such a situation does not 
necessarily present a problem, as this allows for the interactions to produce 
meaningful and reflexive constructions of reality (Bhaskar 1989). While the 
interview may produce knowledge specific to that interview, which may not 
necessarily be replicated at another time or space, such knowledge, constructed 
through cognitive processes, can be meaningful. The aim of interviews is not to 
produce an absolute 'truth', assuming such 'truth' is attainable anyway; it is to 
provide an informed and coherent interpretation of events as seen by those 
involved in the processes under investigation. Precisely because they may be a 
focus of contradiction and opinion, the results may be meaningful as they 
correspond to perceived interpretations of reality from different perspectives. 
Due to such potential flaws in the construction of knowledge from one-
to-one interviews, focus groups or group interviews may provide a 
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complementary information source. The principal advantage of group 
interviewing as opposed to one-on-one studies is the reflexivity of the 
methodology. Almost inevitably, meanings and thoughts are formulated and 
constructed through several interactions and are therefore polyvocal. It is 
suggested that participants will often have several (possibly conflicting) 
opinions upon one subject, and that under normal circumstances these 
motivations, feelings, attitudes and opinions are left unarticulated (Morgan 
1993). As a result, it is suggested that the group interview is able to study the 
production of meanings as, through exchanges in groups, participants clarify for 
themselves just what it is that their opinion or behaviour depends on (see for 
example Morgan 1993; Holbrook and Jackson, 1996; Burgess et al 1988a; 
Burgess et al 1988b). 
The usage of the group interview as a source of validation and 
triangulation as part of a wider context of research is one which has attracted 
some support. Group interviewing may be a part solution to post-modernist 
concerns of over-authoritative research in what Frey and Fontana (1993) refer to 
as a polyphonic data source. The merits of the group interviewing techniques are 
not without qualifications, however. Morgan and Krueger (1993) note that 
research in the group context will not necessarily reveal deep emotional insights. 
As such, this research is wary not to take an over-rational view and to avoid 
attempts to create or apply meanings where it is not appropriate to do so. 
Whatever the problems (both theoretical and practical) of the group 
interviewing techniques, this method offers at the very least a useful form of 
triangulation in multi-method research strategies and in many cases may provide 
a different insight into the production of knowledge as information is divulged. 
Hence, a number of informal group interviews were undertaken during the 
course of this research to add to the range of in-depth one-to-one interviews to 
hopefully unmask findings which traditional research methods may have 
missed. 
A Comparative Approach 
A comparative approach is required within this study due to its ability 
to contrast the function of similar TSEIs in different institutional contexts and 
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spaces of governance. As a research method, the comparative approach attracted 
some criticism due to the conviction from some quarters that social sciences 
should seek to develop general theories which transcend barriers; the 
comparative approach fails to do this, indeed some suggest that its strength lies 
in providing systematic comparisons between social contexts (Durkheim, 1950). 
As McCulloch (2000) suggests, individual evaluations are both fraught 
with methodological and ethical uncertainties and theoretical inadequacies. As a 
consequence, the research undertaken within this thesis produces a new facet to 
the studies discussed above by concentrating on the role of institutions as key 
underpinning elements of TSEIs. The institutional turn of the social sciences of 
the 1980s onwards has provided a renewal in the vigour in which regional, local 
and cultural factors (as broadly defined above) have become key to the study 
and explanation of real world phenomena. Through these, the comparison 
allows the analysis of those functions, institutions and processes of governance, 
which when present or absent, real or actual, can impact upon the nature of 
milieux to create a supportive or unsupportive environment for TSEIs. 
The coping strategies employed to deal with unemployment, while 
associated with national spaces of regulation and governance, take on a local 
role in particular with regard to the more innovative and experimental formal 
sector job-creation schemes. The local variability of the application of policies 
lends itself towards a patchwork of schemes, each of which is regulated and 
mediated by the differing spaces of governance and institutional legacies in each 
region. In addition to this, the growth of third sector projects which seek to go 
beyond formal sector initiatives into new and untapped employment 
opportunities is influenced significantly by the governance and institutional 
structures in any locality. This leads to an interplay of governance structures 
which the research focuses upon and studies in depth. While regional level 
factors undoubtedly have an influence upon the institutional and governance 
factors which influence the operation of TSEIs, practicalities of the research 
period imply that greater coverage allowing comparison at regional level would 
dilute the focus upon the processes occurring within regions and localities. 
However, the following structures wil l be investigated: 
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Regional Governance Structures 
Throughout the UK, a contrast can be made between the 
governance structures provided by regional government, whether it be 
through government departments or the Welsh assembly, or through co-
ordinating offices such as Government Office North East (GO-NE). 
Similarly, a range of funding opportunities are overlaid from European 
through to locally based sources which create a mosaic of resources 
distinct to each region. The structures require investigation, mainly 
through secondary but also through some primary analysis, to determine 
the regional contexts for each case study. 
Local Government 
Within each region, the role of local authorities as the prime 
government structures has a significant impact upon the formulation and 
running of alternative job creation projects. Within each region, there are 
local authorities which are overtly encouraging towards third sector 
schemes, both in terms of direct funding and co-ordination activities. 
Such a variation within a region can be telling with regard to the local 
structures and processes which influence outcomes for projects: similar 
broad national and regional conditions, under different local structures, 
may produce significantly different outcomes. Within this, the political 
leaning of local authorities, and more significantly (but perhaps related) 
the role they choose to take within local service delivery, requires 
investigation. The research helps categorise the local authorities within 
case study areas to help determine which features they exude, as well as 
the influence this exerts upon the local community sector. As such, 
relationships and attitudes of local government need to be analysed as 
part of the overall governance structure. 
Informal Institutional Features 
Healey et al (1999), drawing on Amin and Thrift (1994) 
suggest a variety of non-formalised factors which contribute towards 
the institutional contexts in the case study localities. Such factors 
102 
include the persistence of local institutions, a deepening archive of 
commonly-held knowledge, institutional flexibility, innovation 
capacity, capacity to develop relations of trust and reciprocity, and a 
sense of a widely-held common project. These localised elements, 
which significantly influence the capacity of localities to support 
TSEIs, require research to establish what factors are crucial. 
• Networks 
The role of networks, the formal and informal relations 
between institutions, flinders and organisations, may be crucial to the 
potential for the success or failure of any particular project. This 
question is in some ways related to the role of local authorities and the 
networks between co-ordinators and gatekeeping authorities alongside 
job creation projects. However, it goes beyond this towards 
investigation of networks between projects into areas such as skills 
transfer, advice, best practice etc. 
• Community resources 
Without the skills and innovative capacity of people to create 
and maintain third sector projects, there is likely to be a dearth of 
successful projects regardless of how supportive the institutional and 
funding frameworks are. The role of such factors in determining the 
likelihood of success wil l be investigated, as the internal organisation 
of projects is crucial in their success. The relationship (inverse or 
otherwise) between need and community resources is also investigated. 
These locally contingent, yet regionally or nationally underpinned, 
governance structures are part of the focus of study within this research project. 
As Healey et al (1999) suggest, "Local institutional histories and the contingent 
pressures which affect particular localities combine with broad driving forces, 
leading to diverse outcomes, not merely from place to place, but from one 
institutional 'site' to another within a locality. Such findings emphasise the 
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importance of delving into the finegrain of institutional dynamics" (Healey et al 
1999: 118). 
Sampling Strategy 
As noted above, the concentration on best practice initiatives which 
have a relatively stable funding environment and supportive networks may have 
the impact of masking the initiatives which are equally as successful in their 
contexts yet which might not produce the gross outputs or outcomes associated 
with best practice studies. As a result, this study aims to critically assess those 
projects whose benefits may be less visible, yet are produced in a less supportive 
institutional framework. The sampling strategy therefore proposed to contrast 
initiatives which are broadly 'successful' in unpropitious circumstances with 
projects which ' fa i l ' despite supportive structures. As a comparison, a 
succeeding project will also be studied to act as triangulation device to assess 
more accurately the nature and role of the localised structures in determining 
success or failure. 
The identification of individual projects within the boundaries of such 
structures is crucial as this ought to produce a sample of projects in concordance 
with the research objectives. The literature studied leads towards the choice of 
projects which have employment or training as key objectives in their operation, 
though this does not negate projects which may have other objectives alongside 
these. 
However, employment and training are key factors as they identify 
such projects as potential frameworks for labour market solutions outside the 
formal public/private work creation and training schemes which have been 
criticised so greatly. For the purpose of this research, TSEIs are therefore 
defined as employment and training initiatives which operate with a degree of 
organisational separation from the public and private sector, and usually with a 
degree of community control or input. The case studies are all be based within 
specific localities, although this is not by itself a criterion for inclusion due to 
the potential for local initiatives to be wholly public or private sector-orientated. 
Similarly, Intermediate Labour Market (ILM) projects which engage almost 
exclusively with the private sector are not included. This therefore allows the 
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thesis to assess three factors. First, whether the third sector does indeed offer 
this potential for employment gain within localities; secondly what processes 
operate to permit this; and third, what structural factors are present to enable or 
constrain this role. 
The original choice of projects is made on the basis of success/failure 
within the local structures as identified above. Such a pre-emptive judgement is 
to be made on the basis of the success/failure in relation to their intended 
outputs and outcomes, as suggested by records within and produced by each 
organisation (see Barr et al 1996 for typical evaluation criteria). Such a narrow 
definition of success/failure is dependent upon the scale and ambition of the 
intention at the outset. Consequently, such potential projects have been 
triangulated with other secondary sources, both written and oral, to more 
accurately place them within the matrix in fig 5.1. This helps to reduce any bias 
and inefficiencies incurred due to any evaluation carried out by in-house teams 
(Knox and Hughes 1994: 249). 
An initial set of case studies were identified from a database created by the 
EU LOCIN project which ran until 1999 and which sought to compile a set of 
'best practice' examples in accordance within criteria of what the European 
commission perceived as success. In addition to this, a set of case studies which 
either anecdotally or through written evidence had been deemed to fail or not 
reach their pre-ordained targets were chosen to contrast with the 'best practice' 
examples. Each 'failing' case study was chosen to be within the same local 
authority area as at least one other initiative to permit a degree of local 
comparability. This also permitted the influence of the impact of local 
authorities to be studied as a variable in the comparative analysis. In addition, 
the four local authority clusters which emerged were sub-sets of regional 
clusters, South Wales and North-East England, to permit a comparison of the 
regional-scale institutional factors influencing the development of the TSEIs. 
These criteria taken together led to the identification of thirteen case studies 
within the sampling framework to become the subjects of in-depth case studies. 
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The initiatives selected for in-depth case studies were: (see appendix 1 
for a brief description of each project). 
Region Local authority area Initiative name 
North-East England 
St Simon's Community Project 
South Tyneside South Tyneside Training and Enterprise 
Network 
Low Simonside Employment Initiative 
Trimdon 2000 
County Durham Spennymoor Training Initiative 
Sherburn Road Regeneration Initiative 
South Wales 
Dulais Valley Partnership 
Amman Valley Enterprise 
Neath Port-Talbot DOVE Workshop 
Ystalyfera Development Trust 
Blaenllechau Community Regeneration 
Rhondda Cynon Trebanog Partnership (Waun Wen Ltd) 
Taff Penywaun Enterprise Partnership 
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These thirteen case studies are located in the following parts of the UK: 





• Amman Valley 
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• DOVE Workshop 
































• Sherburn Road 
Regeneration 
• Trimdon 2000 
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Case studies on these thirteen projects sought information through 
intensive research methods, as defined above. Interviews were carried out with a 
number of groups, in order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the key 
research questions: 
• How far is success/failure defined (pre-determined) by the institutional 
and governance context in which a project operates? 
• How much is it defined by the internal logic and organisation of TSEIs? 
• How do the various factors involved interconnect, producing the crucial 
dynamics which lead to success or failure? 
This required interviews with, and data collection from, a number of 
actors to provide an accurate and balanced understanding of the processes 
occurring. This also helps to circumvent the problem of more polished 
performers within some TSEIs presenting a particularly rosy or misleading 
picture of each initiative (see for Example McCulloch, 2000). Most notably, this 
included the following groups of interviewees: 
• Gatekeepers/local representatives 
• Project organisers/key players 
e Local authority representatives 
• Funding representatives 
• Project participants 
The intention in pursuing such a broad range of stakeholders is to address 
not only the internal but also the external factors influencing TSEIs, and to 
triangulate those views. In total, 87 people were formally interviewed; in 
addition, a number of informal conversations were held, particularly with 
beneficiaries of each TSEI, to gauge the TSEI's impact. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter I have outlined the theoretical questions raised by the 
literature and suggested how these may be translated, though a particular 
epistemological basis, into a methodology to answer appropriate research 
questions. I believe the sampling strategy employed allows identification and 
comparison of variables at several levels. First, a comparison of regional 
structures, particularly those emanating from the presence, absence or style of 
108 
regional government in Wales and North-East England. Second, a comparison 
of localised governance structures which influence the operation of TSEIs; 
analysis of what factors play a critical role in determining the success or failure 
of initiatives. Third, analysis and comparison of the internal relations and 
processes which influence the overall performance of any TSEI within the case 
study localities, to produce a deep understanding of the processes occurring. The 
evidence produced by this set of methods will be put forward in chapters 7 and 
8. However, the following chapter wil l seek to establish the regional and 
national contexts which influence those TSEIs when studied in situ. 
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Chapter 6 
Setting the U K Context: New Labour, New 
Deal, New Governance 
Introduction 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this thesis set out the theoretical basis for the 
study of TSEIs within a global context. This outlined the broad theoretical 
positions within the social sciences which attempt to understand how multi-
scalar forces may be mediated to produce particular economic, social and 
political outcomes. While such theoretical analyses inevitably draw upon 
empirical evidence, the processes outlined are not spatially explicit and could be 
occurring across the developed world to produce particular national, regional 
and local variations of after-Fordist political economies. As such, the aim of 
this chapter is explicitly to contextualise the UK experience of regulation and 
the particular policy responses to the globalisation of production. This will be 
done in a number of stages. First, I will outline the local UK policy context over 
the period 1979-2000. Characterised by Thatcherism and its enduring legacies, 
this period encapsulated a departure in political-economic thought away from 
Keynesian demand management towards a neo-liberal economic agenda. This in 
turn created the conditions for an adjustment in the role, both actual and 
perceived, for national and local government as a means to address the 
regulatory challenges of the 1980s and 1990s. As a consequence, UK 
governance structures have evolved to provide a version of Jessop's 'hollowed-
out' or reorganised state, which produces particular configurations of power and 
co-operation from local, regional and national government structures. 
These neo-liberal economic ideas introduced by Conservative 
governments have been taken up, indeed extended, by the New Labour 
government elected in 1997. In addition New Labour has invoked underlying 
philosophies of duty, obligations and work which together with essentially neo-
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liberal economics have led to the cornerstones of 'Third Way' politics (see Blair 
1997;Giddens 1998,2000). 
The moralistic philosophy of the Third Way has, by virtue of change in 
the state form, led to a re-emergence of the notions not only of rights for citizens 
but also responsibilities. This, I argue, is expressed in the three notions of: 
• A 'stakeholder society' in which duty and responsibilities are framed by 
the moral obligations of state and citizen. 
• A re-configuration of the welfare state as a means to ensure reciprocity 
of obligations. 
• A strengthening of paid work as a key element of the state-citizen 
'contract'. 
These three elements have found a policy conduit through the 
development of New Deal and theoretical notions of Welfare-to-Work which 
draw upon US discourses and practices of Workfare. Such a focus on work and 
re-integration into the economic mainstream has, as wil l be seen in later in the 
chapter, been followed through into policy structures concerned with 
regeneration and CED. These policy structures, through their funding criteria 
and politically motivated ideas of what is desirable and attainable, have 
compounded the steering of third sector initiatives towards being arms of 
mainstream policy as opposed to being genuine alternatives to the orthodoxy. 
These policy shifts will be briefly summarised, to demonstrate the particular 
policy context in which TSEIs operate. 
The UK Political Context 1979-2000 
Margaret Thatcher's election in 1979 heralded a new attitude to the role 
of the state in British political and social life. This marked a shift from the post-
war Butskellite consensus in which the role of the state was characterised by 
corporatist paternalism whereby the state mechanism could be a force for social 
engineering (see for example Culpitt 1992). The Thatcherite policies of the 
1980s were enshrined in a philosophy that the state should no longer have a 
primary role to intervene in the economy but to enable and lubricate the 
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functioning of an entrepreneurial economy. Consequently, notions of citizenship 
and social obligation have undergone a period of revision, the welfare state is 
retreating (at least in rhetoric), and government at the local level has been under 
pressure from central government. This section will examine the political 
ideology behind these changes, and will study the new and changing roles for 
the third sector and local authorities as service providers in the after-Fordist 
state. 
'Rolling Back the State' - Public Services Under 
Neo-Liberalism 
The attack by New Right political and economic thinking upon the state 
mechanism in the 1980s was the first great shift in the government philosophy 
regarding service provision since the end of World War 2. The New Right ideas 
and their rhetoric which were "taken up, propagated and colonised by 
Thatcherism" (Wilding 1992, cited in Warrington 1995: 1342) have created a 
departure from the preceding post-war state trajectory. The speed and scale of 
changes in the welfare state have seen a great deal of academic debate across the 
social sciences, ranging from the Regulationist literature discussed above to 
literatures with a basis in sociology and politics (see, for example, Deakin 1987; 
Johnson 1990; Hills 1990; Lowe 1993). 
The incentive for the onslaught by New Right thought against the state 
since the early 1980s was due to the perceived crises in the state caused by the 
burden it was placing on the economy. This notion achieved such an ascendancy 
that even before the election of New Labour, the ideological battle over the state 
had been won by New Right thought and as a result, the debate is now 
"dominated by the 'logic' of economic rationality rather than what mix of 
'social obligations' ought properly to be supported by redistributive tax 
regimes"(Culpitt 1992: 2). This has been mirrored in the 'new sociology' (see 
Taylor-Gooby 1997) leading to a move away from a polemical debate of 'left' 
and 'right' to a reassessment of the role of the welfare state in the economic 
rationality-driven economy and society of the 1980s and 1990s. 
Increasingly, the demise of the political and ideological basis of the post-
war welfare state has led to new patterns in the provision of welfare services, 
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with the market and other providers playing an enhanced role. The basis for this 
lies in the notion of welfare pluralism (see Johnson 1987), also termed the 
'welfare mix' (Rose 1986), or 'the mixed economy of welfare' (George and 
Wilding 1985). An essential element of this approach is the notion of 
partnership between statutory, private and third sector agencies.70 
The inclusion of the third sector reflects the fact that the partnership of 
public and third sectors in a context of welfare pluralism is regarded as a sign of 
'best practice' in the new governance of the UK. This therefore has implications 
for the means of service delivery which has been given impetus by new policy 
mechanisms and the underlying political ideology of reducing the scale and 
scope of the state. Through a shift in thinking, 'good practice' authorities are 
now viewed as those that recognise and support voluntary sector input in two 
ways - delivering mainstream services on behalf of the local authority, and 
providing more socially-based experimental and complementary services which 
promote self-help and advocacy (Bemrose and MacKeith 1996). However, the 
practical implementation of this welfare pluralist ideal has led to criticism and 
the creation of the 'Shadow State' (Warrington 1995) in which the state and the 
third sector are interdependent through funding and contracts and yet are 
producing services without the accountability to the electorate (see for example 
Geiger and Wolch 1986; Wolch 1990). 
Consequently, there has been a movement of some aspects of welfare 
provision away from local authorities and towards a broader set of institutions 
incorporating government departments, quangos and the third sector, resulting in 
third sector agencies becoming more centralised and more susceptible to policy-
led development (Warrington 1995). Third sector agencies are therefore in 
danger of becoming the tools of government policy rather than acting as 
independent agencies, with funding dependent upon compliance with 
government dictats, priorities identified by local authorities, and performance 
and 'value for money' targets. As a result, Warrington (1995) concludes, 
welfare pluralism does not equate to the decentralised, flexible, efficient system 
envisaged by some authors. 
This was the state envisaged by the Wolfendon Committee of 1978, which was the effective forerunner 
of many of the ideas put into practice by the Conservative government of the 1980s. 
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The 'Enabling' Local Authority: New Roles for 
Local Government 
In consequence, the pluralist welfare state requires the adoption of an 
'enabling' role for a local authority in which services are organised and 
monitored, with direct provision of services carried out by other agencies. Such 
an approach was brought about by New Right thinking, and involved a radical 
revision of the role of the local state and the services it provides, particularly 
within a harsher funding climate (see for example King 1987).71 'Enabling' was 
popularised during the Thatcher administration, with Nicholas Ridley a key 
proponent of the new approach. Ridley stated, 'the role of the local authority 
wil l no longer be that of universal provider'...'it is for local authorities to 
organise, secure and monitor the provision of services, without necessarily 
providing them themselves'...'authorities will have to act in a more pluralist way 
than in the past, alongside a wide variety of public, private and voluntary 
agencies' (Ridley 1990: 8, cited in Cochrane 1993: 69). However, to assume that 
this kind of thinking is purely the domain of Conservative governments is 
misplaced; Hill notes that, "In 1993 the Labour Party, in what was seen as a 
reversal of its previous position, stated that local councils did not have an 
absolute right to be direct providers and managers of services" (Hill 1994: 113). 
More recently, John Prescott, in the DETR working paper Modernising Local 
Government (DETR 1998c, subsequently published in full form 30 March 
1999), states, 
"Councils need to break free from old fashioned practices and attitudes. 
There is a long and proud tradition of councils serving their communities. 
But the world and how we live today is very different from when our 
current systems of local government were established. There is no future 
in the old model of councils trying to plan and run most services. It does 
not provide the services which people want, and cannot do so in today's 
world. Equally there is no future for councils which are inward looking -
more concerned to maintain their structures and protect their vested 
interests than listening to their local people and leading their 
communities"(DETR 1998c; foreword by John Prescott). 
The resulting pressures on local authorities to become enablers has had, 
as would be expected, uneven consequences. As noted above in the discussion 
7 1 For a fuller analysis of the ideas involved in 'enabling' see Cochrane 1993, ch 4. 
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of the regulation approach, historical attitudes and political mediation have a 
great impact upon the actual mosaic of service provision types that are found in 
practice. Authorities, exercising the diminished autonomy available to them, 
have challenged and mediated such pressures to produce variable empirically 
observable results. The outcomes produced through intra-authority mediation 
and government pressures can be typified as points on a continuum 
encompassing ideal types at the extremities (Goodlad 1994). At each end of the 
spectrum are the extreme positions, which may be described as 'top-down' or 
'interventionist' provision as opposed to 'bottom-up' or 'market-led' 
provision.72 
Bemrose and Mac Keith (1996) note several Local Authority responses 
to the challenge of state-led provision. These form the ideal types against which 
actually existing authorities, formed through the mediation of central 
government pressures, wil l be analysed in the following chapter. 
• Cautious authorities - who try to maintain traditional ways of doing 
things (often traditional labour authorities). 
» Responsive authorities - who see disadvantages but try to make it work 
as well as possible for the locality. 
• Business authorities - who have adopted a pragmatic managerialist 
approach. 
• Residual authorities - who aim to contract everything out, often through 
competitive tendering (tend to be New Right authorities). 
Adapted from Bemrose and MacKeith 1996. 
What does 'enabling' mean for the role of the voluntary and third sector 
groups in Britain? 'Contracting out' and 'Compulsory Competitive Tendering' 
(CCT) are phrases synonymous with the welfare-pluralist perspective, and these 
involve the officially sanctioned formalisation of a producer-consumer 
relationship of provider and enabling authority. As part of this, the third sector 
has in some cases effectively become integrated into the statutory sector. This 
For a fuller discussion of the role of 'bottom up' forces in local government relations in the UK, see for 
example Harding 1990; Roberts, Russell, Parkinson and Harding 1994; Bailey, Barker and McDonald, 
1995. 
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move towards enabling can be seen to be by-passing the local authority, 
although it still remains a key player in service delivery. As a result, a new 
relationship is being brought about between local authorities and the voluntary 
sector formalised by the 1998 Compact (Home Office 1998). In terms of CED, 
this development of the third sector and funding creates a new institutional 
framework in which key third sector players and institutions must operate. 
'New' Labour? 
This transition from Thatcherism has been marked not by discontinuity 
but by a continuation of neo-liberal economic thought. However, the re-launch 
of the Labour Party as 'New' Labour in the mid 1990s (Brivati and Bale 1997) 
and the subsequent landslide victory of May 1997 has heralded a new era in 
British politics in which the roles of the state, economy and society as envisaged 
over several decades of Labourist thought have been extensively revised. Key to 
this revision has been the ideological shift away from socialist ideas of 'Old 
Labour' couched in a corporate state [the ditching of clause IV, reduced union 
rights, Keynesian economic policy] towards a new conception of the state within 
a social democracy as part of a globalised, post-welfare environment of the late 
20 t h century and the early 21 s t century.73 Etzioni (2001) sums up the Third Way 
philosophy by stating that its "central tenet is that both the state and the market 
are part of the solution, that each has a significant and legitimate role to play, 
and that they need to co-operate rather than constantly be at loggerheads" 
(Etzioni 2001: 25). 
The acceptance of globalisation, and its constituent trends as 'fact', 
places the Third Way and its philosophical underpinning (most notably Blair 
1997, Giddens 1998, 2000) at the head of a potentially distinct regulatory 
environment. This section will examine the central tenets of the Third Way as a 
normative response to these perceived globalisation forces, and will present an 
analysis of their impact on localised institutional structures and the social 
economy. 
" Kendall notes that, "The Labour Party's revision of Clause IV was in part a 'revisionist' strategy in 
response to post-Thatcherite conditions, consciously engaged upon in order to persuade the electorate that 
they were dealing with New Labour" Kendall (2000: 555, emphasis original). 
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The 'Third Way5 
The economic stance of the Third Way, rather than taking a radical 
departure from the previous Conservative government, encompasses a 
continuation (or indeed an extension) of Neo-liberal ideology. This commitment 
therefore problematises the ideological distinctiveness of the Third Way as a 
philosophy. However, in contrast to the period 1979-97, the normative stance of 
the Third Way towards the maintenance of Neo-liberal hegemony is explicitly 
counterbalanced by a regulatory stance based on the crucial notion of social 
cohesion rather than social inclusion (and therefore implicitly the focus on social 
exclusion). It is this 'welfare-tempered Neo-liberalism' (Levitas 1998) which 
provides the economic-social-political nexus of the Third Way. 
The Neo-liberal economic ideology of the Third Way, as with 
Thatcherism, maintains the dominance of the private sector and capital as the 
key engine of wealth and job creation. As such, the acceptance of the 
globalisation of economic activity is met head-on as a challenge and opportunity 
for the after-Fordist economy of the UK. It is this renewal of state activity along 
social-democratic themes - or the permanent revisionism as referred to by 
Giddens (1998: 4) - which has led to a reworking of the roles and 
responsibilities of state and civil society as crucial to the philosophy of the Third 
Way. 
Giddens' proclamation that the state should no longer tolerate people 
who achieve rights without responsibilities (1998: 65) denotes the ethical and 
moral principle of the New Labour/Third Way politics. The 'stakeholder 
society', which was introduced by Hutton (1995, 1997a; see also Field 1996), 
suggests that the moral imperative to tackle deprivation and social exclusion as a 
means to social cohesion is key to the New Labour agenda. This represents a 
'spiritual journey' (Cameron 1999) in which responsibility lies at the level of the 
state to produce a coherent nexus of state, economy and society which has been 
absent from UK political debate. Deacon (2000) refers to the ethos of New 
Labour as representative of a wave of 'Anglicanised communitarianism' which 
draws heavily upon the philosophies extolled by John MacMurray (see for 
example Heron and Dwyer 1999). Such an ethos is couched within the notions 
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of duty, responsibility, reciprocity and, through extension, order. Blair (1996) 
states: 
"At the heart of everything New Labour stands for is the theme of rights and 
responsibilities. For every right we enjoy, we owe responsibilities...You can take but 
you give too. That basic value informs New Labour policy" (Blair 1996, cited in 
Deacon 2000: 11). 
The target in this moral crusade is not the neo-liberal economic agenda 
(as noted above) but the structure of the welfare state as a perceived disincentive 
for individuals to take responsibility. As a legacy of the post-war regulatory 
framework, in the minds of New Labour philosophers it is inextricably linked 
with Keynesian welfarism, and its perceived legacy of welfare dependency. As 
such, the welfare state has undergone significant re-evaluation as New Labour 
demonstrates its commitment to 'think the unthinkable' as it entered office in 
May 1997 (Deacon 2000: 6). This demonstrates a determination to remove New 
Labour from the shackles of the institutional blockage perceived to be created 
by the Titmuss paradigm which produced a commitment to "unconditional, non-
judgemental welfare" (Deacon 2000: 9). 
Furthermore, the creation of the Social Exclusion Unit in 1997 signalled 
the determination of New Labour to set out its agenda in dealing with the 
problems of the 'socially exclude'. However, such an emphasis on social 
exclusion has significant moral and ethical considerations in this area of work. 
Loury (1999), outlining considerations of social exclusion in the context of 
ethnic groups, notes that "a cursory review of what has been written under the 
rubric "social exclusion" over the past five years reveals that normative matters 
are the primary concern of those invoking this concept. What we have in "social 
exclusion" is a loaded term. How could "social exclusion" possibly be 
considered a good thing? Doesn't everyone want to see less of it? Indeed, using 
the term can be, in itself, a political move - a bid to define the debate in such a 
way as to privilege more progressive, "inclusive," and socially democratic 
7 4 These concepts, it could be argued, are elements of the unifying rationale of theories discussed above 
regarding social capacity; these notions have been appropriated under New Labour to provide an 
underlying philosophical basis to the Third Way. However, despite this philosophical rationale, Etzioni 
(2001) notes that taking responsibility is something "which Blair has often pointed to, here and there 
introduced, but not quite led the British people truly to embrace, with his top-down government and stress 
on efficiency" (Etzioni 2001: 26). 
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policy. Concerns about the status of ethnic minority groups, immigrant 
populations, unemployed workers, women, and indigenous peoples fit nicely 
into this paradigm of thought. This observation is in no way intended to signal a 
lack of sympathy for such political programs. I merely seek to point out that, i f 
one undertakes to provide a thorough analysis of the concept of "social 
exclusion," then one must attend to its rhetorical as well as its social scientific 
dimension." (Loury 1999:1). 
Defining social exclusion is difficult, in that i f it is not done merely by 
labour market exclusion, the associated effects upon family, skills, motivations 
and political activity are not counted by market prices. Most crucially, social 
exclusion has multiple, context-dependent meanings; as such it had potentially 
dangerous effects. I am therefore wary of the situation which has been 
engendered by the use of social exclusion to categorise localities or people. The 
very focus of attempts to redress such a perceived situation may serve to 
stigmatize further. 
Furthermore, the key idea to be outlined here is who regards someone as 
being socially excluded. This is not necessarily the 'socially excluded' 
themselves; indeed it may be the case that other measures may lead to an 
activation of feelings of inclusion as opposed to exclusion. Those who are 
excluded may well not be overly satisfied with their stigmatisation in such a 
way, other than to benefit from the affirmative action which may come their 
way. Loury (1999) notes that, while affirmative action may benefit a number of 
marginal members of a group categorized as socially excluded. However, they 
may also further sideline those who ' fa i l ' despite affirmative action, thus adding 
to the stigmatization of their 'exclusion'. In contrast, broader policies which do 
not target may have the beneficial impacts without some of the potential 
negatives of current policies to deal with social exclusion. 
By restructuring welfare in a manner consistent with its Christian 
Socialist ethos, New Labour is attempting to redefine the contract with society 
while maintaining contact with the 'old' Labour traditions of solidarity and 
equality (Deacon 2000: 11). The notion of a new contract, symbolised by the 
1998 green paper, A New Contract for Welfare (DSS 1998) attempts to further a 
policy framework which exerts strong moral obligations on the part of both 
119 
government and governed. It is within this framework that there has been a 
reinvention of paid work as the means to full citizenship (Cameron 1999). This 
siting of the work ethic as a key element of the Third Way will now be 
discussed as a product of the neo-liberal political agenda coupled with the 
historical evolution of the concept of work. 
New Labour and Work 
The conceptions of both wage labour and work underwent significant 
change in the late 20th century. There has been a shift in the organisation of 
production, away from the Fordist mass-production era towards the complex, 
multi-layered mode of accumulation of post-Fordism (Amin 1994). Alongside 
structurally produced unemployment, job insecurity and the general 
casualisation of much employment, there is a movement toward the knowledge-
intensive sectors involved in finance, engineering and the higher services. These 
pressures are combined, and indeed overlaid on each other, to create the 
industrial and social systems of Western capitalism in the late 20th and early 21 s t 
centuries. 
Pahl (1988: 1) notes that, "the world is as much dominated by the need 
to work as it has ever been". In particular, paid work has retained its dominance 
as the primary basis of social organisation. While quality jobs are becoming 
relatively scarcer, government policy retains its emphasis on paid work as the 
principal means by which people are included and identified as parts of 
mainstream society. The New Labour government's focus on social exclusion 
therefore regards the labour market as the key element of integration, cohesion 
and hence inclusion. Similarly, the New Labour Government's 1998 New 
Contract for Welfare states that the government's aim is "to rebuild the welfare 
state around work". It goes on to state that, "For both individuals and families 
paid work is the most secure means of averting poverty and dependence except, 
of course, for those who...cannot realistically support themselves" (DSS 1998: 
7 5 Kendall (2000) employs Kingdon's (1995) notions of policy, problem and politics streams to suggest that 
the policy and political streams were must more interconnected in terms of the compact, thus delimiting an 
inherently political project. Viewed through the lens of govemmentality, this represents not only a 
formalisation of the sector through the policies, funding frameworks and types of initiatives funded, but 
also through the broader application of the technologies of government in terms of the accountability 
criteria and the acceptance of the mainstream role of the voluntary sector in itself (See also Morrison 
2000). 
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23). As such, the work ethic espoused by government privileges paid work as 
the key route for inclusion into society and hence as inherently more valuable 
than other forms of work. 7 6 
The implication of the New Labour government's 'work first' agenda 
(Peck and Theodore 2000) as a cornerstone of the New Labour contract of state 
and citizen wil l now be elaborated upon. The implication of this neo-liberal 
economic agenda, allied to a belief in the philosophy of work, has been key to 
the development of the New Deal as one cornerstone (in rhetoric at least) of the 
New Labour administration's policy framework. Such a confluence of neo-
liberal economics and a work-oriented moral framework draws heavily upon the 
welfare edicts of the USA. As such I intend to introduce the 
theoretical/philosophical background to Welfare-to-Work, before critically 
examining the success and failure of New Deal, both implied from US studies 
and through early British studies. 
Welfare-to-Work, Workfare and the New Deal 
The (perceived) crises in the post-war mode of regulation have become 
evident since the 1970s and have led to a reassessment of government policy 
towards unemployment and welfare in the 1980s and 90s. In the context of a 
reorganised or 'hollowed out' state system (Jessop 1994b),77 there has been a 
reappraisal of the contract between state and citizen, with the obligations of 
citizen to state becoming framed in terms of paid work a key inclusionary 
element. As a result of this, Welfare-to-Work, the broad term used for the 
current set of strategies aimed at reducing welfare dependency and moving 
people into work, has been at the forefront of British policy with the 
introduction of the 'New Deal' for young unemployed and in America for the 
so-called 'workfare' schemes. 
Workfare 7 8 has now taken on a meaning in policy terms to include "as a 
condition of income support...the requirement that recipients participate in a 
7 6 As will be seen later, this potentially presents a tension with New Labour's proclamations regarding the 
value of the voluntary sector, except for the fact that it has introduced, through the compact with the 
voluntary sector, a sense of market discipline into the operations of the third sector. 
7 7 See chapter 3. 
7 8 The Dorsey Dictionary of American Government and Politics, according to Shafritz (1988: 595) defines 
workfare as "any public welfare programme that requires welfare participants to work 
(work+welfare=workfare) or to enrol in a formal job-training program" (cited in Peck 1998b). 
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wide variety of activities designed to increase their employment prospects" 
(Evans 1995: 75; cited in Peck 1998b). The evolution of such schemes has been 
a long drawn-out process, with the basis primarily in the notion of 'welfare 
dependency' which was a central part of the rhetoric and political project of the 
Thatcherite attack on welfare provision during the 1980s and which has 
continued in the 1990s. This section will attempt to define the key elements of 
such schemes, focus on their claims to success and critically examine how their 
introduction wil l affect the welfare systems and labour markets of the future. 
Welfare-to-Work: Theory and Evolution 
In the q/ter-Fordist, service-led economies of the 1990s, Welfare-to-
Work has, through a series of discursive struggles dominated by the neo-liberal 
economic policies of the UK and the US, come to represent the dominant post-
welfare alternative. The politics and rhetoric of welfare reform has meant that, 
"old discourses of needs, decency, compassion, and entitlement have been 
discredited, while 'new' (or more accurately reworked) discourses of work, 
responsibility, self-sufficiency, and empowerment have been forcefully 
advanced" (Peck 1998b: 133; see also Cox 1998).79 This rejection of the 
dominant place of public welfare (Jacobs 1995) represents a repoliticisation of 
the welfare agenda away from the post-war settlement in the UK, and 
particularly in the US where there has been a fanatical espousing of values of 
duty, hard work, incentives and empowerment whilst remaining tough with 
those who are opposed to welfare reform (O'Connor 1998; Peck 1998b). In 
contrast, such rhetoric has been less evident in Europe, or at least its expression 
has been less explicit: Peck (1998b: 134) notes that the notion of 'workfare' 
remained almost taboo until recently in European social democracies. UK 
politicians have been similarly coy and inexplicit regarding the true nature of 
welfare reform in Britain until New Labour's declaration to be a 'Welfare-to-
Work government'. Thus, compulsion, long resisted by the political left in the 
UK, "has since the 1997 general election become a central plank of the Labour 
7 9 The emergence of Welfare-to-Work as an economic concept has, according to Peck (1998b), its roots in 
a speech by Richard Nixon in 1969 in which he states, "in the final analysis, we cannot talk our way out of 
poverty; we cannot legislate our way out of poverty, but this nation can work its way out of poverty. What 
America needs now is not more welfare but more 'workfare'" (televised speech, Aug. 1969; Nathan 1986: 
107). 
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government's (US-inflected) 'rights and responsibilities' approach to social and 
employment policy" (Peck and Theodore 2000: 121). 
Consequently, Welfare-to-Work seems to have won the debate over the 
path of welfare reform into the 21 s t century. Welfare-to-Work has its theoretical 
grounding in two main themes: the notions that unemployment makes people 
less employable and the notion of welfare dependency restricting the incentive 
to work (Turok and Webster 1998). The thesis that experience of (particularly 
long-term) unemployment creates a barrier to re-entry into the labour market has 
been put forward by Budd et al (1988) and Layard et al (1991) and forms the 
central ideas of the Riverside project studied by Peck (1998a) and Peck and 
Theodore (2000). This suggests that through factors such as the depletion of 
skills, the relaxing of the work ethic, stigmatism related to long-term 
unemployment and less intensive job searching, people become detached form 
the workforce: the so-called 'withering flowers' theory (Turok and Webster 
1998: 311). In contrast, evidence from Machin and Manning (1999) and 
Webster (1997) suggests that it is an erroneous assumption to distinguish the 
long-term unemployed from the unemployed in general, as changes in the labour 
market lead consistently to changes both in the short and long-term 
unemployment rates. 
Second, and perhaps more persuasive in terms of the rhetoric of welfare 
reform, is the notion of welfare dependency. This suggests that the structure of 
the tax and benefits regime acts as a disincentive to people re-joining the labour 
market (Layard 1991). Prevailing explanations of the causes of poverty and 
unemployment have therefore been reformulated in supply-side terms as 
problems of dependency, low motivation and inadequate employability (Peck 
and Theodore 2000) such that the system is perceived to foster a durable 
'welfare culture' (Gilder 1993: 135, cited in Peck 1998b: 133). This 
entrenchment of a culture of dependency (HM Treasury, 1997; cited in Turok 
and Webster 1998: 312) and the subsequent 'replacement ratio' theory suggest 
that higher benefit levels relative to the net level of wages will reduce the 
incentive to work. Consequently, we see the ascendancy of the Anglo-American 
'work-first' model based on "a series of active measures, such as assisted job 
search, mandatory 'workfare' programmes, short-term work preparation and the 
threat of benefit withdrawal which are designed to propel welfare recipients into 
123 
the labour market as rapidly as possible" (Peck and Theodore 2000: 120). As 
such, the policy response has been primarily to employ the 'stick' of reducing 
the level or duration of benefits to retain the incentive to take jobs, whatever 
they may be (see Peck 1998a). 
Welfare-to-Work Schemes: Practices, Successes 
and Failings 
Welfare-to-Work schemes vary as to their size, scope, the opportunities 
they offer and the penalties they may impose on non-participants. The genuine 
value of such schemes as a means of facilitating economic development and 
social inclusion is questionable due to the poor quality of jobs which are entered 
into and their influence in pushing down labour costs and perpetuating poverty, 
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even in work. Consequently, the promotion of cost as the sole means to 
measure success leads to a demotion of the creation of less tangible assets of 
social capital as conceived by Putnam (1993) and others to minor elements of 
economic success. The ascendancy of the Welfare to Work/Workfare model is 
primarily vindicated by the implementation and analysis of such projects within 
a [neo-classical] cost-led evaluation paradigm. Again, this is an endorsement of 
the human and economic value of the work ethic as key elements in social 
capital not addressed by European-based authors, but falls well short of a 
potentially inclusive social order suggested by Amin (1999). 
Crucial to the success and/or failure of Welfare-to-Work is the 
geography of new work opportunities in relation to the geography of target 
groups.81 As such, it is those areas with the greatest degree of unemployment 
which will require the greatest number of vacancies under the New Deal (Turok 
and Webster 1998). However, in July 1997 there were 3.3 job centre vacancies 
in the South East for every potential New Deal participant, whereas in the North 
there were just 1.4 vacancies per New Dealer. It is the declining, de-
industrialising areas (for example the North-East of England, Merseyside and 
8 0 Peck's expose of the Riverside project in America suggests that Welfare-to-Work in this form "speaks to 
the politics of poverty, not its underlying causes" (Peck 1998a: 540; see also Katz 1989). 
8 1 In the UK, the concentration of youth unemployment is such that of the 18-24 year old group targeted by 
the first wave of New Deal, half are in 18 of Britain's local authority districts, most of which are urbanised 
and to the North and West of the country (Simmonds and Bewick 1997; Peck 1998c: 14). New Deal has 
now been extended to over 24s and over 55s. 
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South Wales) where there is already a surplus supply of labour that New Deal 
will struggle to create new work for participants. 
Therefore, despite the additional funding which is allocated under the 
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new deal to target groups the geography of such target groups is similar to that 
of unemployment itself. As a result, the emphasis of the New Deal on areas 
which already have an excess supply of labour will have the impact of 
'churning' of people into and out of temporary projects and work placements, 
thereby re-ordering the labour market by propelling those who are job ready into 
work (Peck and Theodore 2000), with no lasting reduction in unemployment 
(Turok and Webster 1998: 325). The New Deal therefore "seems consequently 
destined to run up against the structural constraints of demand deficiency in the 
labour market...In depressed, areas, the New Deal may consequently raise 
employability without raising employment" (Peck 1998c: 17; see also Peck 
1999). 
This points to one of the most significant problems of Welfare-to-Work 
schemes such as the New Deal, and which have been identified in its 
forerunners: the Youth Training Scheme (YTS) and Job Seeker's Allowance 
(JSA). Put simply, Welfare-to-Work can perform well in buoyant labour 
markets when the job-creation capacity of the economy is strong; in times of 
recession or labour market shrinkage, the New Deal is at best ineffective and at 
worst responsible for forcing participants into unsuitable and unsustainable jobs. 
In consequence, Welfare-to-Work projects such as New Deal are 'fair weather' 
policies. Peck (1998c) notes that, "should the economy begin to slow down, the 
situation would become very different. And under conditions of recession, 
Welfare-to-Work in its current form would soon be discredited, finding itself 
caught, just as the youth programmes of the 1980s did" (1998c: 8). Peck's 
conclusions from such findings is that Welfare-to-Work schemes are heavily 
sensitive and dependent upon labour market conditions, with the private-sector 
emphasis on New Deal making it particularly reliant on the dynamics of the 
local economy. As such, local economic, political and institutional factors will 
play a significant role in determining the success or otherwise of New Deal. 
8 2 Youth unemployed, long-term unemployed, long-term sick, lone parents and partners of the unemployed 
- roughly £58 million, or 1% of the total budget of the new deal). 
8 3 For information on the US experience of workfare, see Deavers and Hattiangadi (1998); McCurrer and 
Sawhill(1997). 
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While New Deal may struggle to cope with the necessity for demand-
side intervention to ease the acute shortages of jobs in depressed areas, the 
emphasis on the reduction of welfare payments has continued. Hutton notes that 
such policy objectives cannot be reconciled in the context of anything but a 
buoyant labour market. He states: 
"It is not moral fecklessness and high marginal tax rates for those beginning work 
that are generating worklessness in places such as Merseyside, Strathclyde and 
Tyneside. It is the local economy that has disintegrated - there is no work. Poverty 
in these areas is not caused by the welfare state; rather it is the inadequacy of the 
welfare state that is causing poverty...cutting benefits, counselling the unemployed 
and offering job subsidies to private-sector employers in these parts of the country 
as a 'welfare-to-work' programme are thus foredoomed to failure. There are too-
few private sector employers to take up the subsidy, so there can only be a 
minimal increase in work. Poverty will rise, not fall" (Hutton 1997b: 22). 
Current employment initiatives, typified by punitive supply-side regimes 
such as Welfare-to-Work, have been primarily assessed by the number of 
unemployed persons who have been (re)incorporated into employment in the 
formal economy through a variety of training schemes and employment 
subsidies. As noted above, the quality of work provided has been typically 
characterised by low pay, flexible hours and precarious short-term contracts and 
as such its economic, social and environmental sustainability has been 
questioned (Peck 1998a). Indeed, the marked lack of quality job opportunities 
provided thorough government schemes may, as a result of long hours, low pay 
and precarious employment conditions, contribute to social exclusion and family 
break-up as much as does unemployment itself (Mingione 1991). If, as seems 
likely, current economic structures preclude Welfare-to-Work schemes from 
creating adequate numbers of quality jobs within the UK, alternative methods of 
work creation, which could have different social and environmental goals need 
to be considered (Hudson and Weaver 1997). However, this approach will be 
difficult within the dominant policy situation, in which, 
"the apparently relentless drift towards 'work first' workfare systems is 
not an inevitable or pre-ordained consequence of structural economic 
conditions, nor is it a straightforward outcome of the will and wiliness of 
neoliberal political elites. But it must be acknowledged that the manifest 
political attractiveness of such approaches to a range of centre-left and 
right-wing governments - coupled with their apparent 'fit' with 
deregulated, flexible labour markets - seems to be stacking the odds in 
favour of workfarist developments at the present time. 'Work first' 
programming is emerging as a social-policy complement to the aggressive 
orthodoxy of neoliberal labour market policy, the strategy-of-choice under 
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conditions of welfare retrenchment and laissez-faire macroeconomic 
management" (Peck and Theodore 2000: 135). 
Since the New Deal tends to focus upon the rehabilitation of unemployed 
people within the structures of the formal economy, it may therefore be omitting 
areas of work which have socially useful outcomes but which do not fit well 
with the target of rehabilitating people within the formal sector workforce. The 
New Deal, being a one-off project, is unlikely to be able to support non-formal 
sector activities. Its structure, according to Turok and Webster, "tends to militate 
against work-experience and training projects engaged in socially useful 
activities in the environmental, health, social work and related fields - that might 
otherwise have important attractions - unless they can be converted into self-
financing enterprise generating income from beyond their areas" (Turok and 
Webster 1998: 327). However, i f as the evidence suggests there is not enough 
quality employment for all those wishing to participate in the workforce, there is 
a need to look towards the third sector as a source of work and employment 
which can have diverse social, environmental and personal benefits. 
CED as a Response to New Deal? Policy 
Frameworks and Outcomes 
As a response to the failings of New Deal and its predecessor in the 
Youth Training Scheme (YTS), CED has developed in the UK as a means to 
develop an alternative form of economic development for economically 
depressed areas. However, I suggest that the New Labour focus on paid work 
has the influence of steering the policy framework around CED towards a 
formal sector-oriented system which differs significantly from the 'alternative' 
notion which corresponds to the ideas of Birkholzer (1998). Williams et al 
(2001) suggest that, "In this sense, the third sector is an essential supplement to 
the current 'making work pay' policy agenda... The role of the third sector is to 
both provide these additional job opportunities and improve employability by 
helping people to maintain and acquire skills, develop self-confidence and self-
esteem" (Williams et al 2001). The acceptance of neo-liberal ideologies has, 
through the nature of the policy process, therefore led to particular 
configurations of community development funding regimes which have 
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narrowed the potential for radical alternatives to the formal sector as a means to 
deliver solutions to the unemployment problems of economically depressed 
communities. Allied to this, the predominant governmentality evident as a key 
strand of government attitudes to policy formation in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Rhodes 1997) has produced a dominant managerialist policy context in which 
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CED operates. This governmentality, I suggest, produces two intertwined 
outcomes which are directly relevant to the discussion of TSEls undertaken in 
the next two chapters. The first is the funding regimes behind CED from the 
national government level. Through an emphasis on marketisation, the policy 
process produces tight parameters through which funds are allocated to potential 
CED initiatives. This consequently impinges upon the nature of initiatives which 
are pursued. Second, the competitive nature of 'Challenge' funding reflects the 
shift in central government attitude towards local authorities as well as 
representing the shift from government to governance as local authorities are by-
passed as the direct administrators of urban regeneration. Taken together, these 
two strands lead to a particular national framework which influences the 
development of TSEIs. Through the production of policy frameworks and 
institutional dynamics, national-scale forces are key to the understanding of 
local pressures which will be assessed in chapters 7 and 8. 
CED in the UK 
In this section, I will outline the key national policies and structures 
which have influenced the development of CED over the past 15-20 years. 
Concentrating on the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) as a key regeneration 
policy, 8 5 I will suggest that the structure of UK regeneration militates against 
radical and experimental initiatives, despite the interventions of those involved 
in initiatives wishing to promote genuine alternatives. I also suggest that the 
dominant governmentality leads to the development of partnerships which are 
dependent upon regimes consisting of local authorities and privileged partners 
8 4 Foley (1999), drawing on Walsh (1995), suggests that the public managerialism of the 1980s and 1990s 
had two strands, of which the first was based on "industrial production engineering techniques emphasizing 
objective setting, targets and performance indicators. The second was based on... the primacy of market-
based coordination with its emphasis on competition" (Foley 1999: 813). 
8 5 Whilst regeneration encompasses a number of physical and other projects, a significant number of CED 
projects have been attempted within the framework of broader regeneration strategies. As such, I feel it 
appropriate here to study regeneration in general. 
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(as suggested by regime theory). As such, the combined pressures of 
globalisation, through the UK government's focus on work and the ladder to 
return to the mainstream, have an influence on the potential direction of CED in 
the UK. Significantly, this not only influences the types of initiatives but also 
their chances of survival due to the nature of support from interested agencies. 
It is not my wish here to study in depth the numerous policy measures 
which contribute to the funding and institutional environment for TSEIs in the 
UK. However, it is important to note that funding regimes operate at different 
spatial levels to produce a complex and overlapping policy context. At the 
European level, the attribution of European development status to areas of the 
UK has significantly influenced the policy environment. Most notably, the 
granting of structural fund status 2b and 5 to parts of England (including the 
North-East) has added an extra tier of funding for TSEIs and regeneration 
projects. In Spring 2000, Objective One status, which was already granted to 
Merseyside, was granted to South Wales and South Yorkshire. This has opened 
up a new source of funding for capital projects and more recently community 
development-oriented initiatives. Alongside this, a number of EU-originated, 
sector-specific projects have been influential in shaping the CED agenda and the 
types of pilot projects involved in this. Most crucially, the availability of 
funding has led to a tailoring of the types of initiative which emerge, towards the 
priorities of the funding providers. How these programmes influence the 
particular regional contexts of North-East England and South Wales will be seen 
in chapters 7 and 8. 
At the UK level, a great deal has been written about the form and 
implications of regeneration funds and in particular Challenge funding ( see for 
example Walsh 1995; Ward 1997; Foley 1999). Key to this discussion are 
Single Regeneration Budget (initiated in 1994 with the SRB Challenge Fund) 
and City Challenge (1991) which since their inception have been the dominant 
funding streams amongst numerous strategies (see for example the National 
Lottery, Urban Task Force, Coalfields Regeneration etc).87 Hall (2000) notes 
that Challenge funding had become an important aspect of public policy in the 
1990s in that by 1997, there were fifty-six competitive funding regimes, holding 
8 6 See for example the ERGO, PETRA, L E A D E R schemes initiated by the EU in the 1990s. 
8 7 For a full list of challenge based funding, from 1984-97, see Foley 1999. 
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£3.4 billion and administered through twelve government departments and 
agencies. Table 6.1. summarises the reasons behind Challenge funding put 
forward by the Treasury in the Challenge Handbook (1996). 
Table 6.1 The Key Benefits of Challenge Funding 
A. Cost savings. 
B. Better value for money. 
C. Reduction in bureaucracy. 
D. Involvement of those with direct knowledge of a subject or area. 
E. Ensuring funding is used efficiently. 
F. More innovative solutions. 
G. Levering-in private finance. 
H. Drawing on private sector and other skills, in particular those of 
management. 
Adapted from HM Treasury Challenge Handbook, (1996: 6-7) 
However, evaluation of individual SRB projects and groups of projects 
has suggested that the claims for such benefits are being both misplaced and 
unfulfilled (see Foley 1999; Hall 2000; Brereton and Temple 1999; Brennan et 
al 1999). However, in this context I wish to examine most closely the impact of 
Challenge funding on the dynamics of the boundary between the institutions of 
the third, private and state sectors. 
Crucial within the set-up of SRB has been the role of Government 
Offices of the Regions (GoRs). Hall (2000) notes that GoRs have the role of 
extending the influence of central government in the regeneration sphere due to 
their primarily administrative role in SRB competitions. Since final decisions 
are made by ministers, GoRs act merely as agents for central government and 
thus have extended central government influence into localities (see Stewart 
1994; Hall 2000). While New Labour has altered the focus of SRB and City 
Challenge towards the most needy communities and promoting 'community' 
involvement, Hall (2000) suggests that a continuing institutional tension 
between GoRs and the new RDAs will create new problems. The resulting focus 
upon regional scale institutions as the conduit for regeneration funding has 
meant that, "the government, in this respect, has missed an opportunity for 
achieving the 'new localism' in local regeneration policy and renewed 
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confidence in local authorities that characterised its pre-election rhetoric" (Hall 
2000: 13). 
Alongside GoRs, the special cases of Wales and Scotland have been 
highlighted by the devolution of some powers to the Welsh Assembly and the 
Scottish Parliament in 1998. This has initiated debate over the potential of these 
institutions to shape regionally-defined policy contexts by challenging central 
government policy and utilising their degree of autonomy in the attribution of 
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funds for CED. How these institutional arrangements influence the context for 
TSEIs will be seen fully in the following chapter. 
Foley (1999) suggests that such schemes create new flows of 
accountability which differ from the traditional accountability of a local 
authority through the electorate. Challenge funding (in its SRB form and in 
many other cases) requires an accountable body to be stipulated which oversees 
and administers funding. This therefore shifts the onus towards non-statutory 
bodies at the local level, and also to the Regional Development Agencies 
(RDAs). The consequence of this is a tightening of the regeneration agenda at 
the local level along the government policy line, and, as suggested in chapter 3, 
within a particular governmentality which privileges and justifies neo-liberal 
style solutions to the problems of 'excluded' communities. While there has been 
an evident shift away from the local authority as the sole arbiter of regeneration 
and community economic development policy, there has been an apparent 
parallel reassertion of the strength of central government through competitive 
funding. As such, I therefore suggest that there is a need to assess the manner in 
which government employs Foucaultian technologies to reinforce control over 
the regeneration process. Consequently, there is also a need to analyse the 
external institutional influences on the TSEIs within this narrowly-defined and 
controlled policy environment. 
This is not to suggest that CED is completely controlled; instead, the 
boundaries within which TSEIs operate are more restrictive due to the criteria 
presented by government. Despite this, government power is mediated and 
challenged through partnerships and multi-agency working at a number of scales 
(see fig.6.1). 
8 S SRB was never attempted in Wales; other challenge funds were established or administered by the Welsh 
office such as the Strategic Development Scheme (SDS). 
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Fig 6.1: The Funding Structure and Accountability Stream for SRB 
(adapted from Foley 1999: 819) 
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Drawing on regime theory, there is therefore a need to analyse how 
partnerships emerge, what imperatives are brought to such partnerships, and the 
implications of the presence of each partnership for the institutional 
environments in which TSEIs operate. This wil l have consequences for the types 
of institutional support available to TSEIs, the development of particular forms 
of CED schemes to revitalise local economies, and the utilisation by lead 
partners to influence the third sector agenda in a locality under the auspices of 
the partnership. Power relationships within such partnerships are by no means 
equal and as such Hall (2000: 9) puts forward a 4-point typology of 
partnerships: 
• Shell partnerships when involvement of non-leading agencies was nominal 
• Consultative partnerships when the partnership was strongly controlled by 
the leader but other partners were consulted about the bid and permitted to 
make changes at the margin 
• Participative partnerships when partners had often gained equal access to 
the decision-making mechanisms and frequently shaped policy priorities 
• Autonomous partnerships when all partners had equal access and 
mechanisms existed to ensure genuine and sustained involvement. 
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One consequence of this typology is to suggest that 'genuine' 
partnership is a difficult and rarely achieved goal when initiated by government 
funded regeneration schemes. In contrast, a belief that partnerships are more an 
exercise in window dressing by the lead partner (often a local authority) to 
accede to the requirements of funding has been keenly held. As such, in the 
majority of partnerships, "the term corporatism does not seem appropriate, as 
these (often officer-dominated) partnerships were detached from both the local 
electorate and local communities of interest" (Hall 2000: 10) and these 
partnerships should therefore be referred to as 'local managerialist' or 'local 
statist' (Collinge and Hall 1996). Consequently, the local state has a role in, and 
indeed power over, the regeneration process despite suggestions that the 
centralised government had eroded the power of the local state. Exactly how this 
governance structure and the power relations of the local state and community 
via the context of CED influences the development of TSEIs will be shown in 
empirical analysis in the following chapters. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has outlined the political-economic trajectory of the UK in 
the period 1979-2000 to provide an understanding of the policy context in which 
TSEIs operate. As has been shown, the Thatcherite philosophy dominating the 
1980s has, I believe, led to a significant shift in the policy context for TSEIs. 
Conservative governments of the period 1979-1997 initiated a reappraisal of (or 
indeed attack on) the institutions of local government, marking a shift from a 
conceptualisation of comprehensive service provision towards one of'enabling' 
in which there are a number of providers in a system of 'welfare pluralism' 
which is directed through multi-agency governance in partnership. Recent 
evidence also demonstrates the continued predominance of a neo-liberal 
economic ideology, allied by New Labour to a distinctly moralist political 
conviction. The policy consequences of this ascendancy has been the 
establishment of work as a key element in the state-citizen contract, which has 
been re-written. This, I contend, has consequently manifested itself in the New 
Deal programme in which the state re-draws its obligations and responsibilities 
to its citizens in a new language of reciprocity. 
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These elements have combined to produce the government's policy on 
regeneration which, through its key conduits of City Challenge and SRB, has 
produced the policy framework for a significant number of CED initiatives. 
These policies emphasise partnership working within a tightly controlled 
framework to target funds at communities which are perceived to be deprived. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that the state has become both more 
centralised and regionalised, with power moving away from elected local 
government as part of the reorganisation of the state and the move from 
government to governance. However, alongside this there has been an 
acceptance of the third sector, but primarily as an accompaniment to the formal 
sector. As such, policy tools rely keenly on the mainstream as a key conduit for 
regeneration activities. The consequence of this, I believe, is the narrowing of 
the parameters for CED, producing a limited political-economic structure within 
which success and failure are judged. Such a narrowing therefore limits the 
scope for micro-scale decision-making to determine the needs of a community 
and act accordingly to produce locally- appropriate solutions which fall outside 
the boundaries of the funding criteria. In the following chapter I wil l explore 
empirical evidence from North-East England and South Wales of how these 
forces are reconciled between scales, sectors and individual and collective 
ideologies to produce the context for success or failure of TSEIs. 
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Chapter 7 
Social Capital and the 'External' Influences 
on TSEIs. 
Introduction 
The key theoretical questions raised in chapters 1-6 now require 
tackling at the empirical level. Chapters 7 and 8 will split the empirical evidence 
gathered from fieldwork into two broad sections - first the 'external' 
environmental influences on TSEIs (chapter 7) and second the 'internal' 
management (chapter 8). While acknowledging that this structure analytically 
separates often interwoven processes, this provides a space in which to ground 
the theoretical analyses in a real-world context. These chapters seek to draw 
together a set of diverse narratives which have emanated from the case study 
research to present a coherent single narrative of the key factor influencing 
TSEIs. The resulting features which come to the fore wil l be analysed most 
notably through the lens of Healey et al's (1999) notions knowledge assets, 
relational assets and mobilisation capacity. I will also seek to draw upon the 
diverse set of literatures in chapters 2-4 as a tool to conceptualise the empirically 
observed features of TSEIs and their environments. The task here is essentially 
to tease out the key influences upon the success or failure of TSEIs, moving 
away from a notion of culture and interpersonal relations as a 'black box' 
concept in an attempt to specify more grounded local attributes.89 
Chapter 7 wil l firstly deal with the regional contexts of the case studies. 
This will examine the case made within the literatures outlined above for a 
particular 'social capital' of each region, primarily grounded within its industrial 
heritage and characterised by the industrial, political and social framework 
which has influenced the regional trajectory. This historical reading of the 
8 9 This reflects what Michelle Lenton Johnson, of Rhondda Cynon Taff County Borough Council, defines 
as an "X factor- some places have it, some don't." 
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institutional framework will then be related to the current regional political 
economies which provide the basis on which TSEIs may develop and succeed. 
From this, I employ the discourses of social capital, allied to the notion of 
capacity, as an historically derived factor which produces a key element of the 
external environment in which any TSEI operates. To do this, I will identify the 
qualitative features of local social capital which are present around both 
successful and unsuccessful TSEIs in order to provide evidence for particular 
forms of social capital as being propitious or otherwise for TSEIs. Following 
this, I wil l analyse how new forms of social capital have emerged in the post-
industrial era to examine how this influences the local institutional matrix and 
hence the TSEIs which operate within that context. 
Accepting a role for social capital at the local level, I then wish to 
examine how this interacts with the institutions of governance at a number of 
scales. First, I will examine the role of regional institutions and their strategic 
role in the development of the third sector in North-East England and South 
Wales, while noting that their development is in part a function of the local 
formulations of social capital and a path-dependent institutional trajectory. 
Second, the bulk of this chapter wil l examine the role of local 
authorities in providing crucial structures to support or constrain the 
development of TSEIs. The variety of case study localities has allowed for the 
comparison of local authority structures which are unitary, two-tier or which 
have undergone the transition from two-tier to unitary. This allows an analysis 
of the basic structures which help create successful or unsuccessful network 
environments for TSEIs. I will focus here on the influence of locality, 
embeddedness, the division of strategic planning, service delivery, 
implementation of employment policy and the subsequent tension of vested 
interests and power structures within the two-tier system resulting from 
'ownership' of initiatives. I will also examine the role of departmental 
alignments and network cultures within local authorities in determining the 
success or failure of initiatives 
The role of officers within local authority-TSEI relations will be 
analysed as a crucial yet less structured element in the determination of the 
capacity to produce co-ordinated (and well-resourced) TSEIs. The consequence 
of this is a relationship which is dependent upon the network capabilities of both 
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TSEIs and officers within local authorities to produce a beneficial synthesis of 
resources and capacity. This has long been acknowledged as a key factor in 
developing the basis for a successful TSEI, yet I suggest that studies undertaken 
which attempt to quantify this relationship fail to understand the necessarily 
qualitative nature of this relationship which produces particular outcomes. 
Similarly, the relationship of officers to power structures and resources within 
the local authority, produces a dynamic context in which capacity to act may be 
enabled or constrained. The predominantly human element encapsulated within 
this represents not only a challenge but also an opportunity, given the relevant 
capacities which may be mobilised. 
The relationships of officers and councillors within local authorities is, 
as would be expected, determined predominantly by the trust, respect and the 
relative power differential of individuals within each network. However, such a 
dependence upon interpersonal relations suggests a human element in the key 
structures which intertwine to produce outcomes. While this does not differ 
from the logical position which suggests that there is a variation in capabilities 
of individuals to synthesise resources within networks, I wil l analyse here the 
influence of key movers in determining the outcomes from TSEIs. 
The role of the political basis of the localities as a factor in producing 
particular configurations of social capital and the formal institutions will also be 
analysed. As noted above, the relationship of local authority to its territorial 
space is in part dependent upon the key social structures, of which politics is 
one. I will examine not only the role of political alliances as providing support 
to TSEIs through enhanced network opportunities but also their employment as 
a blocking mechanism through which to further the interests of political elites. 
This role has been most notably thrust into focus through the re-organisation of 
local authorities and the subsequent electoral changes of 1996, most specifically 
in Rhondda Cynon Taff (RCT) and Neath Port-Talbot (NPT). This challenge to 
the dominant political elites established for a number of decades will be 
analysed, as well as its potential influence on TSEIs within those locations. 
This discussion of evidence for particular propitious forms of local 
authority development will then lead to the analysis of broader governmental 
institutions which have been identified as crucial to the development of TSEIs. 
From this, the manner in which all these institutions cut across scalar boundaries 
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to produce particular partnerships around the third sector will be analysed. This 
wil l draw on the work in chapter 3 related to regime theory and its application to 
the third sector. 
To conclude, I will offer a template of how such formal and informal 
institutions create the external environment in which TSEIs are enabled to 
develop or are subject to blocking mechanisms. 
Regional Forms of Social Capital 
In this section, I wish to analyse the evidence for particular types of 
social capital which ease or obstruct the potential creation and subsequent 
development of TSEIs. While drawing on the regional-scale debates, outlined in 
chapter 2, I will examine the locally-specific cultural legacies in the areas 
immediately surrounding TSEIs as factors which influence their chances of 
success or failure. 
The case study areas, as identified above, all fall within regions and 
localities which have undergone significant economic restructuring over the past 
few decades. The role, therefore, of the typically inclusive, corporatist, social, 
economic and political structures which typified the post-war era has been 
challenged. This has produced a watered-down version of the previously-
existing communitarianism around the electoral form or a complete dismantling 
of the institutional formations of the region (see Cooke 1985 for a comparison of 
the industrial forms of North-East England and South Wales). As Wills (1998) 
notes, cultures are not static entities but reflexive responses to institutional 
challenges and change. The response to restructuring therefore has a key role to 
play in the formation of new forms of social capital or the decline of traditional 
forms of social capital. 
North-East England: The Labour Party and 
Tripartite Relations 
The inherent complexity of geographical formulations of social capital 
precludes simplistic non-spatial analyses which neglect regional and local 
institutional variations. The tension in any argument which attempts to simplify 
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the role of social capital to an industrial heritage which has been reinforced and 
modified over time is demonstrated by the case studies in North-East England. 
A diversity of heritage exists in North-East England, from South Tyneside, 
typified by shipbuilding in a predominantly urban context, through to Trimdon 
where mining and agriculture co-existed until the decline of both. Sedgefield 
lies on the South Durham coalfield and Sherburn Road is a housing estate on the 
periphery of the relatively prosperous City of Durham which has small 
manufacturing and administrative/educational functions. Consequently, a variety 
of heritage creates a myriad of interwoven and overlaid forms of social capital 
which create a particular institutional nexus within each locality. The result is a 
broad acceptance of social capital as a function of heritage, yet more locally 
formed and subject to the dynamics of the institutions within any locality. 
At the regional scale, North-East England has seen the historical 
evolution of an industrially-based political economy. The institutional settlement 
which emerged, based upon the predominance of the industry-based political 
economy, has been well-documented, as has its decline and succumbing to the 
chaotic forces of capitalism (See Hudson 1989; Beynon, Hudson and Sadler, 
1991; Colls and Lancaster, 1992; Byrne 1992). This development, accepting 
generalisations, has had several key features which have combined to produce 
the industrial and institutional dynamics of the 21 s t century North-East. These 
are, first, a predominance of coal, steel and shipbuilding as the industrial base of 
the regional economy. Second, the powerful political and social settlement 
which developed to facilitate and consequently protect the heavy industrial 
power base. Third, the challenge of marketisation, evident before 1979 but given 
extra political force under the Thatcher administration to expedite the decline of 
the industrial base to create a new economic climate. These factors intertwine to 
produce the economic conditions of the North-East which form the context of 
the external environment for TSEIs which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
However, it is not the place here to provide a full description of the economic 
conditions of North-East England pre-1979, although such a background is key 
to understanding the subsequent development of the 'hard' and 'soft' 
(alternatively, the formal or informal) institutions which are key to forming the 
physical and social structures within which TSEIs develop. 
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The principal economic base of North-East England until the 18 
century was an agrarian, coastal and craft economy, allied to primary extraction 
of coal on exposed seams. The technologies of coal extraction subsequently 
permitted deep and drift mining, and hence the North-East of England came to 
be based upon coal, steel, shipbuilding and associated trades in the 19th and 20 t h 
centuries, thus reinforcing the region as the industrial powerhouse of the UK. 
Concurrently, industrial development required the development of a supporting 
political and institutional structure to underpin and advance the industrial nexus. 
Hudson (1989) notes that the regulatory system in the inter-war period 
shifted from the 'old' politics of reaction to the 'new politics of modernisation' 
such that, "by the 1940s a powerful cross-class regionalist movement had 
emerged in the North-East, centred on the Northern Industrial Group which was 
premised on a certain sharing of territorially-defined interests that could be 
accommodated via an increased state involvement in economy and society" 
(Hudson 1989: 19). 
Within this context, the stranglehold of industrial interests upon post-war 
regional political economy was set; coal provided 95% of the UK primary 
energy needs in the period 1942-58 and was the dominant employer within the 
region (Table 7.1.) 
Table 7.1 Mining Employment Concentration in County Durham 
(adapted from Bulmer 1978). 
Year % Male population in mining 






These figures refer to the whole of County Durham, including areas 
outside the key mining communities. Beynon (1984) notes that in those areas, a 
greater percentage of male employment was directly related to the mine. He 
notes that even in 1984, "In the Easington District f if ty per cent of all male jobs 
are in the pits" (Beynon 1984: 105). 
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The predominance of mining and the institutions which supported it 
were the driving force behind the regional development and subsequent regional 
regulatory system. Within this period, Hudson notes, the National Coal Board 
actively advocated a freeze on new manufacturing in the region, as this would 
"invite an exodus from the mines to better-paid jobs in healthier and safe 
working environments" (Hudson 1989: 358). The result was, "formidable 
pressures, with a wide basis of support both inside and outside the North-East, to 
freeze the pattern of economic activities around those industries which had 
collapsed in the interwar years and been instrumental in the emergence of the 
interwar 'regional problem'" (ibid: 358). Hudson relates this as a "broad 
consensus within the North-East on the desirability of maintaining the 
'traditional' structure of industrial production and pattern of male labour 
demand associated with it"'(1989: 360-361). 
The inherent intertwinedness of the economic base and regional 
governance in North-East England has therefore led to an institutional structure 
which both reflects and reinforces this social hegemony. However, the 
institutions of this post-war regulatory system have suffered intense pressure as 
the industrial base of the region began to decline after 1979. As such, although 
Hudson (1994) notes a continuation of the post-war regional institutional 
structure through the pursuance of particular development strategies, economic 
decline and diversification has created the potential for new institutional spaces 
which are not as closely attached to one homogenising industrial base. Griffiths 
and Lanigan (1999) note that in North-East England, corporatist (or more 
accurately, tripartite)90 bodies have emerged, primarily in the field of economic 
development to encourage foreign direct investment in the 1980s and 1990s. 
However, the weakening of the regional political-economic-social regulatory 
mechanism therefore requires an analysis of the actually existing governance 
forms in North-East England which have evolved in response to the multi-scalar 
political and economic processes. This section draws heavily upon the 1999 
survey 'Who Runs the North-East Now'. 9 1 This provides the background for the 
Griffiths and Lanigan (1999, drawing on Anderson 1992) suggest that tripartism is a more accurate 
description of the coalition of local government, business and trade unions which emerged as this reflects a 
regional coalition including the local institutions of the state rather than the state itself in a corporate sense. 
9 1 Robinson et al (2000), published at http://www.dur.ac.uk/Sociology/nedemocracy/index.htm. 
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current governance features of North-East England, which have evolved over a 
number of years. 
In the post-war period, as was the case with much of the UK, local 
government in North-East England was characterised by a full-scale service 
provision role. This was particularly apparent in the predominantly left-leaning 
Labour Party authorities which experienced a tightening of political control as a 
reaction to a popular malcontent towards the central government. However, this 
local political hegemony of the Labour Party has been diluted by the edicts of 
central government. In a process outlined in the discussion of governmentality 
in chapter 3, and the development of governance, regional and local political 
institutions have found their electoral mandate tempered by the requirement to 
operate alongside a "bewildering variety of local and regional organisations 
involved in the design, management and delivery of public services" (Robinson 
et al 2000). The result of this stipulation towards partnership working has led to 
a situation in which, "management policies...are characterised by networks and 
partnership as opposed to the hierarchy and markets of the past" (Robinson et al 
2000). Such an assessment points towards a 'right-wing' Labourism within the 
region, influenced by local and regional political processes allied to national 
political trends. However, this position is potentially untenable and does not 
suggest a fully-fledged acceptance of the 'enabling' model of local governance 
outlined in chapter 3. In reality, local authorities in the North-East still hold a 
number of functions which have been associated with a broad service provision 
remit, and many hold this position in the minds of the population. 
Political Composition of Local Government in North-East 
England 
The political development of North-East England in the 20 t h Century, as 
wil l also be see in South Wales, is to a some extent synonymous with the history 
of the Labour Party. While parts of the region (notably the rural areas of 
Northumberland) remain staunchly Conservative-voting, the political values of 
the North-East have most accurately been electorally represented by the Labour 
Party. This has been a long-standing bias within the North-East, with well-
established dynasties of Labour politicians, both as MPs and in particular within 
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local government. This domination was cemented electorally after 1958 and in 
particular after 1979 when Thatcherism and the parallel decline of the steel and 
coal industries produced an electoral map in the North-East in which the 
Conservative party holds just one parliamentary seat as opposed to the Labour 
92 
Party's twenty-seven. 
Table 7.2 demonstrates the political composition of North-East local 
authorities which are relevant to this thesis. This table demonstrates the 
continued dominance of Labour Party politics as the key focus for 
representational democracy in the North-East. Note the Liberal Democrats as the 
major party opposition to Labour, with fewer than 20% of the total number of 
council seats. Overall, of 25 local authorities in the region, 5 are unitary; 5 are 
MBCs; the final 15 are 2-tier authorities combining 2 county councils and the 
remaining 13 district councils. 
Table 7.2: Electoral Composition of North-East Councils9 3 
North- East95 Control Con Lab Lib Dem Other Total 
County Councils 
Durham 9 4 Labour 2 53 4 2 61 
Metropolitan Borough 
Councils 
South Tyneside Labour 50 6 4 60 
District Councils 
Durham City Labour 33 13 3 49 
Sedgefield Labour 43 2 4 49 
Of the 29 parliamentary constituencies in the North-East, in 2001 27 were won by Labour candidates; the 
Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats won one seat each. 
9 3 Source: K. Edkins' website: http://www.gwydir.demon.co.uk/uklocalgov/ (updated to 6.5.2000). 
9 4 Including Council elections 7/6/2001. 
9 5 At 6 May 2000; elections of 7 June 2001 and boundary change adding one new seat to Northumberland 
not included. 
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The focus on electoral politics masks a democratic deficit (Beetham and 
Weir 1999) that is noted in the north-east of England as it is noted in South 
Wales. This is in part due to the continuing impact of Quangos as noted by 
Skelcher et al's (2000) study of the quango state in the UK. Robinson and Shaw 
(2002) note that, "in the North East, as elsewhere in Britain, many public 
services - the services paid for by the taxpayer - are managed and provided by 
organisations which are not subject to local democratic control. There is a 
multitude of unelected bodies, governed by board members who are appointed 
by government ministers, or by other institutions, or who are selected by 
existing board members. Some of these are quangos, others quango-esque 
hybrids (Skelcher et al 2000). Members of these boards cannot be removed by 
the electorate, however badly they are performing or however unpopular their 
actions. It is here where there is a serious 'democratic deficit'" (Robinson and 
Shaw 2002: 5-6). They note the prevalence of unelected bodies, citing at the 
regional level in the north-east the RDA ( One NorthEast), Government Office 
North-east, and the North east Regional Assembly, while also the other bodies 
of NHS health authorities and Primary Care Groups (becoming primary care 
trusts), leading Robinson and Shaw to state that, "responsibility is diffused; no 
wonder it is hard to discover where the buck stops and so difficult for a patient 
to pursue a complaint against the NHS" (Robinson and Shaw 2002: 8-9). 
Similarly, in education, Robinson and Shaw note the 5 universities as well as 17 
Further Education Colleges, seven Sixth Form Colleges and two City 
Technology Colleges in the region which are run by boards of governors and are 
independent of the Local Education Authority, which they refer to as having "a 
tendency to be self-perpetuating cliques" (Robinson and Shaw 2002: 9) 
In addition to this, Robinson and Shaw note a potential lack of electoral 
accountability in a further set of institutions: Police Forces, TECs, regeneration 
schemes, housing associations and in the field of the arts. Overall, they suggest 
that this, "calls into question the common assumption that public services are 
democratically controlled" (Robinson and Shaw 2002: 13). Of particular 
relevance to the study undertaken here is the governance of the wide range of 
partnerships which have emerged- most notably within the sphere of 
regeneration. These partnerships are what Skelcher (2000) refers to as tertiary 
bodies, and which they suggest that remove "decision-making further from 
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elected political structures, increasing their distance from citizens and often 
becoming invisible to public view" (Skelcher 2000: 13). 
While Robinson and Shaw do suggest that the Nolan-inspired reforms 
have led to a greater openness and accountability, for many of these quangos, 
many are thought to lack the real engagement with local people. There are calls 
for greater accountability (see for example Skelcher et al 2000); however, 
Robinson and Shaw are dubious as to the potential of such reforms to lead to the 
ful l engagement of such quangos with local people. This is unfortunately 
compounded by the apparent lack of appetite for the democratic bodies in the 
region; Robinson and Shaw note that, "the region's rusty democracy needs, 
therefore, first to be revived and re-invigorated, beginning with local 
government...Without the re-invigoration and renewal of existing local 
government, it is hard to make out a convincing case for bringing other bodies 
under local democratic control" (Robinson and Shaw 2002: 25). 
In North-East England, regional government revolves around two key 
institutions: One NorthEast, the regional development agency, set up in 1999; 
Government Office North-East (GO-NE) (1994). In the context of this study, 
GO-NE is most relevant due to its age and responsibility as the co-ordinating 
partner for the central government departments of the DETR, DFEE and D T I . 9 6 
A regional assembly is in the stages of development, given impetus by the 
launch of the Campaign for English Regions (CFER) in March 2000, and the 
campaign for a Northern Assembly (see also DETR 2000b). This has been 
given academic support by a number of articles espousing a desire for a form of 
North-Eastern regionalism. In 'Geordies' (1993), Colls and Lancaster set out an 
eloquent call for a regionally-specific democratic remit for the North-East. 
However, as noted within their argument, the question of a North-East regional 
identity is fraught with contradictions. While the notion of a Geordie sums up an 
outsider's view of the North-East's cultural capital, in reality the production and 
identification of the North-Eastern identity is far more complex - so much so as 
to qualify and dilute any notion held. As Byrne (1993) notes, the notion of a 
'Geordie nation' is as much the result of a real or perceived disenfranchisement 
Department of Transport, Environment and the Regions; Department for Education and Employment; 
Department of Trade and Industry. The DETR has been reorganised in 2001 to become the Department for 
Transport, Local Government and the Regions; DfEE is now the Department for Education and Skills. 
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from Westminster and a reluctance to adhere to notions of Englishness 
associated with Southern England rather than the perception of the industrially-
dominated landscapes of the North. As such any suggestion that the North-East 
provides one coherent regional identity inevitably producing the context for 
particular forms of social capital is open to question. While regional pride may 
exist, the acceptance of the notions of north-eastern regionalism have thus far 
been of limited scope and enthusiasm within the population. As a result, despite 
a degree of regional identity, the North-East has no greater degree of political 
autonomy than most English regions and I will treat it as a relatively minor 
explanatory variable in this analysis. 
Beyond the political and industrial development of North-East England, 
the social settlement incorporated a number of institutions such as Labour clubs 
and associated working men's clubs, as well as a range of sporting and religious 
institutions. This produced a locally-specific form of welfare and support which 
was synonymous with industrial development. However, the removal of the 
industrial base in North-East England has therefore exposed these institutions 
and society as a whole to an evolving social formation in which social activities 
are less structured around certain institutions. Despite this, many of the social 
institutions which developed in the early-mid 20 t h century remain and therefore 
provide a focus for the efforts to create and organise non-statutory job creation 
initiatives. What will therefore be seen later in the chapter is the manner in 
which such social institutions provide a resource base representing the local 
form of social capital which may influence the development of TSEIs. 
South Wales: Localised Communitarianism 
The industrial nexus of South Wales, like that of North-East England, 
was significantly underpinned by a political, economic and social cohesion. 
However, a number of key differences between the North-East of England and 
South Wales provide a regional contrast. This, I will later argue, produces a 
different perspective on what at the outset appear to be relatively similar 
industrial heritages. 
South Wales, like the North-East, has historically enjoyed a reputation as a 
solidaristic, collectivist working class community. During the period from 1830 
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onwards, the trade unions and the emergence of the South Wales Miners' 
Federation or SWMF (also known as the 'Fed') "coalesced in the form of 
support for the British Labour Party which has remained consistently the 
political party of the region, even throughout the period of New Right hegemony 
in British politics" (Adamson 1998a: 2). As part of this locally formed 
regulatory system, Cooke (1985) notes an intertwining of the industrial and 
social development of South Wales under the auspices of the Union. The result 
was an all-encompassing social settlement in which, 
"From the chapels to the libraries, from the institutes to the sports 
teams, the control was a popular and a democratic one. The 
organisation of politics in the localities had a similar intent (diverse 
ideologies notwithstanding) and in all this the primary organization was 
the Union...the S W M F was, literally, the fount of all control in other 
spheres as well as that of the industry itself'(Francis and Smith 1980: 
34, cited in Cooke 1985: 237). 
As a result, Cooke notes, the local welfare institutions sprang "from the 
collective responses of individual workers to the needs and suffering of their 
communities, as a means of improving the day-to-day conditions of life in such 
localities" (1985: 237). However, Cooke notes that the form of social 
organisation was a particularly gendered one, noting that, 
"For all the progressive purpose and achievements contained in these 
practices and institutional forms it is an ironic feature of the social 
relations that those centring upon gender remained so reactionary. 
South Wales is, of course, not alone in having possessed this particular 
blind spot; patriarchy has been a transcendent feature of capitalist 
society in general. However, the somewhat aggravated form which 
patriarchy has taken, and continues to take in supposedly politically 
progressive regions elsewhere, suggests that the condemnation of 
women to a plainly secondary role may well be the price that well-
organised labour has been content to pay to exercise leverage against 
capital and to maintain an area of control, in the domestic sphere, 
beyond the 'dull compulsion' of economic forces" (Cooke 1985: 238). 
As such, there is a perception of South Wales as a highly structured and 
directed economy. Adamson (1998a) notes, "The range of social experience in 
communities intricately connected to a single place of employment was 
necessarily relatively homogeneous and the communities of the region have 
often been presented as a political mono-culture, wedded to a slavish support of 
the Labour Party" (Adamson 1998a: 4). However, "closure programme which 
followed the [1984-5 miners'] strike marked the final chapter in the long decline 
of the industrial base which had given rise to the organised industrial workforce 
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of the region, and the last two decades have seen the virtual elimination of trade 
unions as political agents in the politics of the region" (Adamson 1998a: 2-3). 
Therefore, as with North-East England, global economic and regulatory 
regimes processes have been felt at the regional and local scales to redefine not 
only the economic base of the region but also the social and political structures 
which underpinned it. Consequently, Adamson (1998a) notes that for South 
Wales, this entailed a "reduction in the significance and political role of trade 
unions and the demise of class-based political action. The experience of South 
Wales in the last two decades appears initially to support such claims. Central to 
this process has been the changing nature of economic activity in the region 
which has created a more differentiated workforce with clear implications for 
traditional patterns of class identity and political solidarity" (Adamson 1998a: 
4). 
While the level of employment in the mining industry in South Wales 
fell from a peak of 100,00 in 1947 to 24,000 in the 1980s to now under 1,000, 
the initial attempts to revitalise the South Wales economy through inward 
investment have proven to be relatively fruitless in terms of creating adequate 
alternative employment for the region. As a result, the strategies followed by the 
Welsh Office have been regarded as increasingly ones which have strengthened 
the economies of the M4 corridor and the coastal strip in preference to the 
decline of the valleys communities which are now characterised by low skills, 
low mobility and few employment opportunities. 
The decline of the industrial form nevertheless encompasses a great deal 
of resistance, such that "Despite the virtual disappearance of mining and related 
activities in the region, the political practice and cultural activities associated 
with the mining industry survive relatively unscathed in ex-mining 
communities" (Adamson 1998a: 8-9). Consequently, Adamson notes that 
traditional cultural institutions, "maintain a steady, i f sometimes fragile presence 
in the community (1998a: 4). However, he notes that some may also have closed 
or been converted to other uses. 
This particular form of industrially-formed social capital therefore 
presents both opportunities and challenges for policies which attempt to re-
develop communities within the existing institutional framework. Through the 
range of funding streams now available, Community Development schemes 
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have tapped into this sense of valleys culture and identity to respond to the 
growing exclusion and marginalisation of the (fragmenting) working class. 
Adamson (1998b) suggests this occurs through three approaches: 
• The resource development approach - providing leisure or social 
activities 
• Community enterprise approach - primarily based on a business model 
of development 
• Holistic development models. 
Exactly how such initiatives are emerging in South Wales where the 
grass-roots maintains a semblance of the institutions of the past will be analysed 
below. 
Local Government in South Wales 
The current government structure of Wales is, like North-East England, 
dominated by the Labour Party. However, Table 7.3. notes pockets of Plaid 
Cymru as the elected political representatives in Rhondda Cynon Taff in 
particular, which shifted away from Labour to Plaid Cymru control in the 
council elections of 1998. 
Table 7.3. Local Government Composition in South Wales 
Welsh Unitary Authorities 
Control Con Labour LibDem Pl.Cym Others 
Carmarthenshire - 28 1 15 30 
Neath & Port Talbot Lab 40 2 10 11 
Rhondda Cynon Taff PI. C 26 2 42 5 
Swansea Lab 5 46 10 2 9 
Wales Totals 76 560 97 205 334 
This demonstrates a slight shift away from the essentially Labourite 
politics of the valleys which characterised the 20 the Century. However, the 
influence of political attitudes spreads beyond its expression in the ballot box; it 
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is the more nuanced features of political and community action which I will 
address later in the chapter in relation to TSEIs. 
In addition to the localised politics of electoral representation, the Welsh 
Assembly (inaugurated July 1 s t 1999) has also taken distinct role, taking over 
from the Welsh Office in the dissemination of funds at the Welsh scale. Wales 
has also been at the forefront of the development of a number of Quangos, 
notably the WDA etc, which have been particularly criticised as a means 
through which a democratic deficit has been created (see for example Morgan 
and Roberts, 1993; Osmond 1992)97. With the creation of the Welsh Assembly, 
it was hoped that many functions taken by Quangos ( and whose members were 
nominated by the secretary of state) would be returned to democratic control, 
albeit under the auspices of the newly-elected Welsh Assembly. However, this 
has not come to pass, and of the Quangos in Wales, only 13 are listed as bodies 
which may lose or gain functions (Bowen Rees, 2000), of which few are of a 
general interest, thus limiting the scope of the Welsh assembly to limit this 
Quango culture. 
Therefore, it is an institutional challenge, when seeking to identify the 
sources of power, contestation and the route of accountability, to address the 
nature of the Quango culture. The potential of this institutional structure both to 
influence the shape of the third sector in Wales, as well as combining the 
technologies of accountability prevalent in government in a market-orientated 
institution, which may have considerable influence upon the future development 
of TSEIs. This will be examined more fruitfully in the empirical research in 
chapter 7. The role of this and other formal institutions will be addressed later in 
the chapter. 
Collective Action and the Third Sector 
The existence of a particularly regionally-based and locally exercised 
form of social and political institutions leads to a desire to understand the way in 
which this may directly influence the development of the third sector. Before 
Gray refers to this as a "New Right project constructed expressly to make the shift of power from democratic to 
market institutions irreversible", and therefore suggests that there should in fact be a restrengthening of local authorities 
as opposed to the constant barrage of criticism they receive (Gray 1997:104). 
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going on to address this in relation to the notions of capital and capacity outlined 
by Healey et al (1999), I wish to draw a parallel with the historico-geographical 
influence of social capital in strike-oriented collective action. This shows a 
parallel to be drawn with the manner in which collective action occurs (or has 
occurred) within capital-labour relations and the potential of radical or 
communitarian ideas to follow through into the post-industrial development of 
the third sector. 
Notions of community within the areas that have been selected as case 
study areas are thrown into particularly sharp focus through the study of the 
nature of collective action in mining communities. As outlined by Adamson 
(1998a; see also Gilbert 1992; Richards 1996), a number of theories within the 
social sciences and sociology in particular focus on the propensity of particular 
communities to undertake strike action. In this section I will concentrate on Kerr 
and Siegel's Isolated Mass Hypotheses (1954) and Olson's (1971) Logic of 
Collective Action to suggest how existing theories of collective action in this 
sphere might provide a basis for the study of the third sector. This will 
particularly deal with strikes to acknowledge the essentially coal-based labour-
capital relations which existed in the case study areas. This therefore presents a 
theoretical basis for the manner in which a particular form of collective action 
was established within such communities. This allows the subsequent analysis 
of currently-existing forms of social capital mobilised by the third sector which 
recollect or reflect, or are completely separate from, the same virtues of 
collective action which existed within capital-labour relations. 
These theories attempt to understand the nature of community as 
produced through the geographical and institutional attributes of a locality' 
influencing the collective actions of individuals within that locality. Kerr and 
Siegel (1954) argue that the propensity to strike is a function of the geographical 
isolation of a community allied to economic isolation in terms of the 
dependence on a particular industry to define behaviour and economic activity. 
Hence, they argue that in localities where geographical and economic isolation 
is less pronounced, other economic opportunities act as a conduit for 
dissatisfaction, thus diluting the tendency to strike and act collectively. 
Olson's Logic of Collective Action presents a potential refinement of the 
theoretical base for collective action, taking notions of collective action 
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emanating from industrial capital-labour relations (Olson 1971). Based on the 
rationality of individuals, Olson notes the manner in which the potential for 
collective action is dogged by the 'free rider' problem. However, such an 
analysis assumes that an individual's own interests may be in the collective 
interest. To put this simply, it is the level of community spirit, in terms of the 
philanthropic nature of individuals, which may produce a basis for collective 
action. The third sector may therefore benefit from a form of collective action in 
which individuals organise to develop the community in contrast to the previous 
economic rationale for the strike action outlined here. The task is therefore to 
understand the manner in which the predominantly economic rationale for 
collective action in the form of strike action may therefore carry through into the 
non-economic space, to benefit the third sector when translated to an alternative 
community-oriented rationality. 
These two theoretical standpoints suggest that there is a potential for the 
more integrated economy of the North-East, aided by its relative geographical 
openness, to present a form of social capital which is less emphatically 
predicated on a culture of mining and which has responded to multiple 
pressures. As such, the North-East's form of carboniferous capitalism may be 
diluted to a certain extent through the slightly less homogenising influence of 
the trade unions in the North-East (see for example Richards 1996). The result 
of this is to create a potential difference in the received forms of social capital in 
each region, which in turn influences the creation, operation and impact of the 
third sector. 
Relating back to the argument put forward in chapter 2 regarding the 
formation of social capital, it could be argued that the political legacy of 
communitarianism and left-thinking politics in South Wales has given a 
particularly radical influence to the set-up of the third sector in South Wales as 
compared to North-East England. Why should this be? One hypothesis to be put 
forward here is the proclivity of the South Wales valleys towards the politics of 
communitarianism, which could potentially translate into what has now been 
seen as 'bottom-up' transformation of communities via the third sector. This 
could, at one level, be accounted for by the slightly more radical and involved 
approach taken by the community to the third sector. In contrast, the North-East 
appears to be less dominated by the bottom-up (or more accurately, community-
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located) structures and more by the more formal political and social structures 
outlined above. As such it could be argued that the legacy of the North-Eastern 
style of corporatism or tripartism could have created a form of social 
engagement which subsequently influences the style and manner in which 
TSEIs have been created. 
However, while such an argument is plausible in that it may influence 
the manner of development, it is extremely simplistic to suggest that the mere 
presence, absence or degree of particular forms of third sector development wil l 
occur as a functional necessity of particular forms of industrial structure. 
Instead, I suggest that there are a number of complex, interwoven factors which 
influence the development of TSEIs, most notably the influence of individual 
agents, whose actions may be framed by broader social structures but which are 
by no means determined by it. 
This analysis emanates from Bulmer's (1975) critique of the Isolated 
Mass Hypothesis, which notes the influence of non-industrial and individual 
characteristics as key to the understanding of strike action within coal-mining 
localities. In the case of social capital, it must be noted that the formation of 
particular capacities cannot be attributed to the dominant industrial form itself; a 
plethora of influences shape and challenge the particular dominant form of 
social capital. I f Bulmer's argument is to be heeded, the implication is that the 
influence of non-industrial forms of organisation will be key to the 
developmental structure for TSEIs. 
The influence of agency as a key factor cannot be underestimated. 
Throughout this and other research, the defining factor within TSEIs appears to 
be the energy, wisdom, technical knowledge and personal skills of each key 
agent. This, as would be expected from the literatures, stems from the personal 
factors inherent within each agent. However, a crucial outcome of the research 
suggests that the current literatures fail to examine the manner in which the 
structure of the TSEI influences the type of agents who are employed or 
utilised, and the structural constraints upon the ability of agents to act. As such, 
a reflexive loop appears whereby, for example, a top-down structure creates the 
conditions for, and the support for, a particular type of local authority-style 
agent. Consequently, a structurally rigid social framework may produce a form 
of TSEI development which reflects that structure and may by-pass the more 
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discrete elements of social capital. In contrast, a less structured community-
based approach may enhance the role of agency in the development of the third 
sector. 
In addition to the arguments put forward with regard to agency as a non-
structurally specific element of regional social capital, analysis is inadequate in 
that it neglects pockets of substantially different social capital which will always 
form within a broadly homogenous structure of social capital as defined at the 
regional scale. The analysis of dominant regional-scale social capitals as the 
functional determinant structures upon TSEI formation is therefore blind to 
scalar and geographical inequalities. For example, the presence of middle-class 
agents within the TSEIs at Trimdon 2000 has significantly influenced the 
trajectory of the TSEI in a manner which is not wholly in keeping with the 
trajectory expected by the particular regional form of social capital. This wil l be 
addressed later with regard to the more localised factors which influence the 
structural determinant of TSEIs. 
Parochialism, Localism and Isolated Mass 
The notion that the locally-formed social capital is important in 
determining the success or failure of TSEIs dovetails with the current policy 
emphasis (outlined in chapter 4) on the local as the key space for TSEI 
development. However, a parallel to the isolated mass hypothesis offers a 
potential geographical isolationism, translated into a more general parochialism, 
which develops to impede the geographical development of TSEIs. In support of 
this notion, interview data suggest a jealousy of outsiders and a desire to restrict 
the scope of TSEIs in order to remain reactive to local needs. As such, a conflict 
arises between the emphasis upon the local presented through government 
policy and the potential geographical nature of need within less developed 
regions. Uneven development is inherently complex and the spatial scale at 
which funds are targeted does not necessarily represent the spatial nature of 
need or target communities. 
The government prioritisation of the local as the scale of third sector 
development therefore may not interact successfully with the needs of each 
locality and indeed may sustain the status quo with an exacerbation of current 
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uneven development. The scalar complexity of policy, allied to the observed 
parochialism of the case study localities, may therefore result in a particular 
structural emphasis upon such localities, thus exacerbating existing local 
unevenness. 
Alongside this, the scale at which TSEIs operate 'successfully' has an 
impact upon the sustainability of the initiative. By falling victim to, or 
responding to the geographically parochial nature of social attitudes in North-
East England and South Wales, the structural governmental processes which 
operate to aid the creation of TSEIs may inhibit the growth of TSEIs beyond 
their particular target areas. I f a TSEI operates purely at the local scale, it may 
lack the threshold size to become financially self-sustaining. To become 
financially sustainable, a TSEI may have to increase the scale of its operations, 
with the subsequent tendency towards more 'mainstream' solutions which 
militate against the pursuit of a radical local needs-based agenda. Should a TSEI 
wish to remain operating purely at the local scale, funding may be required; this, 
as noted above, tends to suggest a move towards the properties set by funders or 
government. The creation of locally-sited but mainstream initiatives is the likely 
outcome, with the consequence that the needs of the most underprivileged wil l 
not necessarily be met. 
In contrast, local scale initiatives which offer an unorthodox solution 
may find it difficult to become financially secure, to such an extent that their 
long-term sustainability is questioned. However, government is less likely to 
unconditionally fund such initiatives due to their non-formal solutions which do 
not correspond to the priorities as defined by the dominant governmentality. 
This consequently inhibits the possibility of the initiative attaining the critical 
mass required to become fully sustainable in the long term. As such, a key 
trade-off appears between the need to be based within the locality, drawing on 
its capacities and capital, and the need for a threshold size to promote 
sustainability. Should the latter occur, there appears to be an inevitable trend 
towards the mainstream whereas a purely 'community based' TSEI may rely 
upon funding and may not offer a genuine alternative to the status quo at the 
local level. 
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Social Capital and TSEIs. 
As noted above in the literatures, the notion of 'social capital' provides a 
theoretical underpinning for the range of regionally and nationally influenced 
but locally embedded institutional forms produced by the unevenness of 
capitalism (see Cooke 1985). I have claimed that, through its expression as a 
legacy of the economic history of regions, social capital is one of the key factors 
in determining where, how and in what form TSEIs may be created. This section 
will analyse in particular the 'soft' institutions of the case study locations in an 
attempt to determine the potential for and subsequent trajectories of TSEIs.98 
There are therefore heterodox forms of social capital which emanate 
from the industrial heritages of the regions in question. Such institutional forms 
consequently have an impact upon the potential for the development of TSEIs 
within or outside those institutional trajectories. Alongside the traditional ethos 
of work, inclusion and political radicalism which characterised the South Wales 
valleys, unemployment and a downward economic trajectory have produced a 
sense of disenchantment and hopelessness within certain communities. The 
result of the partial break-up of the institutional hegemony therefore creates two 
potential trajectories for the social, economic and political structures of 
localities. The first of these is to produce less propitious environments for TSEIs 
through the lack of confidence in the combined resources of individuals to 
produce successful outcomes. The second is the potential to free localities from 
the stifling inclusiveness of older institutions towards ones which produce more 
emancipatory environments, particularly for women, to create successful TSEIs. 
It is how TSEIs are able to tap into these community resources which I will 
explore in more detail in this section. 
Community Confidence and the Entrepreneurial 
Spirit 
What is described as a 'lack of confidence' creates two potential 
problems for the creation of TSEIs. First, the question arises as to the ability of 
9 8 This section draws upon the literatures in chapter 2 as a mirror of the key facets of social capital which 
act upon and within localities to create the potential for successful regional development, as applied to the 
third sector. 
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TSEIs to develop due to the paucity of capacities to produce a TSEI. Second, 
the formation of TSEIs as an encouragement to ameliorating the dearth of local 
social capital provides a key to improving the development capacity of the 
locality by mobilising what is effectively an untapped resource. The evidence 
from TSEIs, particularly those involved in education and training, demonstrates 
how this unrealised potential for the 'community' may be released through a 
number of activities. This therefore suggests that a catalyst may be required, 
commonly referred to as capacity-building, to realise this potential. However, 
the likelihood of TSEI development suffers from the acknowledged lack of 
entrepreneurial spirit within the South Wales valleys and North-East England." 
This is attributable to the legacy of the previous form of industrial organisation, 
as noted by Gary Foreman of Penywaun Enterprise Partnership: 
R B : "So the entrepreneurial spirit is not a great part of valleys culture?" 
G F : "No, I don't think it is. I don't fully understand it. In some sense I 
suppose I'm ignorant. But subjectively, I was talking to someone 
from the South-East of England and they were saying there that in 
her class at school, the expectation was for most of those people that 
they would set up their own business. That was it. Most of the 
people in her class. That may be the exception, but if you take a 
typical Welsh valleys school and ask them what they want to do 
when they left school, I don't know what the answers would be but I 
can't imagine they'd be very many who'd say they'd like to set up 
their own business. I just don't think that would happen. So it has to 
be a different kind of motivation that gets these people involved." 
R B : "Does this stem from the relatively recent past which was built up 
around the mine?" 
G F : "Oh, I think so. People just wouldn't dream of starting businesses; 
it's just not the done thing really, a small shop, possibly, as we've 
seen, but people baulk at big enterprises. Things were too sheltered 
here, but belatedly it's starting to change. It's interesting as the 
structures have changed over the past few years, people have taken 
on whole areas of responsibility that previously they saw other 
people have but didn't know what was involved. Suddenly it 
becomes theirs, and initially they stand back for the responsibility 
but bit by bit they say, right, I can have a go at doing that now and 
once they're successful, there's no holding them back then."...."and 
team spirit is very strong as well; you'll get your entrepreneurs for 
sure, but you'll find that if you get a team you give them a goal and 
say, can you do it?...they'll rise to the challenge no problem." 
This suggests that the capacity of TSEIs to succeed is in part a function 
of the ability to mobilise the already low level of social capital to aid the 
See for example Strangleman et al (1999). 
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development of the community initiative. 1 0 0 As the evidence presented here 
acknowledges, allied to numerous responses in other interviews, there is a 
significant lack of knowledge resources in many of the case study areas, or at 
least difficulty in the mobilisation of those resources in the pursuit of economic 
goals.101 Consequently, there are significant barriers to private sector 
endogenous development as targeted by the development strategies of North-
East England and South Wales.1 0 2 Despite investment support for entrepreneurs, 
it is difficult to arrive at any conclusion other than that which suggests that some 
forms of homegrown private sector enterprise are difficult to encourage in this 
context. Exactly how this may feed into different forms of regimes and 
community enterprises wil l now be examined in the light of the industrial 
heritage of the case study areas. 
Industrial Organisation and the Third Sector 
The decline of industrial forms of social organisation has led, in many 
cases, to a re-stratification of the social sphere. The decline of the industrial 
bases of particular localities has been paralleled by the decline of many of the 
institutions which have been so closely related to those industrial bases, 
resulting in the partial or complete break-down of this institutional political-
social-economic nexus. This produces new or altered spaces into which TSEIs 
may first of all be deemed necessary to address the problems of a post-industrial 
economy, and then develop within that particular institutional structure. It is in 
these environments that I wish to examine the role of social capital and its 
influence on the development trajectories of TSEIs. 
The case studies which have been claimed to be 'successful' are 
characterised by two broad forms of social capital. First, some TSEIs appear to 
stem directly from the industrial heritage of the locality and its institutions 
which remain intact. Second, there are TSEIs which have developed into 
institutional spaces which were once occupied by industrial institutions which 
have declined. In this way, the TSEI may be promoting the production of new 
1 0 0 As will be seen in the following chapter, this is crucially dependent upon the internal management of the 
initiatives and their ability to mobilise or tap into such resources, or in unpropitious circumstances the 
ability to negate the consequences of'disruptive' forms of social capital. 
"" See also appendix 1.9; interviews with Julie Cook of STI and D O V E members. 
1 0 2 At least as targeted by the development corporations of the North-East, W D A etc. 
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institutional dynamics to plug the social deficit left by the decline of the 
industrial base. 
The first of these categories is exemplified by the case studies of 
Blaenllechau Community Regeneration (BCR), Trimdon 2000 (T2000), and the 
Ystalyfera Development Trust (YDT). It is these initiatives which explicitly 
evolved from the key institutions of the industrial past and which therefore are 
characterised by the 'older' institutions and are embedded either explicitly or 
tacitly within this social fabric. This is evidenced by two factors: first, the 
people who operate in these initiatives and second, the institutions to which they 
are allied. An example of how such initiatives are allied to the institutions of the 
industrial heritage can be seen in this description by Mick Jones of the strength 
behind the development of Blaenllechau Community Regeneration: 
"We've really come from the mining background as a root - with all 
those skills and the political ideas going around. You suddenly take the 
work away from people and a good number of them won't rest. They've 
been used to working within a certain hierarchy within the pit, and then 
all the ideas are kind of kept inside there, all the tensions. Remove the 
pit and there's a load of sharp, knowledgeable people with a certain 
view on the way things should be. Now some of them become depressed 
because of the lack of opportunities, you know. But some can't just sit 
there and start to think what they can do - not just for themselves but for 
the community as well. It's the way they've been trained - to act in 
a...kind of community, er... solidarity, that's the word. You can take the 
people out of the mine but you can't take the mine out of the people". 
Similarly, Trimdon 2000 demonstrates how those who were already 
embedded in the institutions of local politics and society were able to create a 
TSEI within this framework of the existing institutions, citing the following as 
the means by which the community could support it. Through the institutions of 
the Labour club, which was previously the village's Working Men's 
Club,T2000 was able to draw together a number of interested parties to produce 
a template for a development strategy. This is noted by Frank Hoban, speaking 
after a meeting held within the Trimdon Labour club, stating: 
"We couldn't have done it without the support and the network we have 
here. I mean, you look at most of the main players here and they've 
mostly got some connection to this party. Peter, Anne, myself, John -
possibly the biggest players here. So it has grown out of a particular 
grouping that already existed...but having said that, we're looking to be 
as inclusive as possible, not that we're going to sever our links here -
without this club and its resources we'd really have struggled early on. 
So we're proud of the link we have here, and I think that gives us some 
strength. Some kind of common purpose, I guess." 
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The same scenario can be seen, in the manner in which Tower Colliery 
in South Wales is regarded by many interviewees in that area as a legacy of the 
past, embodying the political radicalism of the mining communities. Particularly 
at the Penywaun Enterprise Partnership, this has had an impact on those working 
in the TSEI. Barbara Castle, ex-chair of the initiative, states: 
"Inspiring people, and they're very fundamentally sound. You know 
what I mean. The root is in miners' politics still and they've got ethics, 
you know. They're quite a fascinating body of people." 
This is confirmed by Gary Foreman of the same initiative, 
who states, 
"Well, they're legends in their own lunchtime really. They are, they...it 
embodies some Welsh spirit. You can't go on about it enough. They 
exploit their vision, their profile and everything with it." 
TSEIs which evolve from the institutions associated with the industrial 
past are able to gain support and resources from those institutions which have 
lasted beyond the breakdown of the industrial base. However, while this does 
suggest a potentially beneficial synthesis of resources, institutions and ideas 
within and around a TSEI, there is the potential for alliances with particular 
frameworks of 'older' institutions eventually to limit the development potential 
of the TSEI. I note this for two reasons. First, such configurations rely upon a 
finite and primarily 'decreasing' capacity of older institutions which can be 
utilised. This therefore creates a potential 'glass ceiling' for the development of 
a particular initiative as the particular development path suffers from the 
institutional stances of the chosen network partners. Second, evidence from the 
empirical study suggests that TSEIs which work within the existing framework 
tend to gravitate towards the mainstream or less radical solutions to the localised 
problems within their target areas. Trimdon 2000, for example, sees much of its 
influence as a pressure group to encourage or motivate the statutory agencies to 
modify their structures to promote more mainstream services within the locality 
in question. As such, the key argument here needs to be the appropriateness of 
the economic solutions proposed. 
The analysis therefore represents the manner in which webs of relations 
are mobilised and the nodal connections between networks. TSEIs working 
within the institutional structures which are already present are subject to 
160 
tightly-based networks which may ultimately find themselves limited by the 
industrial ethos. This therefore presents a problematisation of Healey et al's 
template as will be seen later. 
'Full Circle'- A Return to Community Provision? 
Another facet of the decline of the industrial institutions and the 
associated regulatory system requires comment. This is the notion that the third 
sector has undergone a ful l circle of development over the period of a century or 
more. As noted above, the roots of the third sector are in the philanthropy of 
individuals in organisations as a means to combat the failings of the economic 
system, hence becoming involved as additional provision within the mainstream. 
However, the regulatory system of the post-war period managed to marginalize 
the third sector as the government and industry undertook obligations and 
became all-encompassing service providers. This has subsequently, through the 
pressures on the regulatory system as viewed in the governance literatures, led 
to situation in which through notions of governance the third sector is renewed 
as part of the mainstream. In particular, I note the case of St. Simon's 
Community Project, in which church interests have come together to fill a niche 
which was not adequately filled by the mainstream employment and training 
agencies. This represents the manner in which the third sector and new 
governance is the embodiment of the ' fu l l circle' which has occurred it the 
British social and economic life back to the 1930s, when the state demonstrated 
a relatively 'hands-off approach to the regulation of the social sphere. What this 
suggests is a new mode of regulation which will entail new forms of 
philanthropy to support those spaces from which the state has withdrawn. The 
consequence is to create new spaces in which TSEIs may operate, and indeed be 
deemed necessary as the post-war regulatory system is gradually dismantled. 
Amman Valley Enterprises (AVE) whose underlying philosophy 
includes an aspiration, as Derith Powell of AVE puts it, to "replace the features 
of local social life which are in decline", demonstrates an interesting twist on 
this. This represents a philosophy which does not rely solely upon the social 
capital and institutions of the mid-late 20 t h century; nor does it represent a return 
to the institutions of the pre-war. Instead, AVE is attempting to retain a notion 
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of civil society within its sphere of influence through the replacement of certain 
obsolete institutions with new variants to retain social cohesion. In this way, 
AVE explicitly seeks to manage the transition away from the mine-based social 
structure by retaining its roots whilst forging a new future. 1 0 3 
The consequence of this discussion is to highlight the form of 
institutions which actively influence the development of TSEIs in situ, and the 
reflexive reinforcement or decline of those institutions produced by the presence 
of the TSEIs. It is how such institutional forms are allied together with the 
statutory agencies to produce regimes, particular to third sector developments, 
which will be analysed later in this chapter. 
'New' Institutional Spaces 
In contrast to TSEIs which operate within the currently existing 
institutional limits, a group of TSEIs notably create a break from the 
institutional structures of the industrial past. This therefore produces 
significantly different institutional configurations which are able to break 
beyond the limitations of those institutions into more beneficial development 
paths. A key example here is the DOVE workshop, which was created through 
the efforts of a group of women during the 1984-5 miners' strike. As with 
DOVE, a crucial influence within a number of these initiatives is the 
predominance of women in contrast to the male-dominated legacies of the 
industrial heritage (see for example Cooke 1985: 230-232; see also Beynon 
1984; Campbell 1986)1 0 4. Schoone (1988) notes several aspects of the pre-strike/ 
closure social framework which were geared towards the mine and as such were 
gendered in favour of the male population. Leisure activities, she notes, were 
dominated by male interests, quoting John, who states that, "Recreation has 
largely been defined in terms of male expectations and opportunities which have 
meant that women's use of their free time has been dismissed as frivolous or 
unimportant" (John 1982: 18, cited in Schoone 1988,). She continues to note the 
male preserves of the Working Men's Club, which in the North-East of England 
was often at the centre of community life. 
see also Ystalyfera Development Trust, which has revived its local Gwyl festival. 
See for example St Simon's community project; Amman Valley Enterprises; Waun Wen Ltd. 
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The role of women was essentially concerned with the care and support 
for the family, thus sustaining the health of the workers for the benefit of the 
mining industry. This therefore paints a scenario in which the industrial form of 
organisation had a particularly influential role in community life. However, the 
miners' strike of 1984-5 significantly influenced this structure in that women 
played a particularly active role in challenging the strike and the manner in 
which it was fought by the NUM. 
While the strike was ultimately unsuccessful, the impact on the role of 
women was significant, with implications as this became the catalyst for greater 
women's participation in the third sector. There is evidence to suggest that the 
female-oriented initiatives are able .to follow development trajectories which are 
not as reliant upon or subject to the cultural and institutional baggage of the past. 
As such, this is the embodiment in the third sector of a notion of an 
'emancipatory power' in which a break from the past may be able to create a 
more dynamic development path for a TSEI. Several respondents, such as 
Lesley Smith of DOVE, have considered exactly why women should be at the 
forefront of such initiatives: 
"Well, you see, women didn't have the same role in the past - we were, 
not subservient, but the whole culture around here was one in which 
women weren't seen as leaders. There was such a developed system 
around the mine that it was like a closed shop, really. You did your 
apprenticeship, got to know the right people, worked your way up 
through the ranks and so reaching the higher echelons was kind of the 
reason behind life for some people. But women were effectively 
excluded from all this: the work and the clubs....Women worked behind 
the bars and got some part-time jobs, but not much further than that and 
the bizarre thing when we look back is it was accepted. And now, you 
look at almost a complete role reversal. The jobs for the boys have 
gone, as have a lot of the unions men, the WMCs, certainly in this part 
of the valley they're struggling, and now it's women who can get what 
jobs there are on offer - not great mind, but at least there are some jobs, 
and it's us who are able to come here and support ourselves and the men 
now. I dunno, we just seem to have started from a low base that we're 
on the up, whereas the men have had it all, sort of - a job for life, and 
they're a bit like lost sheep without it." 
This view is echoed by Mair Francis, also of DOVE: 
"I can just about trace it back to the miners' strike. The men weren't all 
that bothered about picketing and demonstrating - that had to be 
organised by the union to make it worthwhile or to make them do it. 
Whereas we were out there a lot more, trying to generate support or at 
least keep spirits up - which wasn't easy. So I think that was the point 
when it all changed." 
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There is a potential gendering of this reaction to the shift in the economic 
base, in the sense that males, who were the 'owners' of this mine-oriented 
industrial and social framework, have now been forced into a less structured 
social framework in which the institutions of the mine have been forced into 
decline. In contrast, the female population has been released from the structures 
created by the mining system, and have therefore been able to adapt more 
readily to the new environment which has evolved. 
The result may be to create a new form of institutional trajectory which 
explicitly challenges or chooses to shun the structures of the past. Indeed, views 
have been expressed which characterise the institutions as both inclusive but 
also stifling. As such these new forces may create a move towards a more 
liberated form of social structures within an older context. This option is 
illustrated by John Kearney of Making Music Work, an initiative based near 
Consett in County Durham: 1 0 5 
"You know, I don't hold too much favour with the line that says 
everything was good in the past. All the institutions as you call them 
round the steelworks and the mines, they were very inclusive in one 
sense which was good, but in one way they were so inclusive so as to 
make you kind of toe the line socially. Your life was kind of set out -
how you should work...ok- but what you could do out of work as well -
you were kind of expected to socialise in a particular way, well, that 
makes its sound a bit big brother, little brother maybe - but the point is it 
was strict in itself about what the boundaries were. Any sign that you 
were different, and you were kind of marked out as a troublemaker and I 
can remember people getting dumped on job-wise 'cos of what they did 
outside. So now, with all that removed, or at least declining, we've a 
chance to find new forms of expression, be more creative, and do things 
that might have been well, frowned on a bit more before. So things have 
changed, some in a bad way 'cos obviously the jobs were critical here. 
But you can't sit there and see it all as bad 'cos there's definitely some 
opportunities been created here. That's what you have to think, 
otherwise you're just constantly harking back to the past and you won't 
get anywhere." 
This discussion of the emancipatory effect of less rigid institutional 
frameworks suggests that the decline of the industrial nexus does not necessarily 
lead to a decline in the social vibrancy. Indeed, this reinforces the suggestion by 
Mann (1986) and Amin (1996) that potentially more democratic interstitial 
spaces could emerge from under the shadow of the deeply embedded social 
structures. With a blocking mechanism removed form the social sphere, there is 
N.B. Making Music Work is not one of the cases studied in detail here. 
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a potential for new institutional diversity and with it the space for TSEIs to 
develop. This relates, as wil l be seen later, to a new form of mobilisation arena 
as suggested by Healey et al's (1999) work on the Grainger Town regeneration 
partnership in Newcastle. 
Social Capital Breakdown. 
The theoretical aspects of Putnam's (1993) work on civic society, while 
territorially bounded and politico-centric, provide an analysis of the common 
features of societies which have experienced economic development and 
suggests a reflexive link between the two. However, the spaces inherited by 
TSEIs are often those with a dearth of what may be characterised as a positive 
social capital and therefore I will now analyse the influence of 'negative' forms 
of social capital in TSEI development. It is overcoming such inherent 
disadvantages which poses a key problem for TSEIS. 
In contrast to social capital which provides a basis for inclusive, co-
ordinating environments for TSEIs, some case studies exhibit elitist or 
conflictual forms of social capital. The result is to create a potentially negative 
symbiosis through which the efforts to develop successful initiatives are prone 
to obstacles. 
Where such forms of social capital are present, a deference or hostility 
to the initiative may develop, as is aptly described by the experience of the 
Rhiwgarn estate in Trebanog, South Wales. Waun Wen Ltd, the TSEI which 
gained the funding for a £450,000 community centre, found a number of factors 
played their part in creating an environment which was far from propitious for 
the development of the initiative. Briefly, these are: 
a. The perceived (and subsequently found to be real) intolerance and 
elitism of those within management and ownership regime 
b. Community factiousness which created a scenario where the TSEI was 
becoming the focus for discontent within the community. 
The result for the Trebanog Initiative (also known as Waun Wen Ltd) 
was serious difficulty in the ability of the initiative to develop. Set up in 1995, it 
involved a three-stage plan of which only the first was able to develop primarily 
due to funding problems. The initiative was set up by a group of the Tenants' 
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and Residents' association in conjunction with support from Rhondda Borough 
Council. Through a series of impasses, however, the situation became 
complicated through power struggles and disruptions which created obstacles to 
development. 
The management was seen as elitist both in terms of who they would 
allow to use the centre and also how they were regarded. Michelle-Lenton 
Johnson, of the local Authority, RCT, states, 
"There's always been...a very big split, a chasm, between the younger 
generation and the older generation in Trebanog. Maybe the centre 
could have been and maybe will be now, a solution to bringing those 
together. But what it did in its first two years was actually to widen that 
gap. It was very much perceived that you had the elderly tenants and 
residents...running their bingo nights, a couple of coffee mornings, and 
the kids.... literally they had the door locked, shutters down, and refused 
entry". 
Angela Pulman of Community Enterprise Wales noted a 
similar intransigence: 
AP: "We're actually talking to people who are actually saying, 'don't 
develop community centres like that'. If you've got young people, 
give them a centre. Young mums need a different thing; oldies want 
something else. Put young people near open spaces, so they can 
have music and if they want or go wild, why not, for god's sake. 
They're not disturbing the old crinklies who are like Nazis. It's hell 
on that estate. You know they were talking about sorting out part of 
that centre into a community business. Well this cow said, we're not 
having any young people in here, they should get in the compound 
at the top of the bloody hill. Yeah, shoot them, he said, shave their 
heads. This was the vice-chair of the community council. " 
R B : "So inclusion wasn't exactly the word that springs to mind. Is that 
the sort of opinion that you find, not necessarily across the board, 
that they're more widespread than they should be?" 
AP: "You find there's a lot of people on estates, if they've been there a 
while are very entrenched territorially. This is ours, and we don't 
want young people, we don't want strangers in or anything. And this 
group were running this thing, as a club, but only for their friends. 
There were young mothers on that estate who could have really done 
with some help additionally." 
As will be seen later, Healey et al's (1999) work suggests that a narrow 
range of knowledge resources, allied to a narrow range of relational resources 
with poor network integrations, could precipitate the lack of cohesion within the 
Rhiwgarn estate. This breakdown in confidence within the community created a 
focus for and a reflection of, the broader tensions within the community. This 
led to a situation in which the centre was targeted, particularly as a focus of 
youth disaffection, and became synonymous with particular individuals within 
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and around the project. The question therefore is: What marks Trebanog as 
different from any of the case studies? The crucial difference between Trebanog 
and many of the other South Wales case studies is that the Rhiwgarn Estate (on 
which the initiative was founded) is an artificially constructed housing estate 
which has little or no direct root within the institutional forms of social capital 
which emanate from the mining heritage of the Rhondda. The lack of a clear 
form of community allied to a lack of social institutions created a free-floating 
effect whereby social cohesion, crucial to allow the obstacle-free development 
of TSEIs, was not present. This is in contrast to the villages of Blaenllechau in 
RCT and Trimdon in County Durham. Sue Jones, of BCR, notes that, 
"We've got a very clear geographical community, whereas Trebanog is 
not quite the same. And I think very few projects have that luxury. Even 
in Ferndale, there are different parts of Ferndale. This is a village and a 
community, and because it's separate from everything else, yeah, and so 
that helps as well. And I think it's small, because the width of the 
village, it's very narrow and everybody's on top of each other, and the 
centre is in the centre of the community." 
The result of the ingrained community feeling led to the following 
statement from Angela Pulman of Community Enterprise Wales at meeting of 
the Waun Wen board: 
"You just have to sit them down, tell them straight. The Local Authority 
couldn't do that. She... the woman in charge said, " I've been dying to 
do that, but we can't do that. Aren't you afraid of the conseq...well 
there's no consequences to us, I said. You know, we will give you the 
money back because we can't do the work we want to, so that's 
happened." 
"One woman got up, and said, 'is this really how we're seen', and I 
said, yeah, it really is. If you don't want to let go some of the ownership 
of this place, you are causing more problems that you're solving. And 
we left it with them. We said we couldn't develop community enterprise 
on there because there was too much to be done, but they did actually 
get someone in who started working with them and alleviated the 
problems, you know, negotiating and whatever but that was quite an 
experience." 
Therefore, release from the rigid social stratigraphy does not necessarily 
promote the development of new forms of third sector development. However it 
does in this small sample imply that the developments require a top-down form 
of development to negate this. Indeed, the case of Trebanog demonstrates how it 
is possible to restrict the possibilities for an enterprise before it could take off 
due to small mismatches of personalities which blew up out of all proportion. 
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The influence of RCT running the community centre since 1998 has generated a 
new environment in which petty problems are dealt with in a hands-off, top-
down manner which appears to by-pass many of the deeply embedded 
prejudices within the community. As such this offers a template for the 
development of TSEIs within localities where the elements of social capital are 
so deeply immersed in local issues that they cannot therefore see beyond to the 
wider picture. 
As such, a note of caution is required before any assumptions are made 
with regard to the benefits of a locally existing form of institutions. Indeed, I 
note the following typology of social capital and the potential for trajectories. 
This is an idealised typology drawn from these case studies and is therefore 
dependent upon the individual characteristics of localities. However, it 
recognises the potential parameters for development where social capital is 
present to one in which it is significantly reduced. 
Discussion: Social Capital and TSEIs. 
The structural dominance of large-scale industry which forms the 
economic base of North-East England and South Wales produced a particular, 
socio-industrial ethos which emphasised the skills of heavy and light 
manufacturing and extraction underlined by the career apprenticeship system. 
This removal of the economic underpinning of the third sector exposed a form 
of work ethos which relied upon employment creation by external companies, 
most notably mines and industry, rather than through self-employment. The 
result is that although there was a knowledge and skills resource within the 
regions, this was concentrated within sectors which have undergone decline. As 
such, the range of knowledge resources has not been adequate to sustain the 
economic base; nor have they facilitated new growth via entrepreneurialism. 
This has an impact upon the broader economic structures which produce the 
context for the third sector to operate. However, it also influences the range of 
knowledge resources which are available to the TSEIs to facilitate success. The 
result is a limit upon the specific analytic and technical knowledges which are 
needed to aid the prospects of TSEIs. Most crucially, with the case of Trebanog, 
the narrow range of knowledge resources has proven to be a factor limiting the 
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development of the initiative, as the estate lacked the relevant skills or impetus 
to develop the initiative. This lack of resources was compounded by the inter-
personal conflict which arose when the Trebanog Tenants' and Residents' 
Association (TDTA), the 'elite' within the community, who possessed some 
relevant skills, were closely associated with the TSEI's development. 
The range of knowledge resources, being allied predominantly to the 
industrial nexus of the heavy industrial past, potentially produces a particular 
locked-in response to the needs of the post-industrial economy and society. In 
addition to this, Healey et al's (1999) notions of relational resources, and in 
particular the influence of the range of relational resources, their morphology 
and network integration, presents an analytical framework in which to 
understand the nature of the institutional embeddedness of initiatives, most 
notably in Trimdon 2000, the Sherburn Road Regeneration Initiative and the 
Dulais Valley Partnership. Healey et al's (1999) notion of the range of relational 
resources refers to the number of richly bonded institutional and individual 
stakeholders associated with the initiative. This relates directly to the opinions 
put forward in interviews regarding the quality and range of people involved. 
Those TSEIs which have relatively narrow remits may subsequently possess a 
narrow range of relational resources as the range of stakeholders is limited. As a 
result, much is dependent upon the quality or depth of those relationships, to 
compensate for their narrow range. This is seen for example in the Spennymoor 
Training Initiative (STI), which has a narrow range of stakeholders it reaches 
but operates within a richly-bonded network. In contrast, those TSEIs which aim 
to reach out to the whole community must attempt to create or enhance a range 
of relational resources. 
The form of social capital which has emerged around the leftist socio-
political institutions of the each region has created the potential for well-
integrated networks of actors and institutions. The experience of Trimdon 2000 
demonstrates a well-integrated network of relational resources stemming from a 
richly-developed set of political and economic structures which had historically 
developed around the locality. In Healey et al's typology, this represents a 
strongly-interconnected network of resources which ought to aid community 
development. However, I suggest that, while such a form of social capital may 
be inclusive and democratic, it relied upon a particular frame of reference 
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through which the locality is viewed. The result is that in Healey's typology, 
Trimdon 2000 suffers from the problems of an overly integrated network which 
lacks the mobilisation capacity referred to by Healey et al (1999) as an 
opportunity structure. In a supposedly propitious environment, this is defined as 
being "contexts where there are structural shifts which create opportunities for 
change and there should be some agreement about what are the best 
opportunities to target" (Healey et al 1999: 132). Taking this further, the overly-
inclusive institutional structures of some TSEIs therefore produce a tension with 
the ability of the institutions to offer adaptability, to use Grabher and Stark's 
(1997) terminology, as opposed to the adaptation offered by T2000. A strongly 
historical institutional network may therefore restrict the development potential 
i f the combined ethos of that network is towards mainstream or non-radical 
solutions. 
In contrast, the decline of the integrated network of institutions 
associated with the decline of the industrial structure of the mine has produced 
for DOVE an opportunity structure which has been exploited to provide a new 
institutional dynamic. The stifling historical institutions, which were extremely 
well-integrated in one sense, peripheralised the roles of women in the local 
economy and society. Through their partial removal, this has introduced new 
opportunity structures into which the third sector has developed.106 
Together, these elements represent the 'soft' institutions, drawing on the 
social capital literatures such as Putnam (1993) and Healey et al (1999), which 
have emerged as crucial to the development of TSEIs. However, the remainder 
of this chapter will analyse the aspects of Healey et al's framework in terms of 
the 'formal' or 'hard' institutions which combine to create the more easily 
observed structures in which TSEIs exist. This again can be related to the 
knowledge, relational and mobilisational assets suggested by Healey et al 
(1999), allied to the broader regulatory, policy and power structures which 
operate. 
' Despite this, DOVE still offers a relatively mainstream educational solution to the economic problems 
of the upper Dulais valley. This therefore does not mean to suggest that a 'new' social space inevitably 
creates a radical solution; it may merely be radical in terms of the local institutional framework or the 
solutions tried previously. 
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Regional Institutions 
Thus far, I have concentrated upon the informal, 'softer' social capital 
elements of the support structures around TSEIs. For the remainder of this 
chapter, I will analyse the formal institutional structures which operate to 
determine what potential support mechanisms they provide. 
The role of region-wide institutions has significantly impacted on the 
development of governments and governance from the post-war era and thus 
also upon the structures around TSEIs. While English regions have little 
autonomy from Westminster and have experienced regional-scale government 
only through the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), Urban Development 
Corporations (UDCs) and the Government Offices for the Regions (GoRs), 
South Wales has experienced a significantly different governance trajectory 
during the second half of the 20 t h century. While it is not the intention here to 
study in great detail the intricacies of the regional government of South Wales, 
its development and relative autonomy through the Welsh Office and now the 
Welsh Assembly will be recognised. 
North-East England 
As noted above, there are two key governance institutions which operate 
at the regional scale in the North-East. These are primarily the Government 
Office of the North-East (GO-NE), set up in 1994, and the Regional 
Development Agency, ONE NorthEast, set up in 1999. In this section I wil l 
establish the roles of these institutions as a reflection of regional identities and 
as a force in social, economic and political change. 
Regional institutions in the North-East can trace their roots back to the 
1930s with the North-East Development Board (1935) (see for Example Byrne 
1993; Griffiths and Lanigan 1999). Such institutions are primarily based within 
the tripartite industry, local government and trade union framework created 
within the North-East, before becoming explicitly central-government 
influenced in 1963 with Lord Hailsham's plan for the North-East. In addition, 
the North-East has a degree of regional identity equal to or greater than that of 
most other English regions due to a historical trajectory influenced by the Prince 
Bishops of the North-East, allied to a more a contemporary political mistrust of 
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Westminster. This is compounded by the relative territorial boundedness of the 
region 1 0 7 allied to a socially constructed and to some extent artificial separation 
of the region from much of the rest of England. However, this ideological 
separation is not reflected in a significantly different set of governance 
institutions in North-East England, which in the late 1990s and early 21 s t century 
closely mirrored that of other English regions with the exception of London. 1 0 8 
In the North-East, regional governance in the form of GO-NE has 
influenced the governance framework through its role as a directly-controlled 
outpost of central government. Most accurately, the role played is one of policy 
interpretation between central government and partners within the region. 1 0 9 As 
such, GO-NE has a role of accountability agent for many government 
competitive funding schemes for TSEIs and also as a means through which 
funds are allocated. GO-NE also retains the means to provide information and 
advice to central government departments as to the needs and requirements of 
the region. 
As such, GO-NE can be regarded as a strategic coordinator and 
accountable body, though one whose power is derived from that of the central 
government in power at the time. GO-NE has little discretionary power and 
funding, although its role as a crucial conduit for information as regards funds 
has been noted. While the principle role is as the accountable body and 
partnership facilitator, there is an acceptance that this should not become too 
1 0 7 The region is bounded by the Scottish border to the North, the Pennines to the West, North Yorkshire 
moors to the South-East, thus creating a geographical as well as psychological separation of the region and 
producing a focus around its principal settlements of Newcastle, Sunderland and Middlesborough. 
0 8 However, tentative movements have been made towards the establishment of a regional assembly (see 
also DETR, 2000). 
1 0 9 GO-NE has the following statement of objectives, taken from: http://www.go-
ne.gov.uk/Corporate/main_corporate_page.shrml 
• To support and promote a coherent regional approach to competitiveness; sustainable 
development; regeneration and social inclusion both through the government programmes over 
which the Government Office has direct control and by influencing the action of 
partners/partnerships. 
• To manage the Government's relationship with regional partners, by promoting and supporting 
effective partnership working and in particular through sponsorship of the Regional Development 
Agency and support to it in the delivery of its strategy. 
• To meet the needs of Ministers, Departments and the public in delivering high quality services 
against Service First Principles, including carrying out statutory duties, and delivering a range of 
programmes and contracts in ways which add value, secure value for money, and achieve a 
positive impact on the region. 
• To represent and communicate participating Departments' national policy at local levels and 
provide a channel to inform national policy with local views and issues. 
• To manage, develop and train the staff of the Government Office to ensure that they are equipped 
to deliver their objectives and to work to the Investors in People standard. 
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onerous, and that the remit should not go beyond this. Steve Muse, of GO-NE, 
suggests that its role is, 
"Certainly not preventative, more an enabling function, spotting links if 
there are any and trying to get people together if there aren't. There are a 
number of roles, I suppose, within a partnership, that have that role and 
that principally covers what a partnership is anyway, it's to get better 
value by working together". 
In contrast, the RDA, ONE NorthEast (ONE), which is barely studied in 
this thesis due to its creation in April 1999, may potentially bring a new form of 
autonomy with a strategic and discretionary role in influencing regional politics. 
Through a role as accountable body for SRB, ONE already has a range of 
powers which may be exercised. In the following years, it will be of much 
academic interest to study how the RDA of the North-East and other English 
regions are able to adapt to the need of the regions and in what manner their 
discretionary powers are employed. 
The overall picture for the North-East suggests that, despite a sense of 
regional identity, regional inertia has been created by the lack of institutional 
dynamism. Consequently, a form of Foucaultian governmentality appears to be 
operating, given impetus through the RDA and GO-NE, transcending the 
tentative moves towards a North-Eastern regional assembly. As such, the 
regional governance of the North-East is toothless and has a relatively minor 
part in the day-to-day development of TSEIs despite its key policy remit of 
regeneration and social exclusion. To proclaim a degree of regional autonomy of 
ONE NorthEast and GO-NE denies the influence of central government over 
these institutions. Little evidence for institutional ethoses of independence 
exists, thus restricting room for manoeuvre in the implementation of government 
policy at the strategic level. 
The Welsh Office and Assembly 
In contrast, Wales has had, both in terms of identity and politics, a 
degree of autonomy from the UK government in the post-war era. The two 
crucial political and administrative institutions which have shaped Welsh 
governance experience are the Welsh Office, and the Welsh Assembly which 
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was created in 1999."° Like GO-NE, the Welsh Office was a relatively 
dependent institution which derived its power from Westminster. As such, the 
notion that Wales was able to create a significantly mediated environment for 
TSEIs through the institutions is significantly misguided. However, a number of 
separations from the institutional structures endured by the English regions have 
created a specifically Welsh context and institutional structure which has 
influenced the ability of Welsh TSEIs to develop. I will now expand on this. 
Griffiths (1999) tempers the claim that by the 1980s the Welsh Office 
possessed adequate autonomy to implement policies in a manner not stipulated 
by Whitehall ministries. Through the study of two policy areas, Housing and 
Education, Griffiths concludes that the suggestions of autonomy are exaggerated 
and the centre (i.e. Westminster and Whitehall) held a significant degree of 
control over the policy process which was able to operate within Wales. 
Griffiths puts the renewed interest in the 'territorial ministries' down to the 
reconception of the UK as a union state and not as a unitary state. This is allied 
to a perception that the policies implemented by the territorial ministries were 
qualitatively different from the edicts of the central government, presenting an 
explicitly less Thatcherite set of policies in the 1980s. This autonomy was 
attributed to two particular reasons. First, the possibility of territorial ministries 
implementing polices through their own (relatively limited) budgets. Second, the 
political nature of the localities led to the bending of policies to represent more 
closely the political culture of the localities, whether more consensual or 
corporatist than in England. 
However Griffiths concludes by demonstrating "with few significant 
exceptions uniformity with, and not divergence from, English practice" 
(Griffiths 1999: 803). Griffiths suggests this for two reasons. First, the 
relationship between Wales and England may be regarded as closer in the form 
of an 'ungrounded union state' (closer to the notion of a unitary state form) 
rather than the more complex and loose relationship with Scotland. Second, he 
1 1 0 In addition, the Welsh Development Agency (WDA), created in 1975, has been cited by many as a key 
institution which has influenced the regional economic development strategy of Wales but which has a lack 
of explicitly political or administrative functions of the Welsh Assembly or Welsh Office. As such, the 
WDA has remained through its mission statement more as a business-oriented entity which focuses on the 
private sector developments of the region. In contrast, the Welsh Office was directly accountable to the 
cabinet and as such was more directly influenced by political bias. The WDA was subject to the political 
musings of the time, yet drew its strength from its long-term remit and as such was influenced more by the 
indirect function of the government mechanism rather than direct political interference. 
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draws upon the distinction drawn between 'high' and 'low' politics, in which the 
former has historically been well controlled by the centre but the latter has been 
given to far more local interpretation due to its little interest in the policy profile. 
However, Griffiths suggests a more involved form of government stance which 
attempts to assert a degree of control over even what might be regarded as 
mundane elements of low politics. 
Little interview evidence sustains the image of the Welsh Office as an 
influential mediator of government power. At best, the Welsh Office is 
acknowledged as being able to bend central programmes to local needs and 
influence Welsh development; at worst, the Welsh Office was conceived as a 
stooge of Westminster, therefore representing an institutional mechanism 
through which a form of Foucaultian governmentality may be implemented at 
the regional scale in Wales. Steve Cranston of Wales DTA notes with regard to 
the Welsh Office: 
"Oh they've no real power, or at least they did. Just an arm of 
Whitehall, keeping an eye on the unruly neighbours so to speak. No, 
they did do some good things but that was due to individuals, not as a 
general principle" 
However, there was significant support for the view that the Welsh 
Secretary (excluding John Redwood) was useful in that it created, i f not an 
actual autonomy, a sense of Welsh autonomy and political attitudes. Whether 
this is merely an image as portrayed by those interviewed, and whether true 
authority was represented by the Welsh Secretary, is difficult to determine. 
Nonetheless, the mention of a Welsh Secretary appears to give a sense, correct 
or otherwise, of importance given to mechanisms and policies aimed to operate 
within Wales and at the Welsh scale. In a reflection of this, the appointment of 
Lord Hailsham to the position of minister for the North-East during the 1960s 
could be regarded as an attempt to promote an exaggerated sense of importance 
given to the region to placate political and social tension within the region and 
antagonism between the region and Westminster. While the Minister for the 
North-East experiment was phased out, the Welsh Office, due in many ways to 
the geographical and administrative distinctiveness allied to the political threat 
from nationalists, maintained its Secretary and a place in the Cabinet. However, 
despite this, the notion remained that the central government at best tolerated the 
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Welsh Office and at worst attempted to use it as political tool, to discredit 
Labour Party-based political enemies in South Wales. This politicisation of the 
role of the Welsh Office is made evident by Angela Pulman of CEW, who notes 
that during the 1980s and early 1990s, the developments in the third sector in 
Wales were not without a party-political element. Talking with reference to the 
development of the Trebanog TSEI among others, she recounts a scheme to 
specifically cause problems in Labour-run local authorities: 
AP " The reason for that was they both came under the Community 
Revival Programme. That programme was designed by the 
Conservatives, who were in power at the time. Basically to mess-up 
Labour councils...which we found out from a contact at the Welsh 
Office. I was working for the W D A at the time, at their community 
enterprise unit, and if it wasn't for the fact that I managed to divert 
some revenue money into some of them, they'd be gone. Because 
what they did was classic, yet looks very good politically. You put 
half a million pounds into a troubled area, everybody goes yippee; 
it's all capital, there's no capacity building, and preparation, and 
you've probably heard, the worst thing to do to divided communities 
is to throw money at them. It doesn't work. And basically 
RCT. . . .had three half-to-a-quarter of a million pound projects in 
communities they have to revenue support. So they came from a 
standing start of community revival, hardly any research. The things 
came up, had to be in within six weeks. And actually it's interesting 
to look at the two phases of that programme. Some of them went 
(hff) totally belly-up and nearly killed the community." 
R B "It was a big act by the Tories to actually...." 
AP "To make Labour governments, er...authorities look bad in their 
own communities." 
R B : "Is that written? Is that genuinely what you feel on the subject?" 
AP: "That's what I was told, by somebody in the Welsh Office." 
R B : "So it was more of a political act?" 
AP: "Total. The government...think, 'I think we should sink quarter of 
a million, half a million'...there's no revenue. How on earth could a 
community support you know, a capital asset when you couldn't 
even keep a shop going." 
R B : "No-one's ever said that to me before." 
AP "Well. It couldn't be said, could it? I was told, I wasn't told off the 
record, just in this...context on community revival projects." 
Whether or not this represents an accurate interpretation of events, it 
nonetheless demonstrates disquiet at the role played by central government in 
the administration of Wales, and the inability of the Welsh Office to absorb and 
influence the edicts from central government. This therefore confirms Griffiths' 
(1999) suggestions that the Welsh Office was unable or unwilling to 
substantially influence the policy trajectory within South Wales, presenting a 
power relation in which the centre held significant sway over the region. 
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However, despite the perception of a lack of direct Welsh influence on 
the trajectory of the third sector in Wales, there is nonetheless a number of 
territorially-bounded auxiliary institutions which are allied to broader UK 
organisations. As such there is an acceptance that 'Welshness' is able to produce 
a number of locally-specific institutions, which are more accountable and 
embedded within the localities they serve. For example, the DTA Wales is allied 
to the DTA yet in 1998 decided to become separate to reaffirm its Welsh 
identity. Similar Wales-oriented institutions have emerged in the form of the 
Wales Council for Voluntary Action (WCVO) and the Community 
Development Foundation Wales. 
This notion of strong institutions which are territorially allied to Wales 
appears to emanate from a particularly strong brand of regional (indeed, in the 
case of Wales, a national) identity which encourages and in some cases demands 
a Welsh institutional basis to differentiate itself from the broader UK/ English 
context. Stemming from a sense of the 'other' in Welsh politics in opposition to 
the perception of an overbearing influence of the English, this produces a strong 
source of institutional development and support. This consequently creates a 
depth of regional networks, or an institutional thickness, which operate as 
support structures and which draw strength from the territorial and 
psychological (and to some extent, a limited political and administrative) 
distinctiveness of Wales. This overlapping nature of resources with a strong 
regional focus therefore creates the potential for a more cohesive regionally-
based strategy, in contrast to the less explicitly regional structure and hence 
potentially less appropriate institutional structures in the North-East and other 
English regions. 
The Welsh policy experience also creates a situation in which 
differential implementation creates particular outcomes. Most notably, the lack 
of SRB funding and its allied emphasis on partnership precipitated a situation in 
which many felt the Welsh to be stunted in terms of the regimes which 
developed alongside TSEIs. As such the particularly Welsh experience 
influenced the institutional dynamic. Kay Quinn, formerly of Waun Wen Ltd but 
in this case talking as community development officer for Torfaen Borough 
council, notes, 
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"What I know of England, with S R B you're kind of forced to be in 
partnership but that didn't apply as much here. We've had some stipulation, 
and they're coming in now. But partnerships between local authorities and 
community groups never really happened unless individuals knew each other 
or there was an ulterior motive, you know. So now, with the compact it's 
better. Actually, it seems to have gone too far the other way, as you're 
looking for partners who might not necessarily be the best people to work 
with, you know, not natural bedfellows but it looks good on a form. So yeah, 
it's kind of better now but we've lost the licence to go it alone if we wanted." 
The result is a belated response to partnership working which has 
influenced the trajectory of Welsh TSEIs. The crucial point emanating from 
interviews is the idea that Welsh TSEIs could choose who to work with, and felt 
more comfortable working at the regional level with Welsh institutions. This 
therefore provided a particular form of regime which developed between 
regional-scale institutions, but which was more based at the voluntary 
participatory level rather than through requirements to work in partnership. I 
will discuss this aspect later in the chapter in relation to partnership formation at 
the local scale. 
Local Authority-TSEI Relations 
As noted in chapter 2, some change agents are able to mobilise the 
capacity inherent within the framework with which they deal. This potential 
capital and capacity is found both within the structures and individuals, and 
these are mutually interdependent in that the structures frame the manner in 
which individuals can act, as well as individuals intentionally and 
unintentionally shaping those structures. To address the influence of this 
potential support structure, this section wil l assess the individual and structural 
elements of local statutory agencies as key elements in producing beneficial 
symbioses or mechanisms which act to slow or block, intentionally or otherwise, 
the development of the TSEIs. 
The section will firstly analyse the evidence for a crucial TSEI-council 
officer relationship. Second, the relationship of council officers and the elected 
members themselves will be analysed. Both these elements are crucially 
dependent upon the structures in place to delimit the parameters in which 
individuals may operate. These structures equate to Healey et al's (1999) 
notions of relational resources and the manner in which these translate into 
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broader mobilisation capacities. These will be subsequently analysed later in the 
section by focusing upon the structure and network potential of the local 
authority, the political basis of the authority, as well as the broader political 
basis of the locality. This will suggest the types of local authority structures 
which provide propitious and unpropitious structures for TSEIs. 
Officer-TSEI relations 
Empirical analysis identifies interpersonal relationships between the 
managers of TSEIs and the relevant statutory agencies as key for creating a 
propitious environment for TSEIs. Implicitly, the range of these relational 
resources produces particular configurations of power in which the TSEI is able 
to mobilise the capacity of statutory structures to create both monetary and 
administrative support to enable development. The importance given to the 
interpersonal relationships within local regimes of TSEIs and councils can be 
clearly seen through empirical research. This relationship of TSEI to the local 
authority is regarded as the key relationship (DTA Wales 1998),111 thus 
supporting claims in chapter 3 that local authorities, retains a role as the key site 
of local regulation in dealings with the third sector despite the broadening of the 
governance base. 
This relationship formed between local authorities and TSEIs typically 
represents an unequal power relationship, with the local authority in the 
dominant position. This consequently influences the access to resources, be they 
monetary or human, as a power differential enables the power broker or 
gatekeeper to enact a mechanism which either enables or blocks development. 
As a result, the quality and by association equality of interpersonal relationships 
can potentially aid the development of beneficial TSEI-LA alliances. An 
equality of relations can be achieved through genuine openness, although this is 
still dependent upon personal interactions. However, as illustrated by Peter 
Brookes of Trimdon 2000, in some cases the TSEI may possess a range and 
integration of relational resources which enable a levelling of relations but 
which are not held by the majority of TSEIs: 
1 1 1 Roughly 2/3 or 14/23 responded that the LA was one of the key 3 partners in their regeneration efforts. 
179 
"1 can be quite creative because I know the system. I've worked within 
the county council for 22 years, albeit social services, so I know a lot of 
people. And that's handy 'cos I can say, oh I can phone somebody up. 
But I know who deals with that in County Hall. The problem is that you 
don't want a system that's reliant upon the personal - individuals 
knowing other individuals. Kind of personality-based, 'oh I'll do that, 
Peter, no problem- we can get out to Trimdon next week and sort that 
out. Because I'm Peter Brookes and they happen to know me, that's 
inequitable'...there has to be a system that's transparent, and we'll 
respond to that because that's in the rules, and it's right that we respond, 
and it's a priority that we respond" 
In this case, relatively flat hierarchies of power exist as a reflection of 
the differential access to power of the members of the TSEI boards although this 
may be allied to a context of trust and co-operation as part of a mutually 
beneficial project. However, the mere presence of relational resources does not 
necessarily represent the sole means through which to produce beneficial 
development opportunities. Distance and hence a power differential may be 
maintained between the officers of a statutory agency to provide a working 
relationship based on a clear definition of rules. Such a relationship is dependent 
upon two key factors. The first of these is the relative strength of character of 
each individual which, when intertwined, produce a positive or a negative 
symbiosis as a working relationship in which distance is deemed to be 
appropriate. Second, and related, is the notion of the relative security of 
individuals involved, formed in part through the structures which underpin the 
parameters of actions to produce relative power differentials which inform 
interpersonal relationships. Indeed, the power relations are key to the 
development of TSEIs, in that this reflects the types of relational resources 
which are able to operate. Should this form of relational resources be perceived 
as being weighted towards the interests of the TSEI, there is an empirically 
observed tendency to wish to keep local authorities at arm's length. This 
represents a desire to avoid over-dependence on local authorities but also to 
avoid a scenario in which the local authority becomes a meddling interest in the 
TSEI, a feeling attributable to the perceptions of some local authorities as overly 
keen to dominate. Sue Jones, of Blaenllechau, elucidates on the maintenance of 
a particular working relationship with RCT which relies upon a particular form 
of relational resources 
"We have very good moral relationship with the local authority, but it 
remains at that level. We don't allow them to interfere. They have 
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supported us, and it's no good saying they haven't; they've supported us 
through everything that we've done. But it's on a moral basis. They 
come and give us a hand here or there, yeah; if we need someone to 
speak to for advice, we get it. They have no input of money, they have 
no representation on our board, and at the end of the day if we want 
something we contact them, they don't contact us. And what it has 
meant is that they have had to keep their nose totally out of our 
business." 
This is concurred with by Dan Dowling of South Tyneside TEN, who 
notes that the relationship ought to be "Healthy, but not too close - 1 don't think 
either party wants that at all." 
Such an emphasis upon the relational resources between TSEI and the 
local authority therefore complicates the notion of trust in the development of 
third sector partnerships, or as Healey et al (1999) categorise it, the power 
relations within the sphere of relational resources. Healey et al suggest that 
trusting relationships, when positive, present a potentially more propitious 
environment for TSEI development. This is backed by the research undertaken 
here in suggesting that flattened or shallow power hierarchies tend to 
characterise successful initiatives. However, whether this is as a result of a 
successful initiative possessing the knowledge and relational assets to demand a 
fair working relationship, or whether such a relationship must be based within 
an explicitly trusting framework, requires further research. What does appear 
from this research, however, is that interpersonal relationships which maintain a 
power differential (at least those with a power deficit for the TSEI) produce 
fewer examples of success through the ability to impose outside will upon the 
development of TSEIs. As an extension of this notion, a steep power gradient 
will therefore fail to unlock the full potential of the capacities due to the inherent 
lack of trust and embeddedness.112 Gatekeepers are therefore key to the access to 
power and resources within statutory agencies. However, it is erroneous to 
assume that the potential of individuals within agencies to mobilise resources is 
fixed. Instead, I will suggest that this is a function of two key factors: the 
position of the local authority employee within the structure of the local 
This may be created by a misunderstanding or change in personnel in the sphere of influence, therefore 
shifting the balance of power and knowledge between the local authority and TSEI. The dearth of close 
interpersonal relations and the obstructive force this therefore creates is illustrated by the case of Penywaun 
Enterprise Partnership in which the partial break-down of relations led to the failure of statutory support for 
the initiative. 
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authority and the power relationships of officers within the local authorities and 
elected councillors. 
What does emerge is that relational resources do not, as posited by the 
network literatures, have to depend solely on trust as a feature which can 
produce effective relationships. While this may aid the development of relations, 
a relationship between TSEI and local authority which is based upon respect and 
mutual benefit has been seen to be effective without the engendering of a deeply 
trusting relationship. 
Access to Resources 
The placement of officers within the power structure of institutions 
clearly enables or inhibits that individual's access to power and therefore key 
resources. Individuals who possess the knowledge and ability to move directly 
to the resource base are therefore able to mobilise such resources. This therefore 
depends on the structure of the local authority and the relative emphasis on 
community economic development as a priority or as a peripheral element of 
service provision. 
The empirical study provides conflicting evidence as to the nature of local 
authority structures which create a propitious form of access to resources, and 
hence the range of knowledge resources as well as the means to mobilise these 
resources and reach the arenas in which power is held and exercised (see Healey 
et al 1999). Two initiatives, Low Simonside and BCR, have both been attached 
via officers directly to the chief executive's department in their respective local 
authorities (South Tyneside and RCT). The result was relatively uninhibited 
access to the centre of power hierarchy of the local authority. Mick Jones, of 
BCR, states, 
"We came under Chief Executive's department, with Peter Mortimer 
and Graham. We could get information when needed and it made it a 
real one-stop shop. Any problems with departments were by-passed; 
we'd just go straight to chief exec's department and put our case. I 
certainly think it's one of the reasons why in R C T all community 
development will come under the chief exec's department is because of 
the success we've had." 
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However, such access to sites of power does not necessarily create a 
propitious environment, as Jayne Mills notes in Low Simonside, where the 
initiative also fell under the auspices of the Chief Executive's Department: 
"We were able to get close to the power, but there again that power 
wasn't really used. There was a lot of mistrust or disdain about us, and 
people there weren't experts at what we needed. So it could have 
worked, but in our case it didn't really." 
The result is that one connection to power does not inherently create an 
environment in which development is enabled; indeed, the internal politics of 
local authorities produce particular environments in which individuals and 
departments feel aggrieved at a potential loss of power and then create 
obstructions to the development of TSEIs. The result, therefore, is that power 
structures cannot necessarily be deconstructed to provide an absolute answer to 
the best structure to aid the development of TSEIs; as Healey et al (1999) note, 
it is only when such powers are mobilised that they produce results, either to the 
benefit or detriment of the TSEI. 
Local Authority Structure 
The structure of a local authority is therefore important in creating 
particular conduits for power and flows of knowledge and resources, whether 
operational or not. A common criticism from TSEIs is the compartmentalised 
nature of local authorities acting as a barrier to efficient usage or access to 
power and resources. While moves away from a compartmentalised form of 
government are being made,"3 a tribal feeling remains within local authorities 
in which departments operate as individual power bases with distinct remits, 
away from the central power of the local authority. The result has been the 
characterisation of local authorities as institutions in which there is a distinct 
lack of a coherent response to the needs of the TSEIs. In County Durham, Brent 
Kilmurray of Durham County Council notes, 
"Well they have corporate mechanisms within the County Council, but 
when it comes to our interface with the community it is very much a sort 
of compartmentalised. They ring someone from Economic Development 
to give them funding advice and then they have to contact someone from 
1 1 3 Most notably in the form of proclamations towards the benefits of joined-up government and the shift 
towards cabinet government within local authorities. 
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the environment department to come and talk about the environment. 
You know there's no one person who can sort of act as the interface for 
them." 
This lack of a coherent strategy within Durham County Council is 
typified by the following example, which demonstrates a level of corporate 
malaise within the authority which is unable to adapt to the needs of community 
economic development. As noted by Peter Brookes, in this case operating as 
community development officer for Durham County Council, 
PB: "You see that's exactly what happens. [Name anonymised] rings 
me up to ask what I could do to a plan which has already been sent 
away pending the final decision. It's like we should be there at the 
start, co-ordinating the departments to see how it fits together with 
the regeneration and community development agenda. To see how it 
could benefit everyone. Not at the end, when it's all been done to 
each department's own designs which don't fit together, they 
overlap...and then we get asked to rescue the thing when they get it 
back saying there's no C D [community development] ideas in there. 
Bloody ridiculous...it just shows how narrow a focus some 
departments have. I don't necessarily blame them 'cos it's the way 
it's always been done, and that's what they've kind of been told 
what to do. It's just so bloody infuriating. It is changing, but so 
slowly. I just guess I ought to be thankful that [name anonymised] at 
least called me - it might not have happened a few years ago." 
R B : "So there's just that engrained idea of how things should be done?" 
PB: "Yeah, and no-one has the courage or nous to really change it. It's 
too cosy until something drastic happens." 
A similar compartmentalisation is found within Rhondda Cynon Taff 
borough council due to the result of a the previous administrative split of the 
local authority into Rhondda, Cynon and Taff respectively, operating as a tier of 
government under the umbrella of the mid-Glamorgan county council. Sue 
Jones notes that despite the shift of political control from Labour to Plaid 
Cymru, 
"I think R C T still sees itself as R, C and T . . . . regardless of it changing 
politically." 
This research therefore suggests that a number of trade-offs operate to 
determine the access to monetary and human resources within statutory 
agencies. The majority of TSEIs are allocated to a particular department of the 
relevant local authority. While those TSEIs which had access to the chief 
executive's department were able to access power more readily, this 
consequently created potential blocking mechanisms through jealousy and 
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mistrust of motives from other involved departments. This therefore represents 
an inability to mobilise the resources within the local authority. As such, TSEIs 
may be inadvertently caught up within the internal politics of local authorities. It 
is this element which I will now discuss. 
Political Attitudes Within Local Authorities 
The political bases of localities have the potential to lead to tensions 
within the local government structure, notably where this is allied to a two-tier 
local government structure and the subsequent power differentials and jostling 
for influence over the local decision-making process. With the broad swathe of 
Labour Party control (see earlier) across the case-study areas, it would appear 
that political rivalry would be a relatively minor enabling or blocking 
mechanism for TSEIs. However, deeper analysis of the interview data suggests 
that there are underlying causes of friction, both explicitly stated and tacitly 
alluded to, which may be attributable to the political leanings of individuals and 
groups. 
Trimdon 2000, which operates within the home village of Tony Blair, 
the Prime Minister, is located within Sedgefield Borough Council and the 
County Council of Durham. Due to its creation through the efforts of a number 
of well-skilled, well-networked community activists, T2000 has developed a 
broad range of community and job-based activities which have provided some 
support to a limited section of the local population. Through a range of sources, 
T2000 has secured a sizeable funding stream and is attempting to become self-
sustainable in the medium term through the development of a call centre as a 
community business to generate funds (see appendix 1.10). However, opposition 
to the group has emerged from an unexpected source - the 'Old' Labour party 
which holds the electoral mandate within Sedgefield Borough Council, and 
which operates within a political structure which essentially reflects the 
industrial socio-political framework of the post-war Fordist era. The resulting 
political and financial impasse of the modernising, Blair-oriented politics of the 
groups and the paternalist, power-wielding motivation of the council have come 
into focus and consequently provide a clash of philosophies. 
185 
The impact of this on the T2000 group has been to create a minor 
blocking mechanism on the group by creating what are described as 'walls of 
bureaucracy' by T2000 members. This is evidenced by the Anne Timothy of the 
T2000 board: 
"Well, 1 see, and this must sound very bizarre. But you must know that 
we're in a period of change. Rapid change in all areas. Not just in 
community development; in industry, manufacturing, education. All 
sorts of areas are changing. And I see the voluntary sector very much as 
this third way in that they are ploughing the furrow, if you like. They're 
doing things that haven't been done before but what they're doing 
actually is working. So they're facilitating this change from the old, 
which is the very formal, lots of rules, can't step over them categorising 
things; to a more liberal, a more flexible way of working, more respect 
of the individual. A more realising the capacity within people to govern 
their own lives. And it is the flow between the two that the third sector, 
the voluntary sector, the community sector, seems to be bridging it. 
That's how I see it. Now whether that's in reality how it is, 1 don't know. 
But if you heard Sedgefield borough council when they were first 
informed that we were first talking about this development, they were 
totally against what we were doing." 
This commentary suggests a view of Sedgefield Borough Council in 
which there is an institutional ethos within SBC towards initiatives which 
challenge their hegemonic status. Indeed, this version of events is confirmed in 
off-record comments made by officers of SBC. However, this form of 
institutional inertia, (equating to Healey et al's notion of poor opportunity 
structures through poor relational resources) does not necessarily lead to the 
downfall of Trimdon 2000 as an initiative. In contrast to many TSEIs, T2000 
possesses the capabilities to overcome certain obstacles or more crucially, 
employ them in an intermittent fashion when it best suits the group. In other 
words, they possess the mobilisation repertoires to enable them to by-pass such 
blocking mechanisms, thus allowing T2000 to access the other arenas in which 
resources and regulatory power lie. In contrast, other groups without this 
mobilisation capacity wil l not fare as well. As such, success in such 
unpropitious circumstances could be dependent upon the presence or otherwise 
of key change agents and their capacities to overcome such barriers. This has a 
crucial lesson for the nature of the regeneration process and the manner in which 
it is administered. 
The literatures summarised in chapter 6 demonstrate that the competitive 
nature of funding has targeted funds at the areas with the most significant 
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indicators of deprivation. However the evidence from the case studies examined 
here demonstrates that it is not necessarily those most in need of funds which 
receive them but those best placed to receive them. It is those community groups 
which have the capacity to produce funding applications and who have access to 
power which are able to create successful outcomes for the communities. 
However, those communities lacking such skills are most likely to be untouched 
by the multiple layers of challenge funding which have characterised the sphere 
in the 1990s. As such, I suggest that what is being created is not an equitable 
form of funding and opportunity, but a two-tier system in which those pockets 
of deprivation with requisite skills are able to mobilise resources far more than 
those which are unable to draw upon such resources. 
The result is that competitive funding, by its very nature, creates a dual 
system within itself in which the most deprived localities have to seek (or wait 
to be given) more statutory funding rather than being able to seek to improve 
themselves. As such, while much of this thesis has reflected sentiments which 
are essentially dismissive of the roles of local authority structures as a means of 
delivering services, I suggest that such top-down schemes are a more 
appropriate form of delivery where the locality does not possess the key 
knowledge, relational and mobilisation resources to ensure success. This is not 
to create a sense that local issues should be sidestepped; only to adopt the best 
institutions which wil l allow such negative issues to be circumvented. 
Politics, Locality and Inertia? 
Beyond the notions of access to power, the research suggests that a clear 
tension remains within local authorities between the interests of officers and 
councillors. Reflecting different views on the role, effectiveness and 
modernisation of local authorities, this section will draw upon the empirically 
observed data before reflecting on how this relates to Bemrose and MacKeith's 
(1996) four-type categorisation of local authorities and the manner in which 
responses are formed by local social capital. 
As noted above, the political heritages of North-East England and South 
Wales reflect in general a white male, middle-aged population with roots in the 
corporatism or tripartism of the post-war era. Such a heritage creates a broad 
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political context which has an often conflicting philosophy as to the role and 
necessity of community development in their area. The political basis of the 
local authorities had until 1998 all been primarily Labour-controlled entities, 
whether one or two-tier. The result creates broadly comparable political 
ideologies in the local authorities studied. However, after 1998, the electoral 
pattern in Wales shifted (see above) so that RCT became a Plaid Cymru -
controlled authority. This was complemented by the Welsh Assembly elections 
of 1999, in which RCT elected a Plaid Cymru member. Acknowledging this 
exception, the statistics underline the continued electoral dominance of the 
Labour Party in North-East England and some parts of South Wales where the 
Conservative Party does not offer a realistic alternative to Labour Party control. 
The continuing (though slightly diminished) historical and current electoral 
dominance of leftist labour politics therefore create the conditions for broadly 
comparable political ideologies between the case study areas. However, as noted 
above, the individual development trajectories of each area and their associated 
industrial and political histories produce locally- formed regulatory systems and 
local authority structures which reflect this evolution. As such, while the local 
authorities are broadly comparable, the influence of the broader institutions of 
each region has produced local differences within the meta-scale analysis I will 
now present. 
Within the case study areas the continued dominance of (Old) Labour 
Party politics creates potential tensions between officers and politicians as to the 
direction and execution of policy decisions.114 Despite the potential decline in 
the strength of the mandate for local authorities' elected members, for the 
purpose of this section I will assume a role for councillors as a central tenet of 
local representative democracy. I now wish to focus on the their role as arbiters 
of the actions of council officers. 
The broad thrust of Labour Party politics in both North-East England and 
South Wales is that of 'Old' Labour, thus creating particular brands of political 
and ideological thought which pervade the decision-making process. A crucial 
1 1 4 One note of caution is critical here: electoral politics is the sole conduit of direct electoral accountability 
for the actions of local authorities and must therefore be regarded as essential to the political process. This 
is particularly as a means to counterbalance the trend towards quangos as primary service deliverers which 
lack the (direct) electoral democratic accountability of the local authorities. However, the poor turnout in 
local election of late has re-focused attention towards notions of a democratic deficit at the local level in 
which local politics has effectively been eschewed by the majority of the electorate. 
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element of this is that councillors are imbued with a sense of duty towards their 
electorate which emanates from a [normative] view of the social and political 
spheres in which the role of the state is that of service provider."5 As a result, 
sentiments expressed within the two case regions demonstrated some sense of 
resentment at the overly paternalist, top-down interventionist stance of local 
councillors. While this is regarded by those in power as an obligation to provide 
for the electorate, interview data suggests a popular perception of councillors 
which revolves around an T know best' attitude which is equated to arrogance in 
office. Indeed, while some local councillors are active within the TSEIs, the 
mistrust demonstrated appears to coincide with the electoral shift and 
disillusionment with local politics, most notably in RCT, where Plaid Cymru 
offered what was perceived as a valid alternative to the Labour Party. Sue Jones 
and Mick Jones of BCR note the attitude of local councillors: 
Sue Jones: "It used to be the kind of, I'm elected so I'll make the 
decision. I won't bother consulting until another 4 years or 
whatever but most felt so safe it didn't matter, so there was 
a, I dunno, an ethos of complacency and power-wielding 
that just didn't serve the community. I mean, if you look at 
what we had as councillors until last year's shake-up, if you 
look at what we had, you were waiting for them to be 
carried out in coffins, not only that but prior to that their 
families. And that has been a shake-up. We're yet to see 
how this one turns out. Politics is very good on paper." 
Mick Jones: "The old sort of structure where it was, don't rock the boat, 
that's changed. New fangled things - well, they won't 
work". 
While some significantly forward-looking and therefore responsive 
elected members may be present, this is evidently a minority. Evidence for 
councillors as a power-hungry breed who have become accustomed to a level of 
social standing emanating from the electoral positions of responsibility were 
also represented in the empirical data. Interviews noted the 'monarchical' style 
of rule and the dynasties of councillors. The consequent social importance 
gained from this led to accusations of attempts to further the councillor's sphere 
of influence through capital projects which could be regarded as the brainchild 
of councillors. These would be typically within the councillor's constituency, to 
help create a legacy and cement the councillor's standing. 
1 1 5 See also Adamson (1998a) 
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The result of such attitudes within elected members leads to a situation 
in which the councillors and officers may have significantly different 
philosophies. The resulting obstacles therefore serve to restrict the abilities of 
officers to undertake particular projects, as illustrated by Derith Powell of AVE: 
"We try our best, but at times we're just blocked off. Nothing doing. I 
despair at times wondering what right have they to do that?" 
The overall result of this is to represent opposition to the efforts to 
ensure local authorities enable TSEIs as suggested by the Compact on Relations 
Between Government and the Voluntary and Community Sector (Home Office 
1998). There is therefore a tension between theory and practice in that the notion 
of an 'enabling' council may be well accepted by the officers and some 
councillors; i f this is not accepted as an acceptable or desirable path by the 
elected body, efforts may therefore be made to retain the sphere of influence of 
the council as far as possible. In practice, the reality of budget cuts has forced 
some councils or councillors to admit they wil l lose influence; whether this 
represents in some cases an overt attempt to neglect their responsibilities will be 
analysed later in the chapter. 
What this therefore suggests is that multi-level governance is by no 
means an inevitability without a significant deal of modification by local 
authorities as noted by Bemrose and MacKeith's (1996) four-type classification 
of local authorities. Bemrose and MacKeith's work suggests a typology of local 
authorities of a continuum from 'enabling' to 'top-down', and while there are 
some aspirations towards an enabling model, and some evidence that enabling is 
the sole route open to local authorities, there remains a degree of contestation 
within local authorities over the exact role to be taken by the authority. The 
outcomes of such tensions therefore represent a mixture of pragmatism, idealism 
and the need to appease or satisfice all demands. 
This moderation of political and practical ideologies within the structure 
of the local authority produces significant consequences for the attitude to the 
third sector. While some councillors regard the third sector as a means to retain 
an influence at a more strategic level, over the process of service delivery and 
CED, others regard the third sector as a challenge to their hegemony and as such 
attempt to create obstacles towards third sector institutions. The irony here is 
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that those local authorities which accept some inevitability of broader forms of 
governance, and work within that framework, will potentially be able to 
strategically influence the deployment of resources within their locality. In 
contrast, those local authorities which attempt to retain control may find 
themselves by-passed as TSEIs choose to seek funds directly without consulting 
so closely with local authorities. Mirroring this, the dominant governmentality, 
allied to strong political action, may therefore be a means by which local 
authorities are by-passed in the funding and governance process, restricting the 
local authority's role to that of accountable body. 
LA-TSEI Embeddedness 
The relationship of many TSEIs to the local authority automatically 
prejudices the response to its work within the community. While some areas 
welcome the 'hands o f f approach of a local authority, the local authority tag 
often creates a situation where the oft-aimed-for notions of community 
ownership and embeddedness fall by the wayside. 
This political judgement on the role of local authority towards TSEIs is 
crucial for two reasons. First, it delineates the form of support to be expected by 
the TSEI from the local authority, thus providing the basis for an effective 
relationship. Second, it affirms the ability of the TSEI to operate in 
independence or under the auspices of the local authority. This is important, as a 
trade-off emerges in many cases between the need for funding and support and 
the need to be regarded as independent within the target community. As seen at 
the Ystalyfera Development Trust, there is a confusion regarding the 
development trust as an arm or otherwise of the local authority. This creates a 
situation where a particular association inadvertently prejudices the standing of 
the development trust within the community. Chris Thompson, of the Ystalyfera 
Development Trust, states, 
C T : "I think some people have the idea, with the trust here, like it looks 
like it's part of the local authority. Like, they go, they look after the 
poll tax side of life, anything contentious, so they're coming from 
there, you know." 
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This therefore presents a scenario in which it is not just the actions of 
TSEIs which inform its success but also, through the relations with external 
institutions, the perception of the TSEI. This therefore adds a different slant to 
Healey et al's (1999) suggestion that relational resources and webs of networks 
are necessarily beneficial; depending upon the perceptions of those involved, 
this may also produce unhelpful circumstances for TSEIs. 
Mainstream or Not Mainstream? 
Even within the third sector, a number of positions are occupied which 
deal with the public and private sectors as partners, competitors, or mutual 
beneficiaries. What this research reveals is that the third sector in the main 
cannot be completely independent and its vibrancy is in part determined by the 
public and private attitudes toward its development. Galling as this may be for a 
number of practitioners, it appears that the regulatory mechanisms of the state 
and economy have led to series of structures, imperatives and directions which 
the third sector has to adapt to, challenge or fully adopt. Those third sector 
initiatives which attempt to challenge such structures may fail at the first hurdle 
as they are unable to 'compete' with more mainstream solutions which operate 
within, and indeed perpetuate, the regulatory mechanism of the time. What 
remains to be seen is whether such 'adopted' initiatives are more subject to the 
wills of the government mechanism and its regulatory controls and may suffer in 
the long run i f changes occur. 
The significance of this is to partly de-bunk any notions, in these areas of 
the UK at least, that the third sector offers solutions to the problems which have 
been created by the mainstream policy and economics of the global economy 
and the government of the time. Instead, the evidence clearly suggests that, even 
i f not operating within the mainstream at the outset, the evolution of TSEIs 
tends to draw them more towards the economic orthodoxy, away from the 
radical types of solutions suggested by Birkolzer (1998). 
The result is a misapprehension as to the level of the substitution effect, 
in which the third sector is effectively being drawn away from its role as service 
provider at the fringe and periphery towards the centre through a combination of 
political direction, funding regimes and marketisation. As such, there is a degree 
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of uneasiness regarding the future role of TSEIs: Are they effectively 
supplanting the mainstream agencies or creating a safety net where they fail to 
deliver? 
There is therefore a sense that the initiatives, while supported by 
mainstream funding, are also being used in a way as to fulf i l the 'obligations' of 
mainstream providers on the cheap (see for example Amin et al 1999). While 
not necessarily accepted without question by those involved in TSEIs, there is a 
sense of powerlessness and inevitability - that over time, many projects will be 
subsumed under the auspices of the mainstream.116 However, a significant level 
of disquiet arises in some projects at the perception of the state 'using' the third 
sector as a means to create welfare services on the cheap. This revolves in 
particular around the perception that the third sector is matching statutory funds 
with other earned revenues to provide services for localities beyond their remit 
and perhaps within the remit of the state, therefore further blurring the boundary 
of the third sector. This is exemplified by Sue Jones of BCR, who suggests that 
the funds put into BCR by RCT are subsequently multiplied by the factor of 15 
to produce the actual value of funds to the initiative. The result is to produce a 
perception of exploitation. In contrast, Steve Cranston of the Arts Factory 
suggests that the initiative itself aims to use the mainstream as a means to piggy-
back, thus drawing in funds for the initiative to use. As such, the boundary, i f 
one ever existed, between the third sector and the welfare state is seen to be 
permeable. 
At the local scale, an organisation which is allied too closely with the 
local authority may become intertwined with the development trajectory of the 
local authority. This creates a situation in which TSEIs may not be able to 
project images and radical alternatives to the economic orthodoxy. Instead, local 
authority influence may lead to the development of a primarily mainstream 
option which offers little in the way of new economic development for excluded 
communities. As such, while some TSEIs cite themselves as being part of the 
1 1 6 Indeed, many projects have the particular aim of doing themselves out of a job - Dan Dowling of South 
Tyneside Training and Enterprise Network states, "I'd like to think so. But you know what we're up 
against. As Mike said, we're aiming to do ourselves out of a job, but I certainly can't see any prospect at 
the moment. We probably have made things better, but, yeah, at times you do feel like it's all going against 
you." 
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mainstream, this is by no means a universal aspiration. Sheila Davies, 
Community Co-ordinator of RCT, shares this: 
R B : "The C E D that's taking place: do you see it as part of the 
mainstream or do you see it as slightly separate to the mainstream? 
SD: "I would like to see it as more mainstream...! don't like it being 
classed as separate, because it is mainstream community enterprise. 
Because in instances in areas like ours, where there are areas where 
they are classed as the private sector will not go, the community 
enterprises are the mainstay of local services and local provision for 
some small communities."..."But again, there comes a point where 
they cannot be reliant upon grant support forever. Because they're 
going to set themselves up as community businesses, there comes a 
point where - and they do need a longer lead time for this than 
standard business - that there has to be a point somewhere along the 
line where they have to stand on their own two feet." 
Indeed, the ambivalence of local authorities towards small TSEIs is put 
into focus by an analysis of an evolving role as funding streams become 
involved. As noted by Jayne Mills, of Low Simonside, 
"It's only when you start to shake the pot of money around that they 
suddenly perk up and get interested." 
Local authorities therefore have the tendency to adopt TSEIs as a means 
to develop new resource bases which have been perceived to be top-sliced from 
local authority budgets in the first place - therefore effectively regaining what is 
rightfully the property of the local authority. This is demonstrated by Andrew 
De'ath of South Tyneside MBC, who suggests that, 
"Well, we feel like we're suffering here to create the funds for the 
projects -the government has reduced the funding for the council on the 
premise that it's going directly to the community but they take off the 
admin costs at each level, so there's less going in, but we're supposed to 
support them without the funds. So when funds do come available, of 
course we're going to be keen to get some and make our figures 
balance, as we're probably the best route for it be made available - I 
mean, why pay for admin to the D E T R or whoever when you're not 
going to get any help from them?" 
Accountability 
This revision of the relationship of local authorities to the local area, and 
hence the relationship of local authorities to TSEIs, creates a particular dynamic 
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to the relationship when local authorities act as accountable bodies for TSEIs. 
While interpersonal relations may be beneficial to the participants, the enforced 
role of accountable body can lead to an environment in which the potential for 
tension and recrimination is increased. Most notably, while local authorities are 
often ideally placed as accountable bodies, this complicates what Healey et al 
(1999) refer to as the power relations (incorporating trust and openness) between 
TSEIs and their accountable body. Essentially, this may reduce the trust and 
openness due to the fear of knowledge being used as a tool in an accountability 
study. Sue Callendar, of St Simon's Community Project, suggests, 
"We're normally really open, but you know, we might just be a little bit 
cagey when S T M B C [South Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council] 
are around" 
Consequently, the enforced roles taken by TSEIs and accountable bodies 
therefore restrict the potential relational resources, where a degree of secrecy is 
deemed desirable. This is not to dispel the notions in Healey et al's (1999) 
template to suggest that less open relationships are of benefit to all TSEIs; 
merely the notion that in particular circumstance, a laissez-faire attitude or 
relationship within a broadly trusting relationship can produce a more beneficial 
environment for TSEIs. 
A similar hierarchy of accountability functions raises the hackles of local 
authorities when they are subject to accountability studies from regional-scale 
institutions. This is illustrated by Andrew De'ath of South Tyneside MBC, in 
accepting that the arguments or complaints raised by the local authorities 
regarding over-zealous accounting from GO-NE are similar to complaints raised 
by TSEIs. He suggests that the local authorities' hands are tied, passing the buck, 
stating that, 
"Of course. But we're just following rules, I suppose. We're just 
following what government lays down to us. We don't make the rules 
about quarterly monitoring." 
In whatever manner these accountability criteria are interpreted, the 
necessity to f i l l out onerous forms is reflected as an activity which restricts the 
time available to devote to the actual day-to-day management of TSEIs. A 
number of interviewees concurred with this notion by citing bureaucracy as 
restrictive and time-consuming. The need for strong accountability checks on 
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TSEIs has developed as a crucial element of the shift to governance through 
competitive tendering for third sector funds. However, this has created an 
additional blocking and restrictive mechanism, which will be analysed more 
closely in the following chapter as an element of the internal management of 
TSEIs. 
This crucially raises notions of governmentality as a key structure 
operating not as an abstract mechanism but as a locally-functioning influence 
upon the actions of institutions and individuals. The government edicts placed 
within the framework of challenge funding have clearly produced a hierarchy of 
accountability which, most importantly, local authorities and TSEIs do not wish 
to contravene for fear of being less well-funded in the next round. 
The accountability mechanism therefore appears to be a crucial element 
of governmental control not only at the TSEI level but also at the local authority 
scale. This further complicates the theoretical standpoints which seek to typify 
local authorities as having particular structural forms as chosen by the local 
authorities themselves to respond to the needs of the localities for which they 
have responsibility. Instead, such local authority types are the result of 
conflicting local and governmental forces. 
In relation to the third sector, this research, along with that alluded to by 
Foley (1999), suggests that the role of the local is becoming usurped by the 
stranglehold of the centre over the accountability process. This standpoint is 
echoed by Atkinson and Lejeune (2001), who note that "while local government 
has been reintegrated into urban policy this has occurred on terms largely 
dictated by central government who have been able to define the 'rules of the 
game' and thereby to exercise new forms of control over local communities" 
(Atkinson and Lejeune 2001). Bound up with a governmental insistence on 
measures which do not necessarily represent an accurate assessment of the 
success or failure of an initiative, this leads to a conclusion that the emphasis 
upon the local is merely a mirage while central government concerns are met. 
Cross-Boundary Co-ordination. 
A key factor in developing support mechanisms for TSEIs is the 
cohesion of funding and support. As noted above with the lack of continuity in 
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the recent (1996) shift from a two-tier to a one-tier system in South Wales, the 
resultant institutional diversity is thrown into sharp focus by the case of Amman 
Valley Enterprises. Set up in 1987 with the aid of British Coal Enterprises, AVE 
began in the mining village of Tairgwaith but then has spread out to encompass 
the spatially unenviable localities of Gwaun-Cae-Gurwen and Ammanford, 
which stretch across the boundaries of three neighbouring local authorities -
Carmarthenshire, Swansea and Neath Port-Talbot. The resulting cross-border 
identity creates a situation where local authorities have a tendency to restrict 
their contributions and support to AVE as officers and councillors are not keen 
to work beyond their obligations and remits on tight budgets. The result, notes 
Derith Powell of AVE, has two effects. First, local authorities are less keen to 
devote funds to joint projects or at least the money is less forthcoming. Second, 
there is the potential to play one local authority off against another to improve 
the level of support. This is again dependent upon the ability of a TSEI to 
operate within the key mobilisation arenas, thus identifying where resource and 
regulatory power lies, and the presence of mobilisation repertoires to take 
advantage of such situations. Without this capacity, other TSEIs may struggle 
due to the potential lack of support because of the representational confusion or 
complexity. As suggested by Derith Powell of AVE, 
"You know, we're in an almost unique situation here, being on the cusp 
of three authorities. O f course we used to be just two but then it was 
also two-tier so we almost had four authorities. Still, now we have 3 to 
play with and that's what we do. We're lucky in that we have a good 
relationship with most people within the councils so we can use them to 
get information, help or sometimes even funds when we need them. So 
what we can do is play one off against the other, use it as a kind of 
bargaining tool to get what we need in terms of support. But er...it's not 
great at times - I mean they all have different departments who don't 
talk to each other, let alone between the authorities. So, I mean when the 
officers are talking about what they can do for us, or we're haranguing 
them about what we can get them to do, it's kind of a bit cagey - they're 
not keen to go beyond what they have to do otherwise they'll get into 
some sort of trouble as they've been too liberal with what 1 have to 
admit are pretty limited funds. So it's sometimes a winning situation, 
but sometimes an absolute disaster. You just find yourself getting 
completely obstructed by the bureaucracy and the time it takes to make 
those decisions." 
The implication of this for the development of TSEIs is quite alarming. 
Those projects which are the pet initiatives of local authorities seem to be best 
able to survive. This therefore appears to create a geographical and 
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administrative limit on the development of the TSEIs. While this study paints a 
picture in which TSEIs are mostly small scale and hence locally contained, the 
dependence upon the support of particular local authorities demonstrates a 
potential institutional limit to the geographical growth of TSEIs. This therefore 
prejudices those localities which suffer from a degree of administrative overlap, 
whereas there are few geographical limits to need. This therefore suggests that 
cross-border co-ordination may be crucial for the development of some TSEIs. 
Without this, the institutional parochialism identified may created an unwanted 
blocking mechanism. Similarly, those TSEIs which are subject to two-tier 
regulation of administrative functions may also suffer due to the confusion of 
roles and the inability to develop a cohesive structure between tiers. As with 
many questions raised in this thesis, this is effectively covered by the call for 
increased joined-up government; however, this appears inadequate to directly 
address the problems of the localities studied here. 
Non-Statutory Agencies 
This section has thus far concentrated upon the explanatory 
characteristics of the statutory agencies which operate within the sphere of CED. 
However, despite their perceived (and, in many cases, real) dominance of the 
field of CED within particular localities, the governance literatures above 
suggests that there are now a number of organisations which have been created 
or have developed into this field. As such this section wil l attempt to understand 
the role played by the diverse institutions and networks in the development 
trajectories of TSEIs. 
Examples of organisations involved in the case studies are wide-ranging 
and so will be embellished in the case study outlines in Appendix 1. However, 
they fall broadly into the following categories, which I outline here with some 
examples: 
Third-sector specific organisations Development Trusts Association 
Councils for Voluntary Action 
Community Development Foundation 
Interlink 
Regional economic development Welsh Development Agency 
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institutions T E C s 
Durham Rural Community Council 
Charity organisations Whitbread in the Community 
Church Urban Fund 
B T 
Education Open University 
University of the Valleys 
Others Groundwork 
Tower Colliery 
The role taken by such originations may vary from funding support 
through to technical expertise or training support. However, these agencies 
empirically demonstrate key forms of partnership which are operating at the 
local level around initiatives. As with local authorities, the exact role of 
institutions may be strongly delineated or be flexible; exactly what this role is 
will be crucial in determining the means by which relational assets are 
mobilised. 
The differing remits of organisations produce particular forms of 
relations which enable or inhibit their chances of supporting TSEIs. As an 
example, those organisations which may be most accurately described as 
Quangos (e.g. T E C S , WDA, etc) lack the direct electoral accountability of local 
authorities, and as such are more governed by the financial and accountability 
criteria built into relatively narrow remits by government. Consequently, the 
influence of a dominant governmentality may be utilised in that these 
institutions tend to have the greatest restrictions in terms of the institutional 
philosophies which must be followed. The result is that as a whole, such 
institutions are not as able to be flexible as possible towards the needs of TSEIs . 
This narrow institutional framework is evident in those non-statutory 
institutions which are required to enable TSEIs in a manner coherent with their 
own organisational remit, thus pushing TSEIs towards a particular development 
path. It is therefore the institutional remit and targets of flinders, and by 
extension the government body which allocates these funds, which influence the 
development paths for TSEIs . Similarly, qualms arise as to the increased role of 
mainstream educational resources as a means to develop TSEIs . While funding 
is broadly welcome, the funding criteria of outside bodies produce effects which 
are in opposition to the essential ethos of TSEIs , thus producing more 
'mainstream' or politically acceptable forms of development. 
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As such, the overall finding is that certain initiatives, dependent upon the 
way in which they react within a partnership, can produce a symbiotic 
relationship which can unlock the combined capacities of the T S E I and support 
institutions. However, as noted above, the mobilisation of such capacities is 
dependent upon the strength of interpersonal relations between individuals and 
groups. This in itself is nothing new; the social capital, governance and 
community economic development literatures cited above suggest that such 
relations are key. However, the institutions which have become primary partners 
with TSEIs are those which were in the past essentially concerned with 
community groups offering service delivery within the mainstream; genuine 
TSEIs , in contrast, have different modes of operation and aims. There is 
therefore a disparity in the form of support required and the manner in which 
potential support is channelled; a key obstacle for TSEIs to achieve their 
potential. 
Interview data suggests that, beyond funding, the key focus of networks 
is within the third sector itself. Such a case is particularly noticeable in Wales, 
where a number of third sector-specific organisations operate. Exactly why such 
organisations would be more apparent in Wales is open for conjecture; however, 
it is suggested that such a role has been created by the long-standing autonomy 
of the Welsh political and economic system which has created an appropriate 
space for the development of third sector organisations. While similar 
organisations do exist in the North-East, the relative absence of a cohesive 
territorially-bounded regional space created complexities of governance where 
both national and sub-regional branches operate. 
However, the Welsh experience bears out the crucial influence of non-
statutory relations of both technical and moral support as a help to maintaining 
the vitality of TSEIs . The D T A in Wales, for example, provides a support 
mechanism which is cherished by the members of the organisation. Barbara 
Castle, of PEP, notes that, 
B C : "The D T A is something that has been growing in Wales. We've 
got in to a sort of network with Steve [Cranston] and others; you'll 
know that we've just launched the development trusts in Wales as a 
separate entity. That has been like having best friends in the field; 
it's something I've not had for years. It's been really important for 
me to have people that have...well, you just drown. You just drown 
in these projects. You need mentors and friends, really." 
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R B : "Is that the sort of thing which ought to be replicated elsewhere?" 
B C : "Oh yes, I mean absolutely definitely, you know, people who are 
trying to develop best development practice in a sort of self-
conscious way about what they're doing in this field have got to 
have key networks. There are other organisations who have a very 
local view of what they are doing and they haven't perhaps had the 
luxury of someone like me, saying, this is what we have to do, in a 
very assertive kind of way."..."When you start to network with D T A 
people who are also, some of them, like Steve, very educated really -
the way he thinks about what he's doing and it's great - there are 
several others as well." 
Similarly, in South Tyneside the group of initiatives studied here (TEN, 
Low Simonside, St Simon's) have an overlapping set of objectives which bring 
them into close contact. The sharing of resources, and hence what Healey et al 
(1999) refer to as the network integration thus allowing access to knowledge 
resources, is outlined by Jen Fettis of St. Simon's when she states, "We couldn't 
have done it without TEN. Dan and Mike are fantastic". Without this support, 
projects in County Durham (Sherburn Road, T2000, STI) suffer from a lack of 
the local cohesion seen in South Tyneside and Wales. The projects therefore 
exist more in separation from others, and while certain networks are tapped into, 
there is a less cohesive form of network integration than that facilitated by an 
umbrella body such as South Tyneside or South Wales. 
Unlike local authorities, non-statutory agencies lack the electoral 
accountability and therefore potentially possess a significantly greater degree of 
flexibility towards the provision of their services. However, the non-statutory 
agencies involved in regeneration also suffer significant problems through the 
funding and accountability criteria which govern their operation. One example 
from County Durham is the Durham Rural Community Council (DRCC), which 
operates as a key partner with Trimdon 2000. However, most DRCC employees 
do not receive core funding as of right, and as such a significant amount of time 
is used to chase or create alliances and funding for personnel and projects. In 
addition to this, accountability criteria constrain the parameters of operation to 
such an extent that the ability to make flexible, locally-specific decisions is 
significantly reduced. The result is that there is less attention paid to projects 
than would be in an ideal situation, as illustrated by John Davis of DRCC: 
"When you look at us we're in such a precarious position a lot of the 
time. We've normally got a one-year contract, some lucky ones get four 
or five, but some last six months. So you barely get into helping a 
project by the time you've got to start thinking about where you're 
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going to get paid from again in a few months time. And so that starts to 
play on your mind and eventually when you're looking for funds it's 
kind of, O K , 'what money can I get' before you really consider the 
criteria they're asking. You just find yourself starting to jump through 
hoops to make sure you get the money, and then either have to stick to 
that or you carry on what you were doing - kind of programme bending 
for us, I suppose." 
"Basically it means that we struggle to commit ourselves. We know like 
anyone else that to have started something and then to leave it is so 
dangerous and it can kill projects, knock the stuffing and enthusiasm 
out. So it's kind of a no-win situation at times...make us like councils 
and we've got all sorts of interference but we're safe, or keep us as we 
are and as individuals, we could disappear because of lack of funding. I 
don't disagree with some forms of competitive funding, but not all of 
it". 
The internal structures of non-statutory agencies therefore restrict their 
ability to operate at full capacity for and with TSEIs. What this implies is that 
the governance forms so widely pushed by central government may in fact be a 
restrictive force in the development of TSEIs, resulting in a desire for a co-
ordinated system. This point is made by Frank Hoban, of T2000, who hails from 
a local authority background but who is adamant about the potential of 
government organisations despite their difficulties. 
F H : "Maybe there's a big difference between small projects which 
develop with the help of outside agencies but which remain small, 
and the larger projects which are led by the statutory agencies 
generally, but don't actually meet the needs of those on the ground 
because they're not actually sure what those needs are. And I think 
the gap is something that Trimdon seems to be filling in terms of the 
agencies that help the smaller groups don't actually know how to 
cope with Trimdon 2000 because there are a lot of people in it who 
are well able to speak for themselves, well able to know how they 
want to move forward, and they can't meet that. They've only been 
used to telling people what they need and telling people what they 
should have. They're not used to being told what they should do- it's 
the applecart being turned over a little bit. And if we are successful, 
we're hoping that these agencies that should be helping in a more 
efficient manner will actually end up more efficient. And they'll 
learn from their experience that there is capacity within the 
community - it's not just Trimdon, it just happens to be that Trimdon 
has harnessed its own capacity - but there will be others, and there 
are a lot of developments throughout the country to do with 
community development where people use their own capacity to 
push things forward in a voluntary capacity. And they work." 
R B : "They're actually engaging the agencies in partnerships; is it a re-
writing of roles?" 
F H : "Well, I think it is. Very much you'll talk to agencies such as the 
C D A or D R C C and they'll talk about building the community's 
capacity to do these things. But very often the capacity's there; and 
it's a question of not even helping them along but being there when 
they are needed. And actually having access to information that is 
relevant. And not saying, 'we can do this because we've done it 
before' but we don't know how to do that because oh, we've never 
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done that before. You know what I mean (RB yeah, sure) and yet 
having said all that, you ask for some best practice example and they 
can't give it you" 
The research here suggests that, although such government-initiated 
quangos regard themselves as having an agenda which is in part set by the 
institution itself, the dominant limitations on action are a function of the 
institutional remit and framework. This conclusion therefore leads to a 
Foucaultian analysis which suggests the dominance of a particular governmental 
perspective, either political or administrative, which signifies the 
governmentality. This contrasts to previous analyses of the role of local 
authorities in that they are by-passed, notably in government dealings with the 
third sector, leading to power being taken away from local authorities and 
resulting in contestation between these dominant governmental forces. The 
result, in short, is a new division of responsibilities which to some extent 
privileges the well-controlled non-local authority sphere of influence, therefore 
producing a form of divide and conquer through the governmental mechanism. 
Third Sector Regimes and Partnerships 
The concepts of regimes outlined in chapter 3, which draws upon a 
particularly urban-related set of cases, are considered in this section as the 
theoretical underpinning for the practical formulation of partnerships within 
regeneration initiatives. Anttiroiko and Kainulainen (1998) suggested 4 types of 
regimes (Pluralist, Elitist, Corporatist and Hyperpluralist) which have different 
characteristics and power structures which relate to the relative capabilities and 
capacities to operate in the local context. However, in this section I wi l l take this 
template and suggest that the idealised forms of governance regimes emanating 
from the literatures do not fit the reality of the partnerships formed around 
TSEIs. With evidence from the four case study areas I draw together the facets 
of the hard and soft institutions of localities which produce particular regimes. 
Focusing on localised regimes as the context for the particular dynamic of the 
third sector, I will examine what regimes develop and their impact upon the 
subsequent development forms of TSEIs. 
203 
Interview data and evidence from primary and secondary sources suggest 
that local authorities retain an ascendancy in the localised governance seen in 
the four case study areas, although this has been tempered by the pressures to 
include the private sector as part of a localised coalition. However, in North-
East England interview evidence dismissed the role of unions as a key part of 
local or regional governance, therefore precipitating a move away from the 
tripartism of the post-war years. This potential demotion of the role of organised 
labour within the regional governance regime therefore creates a potential space 
for the institutions of civic society, i.e. the third sector, to become a key partner 
in localised regimes. However, again the dominant neo-liberal imperatives 
which have become evident at the regional and local scales of governance lead 
to the third sector becoming not full members of regimes but more as elements 
of partnership with selected parts of the regimes of governance. This therefore 
reflects Anttiroiko Kainulainen's (1998) notion of pluralist regimes in which 
local authorities are dominant, or corporatist regimes where the business elite is 
relatively unified. 
The practical implication of this is to examine the potential of third 
sector-orientated partnerships not as key regional regimes but as subsidiary to 
this. I will therefore seek to contrast these partnerships with Hall's (2000:9) 
notions of Shell, Consultative, Participative and Autonomous partnerships 
alluded to in chapter 6. These, the literatures suggest, are dependent upon the 
philosophies and practical leanings of individuals and organisations involved 
and the manner in which power within regimes is exercised. Of the locally-
based partnerships studied here, South Tyneside demonstrates a cross-sectoral 
alliance which appears to meet the needs of the third sector. However, STEP 
(South Tyneside Enterprise Partnership) is also predicated upon the strength of 
individuals and partnerships involved, and as such Mike Hall of TEN (South 
Tyneside Training and Enterprise Network) states, 
"It's very much about personalities, and people who are on S T E P are 
dynamic people, they're realistic people, people that will rubbish 
organisations or individuals who don't seem to know what they're 
talking about. They are very good people and they will support 
initiatives they think are worthy of financial support or whatever 
support they can offer. I would wonder, yes, if certain individuals were 
removed from that group how effective it would be. But they're all 
long-term players within the region, and have developed so. Some 
204 
started in very small ways, and have grown in influence and stature 
over the life of the partnership." 
This partnership, a borough-wide grouping of local authorities, TECs, 
private sector and third sector agencies, is regarded as being useful, and 
potentially inclusive. Mike Hall again states, 
"Having seen other partnerships, I think it's a good one, and I would 
support all members of the partnership to the hilt. Because I think they 
have...they're very clear as to what they want to achieve, and they've 
set out a realistic agenda. I've seen part of a partnership down in 
Stockton...the South Tyneside partnership seems to have enough links 
with lots of different levels around the community and is engaging 
people who have something to bring to the community at a local level. 
But I think South Tyneside is very fortunate to have that particular 
group working for us." 
"There is always going to be some element by which the representatives 
are there as figureheads, the organisations go away, do their own thing, 
they've got their own agendas which may differ or conflict in some 
cases. I suppose the purpose of a partnership is to bring all the groups 
of people together to thrash out the ideas and defuse the tensions as 
much as possible so that it helps all the partners. But I mean you can't 
necessarily say that everybody's an equal member of the partnership 
anyway, as Tyneside T E C is Tyneside-wide, whereas most of the other 
organisations within the partnership only have a narrow remit within 
South Tyneside. But er... it's certainly not just a paper partnership; they 
meet regularly, they debate things openly and also in closed forums, 
they have a proper resource manager, Peter Young.. . and if there's 
disagreement between them and the council, then that's a pretty healthy 
thing, a pretty lively debate will go ahead to try and resolve those 
things. But the bidding side of it is very much moving towards the 
community-led approach as opposed to the partnership of you know, 
big wigs. That's how S R B 5 came about, through community panels 
and consultation with local groups. Tiny local groups that have more 
voice in S R B than they would have if it hadn't been there to help it 
happen." 
As such, STEP represents the closest of the partnerships involved here to 
a participative partnership (Hall 2000: 9) as opposed to consultative or shell 
partnership is visible in many of the other key case study localities."7 As a 
result, the evidence from South Tyneside suggests that the third sector-
orientated partnership which has emerged mirrors to some extent the form of 
corporatist or tripartite regimes (Griffiths and Lanigan 1999) which already 
existed in the regional economic development sphere in the North-East. The 
significant difference in the tripartite relations is the replacement of Trade 
Unions with the third sector to produce a tripartite regime incorporating the third 
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sector, private sector and local government. However, in this case the third 
sector appears to retain a consultative role rather than a major leadership role 
within the STEP partnership, the needs of the private and public players being 
regarded as crucial. The third sector partnership therefore mirrors previously 
existing economic development regimes in that they espouse the same inclusive 
framework but within particular bounds. This operates as a means to retain the 
corporatist framework within the sphere of the third sector and regeneration now 
regarded as a key element of regional economic development. This analysis is 
confirmed by Atkinson and Lejeune (2001), who suggest that, 
"greater community involvement can aid the legitimation of government 
interventions in an area as well as playing an integrative role in terms of 
combating social exclusion and increasing social cohesion. 
However...too often both local government organisations and private 
sector developers have, partly as a result of the timetables imposed to 
submit bids to the E C and national governments, conceived and 
developed projects with minimal levels of community input. At best 
community involvement has rarely risen above the level of consultation" 
(Atkinson and Lejeune 2001). 
This scenario is therefore a long way from any notion of the third sector 
becoming part of a new regulatory mechanism to replace the old tripartism of 
the post-war era. Indeed, the lack of equality in the power relationships between 
the members of the third sector partnerships suggests that, while often directed 
towards the third sector as a delivery mechanism in conjunction with other 
institutions, such partnerships are not specifically oriented around the third 
sector. Often, at best, they reflect locally-formed regimes in which the third 
sector participates but wields little power and the private and public sector 
partners hold the key power. As such an extension of this analysis may suggest 
that the third sector is becoming reinforced in a role in which it acts as a 
placatory mechanism for deprived neighbourhoods to maintain the dominance 
and ascendancy of the private and public partners. 
Evidence relating to third sector partnerships suggests that those that do 
exist do not correspond directly to the locally-formed regimes. The reason 
behind this, I suggest, is twofold. First, third sector-orientated partnerships come 
into existence as a reactive response to the existing funding environment as 
partners are formed together to meet criteria, thus reflecting Stoker and 
1 1 7 However, Local Authority members and officers chair 58% of SRB partnership rounds 1-4 in North-
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Mossberger's (1994) Instrumental regimes. Second, the tripartite nature of 
some regimes, and local authority-TSEI partnerships which have emerged, 
operate with different agendas dependent upon the relative influence and power 
dynamics within each regime or partnership. Consequently, the third sector in 
North-East England and South Wales, except for some notable exceptions, is as 
yet underdeveloped, with no coherent third sector-oriented regimes which fully 
integrate the needs of the sector. Indeed, where formal regimes do exist they 
tend to be led by local authorities, producing structured regimes which tend 
toward mainstream economic solutions. As such, a case may be made to suggest 
that TSEIs may occasionally prefer to be part of no regime at all rather than a 
regime which emphasises the needs and desires of other institutions and their 
agendas. 
The overall implication of this for regime theory is that its application 
towards the emerging third sector partnerships cannot be based upon the models 
of urban development coalitions. The regimes outlined within studies of urban 
development demonstrate a far higher degree of co-ordination and scale of 
activity compared to third sector partnerships, and the role of business is far 
greater. Third sector partnerships appear to operate more as support structures 
within a broader local and regional economic development framework, rather 
than being at the forefront of such developments in the first place. Therefore, 
third sector partnerships are more typified by 'Interlink' in RCT which operates 
as an informal but cohesive grouping of interested parties initiated by the third 
sector to co-ordinate dealings with the local authority as opposed to a formally-
existing regime. 
The outcome of this section is to suggest that the typologies of regimes 
introduced in chapter 4 do not adequately represent the diversity of partnerships 
in the third sector in the UK. While most embrace an element of corporatism 
emanating from the local authority or institutional histories, the evidence from 
the UK is that regimes depend to some extent upon the historical context of the 
locality. In North-East England and South Wales, the dominance of local 
government and the private sector spectrum is represented in current regimes, 
with the result that the regimes represent these interests well. 
East England (Robinson et al, 2000). 
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Conclusions 
The evidence within this chapter has addressed some of the key research 
questions raised in the theoretical chapters relating to the 'external', and 
particularly, the institution-based heritages of localities in the creation of 
propitious or otherwise environments for TSEIs. In this, I have demonstrated 
that there is a need to look beyond simple readings of structure, agency and 
power to those which incorporate not only the key formal institutions of the 
particular area studied but also through the lens of social capital as a function of 
industrial heritage. 
While 'best practice' analyses suggests that it is well-funded schemes 
which will be best able to cope with the vagaries of the environment in which 
they are located, this section has demonstrated that the complex relations of 
funding and ideas are allied to the institutional forms which created the TSEI 
and are therefore crucial in determining the development path. Drawing on 
Healey et al's (1999) work on the key relational, knowledge and mobilisation 
capacities present in successful regeneration partnerships, I have demonstrated 
the broadly similar assets required to aid the external relationships of TSEIs. 
The implication of this is that, while a certain level of 'capacity building' may 
be necessary in any community, this solution requires a tailored form of 
development which is able to generate or utilise an appropriate form of social 
capital to create a positive synergy. 
Applying this to the institutional heritages and social capitals of the 
localities in which TSEIs operate, I suggest that a potentially radical industrial 
heritage may provide the basis for a TSEI as a response to the economic 
downturn. However, the evidence has suggested that the legacy of an 
institutional form creates a particular development trajectory. As suggested by 
the literatures on regional economic development, the initiatives which are 
embedded within the institutions of the past may succeed up to a point but are 
restricted by the institutional limitations. As such, there is evidence that TSEIs 
such as DOVE which are able to break beyond the relatively limited opportunity 
structure of the inclusive, corporatist institutional framework may be able to 
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capitalise upon new socio-economic spaces to create further development. 
However, this remains dependent upon the presence of capacity within the 
community in question. The analysis of the more formal, or 'hard' institutions 
influencing the TSEI demonstrates a similar emphasis on the importance of 
relational and mobilisation capacities in the development of propitious 
environments. However, drawing on Foucaultian notion of governmentality, I 
suggest that such institutions, most notably non-statutory agencies but also local 
authorities, demonstrate a degree of co-ordination, i f not control, of activities 
through the governmental technologies employed. 
While both these analyses point to a situation in which a TSEI's success 
in producing outputs is aided through a series of institutional alliances, we must 
again analyse what is meant by 'success'. As noted, in chapter 5, I wish to go 
beyond notions of success which are based purely on outputs and enter into an 
analysis of how outputs correspond to need in target communities. It is therefore 
analytically insufficient to characterise TSEIs which produce numerically 
superior 'outputs' as necessarily better for a target community, even though the 
provision of so-called 'mainstream outputs' potentially represents a coherent 
meeting of needs. However, it is those more radical solutions which potentially 
emanate from alternative or radical roots which may produce more 'value 
added' solutions within communities - therefore increasing the level of 
development and capacity within the community rather than taking over 
mainstream functions. However, evidence also suggests that those TSEIs which 
operate at the fringes of the institutional history are most able to produce 
alternative economic solutions. Those within the 'inclusive' regimes of statutory 
agencies have a tendency towards more mainstream opportunities. 
This chapter has also demonstrated that the key to a 'successful' TSEI is 
not just its ability to mobilise resources but also an ability to remove or 
circumvent obstacles to development, hence harnessing the key mobilisation 
arenas. It is these potential obstacles to development which have become 
apparent from the analysis of 'failed' TSEIs and the analysis of those TSEIs 
which succeed but which may not have achieved their ful l potential. The 
evidence also suggests that those TSEIs which have been regarded as 
'succeeding' do not necessarily lack the potential blocking mechanisms, yet 
have sufficient avenues open through which to stimulate development. 
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The implication of this for the analysis of the 'propitious' structures is to 
suggest that a 'smooth' or 'unblocked' development or support structures are not 
necessarily the best transferable structures. 'Success', as currently measured by 
best practice analyses, may therefore be more of an assessment of the lack of 
significant blocking mechanisms as opposed to an absolute measure of success. 
In contrast, where a TSEI has 'failed', a lack of innovation or blocking 
mechanisms and a lack of influence may be a key element in failure. There is 
therefore a need to move towards assessments of success which acknowledge 
the complexity of the institutional relations around TSEIs rather than seeking to 
merely transfer frameworks which may still possess inactive or circumvented 
blocking mechanisms.118 
As such, each course of action and blocking mechanism is an idealised 
type and may not therefore operate within each initiative to the same extent. It 
is the manner in which, through coherent management forms, such blocking or 
slowing mechanisms may be avoided that will be assessed in the following 
chapter, which concentrates on the 'internal' organisation of TSEIs. 
I am aware that this analysis could in part reflect the comparative focus upon 'failing' and 'succeeding' 
initiatives, thus drawing conclusions which highlight the negative blocking mechanisms as opposed to the 
factors which actively promote positive outcomes (see Connell and Kubisch 1999). 
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Chapter 8 
The 'Internal9 Influences on TSEI 
Development. 
Introduction 
This chapter, as with chapter 7, is based upon an analytic distinction 
between the external and internal influences upon the development of TSEIs. By 
stressing the internal management of TSEIs, this chapter will examine the 
structures which create an appropriate development framework within TSEIs. 
Drawing on the managerial literatures reviewed in chapter 4, this will focus 
primarily on the management structures of TSEIs which encourage TSEIs to 
develop and adapt to a variety of influences from the target community. The 
manner in which such structures subsequently enable the development of the 
initiative wil l be analysed, thus allowing the initiative to be placed within the 
success/failure matrix (figure 5.1 in chapter 5). To achieve this, the chapter will 
examine how each particular management structure forms as the practical 
expression of the configurations of the needs of the community, the resources 
available and the ideological stances of those involved in the TSEI. It is the 
interaction of these factors, allied to the input of empowered individuals, which 
produce the internal influences upon the TSEI. It is these management structures 
which I will examine in more detail within this chapter. 
It is not the intention here to assess the specific details of every case 
study to examine the relationship to the management 'templates' produced by 
Hudson (1995), Harrison (1997), Campbell (1999). Instead, I wish to draw out 
and contrast the areas in which the case study evidence concurs with and differs 
from the ideas outlined in the managerial literatures seen in chapter 4. The result 
is to provide an analysis of the features which, when present, help create a 
propitious structure for the development of the initiative. However, beyond this 
confirmation of the evidence emanating from the literatures, some indications of 
the potential pitfalls within the internal management of TSEIs wil l become 
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apparent as the particular features of 'failed' TSEIs are examined. There are 
therefore a number of particular instances in which the internal management 
processes of TSEIs become crucial to the TSEI failing, or, in some cases, not 
living up to its potential. 
To illustrate this, the chapter will focus on three main concepts. First, 
the notion of the shared vision in and around a TSEI, defined as the relation it 
has to the needs, resources and aspirations of the target community is important. 
This cements the TSEI within the community and in the process creates an 
appropriate ideological and practical basis for the initiative. In this sense, the 
notion of 'community' does not necessarily refer to spatially-defined 
communities but the target community of the TSEI. This differential notion of 
'community' creates a framework to accommodate the potential breadth 
operations of a TSEI, and thus the ability of the initiative to meet the needs of 
that community. 
Second, I wil l focus on the management structures utilised in the 
TSEIs, both in terms of day-to-day and longer-term strategic management. 
These two time horizons will illustrate the crucial structures which enable or 
constrain TSEIs to operate and achieve results in both the short and long terms. 
This section analyses the broad variation of management structures, in an 
attempt to gain an insight into what key features are present or lacking in 
'successful' and less 'successful' TSEIs. 
Third, I assess the nature of human agency in the creation and 
development of potentially successful TSEIs. This wil l be related to the 
discussions of vision and management structures to analyse the manner in which 
the structures in TSEIs both constrain or enable such agency. I will analyse the 
particular individual and collective skills present within TSEIs which create 
propitious environments. 
In addition to these three key sections, a recurring theme throughout 
this chapter wi l l be the underlying notion of community embeddedness.119 This 
is not to devalue the notion of embeddedness but to acknowledging its nature as 
implicitly relevant to virtually all areas of this discussion. Such an interlinking 
1 1 9 Community embeddedness is a broad-reaching term, which may encompass a number of interlocking 
processes. In this case I again tend towards Healey et al's (1999) distinction of the relational assets and 
mobilisation capacities which operate within regeneration initiatives as the underlying mechanisms which 
ensure embeddedness. 
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of themes throughout the chapter demonstrates the inherent complexity of 
structural processes. 
The literatures cited in chapter 4 suggest a degree of consensus over the 
key features of the internal circumstances and processes within TSEIs which 
create propitious environments and management frameworks in which 
successful TSEIs develop. However, it is nonetheless important to study these 
processes in detail for two reasons. First, the internal mechanism itself is crucial 
in determining the success or failure of TSEIs. As such, comparative study of 
'successful' and 'failing' initiatives may help to establish the validity of 
concepts alluded to in the literatures which are based primarily on the study of 
'successful' or 'best practice' initiatives. Second, there is a need, as far as 
possible, to establish the 'internal' mechanisms in independence to the 'external' 
aspects seen to be operating in chapter 7. This ought therefore to act as a means 
not only to examine the interrelationships between the internal and external 
spheres but also to establish where possible the internal mechanism as a 
'neutral' control factor to analyse the external aspects in isolation. This will 
subsequently facilitate the analysis in the concluding chapter. 
This chapter therefore seeks to address not only how the internal 
mechanisms operate and thus influence the directions of TSEI but also by how 
much, thus giving an indicator for the discussion of the relative values and 
interplay of the internal and external factors in the concluding chapter. 
Need, Vision and the Mission of TSEIs. 
The internal structures within any TSEI are to a significant extent a 
function of its organisational aims, which stem from an assessment of the needs 
of the target population or community in which the TSEI rests. An accurate 
assessment of local needs and resources may be brought together within the 
TSEI, thus creating the potential for the development of beneficial outcomes. In 
this section, I will analyse exactly how a TSEI may harness this development 
potential of a target community to benefit both the TSEI and the broader 
community. This will examine, from inception, how certain initiatives develop 
to address particular needs. Through analyses of the manner in which such 
TSEIs can produce organisations and structures which facilitate Community 
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Economic Development, I will draw some conclusions as to the organisational 
structures which result from the origins and evolution of TSEIs. 
Hudson (1995) notes a distinction between the notions of 'vision' and 
'mission' which are crucial elements in the setting of the objectives for a TSEI. 
The 'vision' may be most usefully thought of as "a desirable future situation" 
(1995: 93), and as such it is a powerful networking force on people, though by 
itself it is not a strategy. In contrast, notes Hudson, missions are concerned 
"more with an organisation's common belief and reasons why it exists" (1995: 
94). The mission therefore acts as a grounding of the broader aspiration of the 
vision, thus enshrining, often implicitly, the beliefs and missionary zeal. Mission 
therefore refers to the process of implementing a vision, a means to an end. 
Exactly how such projects are conceived as a vision and implemented 
through the mission is crucial in determining their relationship to the perceived 
needs of the target community, and as such to what extent a shared vision for 
the TSEI may be fostered. As a tentative typology, I suggest the categorisations 
of initiatives into 'community need', 'top-down', and 'evolving' initiatives. I 
will now discuss these in more detail. 
A. 'Community Need' Initiatives 
Many of the TSEIs studied demonstrate roots in the target community 
of the locality, being the descendants of community-based developments which 
emerged as a response to perceived need.120 Such projects share, to varying 
degrees, a number of common factors: 
• Origins which are primarily traceable to ideas formed within and by the 
'community'. 
• A grouping (usually informal) of individuals which pre-dates the 
availability of funding, thus demonstrating a response to need 
independent of the pull of money. 
• Groups which stem from a perceived or qualitatively judged need from 
within the community in question, whether grounded in statistical data 
and quantitative evidence or not. 
• A vision which explicitly emphasises the need for CED as a key to the 
TSEI and the subsequent development of the initiative. 
Such TSEIs include A V E , DOVE, BCR, St Simon's, as seen in Appendix 1. 
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The origin o f the TSEI within community needs creates what is 
arguably the strongest mission for an initiative, thus building a strong 
ideological basis for inclusion and subsequent success. In being created by, and 
formed within, the community, a degree o f embeddedness already exists and as 
such there is an inherent tendency (but no functional compulsion) towards 
cohesion in aims and objectives as demonstrated by Amman Valley Enterprises. 
Len Preece of A V E states, 
"You know. We're people from the community, we've got an office, 
we're visible... between us, those who participate and run the thing, 
we've got to know most of the people in the villages here. We kind of 
feel everyone's behind us even if they don't need us directly - we've got 
a reasonably strong idea of what we want to do, and it's all about taking 
people with us, letting them drive even if you want to stretch the 
analogy. It's that kind of feeling that had been lost and I reckon we've 
started to turn it around." 
As a result, the creation o f a TSEI in a manner which explicitly relates 
to the resources and needs o f the community helps to draw upon a groundswell 
o f support and creates a greater openness and enthusiasm towards the TSEI. 
This therefore creates an inclusionary resource base, in which a commonly-held 
frame of reference is pursued through the range o f mobilisation capacities in a 
coherent manner. This consequently creates a personal and community impetus, 
through the investment o f the resources o f time, energy and hope, to ensure the 
success o f the initiative. 
This inclusive mission and the investment o f resources are potentially 
easier to achieve in TSEIs with a relatively narrow set o f objectives which 
ensure coherence in development o f the initiative. Through this process, a 
degree o f coherence is maintained as an accepted development path is 
pursued. 1 2 1 However, should a TSEI wish to develop beyond this in an attempt 
to address broader Community Development within a spatially-defined 
community, tensions may be created. The breakdown of the mission or frame o f 
reference supporting the initiative may bring about a l imit upon the mobilisation 
A note of caution is required here, however. The notion of a community-based vision does not 
necessarily hold true in that some supposedly 'community-based' needs analyses rely, as noted in the 
previous chapter, on the ideas of locally-based elites. This therefore transgresses the notion that ideas 
which flow from within a particular community of interest are necessarily attached to the broader spatial 
community. There is therefore a necessity in some cases to acknowledge elitist politics as an element of 
TSEI development. 
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capacities and therefore create a mechanism to stall the development o f the 
TSEI. These w i l l be analysed later in this chapter. 
B. 'Top-down' initiatives 
Top-down community initiatives are those which originate in local 
authorities or other non-'community' based organisations. Typically, such 
TSEIs are formed as a response to need as perceived from outside the 
community, often as funding becomes available. Such initiatives (and other 
target areas and groups) are subsequently justified through a number o f 
statistical analyses o f the locality such as the index o f local deprivation 
published by the DETR. Top-down TSEIs are often produced with a degree o f 
community 'consultation', a process involving the utilisation o f existing 
partnerships as the conduit for funds and as such reflect the existing social 
configurations and power relations. 1 2 2 They exhibit the following key features: 
• Top-down TSEIs are primarily organised and delivered at the strategic 
level by local authorities and other statutory organisations. 
» They may involve community participation but are rarely community-
led. 
• They are based in ideas which emerge f rom outside the community, thus 
representing need as perceived by policy-makers. 
• They are set up through the availability o f new funding streams, rather 
than being needs or ideas-led. 
In contrast to the community needs initiatives, top-down projects have 
a significantly different 'mission'. While a particular remit may be produced 
f rom the structure o f the organisation's funding, such remits do not necessarily 
represent the needs o f the target community as perceived by that community. As 
a result, while the TSEI may address a particular form o f economic (and social 
/environmental) problem, it may not fu l ly operate with the invested support o f 
that community to produce the most beneficial result. 1 2 3 Top-down initiatives 
1 2 2 Such TSEIs include Dulais Valley Partnership, Sherbum Road 2000, Low Simonside (see appendix 1). 
1 2 3 The perceived 'need' and real 'needs' of the target community do not necessarily correspond to each 
other. It may be suggested that the 'needs' cited by residents are less likely to represent the structural, and 
hence more abstract, needs of the community as opposed to the more tangible and easily grasped elements 
of the quality of life. I therefore caution the privileging of'community-based' analyses of need over others, 
in that it its the quality of needs analysis which is most crucial in determining the critical needs of the 
community. Need is not the same for all; while some will benefit from particular needs being addressed, 
others will not; many (particularly spatially-based) TSEIs fall into the trap of attempting to address the 
'common' needs which in actual fact may directly benefit just a small minority of the target population. 
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tend to be 'parachuted i n ' , with typically relatively limited consultation periods. 
The initiatives are therefore more inclined to operate alongside the existing 
elites or institutions in the target community, the initiatives lacking a sense o f 
clear route through which to engage the broader community and its institutions. 
The result is to produce a TSEI whose remit may not be particularly inclusive or 
is operating outside the real need of the community. This is illustrated by 
Angela Pulman, chair o f Community Enterprise Wales, who notes, 
"You'll get some communities, who if you throw big money at them 
they'll have a go, but if you really analyse what's happening there, I 
have never found a community actually in control, just a part of the 
community at best." 
Some notable problems may result f rom this lack o f embeddedness. 
First, the TSEI may be regarded as a local authority structure, and therefore may 
fal l foul o f perceptions which regard it as separate f rom the community. In this 
form, a TSEI may therefore perpetuate the long-standing provider-user 
relationship seen within the case study areas in which local authorities are 
expected to service the needs o f population as defined in the post-war Fordist 
regulatory framework. Rather than fostering a 'can-do' attitude within the 
locality, such TSEIs may instead create a 'what can you do for us?' attitude 
within the community allied to a notion of 'why should I be interested?' As such 
the nature o f the power relations between the two parties - in which the 
'community' is regarded as under-empowered and not included in the process -
may lead to a distinct lack o f embeddednesss and a subsequent lack o f a 
coherent vision. 
Second, the appearance of TSEIs which have little obvious attachment 
to the communities presents problems in terms o f the trust relationships, akin to 
Healey's et al's (1999) notion o f relational assets, which may be built wi th the 
communities. In particular, TSEIs in the employment field may be perceived by 
the target community as acting as a conduit for statutory agencies such as social 
services and the employment service. As such, there is an apparent diff icul ty in 
the forging o f a common mutual vision. A n example o f this is the perception o f 
the Low Simonside Employment Initiative, which St Simon's Community 
Project is determined to avoid. This notion is suggested by Chris Clarke, local 
authority worker with Low Simonside, who notes the origins o f the initiative 
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and the result it had for the initiative's embeddedness in the community it was 
meant to serve: 
"The main idea behind it was that we had a lot of agencies who were 
delivering things according to national or regional type programmes - sub-
regional in some cases. But we were concerned to see whether they were 
being delivered effectively at the very local level. And whether at the local 
level they were seen as a coherent package, fulfilling all the requirements. 
So we wanted to pick a typical area, well, a typical area with problems. But 
to use that to see whether what was being done by the main agencies if you 
like, was meeting all needs. And if not, what would need to be done at a 
very local level." 
"Although it was aimed at community development in a very loose 
sense, the L S E I was very top-down in that Jayne was appointed by a 
number of large agencies, and parachuted into the Community 
Association who never accepted any great sense of ownership 
themselves for their project. And the community at large had a certain 
suspicion of it as well which we, well, Jayne, had to work hard at." 
This potential lack o f vision may be compounded by the reasons 
behind the creation o f a Community Development initiative. This is highlighted 
by the case o f the Penywaun Enterprise Partnership, which began as a top-down 
initiative due to a 'horrendous' murder on the Penywaun estate. This led to 
vigilantism, and the convening of a high-level inter-agency group under the 
Chief Executive o f the local authority. The result was that Barbara Castle was 
asked, 
B C : "In a very unscientific way, to do something about Penywaun. That's 
about all it was, really: do something about this place." 
R B : "Because it was becoming a political thing as well?" 
B C : "Oh it was very embarrassing. They had reporters and lots of high-profile 
ghastly publicity which everyone hated, people assuming that this was the 
end of the earth, which of course it is, but in terms of an abandoned estate 
which it wasn't really." 
The outcome is the creation o f a politically influenced community 
development initiative to address the perceived problems in a particular way 
which was heavily influenced by the local authority. This is not to suggest that 
the initiative is doomed to failure due to the manner in which it has been set up 
with little community input. However, PEP subsequently had a significant task 
to change its perception within the community at large. In effect, this means that 
the mode o f operation, alters to accommodate a shift towards a different mission 
for an initiative. It is these initiatives whose organisational aims, and hence 
institutional frameworks, have evolved, which w i l l now be discussed. 
218 
C. 'Evolving' or 'Hybrid' Initiatives 
A number o f projects f i t into neither o f the above categories as their 
identities and structures have altered over time to produce different institutional 
forms. This may go in either direction, becoming more community based or 
moving towards being more akin to statutory agencies. The reason behind such a 
shift may be dependent upon the perceived requirement to develop the 
institutional framework in accordance with evolving visions o f the role o f the 
TSEI. This may lead to a gradual shift away from the original target community, 
or in the case o f TSEIs set up under the auspices o f local authorities, a move 
gradually to become part o f the community. This is as a means to increase the 
embeddedness o f the initiative within the spatial community and to promote a 
broadly inclusionary vision and mission. 
The above discussion, with its essentially normative stance that 
community based projects are more beneficial to the community, is reflected in 
the literatures on community development. Reflecting this, many of the case 
study initiatives have attempted to shift the emphasis f rom a 'top-down' 
structure in order to promote a sense of shared vision within the initiative. The 
desire for a link within the community is exemplified by the Ystalyfera 
Development Trust, which has striven to remove itself f rom the shackles o f the 
local authority and TEC influence to produce a synthesis o f vision, community 
need and organisational structure which w i l l be most beneficial to the 
community. The reason for this is a perceived lack o f embeddedness and an 
image o f the TSEI which leads to pigeon-holing as a local authority structure. 
Indeed, Clive Thompson of the Ystalyfera Development Trust notes that image, 
and hence understanding, is a key problem faced by initiatives: 
C T : "I still speak to some friends of mine who still don't know what happens 
here, what goes on. I feel very disappointed actually. For fucks sake, I 
say, come on, wake up. For goodness sake. You know what I do, we're 
the local trust." 
R B : "So how do you change that mindset?" 
C T : "Well, 1 think we can change their minds by basically showing them 
again and again what has been achieved and what can be achieved. You 
know local training as well." 
Similarly, Blaenllechau Community Regeneration (BCR) has 
developed from a small-scale community development project to one which 
attempts to reach out to the whole place-based community after attempting a 
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comprehensive social audit - an aspiration which many TSEIs have but few 
achieve. This attempts to create a relationship between the TSEI and the 
community (in this case the village o f Blaenllechau) in which the TSEI can 
more accurately represent the needs o f the whole target community rather than 
narrower communities o f interest. The aim is to foster an 'embeddedness' which 
produces an institutional vision shared by beneficiaries. This has the impact o f 
creating a TSEI which is both open to the needs and possible desires o f the 
community, while being accountable to that community for its actions. The 
impetus behind this is the realisation that, according to Sue Jones o f BCR, 
"If we're not careful, organisations like B C R will become top-down 
themselves. We're a grass roots organisation, but how long before a 
structure is in place where we're actually imposing on our communities 
just like the council had imposed. So I think we're going to have to think 
very carefully about what it is we do and we have to always bear in 
mind the wishes of the community. And if we don't, we could end up 
the same as the council"... " It's very easy to get on with the business 
and forget what you're doing it for". 
In contrast to the experiences o f other TSEIs, the Spennymoor 
Training Initiative (STI) demonstrates a development trajectory which has 
moved it away from the 'humble' beginnings where it was set up on the old 
'gasworks' site on the target estate towards a much more formal training 
initiative with newly-constructed premises. Wi th the corresponding decline in 
'community' control, a tension occurs between the need to formalise certain 
relationships and the requirement to retain a level o f linkage with the 
community need. That is, to concretise relational linkages with funders, most 
notably colleges o f further education and the local council, while seeking to 
retain the key mobilisation capacities within the community. While the original 
TSEI was predicated on the notion o f addressing community need, the current 
set-up is devolved f rom this role. The result is to question the formal nature o f 
the STI and, and thus its eligibility and placement to make use o f the networks 
and mobilisation capacities f rom funders, while retaining its roots in the target 
community. However, this is a product o f the narrow aims (education and 
training) o f the STI and the manner in which it has integrated itself into the 
formal training provision network. The result is that certain organisations such 
as the STI tend, through their aims, to formalise the mechanism of provision and 
hence the mission o f the initiative, to effectively become top-down. This 
220 
institutional shift towards a more formal structure is also allied to a geographical 
shift in the move to a new centre, which respondents cite as a factor in the TSEI 
withdrawing f rom its original status as a community-based initiative. The result, 
as Julie Cook of STI notes, is a shift away from the origin o f the initiative: 
"Yeah, I think we have lost sight a bit of where it all started, but that's 
not saying we've done wrong- you look at this, and it's fantastic. But 
yeah, you're right- it could be about time we started or encouraged an 
offshoot in the community ourselves to kind of reclaim that territory if 
we've moved away from it" 
The overall result of this categorisation is to demonstrate that where 
need and the TSEI are perceived to be co-ordinated, the groundswell o f 
community response, and hence the knowledge and mobilisation capacities, are 
far greater. In addition, the manner in which the TSEI is able to mobilise the 
resources o f those employed or involved in the initiative is crucial to the 
development potential o f the initiative. 
Adherence to the Objectives of the Initiative 
While a co-ordinated and coherent vision within a TSEI may help to 
produce a beneficial development path, this does not necessarily produce a 
structure which benefits the target community to the greatest extent. By 
pursuing what can be a tight, narrow objective, a TSEI may be able to produce 
outputs and outcomes without acknowledging the broader nature o f 'need' 
within the spatial community. Consequently, the possibility o f a more inclusive 
TSEI remit may be negated by the pursuance o f narrow aims. As such, while the 
'vision' may be shared and objectives attainable, such initiatives focus on a 
particularly narrow target community which does not correspond to the broader 
spatially-based community. Therefore, these 'community ideas', which 
represent the needs or desires o f particular sectoral interest groups, may not be 
able to produce a long-term, sustainable mission which transcends particular 
interests to aid the spatial community. 
In contrast, there is evidence to suggest that those TSEIs which operate 
with a far looser set o f criteria may be able to create a more inclusive, yet 
diluted, sense of inclusion around the initiative. Wi th a breadth o f objectives and 
relatively small scale, the division of labour becomes a stumbling block and 
221 
each particular element of the TSEI may not be able to f u l f i l its objectives. 
Similarly, confusion as to the aims of a TSEI may lead to a lack o f interest 
within communities due to inadequate understanding o f the manner in which 
people can participate in, and benefit from, an initiative. The implication o f this 
is the creation o f a tension between the pursuance o f broad objectives in an 
attempt to meet a range o f needs and the ability to form a coherent vision o f how 
those objectives should be realised. Such tensions are likely to be found in more 
spatially-based third sector initiatives, where objectives aim to address broader 
community development, in contrast to initiatives with a more narrow target 
community whose objectives may be more clearly outlined. 
This problem is encountered by Peter Brookes o f Trimdon 2000, which 
demonstrates the tension o f breadth o f objectives within a small-scale 
framework which may lack the capacity to f u l f i l these objectives: 
"Yeah, at times we're pulling in so many directions it's hard for us, and 
for others outside, to know where we're going and how to prioritise." 
This view contrasts with that o f Anne Timothy, also o f Trimdon 2000, who 
states, 
"We don't actually think that it [broad objectives] is [a problem] 
because we can relate all those projects back to the village appraisal 
which highlighted these areas to be areas of need." 
The implication o f such a tension within an individual initiative spells 
danger for the attainment of such objectives. Within Trimdon 2000, two key 
personnel express differing attitudes with regard to the attainment o f objectives 
and the relation o f such ideas to the remit they possess. Peter Brookes appears to 
be suggesting a situation in which broad objectives are becoming more diff icul t 
to attain as one coherent group. This could imply a need explicitly to narrow that 
remit by dropping certain elements o f that remit or by creating different groups 
to f u l f i l those objectives. Alternatively, the implicit prioritisation o f objectives 
remains a possibility to retain cohesion. This tension essentially relates to a 
difference in attitudes and visions o f what ought to be done or what can be done. 
While Peter Brookes regards the benefits o f Trimdon 2000 as specific outcomes 
f rom actions, Anne Timothy suggest that the strength originates f rom the 
adherence to objectives as formed by the community. As such, there is an 
implicit tension o f needs-led and output-led attitudes within the initiative and by 
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extension, perhaps many other third sector initiatives. However, within Trimdon 
2000 this tension as yet appears not to have led to significant breakdowns in 
actions. 
In contrast to the experience of initiatives such as Trimdon 2000, many 
TSEIs do not have the remit or desire to address the broader questions o f need 
within their target or spatial communities. For example, the St Simon's 
Community Project in South Shields has a relatively narrow employment-search 
and training remit and has yet to address broader questions o f local need. 1 2 4 
Within the initiative, this is considered a significant failing, one which partly 
reflects the acute employment needs within the locality but also the industrial 
and social culture o f the area which regards community development as the 
remit o f statutory agencies. 
A similar view is apparent in Low Simonside, in which the primary 
aim was, 'to create employment opportunities for local residents' and the 
secondary aim 'to improve the quality o f life for the Low Simonside area' 
(Bradley Consulting, 1995: iv) . The result is to create a confusion o f aims, as 
noted by primary manager Jayne Mil ls : 
"Well, the original objectives of the project had been about tackling 
unemployment in the Low Simonside area. But I saw right from the outset 
that wasn't possible. It wasn't going to be possible to do, given the 
resources we had, which was £60 ,000 a year for 3 years, to significantly 
reduce unemployment in that time. So we re-wrote the objectives with a 
greater emphasis on community development." 
"The revised objectives were never clearly understood by the steering 
group, which included the education department. And because we'd 
taken that different tack, and become much more a community 
development project rather than an employment and training project -
though we did that as well - but the emphasis shifted. And I think that 
the education department, and particularly the community education 
project in which we were based, felt quite threatened - to an extent we 
were treading on their toes and we were there saying, look at all this 
community development work that needs to be done before you can 
think about getting people employed." 
As such, the pursuit o f narrow objectives may be held back by broader 
community misgivings, or, as seen in chapter 7, the lack o f knowledge and 
relational resources which therefore restrict the development potential o f a 
TSEI. In addition to this, a tension exists between the formalisation o f an 
initiative and the 'skimming' effect (seen with the New Deal) in which more 
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formal structures facilitate the development o f those individuals who already 
possess the basic skills and do not require fundamental or intensive personal 
development. The result is that TSEIs which have a broader CD as well as CED 
remit, must address broader community need in those areas where there is 
insufficient knowledge and relational resources to return directly to the 
economic mainstream. Otherwise, TSEIs may be divisive in that they may 
privilege a target community which already possess the skills, as opposed to 
those with few skills, therefore neglecting to f u l f i l their fu l l institutional remits. 
The Interaction of Vision, Mission and Need 
This discussion leads to a recognition o f two primary forms of TSEI 
organisation - those which have narrow objectives and which are able to pursue 
them with a degree o f clarity and purpose, against those TSEIs which have less 
strongly defined objectives but which are able to respond to the evolving needs 
of the community in a flexible manner which is open to change. This simplified 
categorisation o f TSEI structures leads to a potential dichotomy of 
organisational structures which represent more formal, output-led TSEIs and 
those which represent an attempt to address broader needs within target 
communities. 
The crucial element o f the discussion o f TSEIs relates to the 
institutional structures within the third sector. Narrow objectives, pursued with 
vigour, may produce solid structures which are built around a core activity and 
hence produce a degree o f cohesive sense of purpose and well- defined roles. In 
contrast, a broader set o f objectives w i l l necessitate a more flexible management 
structure within the initiative. The subsequent problems this creates this w i l l be 
discussed later in the chapter. However, the crucial judgement to be made is 
these types o f TSEI structures in relation to the dominant theoretical 
underpinnings o f the third sector. The 'mainstream' models o f the third sector 
which encourage reintegration into the mainstream economy w i l l tend to fall 
within those TSEIs which pursue objectives, often narrow, in conjunction with 
the mainstream. I do not wish to argue, however, that mainstream options are a 
However, the initiative's appointment of a women's development worker suggests a commitment to 
outreach towards as many potential beneficiaries as possible. 
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functional necessity o f narrow objectives. Instead, the evidence here suggests 
that a narrowly- defined training and education missions tend towards more 
mainstream solutions developed within a third sector framework. 
In contrast, those TSEIs which actively aim to develop the broader 
spatial community may be taking over the role o f previously more 'mainstream' 
service and personal development activities once undertaken by the state. 
However, a broader remit does, as in the case o f A V E , allow the development o f 
a more holistic community development programme which incorporates 
elements o f the mainstream to cross-fund more experimental projects. 
I make no judgement here as to which form (highly structured or 
flexible) is best; each key type satisfies to a greater or lesser extent the needs o f 
different communities. Consequently, no clear conclusion can be drawn, 
although a model with narrow objectives does relate more closely towards a 
'business' model o f growth as opposed to a developmental model. To define 
each type by a crude definition o f 'success' is to provide an inadequate analysis 
of the impact o f each organisational structure upon the target community. As 
such, in the concluding chapter a more complex and nuanced understanding o f 
the nature o f 'success' w i l l be examined to fu l ly determine the impact o f each 
structure. 
The Management of TSEIs. 
The internal management structure o f any TSEI creates a framework 
around which decision-making is facilitated or constrained. This structure may 
revolve around a committee, a number o f individuals or one or two key 
individuals at the ' top'. Within this section, I w i l l assess the different forms o f 
internal management structure in an attempt to define the key structures and 
their subsequent impact on the potential o f the TSEI to react to community need 
and cement its success. The empirical evidence presented here w i l l subsequently 
be related back to the discussion o f the internal mechanisms outlined in chapter 
4. This w i l l analyse these structures from both a practitioner's point of view and 
a theoretical management framework as presented in chapter 4. 
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Day-to-Day management 
The day-to-day management o f TSEIs is a key level at which broader 
structures are mediated by key personnel to produce the conditions for outputs 
to be created. In chapter 4, the review of literatures noted the need to understand 
the key facets by which TSEIs as a whole are able to take decisions and 
implement their key objectives. The role o f managers in this process is crucial 
and dependent upon a number o f factors including their personal remits and the 
structure in which they operate as a means to enhance or constrain their role. 
This section w i l l analyse the key features o f the day-to-day management o f 
TSEIs as a precursor to a discussion o f the interplay o f the management o f 
TSEIs and their response and relations to the external environment. 
Day-to-day management and strategic decision-making differ in that 
they are based upon different rationalities and time horizons based on core 
management competencies and day-to-day routines. This section therefore 
draws a distinction between day-to-day management and strategic governance, 
which mediates interests and is legally, financially and morally accountable to 
the TSEI and its flinders (Hudson 1995). 
Day-to-day management utilises an often, though not necessarily, 
distinct group of managers who may or may not be linked directly to the 
community or the user groups within the TSEI. The power held by the managers 
may be crucial in determining the development path o f the TSEI within (or 
sometimes in obstruction to) the vision o f the strategic governance board. 
The flexibi l i ty within the day-to-day group to make executive 
decisions is dependent upon a level o f trust between the strategic management 
group and the day-to-day managers. Should this basis o f trust be present, a 
greater degree o f control tends to be afforded to the day-to-day management 
committee. However, such a structure is in part dependent upon the manner in 
which the TSEI was set up - i f those who are responsible for the creation o f the 
TSEI are those present at the management level, their influence (such as in St 
Simon's/ DOVE) is considerably expanded; the result is to shift the power 
balance towards those managers who have been able to retain a degree of 
control as figureheads. The consequence of this is to promote the development 
of management structures in which vested interests are enshrined; it is these 
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structures which are dependent upon the particular powers inherent within those 
individuals in any TSEI. 
In contrast, some of the case study TSEIs have been set up through 
partnership led by local authorities and as a result do not posses structures which 
allow managers to exercise executive power within the initiative. The 
consequence o f this is to constrain the potential to react in the short term to 
changing circumstances through the inability to take decisions and utilise cash 
funds. Such an influence by the local authority therefore produces a scenario in 
which the ability to manage, and hence the potential success or failure o f the 
TSEI, is compromised. 
This contrast may be noted by comparison o f the day-to-day decision 
making processes o f the St Simon's Community Project and the Low Simonside 
Employment Initiative. A t St Simon's, day-to day decisions are taken as 
necessary, wi th the key decision-making process in the hands o f the project 
leaders. Any capital purchases o f over £100 are referred to the chairman of the 
steering group; purchases o f £1000+ are referred to the steering committee. 
Relatively few decisions have to be made, and other workers are usually 
informally consulted to ensure agreement. The Low Simonside Employment 
Initiative, in which financial power was held within the local authority (South 
Tyneside MBC) , led to a situation in which it took four months to acquire a 
computer. The fact that cash was so strictly accounted for created a sense of 
exasperation within the initiative, as stated by Jayne Mil l s : 
"I mean, we couldn't believe it. They were so bureaucratic about it, and 
yet all we needed was a bit of money to do with as we saw fit- when it 
was needed. I can think even now of at least a couple of times we just 
had to say, 'no, we can't do that. We haven't got money.' So people lost 
out- the people we were trying to help." 
As such, a power balance may exist between the day-to-day 
management structure and the strategic management structure. This is in part 
dependent upon the power o f the management team to direct the management 
process and the ability o f the day-to-day management committee to challenge, 
overturn or manipulate strategic directives. While delineated at the set-up o f 
TSEIs, the role o f the strategic management board is occasionally characterised 
by a wish to retain externally-based control over the decision-making process. 
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As such, a real tension may be fostered between the day-to-day managers o f a 
TSEI, who are directly accountable to the users and the membership, and the 
strategic management group whose direct contact with users may be limited. 
Strategic Management Structure 
This structure, and the interplay between strategic and day-to-day 
management, produces the framework in which the TSEI operates. The strategic 
management structure o f the TSEI, as noted here, is dependent in part upon the 
nature of the TSEI when set up. 
Committees 
As noted above, members o f the strategic group fal l broadly into four 
types: 
• The local 'great and the good' - pillars o f the community such as 
doctors, teachers and clergy 
• Day-to-day managers 
• Representatives o f beneficiaries 
• Funding representatives 
The broad argument made in the literatures 1 2 5 is that the skilled 
members o f the strategic group are required due to their ability to call on their 
expertise and network skills to further the interests o f the TSEI. As such, a 
premium is placed on the needs to get such networked people into the TSEI. 
Similarly, and as a requirement f rom set-up and funding, there are many TSEIs 
which have funders on the strategic board. Their presence on the management 
board may protect the funder's desire to see their money being spent in the 
manner demanded. However the research suggests that such a situation is more 
applicable as a safety net and those involved in the management group rarely 
intervene as active partners. 
The combined resources o f the well-skilled and networked members of 
a strategic management board can, i f utilised correctly, promote broader 
acceptance and understanding o f the aims o f the TSEI. However, the evidence 
from many of the case studies suggests that the members o f the strategic board 
See for example Hudson 1995; Campbell 1999 
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were regarded as 'cronies'- people with little link to the community in question 
and hence with little motivation to address problems directly. Similarly, there is 
evidence that an over-large steering committee may lead to inertia and thus a 
lack o f responsiveness to need within the community or the management group. 
This is exemplified by Low Simonside, in which the evaluation report 
suggests the steering group was, 
"Too large to enable focused discussion and effective policy making and 
forward planning. The group functioned more as a 'talking shop' with 
over-long meetings and a lack of focus" (Bradley Consulting 1995:13) 
The role o f users and the community is therefore key to the strategic 
management o f TSEIs. As with those which have attempted to wrest control o f 
the TSEI away from the auspices of the local authority, some TSEIs have 
attempted to create a proper niche for the community within the strategic 
management group. Similarly, some have been under pressures to include 
community representatives on the management group, as noted by Adrian 
Davies, a 'community' member o f the Ystalyfera Development trust: 
"At first it was, who are the trust? Who are the trustees? Someone from 
Pontardawe, chief executive of this and that, and people can't relate to 
those types of people. I mean, we've got one trustee now who is one of 
those, I wanna be a tree people. He's fine, good, tidy boy. But who the 
hell would think he's a trustee, you know. But he was voted on, good, 
but he's still part of our community and those are the people that we 
need." 
This discussion highlights the fact that strategic management is a 
crucial element o f the potential development o f the TSEI. Strategic alliances are 
created both by the day-to-day managers and the strategic board, and are crucial 
to the long-term development o f the TSEI. 
As a result, there is a role for strategic board members to allow a 
breathing space to look beyond the day-to-day towards a long-term 
development. The result is to specifically assign the division o f tasks concerned 
with the fire-fighting to the management group, thus allowing the strategic 
group space for a clearer vision o f the TSEI which is less influenced by lower 
level wrangles. However, there is often little scope to produce such a long-term 
vision due to the dearth o f specialised skills in the management board. The basis 
for the strategic development also therefore often rests with those workers who 
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are experts in the field and who are employed as workers and those who are 
employed as consultants. 
Clear or Confused Management Structures? 
Broadly, a number o f management structures can be identified f rom 








individual as the 
primary manager 
• Dulais Valley Partnership 
• DOVE 
• Sherburn Road Regeneration 
Initiative 
• Ystalyfera Development Trust 
• Sedgefield Training Initiative 
• Low Simonside Employment 
Imitative 
2-3 key management 
individuals 
A more broad-based 
management 
structure which may 
still be hierarchical 
but which relies 
upon an equality o f 
decision-making 
powers at the highest 
level 
• Amman Valley Enterprise 
• St Simon's Community 
Project, 
• South Tyneside Training and 
Enterprise Network. 
• Penywaun Enterprise 
Partnership 
Cabinet management The key decision-
making process is 
through a committee 
of members 
• Trimdon 2000, 
• Blaenllechau Community 
Regeneration 
• Waun Wen Ltd (Trebanog) 
The literatures cited in chapter 4 suggest that a strongly hierarchical 
structure in some TSEIs can be both advantageous and disadvantageous for 
development (see for example Harrison 1997). A strong grip held by the lead 
partner and manager may be able to create a positive environment for the TSEI, 
but may also have the consequence o f creating a distanced relationship between 
manager and beneficiary, thus negating the possible development o f a more 
inclusionary mode o f operation and community vision. This calls into doubt the 
ability o f management structures which are perceived as being hierarchical to 
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tap into the knowledge resources within the target community which are vital 
for the TSEI's success. This is therefore dependent upon the relational resources 
which exist between the management and 'users', or the broader locality, 
represented by Healey et al (1999) as the network morphology. Should the intra-
TSEI network have a number of access points for the beneficiaries, in which 
power flows are not too steep, we may assume a less hierarchical management 
structure. In contrast, a network which has few access nodes with steep power 
gradients at those nodes presents a hierarchical structure. Therefore, by taking 
Healey et al's arguments and applying them to the internal structures of TSEIs, 
these produce a microcosm of the community-partnership identified by Healey 
et al in Grainger town, Newcastle. 
However, by taking this analysis further, it can be argued that one 
particularly central node may be able to overcome the poor network morphology 
to act as a hub and spoke mechanism. In layman's terms, this relates to the 
standing of the manager within the target community, a 'leader' being able to 
overcome the potential problem of hierarchical control by allying strong 
leadership with a personal touch. 
A strong grip at the 'top' may produce a clear vision of where a TSEI 
is heading at the day-to-day level and thus provide clear and decisive decision-
making. This may lead, however, to accusations of a dictatorial relationship of 
manager and user. As such, most of the TSEIs studied choose to employ a 2-3 
person top hierarchy either for workload or division of labour reasons as a 
means to make decisions. As such, there is a spread of management powers 
within executives' decision-making remits. Significantly, this relies upon a good 
working relationship between managers to promote a coherent management 
policy. 
In contrast, a more 'cabinet style' of management tends to produce a 
less rapidly responsive but more considered management arrangement. This 
therefore creates a structure in which more nodal access points are present, thus 
having the potential impact of speeding up such relations. This is not to suggest 
that such a network morphology is inherently better than a strongly hierarchical 
structure; this is most dependent upon the overall quality of the access nodes and 
whether, to draw upon an analogy, the sum is greater than its parts. However, 
the TSEIs which adopt a strong management stance are those which appear to 
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develop best; those with a more hierarchical structure create vertical flows of 
power, responsibility, and a focus for development. Only in the case of 
Trebanog did this produce a particularly negative synthesis, as outlined above. 
However, the relative contribution of the internal management structure in 
creating a potential for failure is difficult to assess, as there is a suggestion that 
in this case failure was primarily caused by a number of essentially external 
factors. 
'Ownership' 
The discussion of the relative power held by day-to-day management 
and the strategic board is particularly related to the sense of 'ownership' that 
managers feel for the TSEI in question. As noted above, those managers who 
were present at the inception of the TSEI have a sense of ownership of the 
initiative due to the level of time and energy invested in the project. Such a 
sense of ownership has two potentially diverse results. First, positive syntheses 
may result as the sense of ownership creates a deeply imbued desire for the 
TSEI to succeed. Second, it may produce a situation in which negative outcomes 
occur as the 'ownership' is allied to a sense of exclusion. The first of these 
suggests that ownership of a degree of decision-making at the day-to-day level, 
allied to an influence on the strategic level, produces a more beneficial alliance 
to enhance the talents of individuals involved in the management process. This 
is demonstrated by St Simon's and TEN, in the view put forward by Dan 
Dowling of TEN in South Shields: 
"You see Jen and them down the road, and us here - we feel like 
this is our place, kind of our little empire. No I don't mean that, but we feel 
a sense of obligation to this, like, it's our responsibility. I mean, I couldn't 
imagine feeling the same way if I was working for a big oil company or 
anything like that, it just wouldn't be the same. Where else would I spend 
long evenings at work - 1 only do it 'cos of the, I dunno. A sense of 
responsibility. I guess we're a bit soft, but it's like, 'cos we care about these 
people. If we were in some random place or big organisation, 1 can't believe 
I'd care anywhere near as much." 
In contrast, a lack of ownership and the result it has may be 
demonstrated with the case of Low Simonside, in which the ex-post evaluation 
report (Bradley Consulting, 1995: 13) suggests that the management committee, 
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"Never came to identify with the initiative or to feel any sense of 
'ownership' of it." 
This view is confirmed by Chris Clarke, local authority contact for the 
initiative, who suggests that a lack of ownership could be attributed to the fact 
that, 
"The Community Association never felt any sense of ownership for their 
project that was going on in their building...there was in a very limited way, 
occasionally, but for the most part that never really developed." 
However, in contrast, a sense of ownership may be a destructive force 
when it becomes a bitter struggle for power and influence upon the day-to-day 
and strategic development of the TSEI. Should this sense of ownership be 
challenged, or questioned by others who wish to share in the management of the 
TSEI, such a desire for control may be counter-productive. Ownership, by its 
very nature, produces a sense of responsibility and obligation by those working 
within any initiative. By extension this also creates a demand for control of the 
operations within the TSEI due to the desire to ensure the full development of 
the initiative. This scenario is amply illustrated by Trebanog, where the TSEI 
was initiated by the Trebanog District Tenants' and Residents' Association 
(TDTA). This subsequently created a sense of control over the TSEI to direct it 
in a particular direction which was not, as noted in the previous chapter, 
regarded as being in the best interests of the target community in that it 
addressed sectoral as opposed to broader interests. As such, the controlling 
interests created an ownership framework which was unable to cope with the 
challenge from within the community and exacerbated by personality clashes. 
Michelle Lenton-Johnson of RCT notes this: 
"In the centre you had the Tenants' and Resident's lot, who were there often, 
and some other people who hang around in there in the cafe bit, not doing 
anything. But because of that they started saying things. So it was clashes of 
personalities all round which...she didn't like her, they didn't like someone 
else, and this community centre was just the focal point, the battleground for 
it. It was...like a battle, who could control it or have the power." 
Steven Jones also notes that Trebanog suffered from personality clashes 
both within and outside the initiative: 
"I wasn't that close to it, but you heard all about it - mostly bad - about how 
she [Gloria Williams] was running the place like an emperor. But it sounded 
really bad - I mean it was like her against the community, you know. Well, it 
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was err.... the community against the rest of the community, and she fell in 
the middle, but I don't think her attitude helped. It was an awful position to be 
in, with all the pressure and people expecting miracles from this new centre. 
It just didn't have the answers, though I hope in the youth part we helped. I'm 
sure we did. But some kids and their families - I remember people saying it 
had a Wild West feel to the place." 
Indeed, the situation led to the demonisation of the management, such 
that the lead 'community' power (Gloria Williams) was referred to as 'The 
Equalizer' through her attempts to bar 'troublemakers' and other individuals and 
groups of the community. Such a feeling of responsibility was borne out of a 
deep sense of ownership, a factor often encouraged by those who wish to create 
TSEIs. However when 'ownership' causes friction, at an inter-personal level, 
clear lessons can be learned. Ownership ought to operate at the broadest scale in 
the 'community', whereas an analysis of funding documents clearly advocates 
the roles for lead partners, with a potential backlash as seen at Trebanog. This 
therefore has policy implications, most notably for TSEIs which are created 
from inception by top-down structures and which work with elite groups as the 
most available partners. 
However, Kay Quinn, a consultant at Trebanog, notes that a certain 
degree of sympathy must be retained for those involved in the initiative, 
indicating that no blame as such should be apportioned when assessing the 
causes of failure of the initiative: 
"You can't really blame Gloria [Williams] too much, I mean she put so 
much time into it. But she put so much in that she couldn't let go and 
frankly it ruined her life for a period of time. So I don't blame her 
but...I don't know. It just became too much and that's why it's better 
now [under R C T control] as it's not identifiable so much with one 
personality. In other circumstances, she could have done so well out of it 
but not in Trebanog." 
The resulting lesson from Trebanog is to produce a sense that ownership, 
while mostly a positive development, may lead to an unrealistic expectation of 
control over the management process. However, in unpropitious circumstances, 
as the Trebanog experience demonstrates, it may be difficult for those imbued 
with a sense of ownership to relinquish control despite the difficulties which 
may arise. In such conditions, it may be hard to relinquish control until such a 
time as it becomes unbearable. 
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The crucial point here is that 'ownership' may be just as much an 
exclusionary concept and may consequently negate the possibility of a broader 
vision which manages to encapsulate the whole community. As such, ownership 
must in practice be broad-based and inclusive or democratic beyond a limited 
section of the target community. I f a management process focuses on included 
groups, it also defines others as excluded and therefore subsequently creates the 
potential for frictions. The result of this is the need to establish exactly who is 
empowered within a management structure, and how this influence is enabled or 
constrained. The notion of ownership and responsibility felt by key players, both 
community-based individuals and employed professionals, will be seen later in 
this chapter. 
Democracy Within Management 
The level, openness and frequency of meetings of the day-to-day 
management committee are indicators of processes through which management 
decisions are made. Of the case studies, ten have management meetings weekly 
- thus providing a formal and predictable structure to the decision-making 
process. Of these TSEIs, the majority (7/10) are directly open to community and 
beneficiaries. Such openness, it is believed, creates the conditions for a trusting 
relationship.126 Other TSEIs are less structured in their decision-making process, 
emphasising the informal contact of key players in the management process, a 
factor aided by the relatively small size of the operation and often hence the 
physical proximity of the working environment. In consequence, the basis in 
trust was cited as a crucial element of the management process. However, even 
within the case study group, a variation in the accountability of the management 
group to the users ( i f these are a different group) is evident. 
Evidence suggests there is a significant degree to which the will of top 
managers is pushed forward through the management committee; there are few 
examples of the top management being overruled or undermined by lower-level 
groups. As such, while the day-to-day management committees are a genuine 
attempt to increase the level of the democratic decision-making, in some cases 
A reflection of Healey et al's (1999) relational resources 
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this becomes a rubber-stamping exercise and reporting process in which there is 
agreement before ideas are tabled at meetings. 
A crucial function of the increasing size of TSEIs is the requirement 
for an enlarged management function and the division of tasking between 
individuals. This leads to the formal management committee gaining importance 
as a forum for the sharing of information which may not otherwise take place. In 
contrast, a number of TSEIs operate at such a small scale which allows the free-
flow of information through informal contact and the need of one individual to 
address many aspects of the TSEI's work. As such, the flexibility of the day-to-
day management team may be constrained by size and diversity as this 
inevitably leads to a degree of bureaucracy. 
Consultation 
The consultation process between managers and other stakeholders of 
any TSEI (assuming for the moment this represents two different entities) is 
crucial to the fostering of a management style which is responsive to those 
needs. Theoretically, this refers to Healey et al's (1999) notion that nodal access 
points are required for the dissemination and collection of information. More 
formalised contact points may provide a better quality of information 
dissemination, although the control of a particular nodal access point may 
restrict this flow. In contrast, a series of open and less formal contacts may 
provide more information of a lower quality, and hence may not be acted upon. 
However, this may also facilitate the process of information collection, 
particularly from trusted sources. The key element here is how the information 
received is coded and used by gatekeepers, i f at all. This restricts or enables the 
flow of information, and by proxy, the extent of community consultation and 
hence embeddedness within the TSEI. 
In this case, the management groups can again be classified in one of 
two ways. First, the management groups act in the interests of the users and the 
management are not users themselves; second, the management group is formed 
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of users and as such acts in its own interests . With this in mind, the manner in 
which consultation occurs will now be addressed. 
A. User Consultation 
The manner in which users are consulted again varies from initiative to 
initiative. Some employ a users' committee process which provides a structured 
conduit for information, ideas and complaint1 2 8. Regardless of how this is acted 
upon, this is generally regarded as beneficial as it creates a dialogic process 
which may not otherwise operate. However, as with any formalised committee 
processes, this relies upon the talents and personalities of those elected or 
deemed responsible to address such concerns to the management. As such, there 
is a translation loss as ideas and argument may be subsumed under other ideas 
or not regarded as truly worthy of raising by representatives. Again, it is the 
gatekeepers at the access points who determine the flows of information; this 
tends to be those most skilled and adapted who may therefore be able to 
influence the development of the TSEI themselves. 
In contrast, those TSEIs which do not operate a structured consultation 
process which creates a flow of information and feedback rely upon informal 
contacts and the management teams have faith in these. Such informal 
information flows are able to produce a more beneficial feedback loop between 
users and top management without the filtering and interpretation of information 
through a committee process. As such the flows of information may create a 
more responsive reaction to the needs of the users. Indeed, a great deal of 
informality will encourage the flow of information by removing potential 
barriers. With particular reference to the third sector, such notions of informal 
access points become less pertinent as one of the traditional strengths of the 
sector has been its informality in contrast to the state sector. 
Consequently, there is a need to build such informal flows into the 
consultation process to avoid elitist or divisive forms of consultation. The most 
crucial element of user consultation is that the users as a whole must feel that 
they are valued. I f this is successful then the level of user interaction will be 
1 2 7 It must be noted that the 'community' and 'users' of TSEIs are not the same. Those TSEIs with narrow 
remits will respond purely to the needs of their target community, those with broader remits will attempt to 
appeal to the geographical community at large. As such, the manner in which consultation and information 
flow take place are significantly different 
237 
significantly increased. Without this valuation of the role of users, a mental 
distance may be created between the management and users, thus producing a 
more authoritarian view of the TSEI. This can be seen by the reaction of two 
adult learners at DOVE: 
"You know, it's like they just care here...not like at school where you're 
told you're crap. I mean, that's no way to go about it, and so I lost interest at 
school I suppose. Thought, 'no, this isn't for me' I couldn't wait to get out 
of there. But here, it's just so different. I want to come here, most of the 
time anyway, and that's 'cos of the people here - Mair, Julie, Lesley, all the 
rest of them" 
"It's the whole atmosphere- it's friendly, we're here to learn and...well, 
when we ask, we get things, occasionally (laughs). So it's like...it's a 
respect thing. We're treated as people, and they actually listen to what we 
think. Even if it's wrong. But at least they'll listen and tell us it's utter crap. 
But that makes us want to do things, like it's our place and we've got a role 
to play in the project. No barriers like school." 
However, I suggest that such consultation structures can be seen as 
primarily a response to the evolution of the TSEI - more developed or larger 
TSEIs require a more structured form of information flows to retain a level of 
interaction between the user and management. Informal flows, which may be 
beneficial in the manner in which flows are enabled, are necessarily dependent 
upon interpersonal relations and as such may be less comprehensive than 
formally structured flows. 
B. Broader Community Consultation 
Where a TSEI has a remit covering the local spatially-defined 
community as a whole, the consultation process requires a degree of 
sophistication to ensure the participation of the community. Again, this may take 
the form of both formal and informal flows, which I will now address. 
Formal flows seen within the case studies revolve around the uses of 
newspapers and newsletters, which operate mostly as an information provision 
resource, and the reciprocal influence of community membership and 
representation at the management committees. Information outreach flows are 
undertaken by most TSEIs, to a varying degree. Such a process is regarded as 
beneficial, both to encourage people's participation through the development of 
a newspaper and development of an organisational identity. As Brian Aherne of 
1 2 8 For example the Spennymoor Training Initiative; Penywaun Enterprise Partnership 
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the Dulais Valley Partnership states, "It's all about getting us lodged in people's 
minds". However, such a spreading of information is a one-way process and 
does not correspond directly to the requirement to gain information regarding 
the needs of the community and actively to encourage participation. To create 
this, at a more sophisticated level, social audits have been attempted to gauge 
more accurately the desires within the community for the direction of the TSEI. 
Two TSEIs actively participated in social audits in an attempt to identify the real 
needs, fears and values of the community (Blaenllechau Community 
Regeneration; Trimdon 2000). Such an audit at the very least creates a baseline 
against which to evaluate the activities of the TSEI during its life. This is 
exemplified by Trimdon 2000, where the 'appraisal' retains an influence upon 
the manner in which T2000 conducts it operations. The appraisal was carried out 
in 1995, via a questionnaire offered to all residents of Trimdon (approx. 3500). 
These were returned with a 47% response rate, identifying the key areas of 
concern for residents. The appraisal remains a key resource which framed and 
continues to frame the strategic aims of the initiative, as illustrated here by 
T2000 treasurer Frank Hoban: 
"Well, it is. I've been impressed and that keeps coming up and everything 
has been discussed. Because people get very enthusiastic about what they 
want more or less as they get involved in something. But that's been the 
basis of everything that's been done and... I think will continue to be within 
the organisation." 
"One of the things that has come through over the months is that whenever 
we were looking to address a problem there would always be at least two or 
three voices saying, wait a minute, what did the appraisal say on that? And 
that has been the basis that we look back on all the time. To remind 
ourselves that we're trying to meet the aspirations of the people who 
answered the appraisal, not our personal ones. So it's been fairly...I think 
the appraisal document's been a very good basis for moving forwards. I 
think the population in the village, when they imagine that they filled that 
appraisal in four years ago, if they can remember it, nothing's happened and 
it has gone into history but actually it's taken that long to get to this stage. 
And it's taken the group of thirty-odd people to push forward the little 
things that have added up to where we are now." 
However, by their very nature such audits are time-consuming and out 
of date by the time they are collated (furthermore, there are methodological and 
practical inadequacies of the social audits).129 However a key theme of ' fai led ' 
TSEIs is that very little community consultation took place, therefore reducing 
" For example, Sue Jones of BCR notes that their Jigsaw survey was limited, stating, "it asked people 
things like what they wanted, and I have to say, I don't think they knew - people ticked every box". 
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the level of community participation and ownership. While some such as Gloria 
Williams at Waun Wen Ltd/Trebanog, suggest this is due to an 'unresponsive' 
community which discourages the efforts of the TSEI, such a lack of 
consultation may prejudice community feeling against the TSEIs. 
The time and energy required to create and sustain such levels of 
community information may be regarded as counter-productive in that it takes 
time away from more crucial management and development tasks. However, 
there is evidence to suggest that TSEIs have to put in significant efforts to 
alleviate the impression that the TSEI is a local authority structure. Anne 
Timothy, of Trimdon 2000, notes, 
"Because it has a name and because it has meetings, and because it's 
doing things that statutory agencies have done in the past, I think it does 
have a problems with people perceiving it as just another agency that 
has come in, to fly in, to put things on the ground. And we have to get 
over that." 
To counteract this tendency, informal information flows through 'word 
of mouth' are considered as most crucial to the development of the institutional 
ideology of the TSEI and able to produce more rapid results. The ability to have 
a network of community participants who can 'spread the word' is a crucial 
element in being able to pass on information. This is noted by DOVE, whose 
review of 1999 states that, 
"The committee members of D O V E are women who are politically and 
socially actively involved in their communities [and] therefore the 
identification of educational and training needs of women have not 
proved a problem." 
This is also noted at Penywaun Enterprise Partnership (PEP), where 
Gary Foreman states, 
G F ; "There she is, Julie - the oracle of Penywaun. We just need to tell her 
something and it's with all the gossips in the estate within the hour, 
isn't that right, Julie" 
Julie: "Oh, yeah, anything needs doing, fast as you like. Fastest gob in 
Wales, I've got." 
This therefore demonstrates an informal relational resource and hence a 
mobilisation capacity which may be brought to life by the actions of an 
individual change agent or set of change agents. More broadly, this refers to the 
embeddedness of the TSEI within its target community; however, what is 
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demonstrated here is that such an embeddedness is formed through a series of 
formal and informal interactions which operate within and outside the auspices 
of the TSEI. Only when such interactions operate will the TSEI be able to 
engage fully with the target population. 
Need for Visible Developments 
This discussion suggests that there is a tension between the requirement 
to meet the needs of the community as perceived by its members and the same 
need as viewed from a disengaged and hence supposedly objective (and 
potentially normative) analysis of community need. Interview data suggest that 
there is a need for a substantive element of (predominantly environmental) 
community improvement which can act as a tool for grounding the basis and 
identity for the TSEI. Such processes and ideas may not accurately address the 
more deeply-seated needs of the community, such as unemployment, 
demography, amenities and the local economy. However, this represents a 
perceived need and as such meeting these needs is required. 
Examples of such developments are: 
• PEP - road blocking technologies have been implemented in response to 
calls for their introduction. 
• Trimdon 2000 - the creation of community garden and landscaping for 
the millennium celebrations of 2000; an annual music festival to be held 
in the village under the auspices of the initiative. 
• Blaenllechau Community Regeneration - landscaping of one road in the 
village; use of local children to provide ideas for art within village 
• Ystalyfera Development Trust - which has resurrected the local Gwyl 
festival as a means to create community cohesion but also to promote the 
development trust. 
• Sherburn Road Regeneration Initiative- which has introduced a number 
of aesthetic improvements to the estate alongside the installation of 
security cameras throughout the estate 
TSEIs therefore appear to require a demonstrable success to take the 
level of community confidence to a higher level. Peter Harding of the National 
Assembly of Wales, notes this: 
"One of the things we've learnt quite dramatically with our projects is 
that when you've got expectations to a certain level...you have to 
deliver pretty quick otherwise people will start saying, oh, we've been 
here before. Things have to be perceived to change" 
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This is confirmed by the experience from Penywaun where, in the words 
of Michelle Lenton-Johnson, of Rhondda Cynon Taff Borough Council, the 
partnership, 
"Has transformed not just life but the appearance of the estate as well. 
So 1 mean the fabric issues go hand in hand with the others, and quite 
often - it's not...Trebanog, if you look at the houses actually, 
themselves, that is a bleak environment. But the houses aren't badly 
maintained. But the environment is awful. I mean, the environment isn't 
very well maintained, a lot of them are empty, there's burnt out cars, 
you know, there's a significant environment issue. And there's no real 
kind of work to tackle the problems...Penywaun differed hugely from 
the loss of coal-related jobs...because they've done a lot of practical 
things and they've made an enormous difference"..."they're based in 
the community and they're actually getting out and they're making 
improvements physically to the community which individuals can then 
see happening and individuals- they've gained the trust of that 
community and individuals then have benefited, they're coming into the 
centre, and as I said it's in their local environment and they're 
comfortable there." 
As such a key task for the management is to produce a steady stream of 
results, whether beyond or within the core remit of the TSEI. This is not a 
radical departure from received wisdom; indeed, there has always been a need 
for concrete development to create an embedded vision of the TSEI within the 
community. A twin-track approach is therefore required to back-up the less 
visible (but not necessarily less important) developments with a level of more 
concrete development which can radically alter the perception of the TSEI 
within its target community. 
However again a tension exists as there is a perception that the 
betterment of the local environment (in a broad sense) becomes a problem to be 
solved by the TSEI. Moves made by TSEIs to develop such a strategy may be 
able to create jobs through addressing such needs and employing local people 
and resources. However there is a crucial element in the evolution of such a 
strategy to develop a realistic element of expectations in the communities. 
Evidence suggests that there is a need both to develop the expectation and 
optimism within a community, thus fostering a can-do attitude which can 
encourage the mobilisation of the knowledge and relational resources of the 
target community. However it must be recognised that expectations, created as a 
function of the hopes of the target communities, must be capable of being 
realistically met and actively tempered by the TSEI. I f an initiative attempts to 
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alleviate certain problems which are beyond its capabilities, it may bear the 
brunt of a backlash of community il l-will when it fails to deliver. As is often 
commented, should expectations be raised and then dashed by a TSEI, a greater 
degree of damage to the community may done than i f no attempt was made at 
all. As such a role for the management may be not only to raise expectations but 
also to temper such an expectations to ensure their realism. 
'Inclusion' vs. 'Exclusion': A Willingness to 
Adopt Ideas? 
The development of ideas within an initiative, both from within and 
outside the organisation, is related to a sense of a common theme and a sense of 
purpose. As with the discussions above regarding the nature of the link with 
need, a set of narrow objectives may produce a successful development which 
addresses needs within strictly defined boundaries. However, such a strict 
regime of ideas and concepts may limit the ability of the initiative to adapt to 
changing circumstances and the subsequent flexibility of the management 
regime to adopt new and potentially worthwhile challenges. As such a new 
tension arises between the ability to pursue tightly framed objectives which are 
negotiated with the target community and the potential to fu l f i l a broader remit 
for community tasks. 
A connection may be drawn between the delineation of a set of 
objectives and the potential for those objectives to tend towards being either 
radical or institutionalised.130 Notwithstanding the small scale of the sample 
studied here, a link may be drawn between the tendency of a TSEI to pursue 
narrow objectives and their form as being primarily mainstream (see for 
example DOVE, TEN, St Simon's, STI in Appendix 1). In contrast few TSEIs 
operate solely as a non-mainstream entity and it is within this broad outlook of 
such TSEIs that the more radical role of non-mainstream facets are framed as 
part of a bundle of broader Community Development or Community Economic 
Development opportunities. As such there is again a tension between the vision 
of a narrow objective for a TSEI and the manner in which such objectives 
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accurately reflect and address the problems faced by the community in a way 
which is different from those of mainstream providers and by the private sector 
economy. 
Thus it is those TSEIs which demonstrate elements of radicalism (for 
example PEP, BCR) which are able to accommodate this within the broader 
structure which encapsulates both mainstream and radical solutions. Radical 
solutions, one would conclude from the sample case studies, are configured 
more as experiments and offshoots of the TSEIs rather then being as part of the 
central focus, and are often funded through such initiatives. Indeed, as AVE 
demonstrates, there is a flow of funds to the more radical ventures which may or 
may not be deemed appropriate by the funding frameworks available and hence 
not funded. As such through a combination of programme bending and capital 
flows within the TSEI, funds may be employed as a means through which to 
develop a wider needs agenda. 
A distinction may therefore be drawn here between those organisations 
which pursue narrower objectives and outputs as the be all and end all of the 
TSEI, and those which operate a profit-making or fund-raising shell as the 
means through which to pursue other objectives, outputs or outcomes. 
Agency 
As noted above in chapter 4, the role of individual change agents in 
cementing and facilitating the direction of a TSEI is crucial to its development. 
It is also recognised that actions of actors are dependent upon the motivations of 
the individual, and as such are difficult to predict and, where necessary, to 
constrain. However, accepting the potential impact of change agents, both 
individuals and collective groups, upon the success of TSEIs brings three 
research questions to the fore: 
• What change agents exist and are used - either 'experts' outsiders or 
'community' representatives - and the manner in which such change agents 
influence the development of the TSEI 
• How interpersonal conflicts occur and how such tensions are resolved 
' This is not to suggest an absolute dichotomy of these two features in other circumstances and 
environments. 
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• The manner in which 'management' and 'user' agency decide to concur with 
or challenge the structures created by and around the TSEI 
This therefore opens up discussion of the relative strengths of the 
framework to determine the actions of individuals and the reflexive impact of 
individual actions in changing and channelling the frameworks for their own 
needs. 
Expert and Community Change Agents 
The individuals involved in the governance and management of TSEIs 
fall broadly into two categories: 'expert' mangers who have been brought in to 
the initiative to add a degree of professionalism, and community representatives 
who may or may not possess expert knowledge resources to perform many of 
the tasks required. 
This potential two-tier arrangement may therefore create divisions between the 
'imported' managers and community-based agents, dependent upon the power 
relationships between each group. The role of expert agency in the development 
of TSEIs has recently undergone a revision from managerial function towards an 
entrepreneurial function. We therefore have to move to analyse the role of 
agency in TSEIs not just as a manager of community needs, resources and 
desires but as an entrepreneur who is able to develop and enhance this 
community resource. There is therefore a twin-track role for management, and 
this role for manager and entrepreneur is cemented through both day-to-day and 
strategic decision-making. 
The role of the community entrepreneurs or animateurs has therefore 
become accepted as a key need for TSEIs to develop a level of embeddedness 
within the target community. As such, a degree of imagination is crucial for the 
development of success. Community entrepreneurs rely on innovative strategies 
to produce beneficial results, particularly as the nature of funding application 
process for competitive funding sources requires a degree of innovation to make 
them stand out. The result is that, as Sheila Davies of RCT notes, "to get 
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funding you have to be very innovative and it's actually quite hard work to be 
on top or in the forefront all the time." 1 3 1 
As such, the skill level of the individuals involved with a TSEI is crucial 
to the development of the initiative. While this is not a surprising conclusion, 
concurring with Healey et al's (1999) suggestions of the importance of change 
agents, it nonetheless emphasises the role taken by agency to determine the 
development path, indeed ultimate success or failure of any initiative. 
Empirically, this is illustrated by Angela Pulman, of Community Enterprise 
Wales, who in comparing Trebanog with Blaenllechau, suggests, 
"The difference there is in Blaenllechau was Paul Burke, who you probably 
won't hear about. But Paul - he worked in industry and was very interested 
in communities. And he took it by the scruff and was the catalyst there, the 
community entrepreneur. They didn't have one in Trebanog. Now if you 
look at the other ones; Bryncynon has Bryn, and actually the Arts Factory 1 1 2 
when it started had Bryn too. So there was a person who had the skills, the 
knowledge and the determination to be the focal point...Trebanog didn't 
have that." 
This need for such skills has led to a professionalisation of the TSEIs, 
with two results. First, it necessitates a professionalisation or formalisation of 
the role of volunteers who may not be able to give adequate time to the 
organisation, and second it places an over-reliance upon professionals to do a 
good job on a long-term basis. St Simon's illustrates the first of these points, 
where the current managers are all originally volunteers who have been trained 
to do their job. Current leaders Jen Fettis and Sue Callendar illustrate this 
development of personnel towards a more professional outlook: 
Jen Fettis: "When we started we really didn't have a clue at all. You know, 
we were really thrown in at the deep end and we felt well out of 
depth at the start. Didn't we (SC: a-ha). But we got training in 
how to deal with people pretty early on - we've all got that now-
er...so nowadays we're the ones who...well, we don't feel lost 
any more. It feels a lot more like it's our place, although we'd 
never let ourselves become snooty about it and tell the blokes 
out there to take their feet off the chairs. Well, you might, but I 
wouldn't. But we don't take any stick from the committees and 
the so-called professionals now- we just feel more confident 
about it and sure about what we're doing." 
Sue Callendar: "I think we scare Mike and Dan now in those meetings" 
' This is not to disprove the claims made earlier with regard to governmentality and means by which 
TSEIs must fulfil the criteria within funding proposals. Governmentality retains a strong framework in 
which TSEIs must operate, and within which a degree of'innovation;' is encouraged within the bounds of 
the funding criteria. 
1 3 2 Arts Factory: a TSEI situated in Ferndale, Rhondda Canon Taff. 
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In contrast, where professionals have been brought in, there is less 
acknowledgement of the need to encourage a more broad-based range of change 
agents with a variety of knowledge and relational resources. Sue Jones of 
Blaenllechau Community Regeneration notes this: 
" I think one of the biggest factors [in Blaenllechau's success], and it's 
actually turning out now to be our Achilles heel, and that is the board 
made a conscious decision in the first place to make this a professional 
organisation and they did not have the time to devote to it that it would 
need. Because we're open long hours, at times we're open late. It 
couldn't be voluntary and they took on board the fact that we wanted 
community businesses; we would have to become a company limited by 
guarantee to protect the interests of the community. We would have to 
become a registered charity because at the end of the day our aims are 
charitable, but we have to take on board there is a business aspect 
involved in all this, so they took on a professional team. And that was 
our biggest strength. The only problem now is it's becoming our biggest 
weakness in as much as people... the whole emphasis now for all 
funding bodies has switched to community. Consequently, it's switched 
to a system of 'we will no longer fund professional staff. If people want 
things to happen in their communities then they have to be prepared to 
make them happen themselves, you know. I mean, ideally, we should, as 
a professional team, we should have left by now. We should have been 
drawing out for it to be run by the community. How realistic that is, I 
still have grave doubts about that." 
The consequence of such a division of responsibility and the focus of 
management processes and skills is to develop a structure in which the potential 
exists for an inordinate level of power concentration. While concentration of 
power may be a potentially useful management tool, such a concentration may 
in actual fact produce a fragile management framework in that an illness or job 
move may initiate a collapse in the structures built around that key individual. 
Sue Jones again illustrates this: 
R B : "So you don't feel there's that succession there to take it on? 
Sue Jones: "No, I just think it's too big, too much for them to take on. As 
volunteers it's too much. I think we've moved from the time now 
when the skills weren't in the community, I think the skills are 
there to do it, and I think they'd do a fine job, but they would still 
need paying. So there's a big difference between running an 
organisation of this size as a volunteer with all the responsibilities 
that puts on you and doing it as a paid member of staff. But 
I...we're at a position now where we could effectively run it, paid 
staff that were drawn from the village. But for funding bodies to 
take the attitude they should run it themselves for nothing... I 
think the dole would have something to say about that." 
Frank Hoban of Trimdon 2000 also voices this fear: 
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R B : "So is it in some ways too reliant on particular people like yourselves?" 
F H : "I think it is" 
RB: "So at the moment you can't see the progression?" 
F H : "No, no I can't. I can see it going with what it's got now. It will 
have to continue to look at that. Er . . . I don't know what the answer 
is, really, whether at some point we particularly try to target young 
people to get another generation involved or some such like. I don't 
know how we do it. Even this organisation I've no idea how long it 
will last.... there aren't dozens of people able to take up the key 
posts successfully. I mean, Peter Brookes has been a very very 
good chairman and he's made people feel very welcome. I'm not 
sure that there are many, in fact I know there aren't many others 
who could do it, if any others. So a lot of it is dependent upon the 
skills that a few people have. I don't think many people would have 
flogged through the administration I've gone through, because it is 
boring. But it's the only way you can keep records and look official 
on paper to these people in partnerships. They all get letters 
inviting them, an agenda. Minutes of the previous meeting, and 
things like that, and it looks sometimes more than it is. And that 
helps to keep the thing going. And I don't know if I' l l do it for ever 
either. I've been doing it for a while, but I'm not sure: depends 
what else happens." 
A similar situation was seen in Low Simonside, where the Evaluation report 
(Bradley Consulting 1995: 5) suggests staff changes were regarded as a key 
element in the downfall of the initiative: 
"The initiative lost its focus and administrative structure during its later 
stages as a result of a number of staff changes. This could have been 
remedied by clearer organisational lines of responsibility and improved 
management of the initiative in terms of bureaucratic procedures 
imposed by the local authority and its relationship with the community 
centre." 
The result within some TSEIs is an attempt to create a long-term 
strategy in which a succession exists to promote continuity within the TSEI, 
although an acceptance exists that this is far from perfect. Similarly, when a 
sense of concentration of power is noted, this tends to lead to a concerted effort 
to establish a more broad-based set of agents within the structure of the TSEI. 
The result is to produce a more flattened management hierarchy, although the 
key management positions remain in place while delegating some power to the 
broader base of individuals. Thus, some TSEIs which are unable to adapt to a 
change in personnel are more vulnerable in the long term to shifts in the 
environment, demonstrating the fragility of TSEIs. 
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Change Agents and Embeddedness 
The role of personalities and agents is, as noted above, key in 
developing a trusting relationship with the users. In a positive light, this may be 
illustrated by St Simons, in which a relationship is built up between the users 
and the management group. This creates a beneficial synthesis in which those 
agents are catalysts for development. From a user's perspective, this may be 
seen by David Brown and Alan Smith, beneficiaries of St Simon's Community 
Project in South Shields. 
D B : "Jen and Sue are like Bobby Robson coming to Newcastle. The 
enthusiasm rubs off. Er.. .you've seen what Newcastle's been 
playing like...he, Bobby Robson hasn't changed his team, but then 
they score 8-0 on Sunday. So it proves a point, you know. If 
you've got people that's got enthusiasm in here..." 
R B : "Is there a lot a respect as well?" 
D B : Yeah, they have a bit of a joke as well, but that's just banter, you know. 
Makes the place what it is." 
Alan Smith: "Well, there's nothing else like this: it's really relaxing. 
They're really very helpful to you; they'll do virtually anything you 
want for you. There's other places around, but not like the same people 
there is here."..."It's these people here that make it. I'm saying, if you 
have the same people in another one, in another area, a different area, 
they'll not. That's why I come here." 
This role is in part a reflection of the need for the management team to 
be social workers, beyond the original remit, thus creating a key element of the 
interpersonal trust and relationships to develop the individuals involved. In 
Healey et al's (1999) terminology, this is the role of agents being able to revive 
the capacities of individuals. The result is to significantly increase individual 
confidences. However, this again points to a discrepancy in the nature of the 
targets and remits for TSEIs. An increase in an individual's confidence, and 
hence the unlocking of unrealised potential, is often central to the work of TSEIs 
in contrast to the more formal employment initiatives. Within third sector 
organisations, any boost to individual morale counts as a successful outcome. 
Sheila Davies, of RCT Borough Council, outlines this: 
SD: "And the community groups themselves are far better placed to access 
the socially excluded and those aren't working and bring them back in 
to access the facilities that are there - which I'd class as the mainstream 
institutions." 
SD: "It's not because it was inadequate, it's because people who were 
classed as a drop-out have a mistrust of institutions. And because they 
view the DSS and the job centre as government, controlling, giving 
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them their money and keeping an eye on them, the big brother bit, 
they've rejected it and rather than having the perception of 'they're 
here to help', the staff in those bodies don't help a lot by being 
officious, by being, 'here are the rules and regulations, you have to 
stick to them', whereas groups like the Arts Factory and the D T A have 
a completely different approach and they value those people and they 
give them a certain self-respect back, and encourage them in different 
ways. Kind of like social workers, I suppose. And the people don't feel 
threatened and they don't feel like they're being watched, and they 
don't feel as if, 'if 1 don't behave or act in a certain way they're going 
to take the money off me." 
This social-work role, in which confidence in both individuals and the 
target community as a whole is crucial, depends upon the quality of 
interpersonal relationships. Such a role is cemented through the fact that the 
managers are resident within the local spatial community itself, and are thus 
easily recognisable and become identified in everyday life as members of the 
community. However, this does have a downside for those working within the 
initiative. Sue Jones of BCR notes this: 
"I've seen it happen in other areas where you have to live in that village 
after, you know, and when Western World 1 3 3 went in, over in 
Treherbert, it was horrendous. I was living in Treherbert and was just 
working behind the bar there. And when that went belly-up, I was 
having people shouting at me about it, and it was horrendous. They 
blame you, because you are the only one that's left, you know. All those 
Brummies that came down to set it up disappeared back to Birmingham 
and never saw it again." 
The result is that such an identification within the community of a 
particular agent and the TSEI may produce a trade-off between the benefits for 
the TSEI from the relational resources this propagates and the potential stress 
for the agent involved. Potentially, this may create a situation in which agents 
are dissuaded from becoming part of the community as a whole, or begin to 
detach themselves from the TSEI, thus negating the benefits of embeddedness. 
As such, embeddedness may be thought to take a variety of forms, dependent 
upon the strength of network linkages or nodal access points which are present. 
The greater the variety of binding mechanisms through which the TSEI-oriented 
network and broader community-based networks are integrated forms a potential 
strength and a number of nodal access points through which information 
resources are transferred. In contrast, should the key binding factor between 
Sue Jones' previous employers, also a community project. 
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networks be one person or a small number of people, the potential impact upon 
those individuals may become undesirable, should the weight of any conflict fall 
upon them. 
It is also the form of embeddedness which influences the impact upon 
individuals, as related above to the aims of the initiative. I f a TSEI aims to be 
explicitly inclusive and representative of the broader spatial community, there is 
a need for embeddedness to enhance the standing of the initiative. In contrast, 
more targeted or mainstream economic TSEIs that do not depend on the 
community embeddedness to such an extent are able to forge relations within 
the locality which are held at the level of a working relationship. As such any 
incidents of conflict are likely to remain at the level of workplace relations as 
opposed to becoming interpersonal conflicts. 
Conflict resolution 
In contrast to such a positive reinforcement of beneficial trends, there is 
an evident dearth of interpersonal understanding in some TSEIs. This was 
particularly notable in Trebanog/ Waun Wen, where the TSEI became a 
microcosm of community malcontent. This malcontent revolved around 
particular personalities, both within and outside the TSEI. With such clashes, 
there was an inevitable break-down in relations between those agents involved 
in the initiative. The ensuing rivalries created blockages for the development of 
the TSEI through disruptions and clashes of personality, thus contributing to its 
demise. 
Trebanog evidently failed, through the personalities involved, to reach an 
accommodation or understanding as to the root causes of disruptive influence, 
and as such was unable to resolve conflict. Indeed, it is arguable that it was not 
just the manner in which individuals handled conflict but it was the personality 
clashes which were the roots of the problems. Consequently, the key lesson 
which must be drawn from this illustration of conflict is the need to balance 
personalities such that clashes may be negated through the management process. 
This wil l lead to conflicts being resolved either through particular conflict 
resolution structures or kept external to the TSEI. 
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Of the case studies, AVE, through its size and influence, is the sole TSEI 
which has a formal procedure through which to resolve conflict. However, this 
has apparently never been needed as no conflicts have arisen which have been of 
adequate severity to warrant official procedures. This lack of conflict is never 
fully explained, although Len Preece does state, " you get the odd oddball, but 
then you can hush them up, quiet word, and send them on their way". As such, 
this relates to a sense in which power relations may influence the manner in 
which conflict is dealt with. The AVE example shows how the relatively 
inclusive, 'embedded' nature of AVE gave strength to those wishing to dismiss 
the potentially disruptive influence of an individual. In contrast, the lack of 
embeddedness of Trebanog and the lack of sway the initiative felt within the 
Pvhiwgarn estate meant that the 'disruptive' forces could amplify their objections 
through interactions with others, thus deepening the divide between the TSEI 
and its target community. As such, an official resolution structure could have 
been potentially beneficial at Trebanog. I f it had been available in this case, 
official sanctions may have been able to regulate conflict rather than create an 
atmosphere for feuding. 
In other situations, there are few formal procures in place which offer a 
solution to conflict. Such following statements exemplify the attitude towards 
personality clashes - they are just worked out. The lessons from Trebanog are 
not clear, as no other case study has demonstrated such a tension between the 
TSEI and its target community. As a result, no concrete and repeatable lessons 
may be learned in that the structures in place have not been tested by such a 
level of tension.134 It is through luck and a degree of personal judgement rather 
than through structural forces that such potential conflicts are resolved or 
negated at an earlier stage. 
Gary Foreman of PEP, illustrates this: 
"We've just been open and talked people through things. Been blunt at 
times, but the lesson is that we've managed to nip things in the bud, shake 
hands and get on with it. From what I know of Trebanog, these were just 
things that were left to fester and so became engrained." 
"When things come up here, we deal with it somehow...we've never 
encountered the need for a formal arbitration process and I don't think it 
however, the one structural cause of the tension in Trebanog, allied to the interpersonal problems, was 
the general confusion over the aims and frame of reference within which the T S E I was operating. When it 
was found that certain sectoral interests were not catered for, this created tensions which were applied by 
the personal attitudes which came to the fore. 
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would work - by introducing that you kind of officialise... if that's the 
word... acknowledge in official terms the problem, but we don't want to do 
that. It's better to smile, address the concerns informally and then move on. 
Don't dwell on it." 
As such, the role of agents, supported by the interpersonal relations 
within an agreed frame of reference, appears key to the negation or solving of 
potential conflict. 
Structure and Agency: Control vs. Flexibility 
The role of agency in mediating the development framework of an 
initiative is, as always, key to the development of a TSEI. Again, as a 
microcosm of the wrangling which occurs between TSEIs and broader 
governance institutions, individuals must be able to adapt to, and where 
necessary challenge, the structural edicts of the development framework, 
funding criteria, and their influence upon the capacities of the TSEI to meet its 
potential. The result is that TSEIs, and the individuals within them, produce 
contestations of forces, thus bending programmes towards the outputs and 
outcomes as seen in appendix 1. 
Thus, human agents within TSEIs are aware of the manner in which 
they must challenge the structures which constrain their actions. Gary Foreman 
of PEP notes the role of the Employment Service in that it incorporates, 
"The sort of people who are used to putting the tramlines down which 
make it difficult to manoeuvre. So I think that's probably where people 
like myself, and other professionals would have to do something about 
shaping it ourselves on behalf of the beneficiaries to see if we can get 
some programme bending, to try something new, really, and to see if it 
works. It's still a big step for people to jump from being an unemployed 
single parent to becoming involved in a community business or a sole 
trader or whatever." 
Individuals with both formal and informal power may be able to 
influence the direction of the TSEI through a series of contestations. As such, 
the values of that individual, when enabled through the structure, may become 
to some extent imposed on the TSEI. Indeed, the power of any individual to 
influence unduly their development has become an area of concern for many 
TSEIs. The result is to produce a tension between the need for flexibility of 
action, thus empowering individuals to make decisions and develop the TSEI, 
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and the need for structures to prevent the possibility of individuals taking 
decisions and courses of action which may be damaging to the initiative. As 
such, a tension therefore exists between the control of actions as a preventative 
element versus a free/liberal structure (or less 'structured' per se) to produce 
beneficial results. 
TSEIs rely on individual enthusiasm and action from both professionals 
and volunteers to produce results. To constrain the scope for individual action in 
a manner designed to negate disruptive consequences has the potential to divert 
the TSEI from its vision. The basis in trust is therefore paramount; indeed, many 
volunteers may not take on jobs i f they are under constant scrutiny. This 
therefore produces a quandary for those wishing to create a template for the 
ideal, transferable TSEI. In reference back to Healey et al's work in chapter 2, it 
is the notion of capacities which may provide an academic framework in which 
to pursue this argument. An inevitable trade-off emerges between the need for 
individual agents to realise their potential within the structure of the TSEI, thus 
activating the positive social capital and capacities to produce results, and the 
need to restrict the potential for negative consequences. This will be addressed 
in more detail in the following chapter. 
Conclusions 
This chapter sought to outline the key features of the internal 
management of TSEIs in a particularly managerial context, in order to 
understand the manner by which TSEIs are able to cope with the pressures 
generated by the external environment outlined in the previous chapter. There is 
a significant degree of agreement over the features which appear to be present in 
'successful' TSEIs or lacking in 'failing' TSEIs. However, what does emerge is 
that no 'one size fits all ' template for the internal organisation of TSEIs can be 
formulated. Rather, a number of tensions exist which exemplify the trade-offs 
between different forms of TSEIs. 
The result is that each form of internal organisation, based on a set of 
core principles and dependent upon the evolution, size and origins of the TSEI, 
is a reflection of the core competencies of the TSEI. As such, attempts to 
254 
produce an all-encompassing template of internal management which produces a 
suitable development plan for all situations fails to accept the inherent 
complexity of organisational forms required by TSEIs to realise their aims. 
The fact that such tensions exist represents a quandary for those wishing 
to draw transferable lessons from the analysis of 'successful' management 
structures. However, while there are a number of 'variable' management factors 
which reflect the particular aims of organisations, a number of 'core' features or 
aspirations remain which are transferable and apply to all. These 'core' and 
'variable' features of the process will be identified below, thus identifying 
common features from the literatures which are applicable to all TSEIs, and the 
features which are specific to the origins, management and change agents 
operating within particular initiatives. 
Core attributes include: 
• Ability to manage conflict 
• Knowledge-based management skills 
• Adherence to legal requirements 
• Adequate safeguards to prevent financial instability 
» Pro-active crisis resolution 
• Ability to spread and collect relevant information 
These 'core' attributes of TSEIs refer to a group of aspirations which 
vary between specific management practices and anodyne statements of intent. 
These attributes are features identified in both the literatures and empirical 
analysis which reflect the features of TSEIs which may be of benefit to every 
TSEI. This is not to suggest that all 'successful' TSEIs exhibit the core attributes 
to the same extent; these core attributes operate mostly as 'aspirations' which 
appear to concur with healthy structures and hence successful TSEIs. Indeed, the 
transferability of such core attributes is open to question due to their inherent 
reliance upon the actions of individual and collective agency and hence 
essentially ephemeral nature. As a result, even a TSEI which demonstrates the 
majority of the supposedly beneficial features may fail due to one particular 
element of agency or unforeseen circumstance which operates beyond its 
control. 
Table 8.1 demonstrates the variable organisational types: the trade-off 
between organisational aims and community need. The central column 
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Table 8.1: Organisational Choices for TSEIs 
Organisational Factor 
t 
Structured Organisational remit Flexible 
Targeted/Sectoral 
community 
Extent of 'community' Wide/Geographical 
Narrow Diversity of operations Wide 
Low Democratic control and 
openness 
High 
High Partnership with 
mainstream services 
Low 
Infrequent Programme bending Frequent 
Outputs Impacts generated Outcomes 




Legal and accountability 
requirements Low 
Low 
Ability to adopt different 
modes of operation High 
Low 
Susceptibility to broader 
community tensions High 
represents the key variable organisational factors around which TSEIs choose an 
appropriate structure. Columns left and right offer potential organisational 
choices for a TSEI, which represent the configuration of needs and capacities in 
the locality. Elements which are in the left-hand column are predominantly 
associated with narrow aims and are structured around potentially mainstream 
solutions to those aims. Characteristics in the right-hand column typically 
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represent the organisational choices and features of TSEIs which operate under a 
broad remit and require flexibility of action and embeddedness within the target 
community to succeed. 
The 'variable' attributes are those which are dependent upon the stage 
of development, vision and mission of the TSEI. These variable attributes 
represent the particular developmental patterns of each TSEI within its 
institutional and cultural context, combining to produce a particular 
organisational structure which is a reflection of, and response to, the aims and 
vision. Consequently, the framework suggested here is one which represents an 
appropriate organisational set-up which reflects the needs of both highly 
structured and flexible organisations. Unlike the 'core' attributes, this is not a set 
of aspirations which wil l be followed by all TSEIs; instead, such variable 
attributes represent a 'pick and mix' of factors which are dependent upon the 
aims, concepts and desired outcomes of each initiative. A TSEI must therefore 
adopt the most appropriate elements of structure and flexibility to create the 
most suitable structures around it to maintain a positive synthesis. 
A crucial implication is the need for a flexible attitude towards TSEIs, 
particularly those with relatively small budgets.135 This empowering of those 
involved to develop a management structure which is sensitive to the particular 
needs of the organisation and its target community is crucial. Without this, 
management tasks tend to become overburdened by bureaucracy and the ability 
to work on an ad-hoc basis, a distinctive element of the third sector's operations, 
will diminish. The resulting lack of ability to take full advantage of 
opportunities may prove financially costly for the organisation, as well as 
forcing an identity crisis in which it becomes regarded as just another statutory 
agency. 
The transferability of the lessons from an initiative is largely dependent 
upon the locality and people involved in a TSEI. Data collected demonstrate that 
the key to success is the role of change agents and the standing of these workers 
within the community. These change agents and their embeddedness therefore 
represent the essence of the initiative, with the consequence that key staff 
changes potentially destabilise the internal dynamics. The crucial lesson is that 
1 3 5 Although these budgets may be the equivalent of the S M E s they are wishing to create. 
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although the mechanism employed is potentially transferable, it is the organic 
nature of the initiative's development and the workers which provides its 
strength. 
This chapter has outlined a number of internally-specific features of 
TSEIs, some of which are transferable and some which are not. Other factors, I 
note, are dependent upon the particular context of the organisation as defined 
through its remits, origins and agency, to produce particular configurations. The 
concluding chapter wil l address these specific features in conjunction with the 
discussion in chapter 7 of the external environment, in an attempt to address 
how the interplay of these factors influences the potential development of 





The concluding chapter of this thesis will be split into four parts. First, I 
will briefly summarise the theoretical arguments put forward in chapters 1-4 
regarding the institutional influences upon the operation of TSEIs in the UK in 
the late 20 t h century. This will provide the basis for the second part of the 
chapter in which I will draw together some conclusions from the research 
regarding the key internal and external factors which operate upon TSEIs to 
produce particular outcomes. This will link together the findings from the 
research undertaken here in relation to the research questions which arise from 
the literatures. The third part of the chapter will reflect upon these findings in 
the light of the epistemology and methodologies employed to critically examine 
the validity of the conclusions presented here. Section four analyses the policy 
impacts of the research and the potential for further studies in response to both 
the methodological challenges and the unanswered questions which are raised. 
Theoretical Overview 
The theoretical literatures reviewed in chapters 2-4 sought to present a 
worldview which could provide the basis through which to view empirically the 
key factors which influence the success or failure of TSEIs. This thesis has 
presented an argument which adapts a multi-scalar analysis of political, 
economic and social phenomena to reveal the structures which influence, 
predominantly at the local and regional scales, the operation of TSEIs. This 
revealed a number of factors operating at a varying spatial scales. The regulation 
approach (RA) is therefore a useful tool in that it conceptualises the manner in 
which the impacts of particular regulatory practices may be felt by TSEIs via 
both the governance process and the economic climate this produces. The 
regulatory structures in place therefore help to produce the broad-based 
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international and national structures which first of all create the economic 
conditions in which third sector input into work creation schemes is deemed to 
be desirable, and subsequently determine the path by which it develops. The 
regulation approach, while offering a degree of abstraction from real-world 
phenomena, therefore produces a synthesis of economic, social and political 
factors which could be used to conceptualise the structural influences upon the 
development of TSEIs. 
It has been seen that the UK economy is not entirely permeable to global 
market forces due to mediation of these pressures by the state regulatory 
mechanisms. However, these mechanisms do not shield local and regional 
economies from global market change where this lies within the legal 
constraints enshrined by the state. Indeed, the political and legal spheres 
combine to produce a partially regulated framework in which economic and 
industrial sectors may be privileged or disregarded by the market and state.136 
The regulation approach, within the UK context outlined in chapter 6, 
provided the context for the study of the TSEIs in chapters 7 and 8. This noted 
the crises within the Fordist regime of accumulation precipitating a shift in the 
mode of regulation in a thus far unsuccessful search for a stable, or at least an 
emphatically characterised, successor. The result has been a revision of the role 
that the state should play, reflecting a gradually more rightward-leaning view of 
social policy. This leads towards and a re-drafting of the welfare state into one 
in which rights and responsibilities have been re-drawn towards a new contract 
between state and citizen. However, the regulation approach by itself has been 
deemed to be insufficient to analyse the real-world structures and actions which 
influence the operation of TSEIs. As such, chapter 3 sought to reflect a number 
of theories of governance to understand, within a theoretical context framed by 
the regulation approach, the actually existing structures which both directly and 
indirectly influence TSEIs. 
In a similar vein, the third sector has been appropriated by national 
government in the UK as an essential form of welfare provision alongside, and 
in some cases as part of, the local welfare state. This conviction comes from an 
1 3 6 The closure of the majority of the coal industry in the South Wales valleys and the North-East, which 
was arguably both a political and economic decision, demonstrates this; similarly, the rationalisation of the 
steelworks at Llanwern and Ebbw Vale demonstrate the influence of global economic forces, mediated 
through national structures, to produce particular economic conditions the T S E I localities. 
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analysis of the historical pattern of the boundaries of the welfare state and the 
relation of the third sector within this. Through a placement of the third sector 
close to the mainstream, there has been a perceived shift of responsibility from 
the statutory agencies of the welfare state towards the quasi-non statutory 
agencies of the third sector. Allied to the communitarian evangelism of the New 
Labour government elected in 1997, this trend has been led by calls from 
practitioners to develop the third sector as a genuine alternative to the welfare 
state. 
This political basis for the development of the third sector, allied to a 
shift in the governance of the state as a whole, produced a set of questions which 
needed to be addressed, namely to investigate the institutional structures, both 
formal and informal, which produce propitious environments for TSEIs to 
operate. This drew upon the institutional literatures in chapter 2 as a framework 
in which to study a group of TSEIs. Empirical work undertaken in the two case 
study areas concentrated upon 'internal' management structures and 'external' 
institutional factors which have influenced the development of TSEIs. This 
focused on a comparison of geographical locations and success and failure 
within these locations. This offered a qualitatively different method through 
which to study TSEIs in contrast to the 'best practice' studies which had been 
attempted in the past. Key conclusions from the empirical research will now be 
presented. 
Reviewing the Institutional Influences on TSEIs 
Institutional Theory, Social Capital and the Third Sector 
The institutionalist notion of social capital outlined in chapter 2 
suggested that particular forms of civic institutions can facilitate the economic 
development of places, as suggested by Putnam (1993). Drawing on Healey et 
al's (1999) discussion of forms of human capital and capacity, it was 
subsequently suggested that a similarity may be drawn with the forms of social 
capital elucidated in the regional development literatures which may be present 
in and around third sector initiatives to aid their development. In this research, I 
have employed a historical and comparative analysis to examine how past and 
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current institutional forces in North-East England and South Wales have created 
particular institutional environments to aid or hinder TSEI development. 
A comparison of the social capitals of North-East England and South 
Wales reveals that, despite relatively similar industrial heritages, each region 
demonstrates its own form of social legacy. Critically, the empirical research 
revealed a number of factors which influence the formation of third sector-
friendly social capital in each case study locality. The comparison reveals that 
the North-East and South Wales possess broadly similar industrial heritages 
formed from the creation and subsequent decline of extractive industries and 
manufacturing in each region. Consequently, the regions have been seen to 
develop particular forms of social capital which inform and shape but which do 
not determine the base for the development of the third sector. 
The differences in the strength of adherence of each locality to the social 
structures created and maintained by the industrial base can in part be accorded 
to the strength of the ties which existed in the first place. The literatures and 
some empirical evidence suggests that the original tendency of the North-East 
was to be a highly communal, yet nonetheless less politically and socially 
homogenous entity than the South Wales valleys. This, given the strength of a 
communal valleys' identity, allied to the relatively homogenous form of 
industrial settlement, created a relatively coherent, well-integrated, multi-
layered but still locally-defined form of social capital. The legacy of these local 
social capitals has subsequently remained in existence, to create the conditions 
for the third sector in the South Wales valleys. This revealed a highly gendered, 
male-dominated institutional past for many of the localities in question but one 
in which the roles of women have become more apparent in the development of 
TSEIs. This subsequently created new spaces into which the TSEI may be able 
to develop. 
This notion of the 'strength' of social capital in the South Wales valleys 
(defined here as the homogeneity and hence the allied dominance of any 
particular mode of social organisation) can be in part attributed to the one-
industry dominance of the coal industry and its broader influence upon social 
relations. This strength may also be a function of the 'isolated mass' wherein the 
industrial dominance created a set of locally isolated (in terms of the locational 
geography of the valleys) forms of social development within a strong regional 
262 
framework. Again, this strength (or indeed, the lack o f alternatives as noted by 
Kerr and Siegel 1954) may have been the basis for the development o f a set o f 
key social structures around the South Wales Miners' Federation which were 
established, maintained and indeed reproduced during the industrial peak. The 
result was to produce a particularly stratified social and economic system within 
both regions. In contrast, a difference may be seen in that the emphasis placed 
on the formation o f social capital in the North-East is at the regional level; it is 
at this scale that the tripartite structures o f trade unions, local government and 
the private sector industrialists coalesced to produce an economic and social 
framework which subsequently influenced the development o f local institutions. 
While the South Wales Miners' Federation (the 'Fed') operated at the 
regional level, the relative territorial isolation o f each valleys community may 
have precipitated a more local-scale, parochial form of social capital. This is 
more closely bound up with local trade union lodges and the social institutions, 
namely religion, sport and the miners' welfare to produce a locally-specific 
ethos and identity allied to a macro-regional Welsh identity; hence the 
effectively regional (or national) South Wales or Welsh identity is muted by the 
pull o f these other scales o f activity. 
The result o f this is to conclude that the geographical and economic 
variation within the North-East created a slightly watered-down version o f the 
South Wales collectivity, without the homogeneity o f social structures and the 
radical leftist or communist politics o f the South Wales valleys. The influence 
on the third sector and the formation o f 'community-based' initiatives therefore 
reflects to some extent this formation of social capital and a particular ethos o f 
community involvement. 'Social capital' and the call to the historical social 
formations is therefore relevant in that it partly informs the types and level o f 
third sector operations in each area. The implication o f this is that many of the 
valleys o f South Wales, which appear to retain many of the communitarian ideas 
of the industrial era, may be more fertile patches on which to 'sow' the seed of 
third sector operations as a response to unemployment. This contrasts with what 
may be expected f rom a different form of social organisation which is not 
organised by locality or industry. Similarly, the question arises as to whether the 
third sector is borne out of, or is a response to, the lack o f formal sector 
opportunities or whether it is inherently a feature o f such communities in that it 
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may exist i f there were fu l l employment. This question, along with many others 
raised in the course o f this thesis, remains to be answered. 
Government, Governance, Governmentality and the Third 
Sector 
The theories o f governance outlined in chapter 3 suggest a shift away 
from the notion o f local authorities as all-encompassing service providers, 
something which has been subsequently borne out in the roles local authorities 
perceive for themselves in the delivery and support o f TSEIs. A key feature to 
emerge f rom this research is the continued dominance, even within a flattened 
governance structure, o f local authorities as key partners with TSEIs. The result 
is to produce regimes and partnerships in which local authorities and informal 
institutions more associated with economic structures o f the past have remained 
as key elements in the production o f social spaces and hence the means through 
which TSEIs develop. 
However, such structures have been seen to be influenced f rom the 
national scale despite the reorganisation o f the state and its 'hollowing out' in 
which there is a perception o f a loss of powers f rom the national state scale. 
Although the third sector may be subject to a less explicitly directed form o f 
national-level control over its operations, there is a nonetheless a significant 
body o f evidence f rom both the literatures and empirical work undertaken here 
o f a dominant governmentality influencing TSEIs. This favours policies which 
focus upon competitive funding and is underpinned by accountability criteria to 
aid TSEIs which are not sustainable without government support. 
Crucially, the evidence f rom the empirical research and literatures, 
suggests that the third sector, in its present form at least, does not represent a 
panacea for the potential social and economic problems caused by the decline in 
local economies. While the third sector appears, in this case, to be able to 
produce systems which operate alongside the public/private sectors to smooth 
and enhance local economic development, such ideas and initiatives are notably 
stunted in their ability to offer real and lasting alternatives to economic 
problems. This, I believe, creates inherent tension between the academic visions 
o f the third sector and the view of practitioners, a tension which has been the 
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source of conflict both between and within initiatives. Most are resigned to the 
necessity o f their work as a response to the inadequacies o f the welfare state and 
formal sector employment. However, a significant number of practitioners find 
they are torn between the need to make a difference within the funds provided 
by statutory agencies and the desire to create innovative, non-statutory agencies. 
Few examples among the case studies exist to suggest that there are genuine 
alternatives to the mainstream. In contrast, there are many examples o f the third 
sector 'piggy backing' on the mainstream to aid its own development. The third 
sector may therefore be limited to the level o f development within the 
mainstream itself, thus delimiting the potential for its own developments. 
The third sector is unlikely to offer a comprehensive solution to local 
economic problems for a number o f reasons. First, there is the limited potential 
o f the third sector to create and subsequently maintain genuinely alternative 
forms o f economic development. As pressures to grow and 'succeed' emerge, 
the need for finance leads to a 'mainstream' vision for the TSEI, thus subsuming 
a number o f 'alternative' elements within a broader framework. Second, and in 
relation to this, there is evidence to suggest that third sector organisations are 
required to search for funds to ensure their survival; this therefore negates the 
likelihood o f long-term sustainability. The result is therefore twofold - either 
TSEIs must adhere to the economics o f the private sector in order to generate 
funds, or must adhere to the dominant ethos o f funding bodies to protect the 
TSEI. In short, the policy process is forcing TSEIs to adopt the structures o f 
governmentality which operate at the time to ensure survival, let alone success. 
As a result o f this, many TSEIs operate more as a 'ladder' into 
mainstream employment structures rather than as alternatives to them, limited 
by their ability to become genuinely self-sufficient alternatives to the 
mainstream. A t best, many of the cases here represent alternative service 
providers which offer organisationally different structures (as seen in the 
examples o f St Simon's and DOVE) rather than genuinely alternative and 
radical approaches to meeting local needs with local resources. 
The 'external' elements o f the environment produce an institutional 
framework in which the TSEI rests. This may be propitious or unpropitious 
towards TSEI development, although I contend here that this framework is not 
necessarily a key factor in determining the success or failure o f a TSEI. Instead, 
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what is crucial is the manner in which the TSEI places itself within the 
framework, adapts to it, challenges it and in some cases works around blocking 
mechanisms to produce beneficial results. Thus, the manner in which the 
internal and external interact produces key developments in the circumstances o f 
TSEIs. This is demonstrated by Trimdon 2000, which 'succeeds' despite several 
blocking mechanisms in place. In contrast, the Dulais Valley Partnership suffers 
f rom relative failure due to its limited engagement with the target population 
despite significant support from the local authority. Consequently, the relative 
impacts of ' in ternal ' and 'external' influences on TSEIs are not equal, bringing a 
diversity o f pressures to bear upon TSEIs. 
'Internal' Organisation of TSEIs- the Managerialist Perspective 
The internal organisation of the TSEIs, which as in the literatures have 
been the focus o f the analysis o f TSEIs through their management structures, 
produces the mechanism through which TSEIs adapt to and challenge this 
context. This internal structure focuses on the organisational template, which I 
conclude to be not one which offers blindly transferable features o f successful 
TSEIs but which must be regarded as a structure to adapt to the institutional 
context, needs and resources o f the locality. 
The influence o f agency is paramount in determining the success or 
failure o f TSEIs. Examples within the research here (most notably the example 
of PEP, see appendix 1.2) suggest that where TSEIs have been helped to avoid 
failure due to the influence of individual agents; in contrast, the destructive 
influences at Trebanog suggest a potentially divisive force. There is therefore a 
task for those wishing to learn transferable lessons f rom TSEIs. I suggest this 
requires flexible mechanisms and the notion o f an open framework in which 
actors have more opportunity to act within their own capacities where such 
capacities exist; where they do not, TSEIs may require a more structured 
environment to l imit the maverick actions o f individuals. 
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Bringing the Strands Together: The Interplay of Complex 
Internal and External Processes in Structured Flexibility 
At this stage o f the thesis, an analysis of the empirical data emanating 
from the research must be reviewed to draw some conclusions as to the relative 
importance o f the internal and external factors in determining the success or 
failure o f TSEIs. This section w i l l essentially attempt to draw out the general 
underlying factors which influence the development o f TSEIs, thus subsuming 
the individual characteristics o f certain case studies to suggest lessons which 
may be generally applicable, while accepting that these lessons are drawn from a 
relatively limited set o f case studies and hence transferability may also be 
limited. 
The most crucial element to emerge is the distinction between critical 
and more gradual assessments o f success and failure in TSEIs. Critical failure, 
such as that seen in Trebanog/Waun Wen reflects the absolute and often sudden 
failure o f a TSEI. This is most likely, though not exclusively, the result o f 
internal pressures or problems, which cause the ultimate and often irreversible 
breakdown of the TSEI. This may be through the mismanagement o f funding, 
for example through the embezzlement o f funds, which essentially starves the 
initiative o f its life source where funds are required. In the case o f Trebanog, the 
mismanagement o f funds in terms o f the (disputed) failure o f a funding 
application was one reason for the failure, in terms o f the initiative failing to 
reach its proposed 2 n d and 3 r d phases, and ceasing operations well before the 
projected end o f its funding stream and expected life. The result was to produce 
a relatively abrupt and cataclysmic end to the life o f a TSEI. In this case, the 
legal restrictions which do not allow initiatives o f the kind studied here to enter 
into debt produce a 'hard landing' for TSEIs which, due to inadequate internal 
management, may become insolvent. This contrasts with initiatives which are 
able to raise extra capital or non-third sector organisations which can draw upon 
other funds, both private and public, thus borrowing to ensure the short-term 
continuance o f the initiative. This therefore produces a 'soft landing' f rom 
which the TSEI can possibly recover when cashflow problems are rectified. 
Funding therefore represents the key factor in determining critical failure 
of a TSEI. Remove funding, or the stability behind funding, and the TSEI w i l l 
struggle to survive unless via innovative actions it is able to tap into alternative 
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funding streams. Such a scenario was illustrated by PEP, which entered into a 
dispute over EU funds and as a result was plunged into severe cash f low 
difficulties. This was only rectified and the initiative returned to an even keel by 
the efforts o f two employees who undertook much outside consultative work in 
an attempt to shore up the financial security of the initiative. 
In contrast, more gradual analyses o f success and failure are dependent 
upon both the external and internal factors influencing TSEIs. Gradual failure 
emanates potentially f rom a relationship with the external environment (both in 
terms o f formal and informal institutional alliances) in which there is a lack o f 
coherent effort and vision to produce 'success' alongside efforts made by the 
internal management. The result may be twofold: the gradual decline o f an 
initiative (see for example Low Simonside, appendix 1.11), leading to the 
eventual closure o f the initiative due to the lack o f embeddedness in the 
community, or a lack o f support f rom funders and other institutions in the form 
o f blocking mechanisms. In contrast, the conditions for 'successful failure' 
(Seibel 1999) may be created in which the initiative may continue to operate 
without meeting its targets due to the presence o f a critical mass o f internal or 
external resources to continue the initiative. Should this support or conviction 
emanate from institutions or agents f rom the external environment such as 
funders or other support institutions, this may help to preserve the initiative 
despite not reaching targets in what Seibel (1992) refers to as Functional 
Dilettantism. In contrast, successful failure may occur when support o f many 
funders and institutions declines, but the local community takes control o f the 
initiative and preserves it without outside support because o f the appreciation o f 
the value added to the community which may not be quantifiable in accounting 
terms. In such cases, success is determined mostly by the knowledge, skills and 
interpersonal resources o f agents within a broader value structure which does 
not privilege 'bottom line' accounting. 
In these terms, complete 'success' could be conceptualised as structural 
interlinkage o f internal and external elements, reflecting the best adaptation to 
the institutional framework. As was seen in chapter 8, it is the relationship o f 
needs and resources to the organisational template which potentially creates a 
coherent vision for the initiative. The interaction o f these two factors therefore 
poses questions regarding the transferability o f any organisational template, due 
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to the need to contextualise this within the institutional framework o f each 
locality. The result is that best practice refers to best practice within a specific 
context, and should not be immediately regarded as an ' o f f the peg' solution. 
This analysis of these case study TSEIs reveals a trade-off between 
structure and agency in the development o f the third sector. There is therefore a 
need for a 'middle way' between extreme positions o f a highly structured 
organisational framework which restricts and controls the operations o f a third 
sector initiative and less structured frameworks which allow the input o f 
individual agents into the development o f TSEIs. The highly structured elements 
of a TSEI are required by the legal and to some extent accountability 
frameworks to for t i fy the TSEIs against cataclysmic breakdown by 
misappropriation o f funds or illegal actions. However, the essential essence of 
the third sector and what it represents depends upon the actions o f individuals 
who act collectively for particular reasons, be they through communitarian 
convictions or more personally-defined rationales. A highly structured 
organisational framework may therefore preclude this most crucial o f inputs into 
TSEIs i f it does not allow the creation of a collective vision to engage 
individuals. There is therefore the need to create licence within the structures o f 
any TSEI or a Structured Flexibility for employees and volunteers to maximise 
their own inputs and outputs f rom the initiative. Only in this way w i l l the third 
sector benefit f rom its distinct position in relation to the public and private 
spheres. To conclude, therefore, the relative strengths o f internal and external 
impacts upon TSEIs is dependent upon an initiative's organisational mission and 
its requirement to interact wi th its wider environs. 
However, such interlinkages which create the conditions for 'success' 
are in the main dependent upon funding for TSEIs to enable agents to employ 
their creativity. Herein lies a significant problem for TSEIs. The majority, 
which are not able to generate their own funds, are financially unstable and 
fragile. Even those initiatives which are able to generate funds are subject to the 
vagaries either of the private sector or o f state funding (and hence policy 
priorities) to develop a surplus o f capital which can help the funding o f the 
TSEI's non-commercial activities. As such, the frameworks o f policy, legal and 
funding strategies which have been pursued over the last 20 years again seem to 
militate against the development o f genuinely alternative, self-funding and 
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sustainable TSEIs. There is therefore a responsibility on government to redress 
this balance and to promote a structure for TSEIs which supports their activities 
without the demands for draconian accountability procedures. 
Methodological and Theoretical Challenges 
This section w i l l seek to address some of the methodological and 
practical challenges raised by the research undertaken here. This recognises that 
this research is both temporally and spatially situated, and as such represents a 
'snapshot' o f the multiple causal structures which vary in strength and validity 
over time and space. The set o f case studies examined here must be placed in the 
geographical-historical contexts in South Wales and North-East England, 
inevitably raising questions regarding the validity o f the conclusions which have 
been extrapolated f rom these cases. 
It is therefore necessary to comprehend the intricacies and varied nature 
of space and place in order to adequately conceptualise underlying social 
processes that exist and their relation to spatial differences and differences 
between places (Hudson 2001). Analysis should therefore not just concentrate 
on Seve's (1975) science o f the singular or Layder's (1981) science o f the 
specific, but should also be able to conceptualise such specificities within the 
broader spatial, scalar and temporal framework. While this thesis has attempted 
to acknowledge this, I recognise the weakness o f the empirical research in the 
light o f these arguments. 
Similarly, I acknowledge freely that this research offers only a snapshot 
into the localities, communities, third sector organisations and policies which 
interact to produce the observed outcomes and narratives reviewed here. These 
cases are temporally located in the last two years o f the 20 t h century, although I 
suggest this permits an analysis which acts as a 'window' onto the processes 
which were and still are operating. This does not invalidate the findings outlined 
in this thesis; it merely generates a contextually-situated insight and should be 
regarded in that light. 
Together, these spatial and temporal difficulties offer a methodological 
critique o f the research undertaken here. However, seen from another 
perspective, the research is more a window onto the social processes which 
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operate more generally over spaces and scales. The task, therefore, has been to 
focus upon the specific and extrapolate generalities from the research to provide 
a wider understanding o f the processes influencing TSEIs. 
The relatively shallow analysis undertaken here has constrained the 
ability to assess the depth and complexity o f social capital (or capitals), conflicts 
and structures around each case study. As such, a f u l l ethnography o f each case 
study would offer a deeper insight into some areas. While such a task is beyond 
the remit o f one three-year study, efforts could be made to pull together a series 
of detailed studies which could be undertaken with a degree o f academic rigour-
i.e. beyond the mere assessment o f success and failure as related to the funding 
or accountability criteria. Such a broadly-based approach might be able to pool 
together a set o f knowledge which would more accurately describe and analyse 
the deep structures which tacitly and explicitly influence the conduct and 
operation o f TSEIs. 
Similarly, process o f interviewing does have drawbacks in that the nature 
o f data collection focuses more heavily upon those interviewed who are 
regarded as giving greater input into the process. This does tend to lead towards 
a situation in which there is a greater emphasis upon the activists as opposed to 
the participants within any given initiative. While this methodological bias is 
acknowledged, I do not feel this has compromised the standing o f the research 
or the conclusions produced here. 
Bearing in mind this potential critique, I do acknowledge that the slight 
majority o f interviews were conducted with activists as opposed to participants 
or beneficiaries. The result is to promote a set o f views which may focus more 
upon the procedural and strategic matters which are dealt with on a day-to-day 
basis by such actors. As a result, a different focus may have emerged. 
However, I am also aware o f the accusation that there are a number o f 
people within any given geographical area or target community which w i l l be 
untouched by an initiative or who do nor feel represented, or are wi l l ing to 
participate. There is therefore a number o f people who are not directly 
associated with any initiative. However, to have undertaken to interview such a 
road section o f the target population is, one has to suggest, a daunting task and 
one beyond the scope of such a research project as outlined here. As a result, 
there is no attempt to suggest that the findings outlined here represent the views 
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of all people within a locality; it merely represents a snapshot o f views within 
and around a project without necessarily being able to put those into the context 
o f the locality. 
This study has demonstrated and outlined both the written and first-hand 
evidence o f a link, though no functional mechanism, between the industrial and 
hence social heritage o f each region and the current form of social capital. 
However, the industrial and institutional similarity of North-East England and 
South Wales provided little overall difference while emphasising the substantial 
similarity o f the two areas. A broader study is therefore required to examine the 
structures which operate beyond areas o f common industrial heritage. A n inter-
regional comparison would therefore provide an analysis o f the common factors 
influencing TSEIs, which operate within regions o f disparate industrial and 
social heritage while isolating those factors which are associated solely with the 
case study regions seen here. For example, regions o f the U K which anecdotally 
appear to have significantly different industrial and political heritages such as 
South-East England, may demonstrate different collective ethoses around work, 
politics and community involvement. The hypothesis that more communitarian 
forms of social organisation in Wales and North-East England would produce a 
more propitious basis for the third sector as opposed to the perception o f a more 
individualist society, is one which deserves more attention than was possible in 
the research undertaken here. 
However, such a comparative study necessitates the study o f dissimilar 
localities in which the nature o f unemployment or welfare need may be 
significantly different. This therefore requires a different response by the third 
sector to produce the desired benefit for those localities. As such, allied work on 
the non-industrial forms o f social capital, community and philanthropy may be 
required to understand the development o f the third sector in these localities by 
contrasting dissimilar circumstances. 
The prospects o f a longitudinal study hold out the potential to examine 
the evolving policy and institutional environment in the development o f TSEIs. 
O f particular interest in this case w i l l be the future development o f the Welsh 
Assembly and its role in producing a framework, both in monetary and 
institutional support terms, for the development o f TSEIs. Of similar interest 
w i l l be the conferring o f EU Objective One status to Wales. This w i l l be a 
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significant determining factor upon the future o f the TSEI and the manner in 
which the Welsh experience begins to differ f rom the rest o f the U K as the 
institutional network fronted by the Welsh Assembly gathers momentum. This 
w i l l also be influenced by the manner in which the economic contexts around 
each TSEI develop over time. Furthermore, work studying the emergence of the 
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) in the U K may help to produce an 
evolving analysis o f the governance structures influencing the development o f 
TSEIs. 
Similarly, a longitudinal study can potentially assess the success or 
failure o f TSEIs as the case study localities either suffer f rom further break-
down o f the post-industrial social structures or are able to re-create these 
structures via the third sector. Correspondingly, an alternative to the former 
economic base may be created via inward investment or endogenous growth and 
with it a different social ethos or rationale to act collectively. As such through a 
number o f conduits, the existing social structures may be challenged or broken 
down in such a manner as to radically alter the social capital o f a locality in 
relation to the perceived importance o f work, community and by extension the 
efforts o f the third sector. The possibility o f the third sector replacing or acting 
as an alternative cushion for the economic development and hence a tentative 
element o f a localised mode of regulation, w i l l in the future provide a f ru i t fu l 
avenue for research. 
In contrast, the potential revitalisation o f once economically-depressed 
areas may give clues as to the potential trajectory o f post-industrial social 
capital, and the result this w i l l have upon the need and potential development o f 
the third sector in relation to the mainstream economy. Should there be an uplif t 
in the economic fortunes o f these areas which have in the main been in decline, 
an analysis o f the social structures and networks which overlay or supersede the 
current institutional matrix may be o f interest to social scientists. 
The 'soft institutionalism' referred to by MacLeod (2001) has been 
signposted in this discussion o f the influence of social capital upon the 
development potential o f TSEIs. While I have put forward the case that this 
dimension o f the external environment o f TSEIs is a key part in understanding 
the development o f TSEIs in particular locations, it must be acknowledged that 
it is not in itself an adequate explanatory factor. As such the concept o f social 
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capital is crucially lacking the explanatory weight that has been (perhaps 
mistakenly) attributed to it in the study o f regional economies. 
I therefore suggest that there are crucially different dynamics and 
rationales to the notion o f social capital applied to the study o f regional 
economies as compared to when it is used as a tool to understand the 
development o f TSEIs. These factors include, 
• The industrial-social legacies o f the regions and localities in question. 
• Notions o f public and private action, and the rationalities behind these; 
the notion that a particular form of social structure, demographics, 
wealth or legacy o f communitarian ideals fuels an upsurge in 
volunteering and third sector action. 
• The relationship between the need for voluntary action in the third sector 
and the desire to participate in third sector initiatives; this therefore 
accepts the motivational aspects o f self-interest in the third sector as a 
job creation tool, as opposed to a purely philanthropic rationale. 
• Relations between the modern-day functions o f work in the paid sense 
and the subsequent limitations on time budgets traded o f f with the skills 
o f those in work, allied to the forms of economic activity. 
As such, while the notion o f social capital is certainly not redundant as a 
factor in the explanation o f third sector development, it requires a degree o f 
fine-tuning to incorporate these specifically third-sector related dynamics. 
Funding: The Key Structural Input? 
This thesis has attempted to analyse the structural frameworks which 
produce propitious or otherwise environments for TSEIs. This has concentrated 
upon defining success and failure within an analytic framework designed to 
minimise the distortions created by a plentiful or otherwise funding stream. This 
produces two results which need to be addressed. First, this underplays the 
influence o f funds upon the development potential o f TSEIs. Second, it could be 
said to have the result o f tacitly accepting the dominant policy environment 
which stresses efficiency o f outputs and outcomes as a function o f monetary 
input, mirroring the influence of market principles in the third sector. 
First, it is far f rom controversial to suggest that perhaps the most 
significant factor which has allowed the TSEIs studied here to produce outputs 
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has been the presence o f outside funding f rom different sources as both capital 
and revenue funds. Those TSEIs with ample funds are those most able to 
develop a framework which can continually produce outputs, while producing a 
strategic plan for the long-term. In contrast, those with limited funds may 
struggle to produce the outputs and outcomes, most notably due to a dearth o f 
revenue funds in the short tem. Consequently, in response to enquiries about the 
factors which would significantly improve the ease with which TSEIs and their 
workers produce their outputs, funding was cited by most as key. Indeed, this 
was often dismissed as an obvious element o f enquiry and so was effectively 
regarded as a 'neutral' or 'control' input factor in the study o f other 
environmental factors which influence success and failure. This therefore 
underplays the influence o f funding as one of, i f not the, key element in the 
success-failure matrix, thus affecting the chances o f a TSEI achieving both long-
term and short-term targets. However, the principal focus o f this thesis has been 
to analyse the process by which funds are utilised through the external 
influences and internal structures o f TSEIs to produce success and failure. 
Second, the very nature o f funding defines it as a key input into the 
'environment' which determines the success or failure o f an initiative. However, 
by accepting funding as a potential constraint upon the operations o f the TSEIs 
when viewed as research objects, two issues are raised. First, this acceptance 
during the research process tacitly underlines the hegemonic tendency towards 
the privileging o f cost efficiency as a key element in the allocation o f funds. 
This analysis therefore has the potential to reinforce this dominance o f cost-
efficiency (as noted in the discussion o f governmentality) as the pre-eminent 
means o f analysing the benefits o f TSEIs. Second, and in response to the first 
point, the success-failure analysis must therefore be open to the impact o f the 
quality, scale and types o f funding as factors in success and failure without 
prejudging those TSEIs which offer less 'efficient ' output-cost ratios. As such 
the assessment o f success and failure presented here specifically seeks to 
analyse TSEIs as a whole, with efficiency o f outputs just one o f a set o f complex 
factors in defining success rather than being the sole criterion by which success 
is measured. 
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The Third Sector in The 21st Century: Politics, 
Policy and Research? 
This thesis has addressed many of the key factors which influence the 
TSEIs studied here. This final section w i l l re-engage with the political and 
policy environments to sketch out some future directions for the third sector and 
the research community. 1 3 7 Primary among questions for further research are the 
methodological and hence theoretical difficulties and challenges created by the 
close association o f the third sector with contemporary government policy 
priorities. There is therefore the need to understand the governmental 
technologies which have created and sustained the emphasis on the third sector 
as a key conduit o f welfare and service provision. Al l ied to this, focused study is 
needed, through the lens o f governmentality, governance and theories o f the 
state, into the policy processes which create and subsequently direct the 
mechanisms and policies through which the third sector is constrained and 
enabled. Conclusions could be drawn regarding the internal policy process, 
allied to this study, to provide a fuller understanding o f the structures which 
constrain and enable TSEIs. 
Indeed, f rom a Foucaultian governmentality perspective, the prevailing 
attitude towards the third sector has been seen as a key element in the 
development o f the third sector as both a practical and rhetorical response to the 
needs o f 'excluded' communities. The result is to create the regulatory 
conditions through a particular governmentality to establish the third sector as a 
factor in what could be local modes o f regulation. However, this is dependent 
upon the prevailing policy environment to privilege and focus on the third sector 
as a means to adapt to and develop localities within the regulatory framework. A 
shift in the policy emphasis may therefore move funding resources away from 
the third sector and towards other potential solutions to local and regional 
employment problems. I therefore suggest a more focused set o f questions need 
I am wary here of MacLeod's (2001) warning of the role of academic work being taken as read by 
governance at all levels and hence implemented as a 'truth' regarding the framework in which to develop 
the third sector in a particular form. I believe that the unquestioning appraisal of the work examining the 
third sector has been interpreted as a policymaker's 'how to do' manual. The consequence has been an 
attempt to address the local characteristics of supposedly underdeveloped localities through the applications 
of rigid policy frameworks which fail to understand the individual contexts and aspirations of each locality. 
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to be raised, and answered through the lens o f governmentality to analyse how 
such political acts influence the development o f the third sector over time. 
The revision o f government policy towards the third sector means the 
third sector (as far as it can be defined) must itself address the role it wishes to 
play in relation to the mainstream economy and welfare state in the 2 1 s t century. 
This comprises two intertwined factors: first, the fragmentation o f the ' third 
sector' towards its role in relation to the mainstream, and second, the continuing 
government policy over the direction o f the third sector. The evidence f rom the 
research undertaken here suggests that there are significant differences within 
even a relatively homogenous group of third sector organisations, between the 
role they feel they ought to be undertaking in service delivery and employment 
generation and the role it has been encouraged to f i l l . As envisaged in chapter 4 
the third sector occupies a broad spectrum o f positions ranging f rom an 
alternative to the mainstream, to a position within its auspices. There is 
therefore little cohesion in terms of a broad 'third sector' role which 
encompasses the views o f all those involved in the sector. 
There has therefore been a move in policy towards the third sector 
becoming an arm o f the Third Way in the U K , with the boundaries between the 
private/public (which was becoming blurred with the introduction o f market 
disciplines into the state PFI, CCT etc) and the third sector now less distinct than 
ever. The state, through the policy mechanisms it has employed, allied to the 
technologies it has been able to employ to discipline the third sector, has 
therefore in many ways incorporated the third sector into a new state. While this 
has only been a partial incorporation, the Third Sector has the danger o f 
becoming an arms-length part o f the state itself. 
The long-term consequence of this in the U K may be to radically alter 
the conception o f the third sector as one entity. Returning to Anheier and 
Seibel's (1990) definitional aspects o f the third sector, it may be that the third 
sector may no longer be definable through its organisational rationale, i f this is 
subsumed under the state. The third sector may maintain a distinction in terms 
of its organisational structure, but this does not equate to a truly independent 
sector. 
Conceptually, I suggest that this offers a critique o f the third sector as an 
entity for enquiry. Any neatness o f definition has diminished, as the state 
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appears wi l l ing to embrace and utilise the third sector. This may require a 
redefining o f the notion of the third sector away from one in which it is regarded 
as separate f rom the state to one in which there is a significant degree o f 
permeability between the two. As such, the 'residual' nature o f original 
definitions o f the third sector may have to be re-established. This w i l l entail 
redefining the third sector as genuinely additional to state provision; otherwise, 
it may lose a significant level o f descriptive power. 
What this suggests, therefore, is that the third sector in its current guise 
w i l l become more o f an element o f the broader regulatory system, in which the 
third sector is an inherent part o f the state-private structure as opposed to being 
separate f rom it. What this therefore reveals is a crucial element for geography, 
as well as other disciplines interested in the third sector, to emphasise that the 
third sector is therefore inherently politically motivated and therefore cannot be 
analysed in separation f rom these values. As such, the academic analysis o f the 
third sector needs to move beyond a naivety o f the structural factors involved in 
the creation and sustenance o f the third sector. Geographers are ideally placed to 
employ a range o f methodological tools and analytic lenses to conceptualise the 
third sector in this way. 
The third sector must also be cautious o f becoming a tool for the use o f 
governments to f i l l the gap left by a less comprehensive welfare system. This 
can be seen by the suggestion that the presence o f voluntary action is an inherent 
advantage in the third sector (see for example Campbell 1999: 28-29) due to the 
relative cheapness o f the inputs f rom volunteers. A n analysis such as this 
essentially results f rom a policy-maker's view of the value o f the third sector in 
relation to the values o f the public sector. However, the mainstreaming o f the 
third sector contrasts wi th the views o f many of those involved in the sector. The 
input o f an individual's resources is dependent upon a particular rationale for 
volunteers to lend their time and effort, which emanate f rom a perception o f 
shared goals and common vision (see for example St. Simon's Community 
Centre; Blaenllechau Community Regeneration; DOVE). The consequence is to 
suggest that i f the government wishes to mainstream the services provided by 
the third sector, it must also realign the funding and payment gap between the 
public sector and the third sector. Otherwise, despite the current availability o f 
voluntary input, the mainstreaming of the third sector may remove the essential 
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rationale of those volunteers and reduce their input, therefore compounding the 
fragility of the third sector. The task for government and the third sector is 
therefore to clearly set out the organisational aims and goals and to ensure that 
the policy environment regards the voluntary input as valued and not exploited. 
Otherwise, the inherent advantages of the third sector may be removed. 
In parallel, the government has demonstrated its preference for a more 
mainstream version of the third sector to work alongside the formal sector 
economy. This therefore synthesises with the power gradient to suggest that the 
third sector may, through the direct control of policy and the influence of 
governmentality, lead to the third sector developing in a particular direction. 
However, the lack of cohesion within the third sector suggests that i f such a step 
were to be taken, it might create a 2-tier framework which could detrimentally 
affect those third sector organisations whose activities do not fit with the 
mainstream-orientated thrust of government policy. This therefore does not 
bode well for the TSEIs whose activities cannot be evaluated within the current 
framework, thus militating against 'alternative' aims and frameworks in the 
third sector. 
This study has examined the essentially uncomplicated and hence crude 
nature of the accountability process undertaken in the analysis and evaluation of 
TSEIs. Until recently, the criteria for success or failure have been determined by 
the accountability criteria set by funders, whose tendency to emphasise 
numerical outputs and statistical evidence has led to the establishment and 
legitimisation of such criteria as the means by which to assess the impact of 
TSEIs. However, such an emphasis clearly devalues the non-numerical, tacit and 
implicit values of TSEI to their target communities and beyond. There is 
therefore a need to address, via alternative methodologies, the broader outputs of 
TSEIs and to establish new modes of evaluation which measure more accurately 
the value of the inputs and outputs of TSEIs. 
In response to this, the New Deal for Communities (NDC) Outcomes 
and Milestones Statement (DETR 2000a), suggests that the UK government is 
beginning to move away from a focus on the production of outputs towards 
outcomes. It acknowledges that, "most outputs will tell you little or nothing 
about the long-term impact a project has on people's lives" (DETR 2000a: 7). 
As such, the outputs and outcomes it refers to in relation to worklessness 
279 
suggest a focus on the outcomes of proportion of working aged in work, reduced 
claimant unemployment rate, and increased level of average incomes. However, 
these proxy measures remain at the level of proxy measures and do not go 
beyond the measurable into the realm of non-measurable impacts and thus fall 
into the trap of the raw outputs in many ways; in its example of outcomes, the 
NDC claims that the outcomes it suggests are 'clear and measurable targets' 
(ibid: 10). The change is therefore one of timescale as opposed to a radical shift 
in the form of measurement itself. In the meantime, the NDC suggests a focus 
on milestones as the short-term measure of progress. This is regarded as crucial, 
as this is also the means by which future funding decisions are made. The NDC 
states, "ministers need to know about these milestones because continued 
funding, through the lifetime of the scheme, will be dependent on their 
achievement and on satisfactory progress towards...long term outcomes"(ibid: 
9). 
Similarly, the NDC's reliance upon measurable impacts attempts to 
isolate the impacts of a particular project above the impact of other structural 
and contextual factors, be they economic, social, cultural, or indeed 
environmental. The NDC's output and evaluation criteria therefore neglect the 
broader changes which influence the development potential of'communities', in 
this case, and by extension the TSEIs which may emerge as parts of the NDC 
scheme. As such, the evaluation of a TSEI is done in relation to baseline figures 
taken at the start of the project period, and reassessed at 3, and 6 year intervals 
as 'milestones'. 
The result is a slight adjustment in the focus of the outputs from the 
NDC, while it still retains a strict set of guidelines surrounding the ascendancy 
of audits, financial accountability, monitoring, reviewing and evaluation as the 
key tenets of the approach. There is therefore the need to address this significant 
gap in the study of the third sector and to reverse the seemingly unstoppable 
shift towards crude value-for-money measures as the measure of success. 
This essentially questions what constitutes 'economic' development. As 
Williams et al (2001) and Williams and Windebank (2000) suggest, there is 
potential for full engagement as the key role for the third sector. I f this is 
accepted, the third sector may have a role in promoting a revised notion of what 
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constitute economic development in a locality and indeed more widely. The 
challenge is for the policy and institutional structures to allow this. 
As such, I am therefore sympathetic to Connell and Kubisch's 
suggestion that a Theory of Change approach to accountability and evaluation 
allows for a new structure in that "Stakeholders are collectively accountable for 
the theory, and thus the ultimate outcomes based on it" (Connell and Kubisch 
1999). However, the current policy context of the UK, in which the availability 
of funding is underpinned by power and political wil l , has moved away from 
local government. Consequently, its flexibility to address more locally-defined 
and negotiated goals, values and needs has been limited. Until there is a 
relaxation of the means by which Community Development initiatives can 
define their own objectives, the localisation of policy outlined in chapter 4 will 
at best lead to the development of small-scale versions of mainstream 
programmes under the auspices of the third sector. These initiatives may 
consequently fail to utilise the essential strengths of the third sector in the 
creation of genuine workable alternatives to the mainstream, potentially 
resulting in the throwing of good money after bad in the pursuit of misaligned 
goals. 
Alongside this, the lessons which have been learned from case studies 
(accepting the limited transferability) have not been applied horizontally to 
inform actions taken elsewhere. This in part is due to the nature of the policy 
frameworks which offer fixed period, non-recurring initiatives. The 
consequence of this is to suggest that i f the third sector is to become a genuine 
part of the economic framework of the 21 s t century, a move wil l have to be 
made away from token localism, or, evaluation must inform the long-term 
developmental framework within the localities. 
More broadly, this fits with the recognition that the problems of 
'excluded' localities cannot be 'fixed' by the third sector alone in its current 
guise. Broader national pressures and policies have far-reaching implications for 
localities, but without the local targeting which is de rigueur partly for its 
potential cost implications. However, as Robinson (1999) notes, "It can be 
argued that problems facing disadvantaged communities cannot be solved from 
within, and stem from much wider causes. Mainstream policies, on welfare 
benefits, for example, can have far greater impact than small-scale initiatives. 
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An area focus is valid and valuable, but must be integrated within the larger 
policy framework" (Robinson 1999:135). The result is the continuing need to 
address the wider economic and policy structures; the third sector, in its current 
form, is a potential solution to some of the symptoms of uneven development. It 
is not in itself the solution to the cause. 
This thesis has presented an analysis of the institutional elements which 
produce supportive or unsupportive environments for TSEIs. It has added to the 
debate over the desirability of the third sector and questioned the received 
wisdom regarding the institutional factors which help to determine success or 
failure. Accepting the limits of any research, I hope these findings will help to 
further the analysis of third sector employment in both the academic and policy 
spheres. Furthermore, more broadly for human geography, this research 
suggests that questions of what constitutes the economic and non-economic 
spheres must be constantly re-evaluated. The incorporation of the third sector 
into the state, albeit a partial and contested process with shifting and dynamic 
boundaries, does not easily allow the separation of the third sector into an 
independent academic enquiry. To compartmentalise the objects of enquiry in 
such a way, while perhaps methodologically neater and conceptually clearer, is 
symptomatic of an ontological myopism which must be guarded against. 
Therefore, by offering a partial critique of the notion of what constitutes the 
third sector, I hope to redress this balance and offer a reminder to other spheres 
of human geography. 
By stressing the disparate nature of institutional environments and the 
needs they contain, I urge that government policy be constantly reviewed to 
assess the validity of privileging mainstream economic solutions above those of 
the more experimental, alternative nature for which the third sector is renowned. 
In doing so, I return to the central geographical notion that people and places 
matter. The third sector, by virtue of its institutional flexibility, possesses some 
of the tools to address the employment problems of the late 20 t h century and 
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Appendix 1: Brief Case Study Outlines 
Rhondda Cynon Taff Borough Council 
1.1 Blaenllechau Community regeneration (BCR) 
1.2 Penywaun Enterprise Partnership (PEP) 
1.3 Waun Wen Ltd 
Neath Port-Talbot Borough Council 
1.4 Amman Valley Enterprise (AVE) 
1.5 Dulais Opportunities for Voluntary Enterprise Workshop (DOVE) 
1.6 Dulais Valley Partnership (DVP) 
1.7 Ystalyfera Development Trust (YDT) 
Durham County Council 
1.8 Sherburn Road Regeneration Initiative (SRP) 
1.9 Spennymoor Training Initiative (STI) 
l.lOTrimdon 2000 (T2000) 
South Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council 
1.11 Low Simonside Employment Initiative (LSEI) 
1.12 St Simon's Community Project 
1.13 South Tyneside Training and Enterprise Network (TEN) 
308 
Appendix 1.1 
Blaenllecnau Community Regeneration (BCR) 
1.General Information on the Initiative 
Origin and Aims of Initiative: 
Blaenllechau Community Enterprise Group was set up in 1993 by a group of 
village residents on a voluntary basis who recognised the need to bring jobs and services 
back into the village. The original group drew up a business plan for the village on the 
strength of which it made a successful bid to the Welsh Office Special Development 
Scheme (SDS). This provided the initiative with sufficient capital funds to renovate a 
disused building in the centre of the village to use as a multi-purpose community and 
enterprise centre. Funding from the local TEC enabled the project to employ a computer 
and development worker for six months to establish systems and courses. 
Blaenllechau is a small village in the Rhondda Valley with a population of around 
2,000. The village has suffered from social, educational and economic depression due to 
the closure of traditional industry in the area, particularly coal mining. Many local people 
live on benefit, suffer from low self-esteem and have poor health. 
BCR is a community regeneration project dealing with the economic, social and 
environmental problems of the local community. BCR established a Community 
Resource Centre (the Bell Centre) as a focus for its varied activities, including computing, 
training, childcare and a community cafe. The cafe is one of four community businesses 
already established by BCR, the others being a building firm, a registered day nursery and 
a fish and chip shop. 
Key Partners and Funding Bodies 
• Rhondda Cynon Taff County Borough Council (Unitary) 
• Rhondda College, 
• University of Glamorgan 
• Welsh Office and Welsh Assembly 
• Interlink 
• Welsh Development Trusts Association (WDTA) 
Local Data: Indices of Deprivation (2000) 
Ferndale: 
NB: Blaenllechau village itself is too small to warrant its own ward-level statistics and as 
such has been merged with the neighbouring village of Ferndale. 
Index of multiple deprivation score 36.49 
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Rank of index of multiple deprivation rank 117 (out of 865 
divisions) 
Employment domain score 
Rank of employment domain 
24.41 
94 (out of 865 divisions) 
2. Outputs and Outcomes from the Initiative: 
Quantifiable Outputs: (1999) 
Clients into employment/jobs safeguarded 23 in community enterprises and Bell 
Centre 
Other outputs The Bell Centre runs many courses, 
which also train and educate young 
people and adults, in conjunction with a 
number of providers. 
Non -quantifiable outputs: 
Social effects; community and individual confidence. 
• The closure of traditional industry in the area undermined both the economic and 
the social structure of the local area. As a result the focus of the community was 
disrupted leading to low self-esteem, lack of confidence, ill-health, crime, 
substance abuse and isolation for many local people, particularly the young. 
There are very few job opportunities coming into the area from outside so that the 
greatest potential for regeneration must be through the development of the local 
social economy. 
• BCR has been able to support a number of courses in the Bell Centre which focus 
not only training but also on more social aspects of the village. This has led to 
attempts to integrate as much of the village into BCR's work, particularly those 
without job prospects. BCR anecdotally suggest a number of otherwise excluded 
or marginalized people, particularly those with disability, have been able to 
reintegrate fully with village life as a stepping stone to greater interaction in the 
job market. 
Development potential of the area 
• The nursery and after school care facilities run at the Bell Centre allow single 
parents and women returners with children to take up training opportunities 
through BCR or elsewhere. 
• The long-term strategy of the project includes making improvements to the local 
environment and to housing and to halt the emigration of young people from the 
village. The hope is this will help the long-term economic and social 
development of the village. 
Changing culture 
• BCR has social integration and inclusion as a primary aim. The establishment of 
the Bell Centre as a community asset and meeting place has been very important 
in establishing a focus for the community. The recent re-opening of the village 
fish and chip shop as a community business is also seen as a very significant 
element in the recreation of a sense of community. 
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• In addition to these services BCR is encourages involvement by members of the 
community through outreach and youth work. BCR also offers support services 
for the disadvantaged including attempting to deal with alcohol and drug abuse. 
Environmental impact 
• A number of projects within the village have sought to benefit the aesthetic 
appearance of the village, most notably a mural drawn by local children. 
Assessment/Evaluation of Initiative 
Key factors in success of the initiative 
Mechanism of provision 
• The project is able to offer training, employment, youth work, childcare, sports 
facilities and a focus for community life. BCR publishes a monthly newsletter to 
keep the village informed of progress and activities and actively networks with 
local people to encourage participation. 
• BCR runs a variety of vocational and non-vocational courses for all members of 
the community. Several courses are run in partnership with Rhondda College 
including aromatherapy and beauty, dressmaking and crafts, foreign languages. 
The Bell Centre has a computer suite which offers training courses at several 
levels in information technology skills. 
• BCR is therefore holistic, with a number of engagement as well as employment 
projects, to address many of the needs of the locality. 
Governance 
• BCR demonstrates a very co-ordinated governance structure. Relationships with 
the local authority are close, but kept at arms length and are used for the benefit 
of BCR. The initiative is also well integrated into third sector governance 
frameworks in the region. A l l elements of BCR are integrated to offer a co-
ordination within one governance framework, with as flat a hierarchy as possible 
to integrate decision-making with the daily running of the Bell centre. 
External Environment 
• The main difficulty for the local workforce is a lack of available jobs. There are 
many skilled people in the community who formerly worked in local mines and 
support industries, but these jobs are not being replaced. Whilst there is inward 
investment, this has tended to be capital intensive or relies on an imported 
workforce, further displacing local employment potential. However, the structure 
of mining jobs provides a basis for a stable and cohesive community which is 
beneficial to BCR. 
Key failings of the Initiative: 
• The early phase of the project has not been without problems, in part due to 
mistakes made during the construction of the Bell Centre on the part of the 
architects which left the initiative with a community hall with very poor 
acoustics. Other problems included a lower than expected attendance at the 
creche and low use of some other revenue generating spaces. Although the SDS 
funds allowed for the project to be established, these were exclusively capital 
funds and the project found itself with barely sufficient funds to deal with the 
running costs once the capital expenditure had been made. Since it was 
established BCR has recognised a need to obtain charitable status to enable it to 
311 
apply for further funding from sources not available to it at present. In order to 
do this the project is separating the community enterprises from the core project 
into a wholly owned subsidiary to be called Blaenllechau Community Enterprise 
Ltd 
3. Processes 
A. Funding/Financial situation 
• BCR was established on the basis of a successful bid for £500,000 from the 
Welsh Office SDS programme. A l l of this money was intended for use on the 
development of capital projects and was used by BCR to develop the Bell Centre 
and to purchase other properties in the town for use by community enterprises. A 
further £500,000 was secured in 1996 from the ERDF to allow further 
development of the project over three years. The majority of the funds to date 
have been for material expenditure on buildings and equipment. 
• The main difficulties have been concerned with the securing of other funds to 
ensure the running of the project once the capital sums have been spent. The 
original management team did not apply for sufficient funds during the early 
phase of the initiative and were further constrained by the legal status of BCR. 
Without charitable status many potential funding sources were closed to them. 
• Funding is administered by RCT ( the local authority). Support for funding 
applications are significant, but at the behest of BCR rather than imposed by 
RCT. 
B. Targets set by the initiative; output-led funding 
• Most of the funding to date has been linked to specific capital projects which has 
had a bearing on the results of the project in that, first, it has allowed the project 
to develop assets and, second, in that insufficient funds were set aside for the 
ongoing running of the project. These problems may have a bearing on future 
funding. 
• BCR heavy reliance upon voluntary work to maintain core services is partly an 
expression of these financial difficulties but is also a necessary part of community 
involvement in the project. 
C. Governance of the Initiative 
• BCR is managed by a Committee of 17 local people elected by the community. 
This group meets once a month to determine policy and take a day-to-day 
management role in matters of personnel and finance. Al l other aspects of the 
project are co-ordinated by the Centre Manager and support staff including 
volunteers. 
« The community businesses are currently an integral part of BCR as a whole and 
thus are run by the same management team. As part of the effort of the initiative 
to win charitable status, the community enterprises will be separated into a 
different, but wholly owned, organisation, Blaenllechau Community Enterprise 
Ltd. leaving BCR as a co-ordinating body as a company limited by guarantee. 
This move will entail some devolution of the management structure. 
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D. Community embeddedness 
• BCR produces a monthly community newsletter to keep local people informed of 
events, courses and services. The project provides a detached youth worker and 
the provision of some limited sporting facilities. 
• BCR was established by volunteers and still relies on a high level of voluntary 
work from around 50 local people (10 men and 40 women). Volunteers work in 
all aspects of the project including running the general office and all of the 
community enterprises. Many of the volunteers are older, retired people who 
have a strong commitment to the purpose of the project in regenerating the centre 
of the village. BCR also, however, benefits from voluntary work by some local 
young people which has been particularly important in developing youth work in 
the village. Voluntary work is particularly important to the project during the 
present time of financial uncertainty brought about by the problems highlighted 
above. 
• The newsletter published by BCR each month is helping to develop and 
strengthen community links and social interaction. The initiative also organised 
events such as entertainment, conversation forums, group discussion and liaison 
between community members and official bodies. 
• New facilities have been made available in the village with foster social 
interaction and a sense of community. Youth issues are being tackled through the 
work of the detached youth worker who is able to prevent future problems such 
as alcohol and drug abuse. 
• The village lacks facilities for the elderly but many older residents use the cafe in 
the Bell Centre which provides them with low-cost and nutritionally balanced 
meals. 
E. Role of Agency in Enhancing the Initiative. 
• In the past, there has been a key identification with key actors in the initiative, 
particularly when this was members of the community who began the group. 
However, the more recent times have seen over-reliance upon professional staff, 
leading to potential problems when staff members leave. There are ongoing 
attempts to ensure a continuation of the initiative beyond the influence of 
particular staff members by introducing a more flattened governance hierarchy. 
F. Relationship with external partners 
• BCR is part of a network of community initiatives in the area which support each 
other through the exchange of ideas. BCR also enjoys positive relations with the 
Rhondda College, the University of Glamorgan and the Welsh Office. Relations 
with the local authority, Rhondda Cynon Taff Borough Council, have been more 
problematic, though overall the council has been supportive. The lack of a 
coherent policy towards the voluntary and community sector on the part of the 
council has presented problems for several initiatives in the area. 
• Current plans include the deepening of networks of communication and exchange 
among neighbouring community projects. 
• Close relations are also held with the Welsh Development Trusts Association. 
G. Position relative to other service providers 
• BCR works in partnership, but not necessarily in elements which ought to be 
done by the state. BCR attempts to add additional or complementary services to 
the state. 
• BCR wil l continue to tackle problems of drug and alcohol abuse by raising funds 
specifically for these issues to raise awareness and to establish a rehabilitation 
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programme. This would include residential facilities, work skills training, 
behavioural modification and extensive after care support. Further work in this 
field will be developed with ex-offenders and children excluded from school 
through continued work with the probation service and Education Authority. 
• Negotiations are under way with the council to establish a day-care facility for 
the elderly and the Youth Project wil l continue to grow. 
• BCR is examining the possibility of purchasing a local farm to run as a model for 
LA21 and plans to purchase residential properties for the provision of low cost 
housing to local people. 
H. Institutional Learning 
• BCR is an unusual project in that it is rare to find such a very large amount of 
capital investment being put into a relatively small community. The problems 
that the project has had have stemmed largely from an imbalance between capital 
income and funds needed to run the initiative on a daily basis. This came about 
partly as a result of cost overruns on the building programme, inadequate 
provision being made by the original management and a lower than expected 
amount of revenue generated by the community enterprises. From this, BCR has 
quickly learned to target revenue funding as a key stream in the development of 
its ongoing activities 
• Despite these problems, which are being addressed, BCR has been able to fu l f i l 
its immediate objectives in providing the community with a focus, creating jobs 
and bringing people together. This suggests that whatever mistakes were made in 
execution during the initial phase, the fundamental objectives of the project are 
sound. BCR offers valuable lessons for other small communities which find 
themselves in receipt of large scale capital investments. 
Formal Interviews with managers, beneficiaries and volunteers 
Sue Jones Centre manager, now 
departed 
Mick Jones Ex-miner; original member 
of the committee which 
initiated the creation o f 
BCR 
Allison Evans Current Centre Manager, 
resident o f Blaenllechau 
Other related interviews: 
Michelle Lenton-
Johnson 
Rhondda Cynon T a f f County 
Borough Council 
Steve Cranston Manager, the Arts Factory, 
also head o f the Development 
Trusts Association, Wales 
Meurig Brookes Rhondda Cynon T a f f County 
Borough Council 
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Ruth Hopkins Director, Interlink (RCT) 
Appendix 1.2 
Penywann Enterprise Partnership (PEP) 
1.General Information on the Initiative: 
Origin and Aims of Initiative: 
The Penywaun Enterprise Partnership (PEP) was set up after a fairly long 
consultative period beginning in 1992. The initiative is a community-based regeneration 
project serving two large housing estates, Penywaun and Trenant with a combined 
population of 3,500. The estates are situated at the head of the Cynon Valley in what was 
the South Wales Coalfields. Since the closure of the local pits the area, which was 
already deprived, has experienced chronic unemployment, poor housing, physical 
isolation and high levels of crime. The many problems of the estate were drawn to the 
attention of the local authority by a highly publicised murder which took place, and which 
motivated some action. The estate had been in long-term decline since the 1980s and the 
closure of the local coal industry. 
A series of small-scale initiatives were started by the local authority and a major 
consultative exercise was conducted, led by a council officer who has since become the 
project co-ordinator. As a result of the consultation exercise it was decided that any 
regeneration scheme needed to be based within, owned and run by the community. Funds 
were secured through a successful bid to the SDS scheme in 1994 to purchase and 
refurbish a derelict 19th century chapel on the estate, a building chosen as much for its 
symbolic significance (it had been a school attended by many of the estate residents as 
children) as its size and availability. This has now become the Cana Centre 
Penywaun Enterprise Partnership (PEP) has been established to help regenerate 
all aspects of the life of two multiply deprived housing estates at the top of the Cynon 
Valley, an area traditionally supported by coal mining. PEP's work is holistic, including, 
housing refurbishment, traffic-calming, training, an after-school club, a computer and 
Internet suite, a community cafe, training and the provision of development workers to 
encourage community businesses and self-employment. 
PEP has four main aims: to acquire assets owned by the community, to adopt a 
community development approach, to continually assess performance and policy to 
ensure that the project remains relevant to local needs, and to develop effective 
partnerships with all relevant organisations. 
Key Partners and Funding Bodies: 
• Rhondda Cynon Taff BC (Unitary) 
o Groundwork Merthyr & RCT, 
• Cynon Valley Crime Reduction Centre, 
o Aberdare College, 
• People and Work Unit, 
• Community Enterprise Wales, 
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• Tower Colliery Ltd. 
• South-East Wales TEC 
Local Data: Indices of Deprivation 2000 
Penywaun: 
Index of multiple deprivation score 73.34 
Rank of index of multiple deprivation rank 2 (out of 865 divisions) 
Employment domain score 35.75 
Rank of employment domain 4 (out of 865 divisions) 
2. Outputs and Outcomes from the Initiative: 
Quantifiable Outputs: (1998) 
Direct employment and jobs safeguarded: 15 
Community business supported: 2 
Number o f training course run annually: 30 (including Computing, 
Community/Youthwork GCSE, 
Playwork/Childcare, Catering, 
and Estate Management.) 
Non -quantifiable outputs: 
Social effects; community and individual confidence. 
• A core function of PEP is to build the social as well as the economic capacities of 
the local are to overcome some of the barriers to regeneration that have been 
produced by unemployment and deprivation. The project works to combat 
apathy, low self-esteem, cynicism and hopelessness through community arts 
work, outdoor pursuits, visits to other community projects, competitions, 
performances and outreach work including advice sessions. 
• Although PEP is still at a relatively early stage of its development, it has already 
been able to tackle the negative image of the Penywaun Estate. The estate 
formerly had a reputation for crime and poor housing but, whilst these problems 
have not been resolved, it is now seen as a safe and even desirable place to live. 
Garden enclosures, the erection of anti-motorcycle fences and general 
environmental work have all begun to transform even the most run down areas of 
the estate. 
Development potential of the area 
• Via training and employment schemes, the initiative has been able to aid in the 
development of the skills base for the population of the two target estates. 
However, the reliance upon private sector job creation, has led to a lack of new 
employment i f the area. However, a new environmental project is aimed to meet 
the needs of the local population terms of environmental improvement and 
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education, while creating permanent jobs within the estate. However, at the outset 
this has been reliant upon outside funding rather than funding from within the 
estate itself. 
Changing culture 
• PEP has heightened interest in the possibilities of the social economy and 
community economic development as opposed to the previous reliance upon 
mining jobs. However, there is a deeply engrained culture which does not focus 
on entrepreneurship or self employment, thus making it more difficult to establish 
community businesses. However the protection of the PEP structure is believed to 
be a potential avenue for such developments to emerge. 
Environmental impact 
• A significant number of works have been carried out within the estate to improve 
the environmental aspects of the estate. These have significantly altered the 
appearance of the estate and have helped to embed the PEP in the community. 
Assessment/Evaluation of Initiative 
Key factors in success of the initiative 
Mechanism of provision 
• Specifically PEP carries out physical improvements such as garden enclosures 
and traffic-calming, has established a community asset base in a refurbished 
chapel which is now a Training and Enterprise Centre, is in the process of 
establishing community businesses, has acquired a neighbouring field for 
environmental projects, offers a variety of training courses, meeting places and 
community services. Together this holistic and community development- based 
agenda helps to address many of the needs of the target estates. 
Governance 
• The governance framework of PEP is very transparent. A formal hierarchy and 
democratic process exists but this is, where possible, circumvented by the 
workers to produce more responsive decision-making. The external partnerships 
and strategic board, made up of partners and PEP employees, allows a strong 
day-to-day mechanism and strategic board. 
External Environment 
• A deeply engrained culture exists which does little to aid community business 
development. There is very low self esteem and social capital on the estate, allied 
to severe economic problems as demonstrated by the index of multiple 
deprivation figures outlined above. The estate is in need of substantial 
employment input and change in the attitude towards the social economy i f PEP 
is ever to become self-sustaining. 
Key failings of the Initiative: 
• PEP has had a high level of involvement from some groups but has found it 
difficult to reach some of the more troubled young people. These problems have 
been difficult to overcome due to the deeply engrained economic and social 
problems of the estate. 
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Lessons for Transferability? 
• PEP has successfully completed the first phase of its development and is 
beginning to make significant differences to the estate. The development model 
used by PEP, based on local ownership and control, with careful planning to 
develop community businesses and employment is one that is used elsewhere in 
the immediate area, in different local conditions, and is certainly transferable. 
However, the essential fragility of the initiative has been demonstrated and the 
reliance of individual agents has limited the transferable lessons to be taken from 
the initiative. 
3. Processes 
A. Funding/Financial situation 
• The initial phases of the project were funded by the Local Authority which was 
trying to identify how best to resolve the problems of the state. The first major 
funding for PEP came from a successful bid to the Welsh Office SDS scheme in 
1994 which provided £750,000 for the purchase and refurbishment of the Cana 
Centre. This was followed in 1995 with a further £525,000 from the ERDF. 
• Funding is administered by RCT Borough Council Finance Department which 
acts as 'banker' for the project, giving it a degree of security and continuity it 
would not have i f funds were administered by it alone. 
• PEP suffered dramatically from a lack of funds when a funding application was 
paid in arrears rather than in advance, only through the efforts of the key 
employees, Barbara Castle and Gary Foreman, was the initiative saved through 
extra consultancy work to ensure the continuation of the initiative. 
B. Targets set by the initiative; output-led funding 
• Most of the grant funds are restricted to specific projects such as the Cana Centre 
construction and the various physical improvements that have been carried out on 
the estate. Only recently has a idea of discretion come into the usage of funds. 
C. Governance of the Initiative 
• PEP is a membership organisation with four different categories of member. 
These are: local residents, local organisations and groups, outside organisations 
with a role or concern in Penywaun and outside individuals with a role or interest 
in Penywaun. It is to this membership that the project is ultimately answerable. 
The main use of volunteers by PEP is on the management committee which 
consists of nine local people. Volunteers have been used in the past to a much 
greater extent than at present and may be again, depending on the requirements of 
specific projects. 
• Daily running of the project is carried out by the project co-ordinator, business 
development worker, development officer and an administrator. 
• The greater number of the membership of PEP is made up of local residents and 
they constitute a majority on the Management Committee. PEP is evaluated both 
internally through formal and informal consultation with local people, and by the 
various funding bodies that have contributed. 
319 
D. Community embeddedness 
• PEP has ensured significant material investment in the fabric of the estate. This 
included garden enclosures, traffic calming measures, environmental 
improvements and the Cana Centre, and these have significantly improved the 
standing of PEP within the target community. There is an identification of 
workers within the community, as they are figureheads for the project, most 
notably Barbara Castle. An improved attitude towards estate residents on the part 
of the local authority would also help to break down some of the barriers that 
currently exist. 
E. Role of Agency in Enhancing the Initiative. 
• Individual workers have significantly been important in developing the PEP 
initiative. Of these, Barbara Castle was asked to return to the estate after having 
set up the initiative. In all, she stayed for 5 years before the initiative was handed 
over to Gary Foreman as the project leader. These members have crucially aided 
PEP when in financial difficulty. 
F. Relationship with external partners 
• PEP enjoys generally good relations with the local authority and receives funding 
and support. That said, Rhondda Cynon Taff council is criticised for a lack of an 
overall strategy towards the voluntary and community sector and can be 
insensitive to local issues and people. 
• By including categories of membership that include organisations and non-
residents, PEP had close links with a wide variety of organisations from the 
public, private and third sectors. 
• PEP has established a number of working partnerships with other local and 
regional organisations, in what Gary Foreman refers to as 'Aggressive 
Networking'. The following are cited as partners in PEP literatures: Groundwork 
Merthyr & RCT, Rhydywaun Community Education Centre, Penywaun Junior 
School, Penywaun Community Centre '84, Task Force, Penywaun Senior 
Citizens, NCH Action for Children, Cynon Valley Crime Reduction Centre, 
Aberdare College, Cynon Valley Waste Disposal Ltd., People and Work Unit, 
Whitbread in the Community, Community Enterprise Wales, Scott-Cowan 
Associates Ltd., British Red Cross Society, North Glamorgan Health Trust, 
Tower Colliery Ltd., WS Atkins, Chapman Warren, Green Meadows Riding 
School, Rotary Club of Aberdare, Community Design Service, HGM Engineering 
Ltd. 
G. Position relative to other service providers 
• PEP acts as pressure group at times, to ensure statutory services are performed 
correctly (see also Trimdon 2000, appendix 1.10). Most of the services provided 
by PEP are relatively mainstream, but these are carried out under the auspices of 
PEP and are therefore regarded s significantly different. However, these services 
are regarded as part of the broader community development of the estate and are 
the means through which to develop other projects in the estate. As such, these 
relatively mainstream approaches wil l eventually add significant value to the 
target estates. 
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Formal Interviews with managers, beneficiaries and volunteers 
Gary Foreman Project manager, PEP 
Barbara Castle Ex-project manger; 
originally a local authority 
employee, who was asked to 
return to work in Penywaun 
after the initial consultation. 
Sarah Mayze Financial assistant and local 
resident 
Julie Gooding, Local Volunteer 
Other related interviews: 
Steve Cranston Manager, the Arts Factory, 
also head of the Development 
Trusts Association, Wales 
Meurig Brookes Rhondda Cynon Taf f County 
Borough Council 
Dimmock, Steve South-East Wales TEC 
Richard, Chris Princes Youth Business Trust 
(at Y D T ) 
Hopkins, Ruth Director, Interlink (RCT) 
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Appendix 1.3 
Waun Wen Ltd, Trebanog 
1.General Information on the Initiative 
Origin and Aims of Initiative: 
The Rhiwgarn Estate, Trebanog, in Rhonda Cynon Taff, is a housing estate which 
demonstrates some of the most acute economic and social problems in the South Wales 
valleys. An estate of roughly 350 homes, the estate had been declining since the local 
mining industry was removed in the 1980s. To help regenerate the estate, a group 
involved with the Trebanog and District Tenants and Residents Association (TDTA) 
began to search for funds to create a community centre to f i l l the acute services, leisure 
and employment problems on the estate. After several attempts, funding worth £512,000 
was forthcoming from the Strategic Development Scheme (SDS). 
Work was due to start on a community centre march 1995. However, the local 
authority, RCT 'put numerous obstacles in the way' and delayed work by 8 months-
estimated at a cost of £42,000. In March 1995, a submission for ERDF funding made for 
capital and revenue. This funding was for capital for an annexe to centre, which would be 
a dedicated youth space. However, the first form returned from the Welsh Office due to 
the revenue bid being printed on wrong coloured paper, despite assurances that this would 
be OK. A second application was made, and this was rejected as it was suggested that the 
chair of the TDTA's signature had been photocopied (an assertion denied by the 
applicants). 
Consequently the application had to be resubmitted in round two and was 
successful for £243,000. However, this could not be matched to SDS funds due to rule 
changes from first round, leaving the community centre which was being built with very 
little revenue funding with which to commence operations. 
Work began on the centre in December 1995; when completed, this was handed 
over to TDTA on 5 July 1996. To consolidate the centre management as a new legal 
entity, Waun Wen Ltd was set up, its directors comprising representatives of the TDTA, 
RCT (Local Authority); Legal representatives and Community education agencies. 
Due to the lack of revenue funds, South Wales TEC offered £12,000 to buy basic 
equipment and allow the centre to open in August 1996. However, due to a number of 
factors, the initiative had to cease operations in December 1996. Another abortive attempt 
to open the centre was made between February to December 1997 with £30,000 funds for 
ERDF. Due to problems, the initiative never achieved its second phase. It has been re-
opened since 1999 by RCT, due to the threat of claw-back of £384,000 from the local 
authority i f the initiative remained closed. 
Key Partners and Funding Bodies 
• Rhondda Cynon Taff Borough Council 
• South Wales TEC 
• SDS funding 
o South-East Wales TEC 
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• ERDF 
Local Data: Indices of Deprivation (2000) 
Nearest possible data for ward-level Indices of Deprivation (N.B these figures mask the 
real extent of deprivation on the Rhiwgarn estate) 
Porth 
Index of multiple deprivation score 
Rank of index of multiple deprivation rank 
Employment domain score 
Rank of employment domain 
Tonyrefail East 
Index of multiple deprivation score 
Rank of index of multiple deprivation rank 
Employment domain score 
Rank of employment domain 
30.14 
199 (out of 865 divisions) 
24.09 
105 (out of 865 divisions) 
33.98 
140(out of 865 divisions) 
23.65 
108(out of 865 divisions) 
2. Outputs and Outcomes from the Initiative: 
Quantifiable Outputs: (1999) 
The initiative produced no quantifiable outputs except the temporary employment 
of managers and staff. However, the second phase o f the initiative planned to 
include increased space for practical training opportunities, therefore encouraging 
greater take-up rates amongst local people. There was also planned to be a 
dedicated space for young people, a network room, job club, careers advice and 
literacy centre. This phase had the fol lowing targets within 18 months after 
completion: 
Direct job creation: Minimum 14 jobs 
Indirect job creation: Minimum 10 jobs 
Jobs safeguarded (permanent) 35-40 
(temporary) 10 
Assisted community businesses - 4 over 3 years 
Non -quantifiable outputs: 
Social effects; community and individual confidence. 
• Very few effects- due to the poor relations with community. The initiative is 
actually thought to have reduced community confidence; those 'best placed' to 
bring together funds were subsequently put off the job. 
• The initiative started and failed almost immediately, thus actually creating more 
resentment towards the initiative and the concept of community economic 
development. 
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Development potential of the area 
• Trebanog started from a very low base; economically, socially, and politically the 
estate was very poor. Apart from some small success with youth work and drugs 
which were housed within the community centre, very little was achieved. 
Changing culture 
• The initiative did very little to improve the culture within the estate. The original 
community centre actually acted to reinforce community divisions and did not 
raise the likelihood of increased participation in third sector operations. 
• However, before its re-launch, 100 people turned up to a general meting, 
regarded by Michelle Lenton-Johnson of RCT as perhaps the biggest gathering 
on the estate ever. The result was that some sections of the community were 
united in their resentment at the manner in which the centre was originally 
conceived and managed. 
Environmental impact 
• The environmental impact of the initiative was effectively negative; the centre 
took over green space in the estate, which used to be available as a football pitch. 
Assessment/Evaluation of Initiative 
Key factors in success of the initiative 
Mechanism of provision 
o The provision that came from the centre was essentially low-key due to a lack of 
funds. It was intended that the initiative would involve broader community 
development and community economic development in phase 2 but his was never 
realised. Provision revolved around activities for the elderly and the very young, 
with drugs and youth workers holding surgeries twice per week. 
Governance 
• Essentially top-down from within the TDTA, the key group involved in the 
initiative. The management of tensions was difficult, and came to be one of the 
key stumbling blocks for the initiative. 
External Environment 
• The environment within the community regarding the centre became poisoned 
very early on. This is put down to a turnover of population, lack of community 
institutions such as sports teams, leading to a lack of cohesion. The initiative 
therefore struggled to cope with a fragmented external environment within the 
estate. This led to a lack of support and open hostility at times. 
• A major problem which developed over a short time was a group of menacing 
youths who were hanging around outside the building and which was putting 
other people from the community off, thus seriously disrupting an already limited 
programme. 
• The initiative also failed due to tensions within the target community, namely two 
families whose actions led to factions being created within the community which 
became associated with the initiative. 
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Key failings of the Initiative: 
• The 'vision' of what constituted social and economic development within the 
community was too narrow, and focused largely upon the activities of the older 
members of the community. This therefore did not extend needs and ideas 
agendas of the young people on the estate. The initiative therefore did little to 
address the real needs of the disaffected youth of the estate. 
Lessons for transferability? 
• The experience of Trebanog/Waun Wen provides a key case of what not to do 
when attempting to set up a community centre before the community was ready 
to participate in it fully. Therefore, a significant amount was learned with regard 
to the need for community development in the initiative before it was re-opened. 
Processes 
A. Funding/Financial situation 
• Funding from the Strategic development Scheme (SDS) was administered 
directly to the initiative, Waun Wen ltd. Rhondda Cynon Taff (RCT) borough 
council was the accountable body for the funds. Accountability was also direct 
to funders in the case of TECs, although this was relatively small amounts. 
• Financial control consisted of the operations of an independent consultant, Kay 
Quinn in association with the Trebanog District Tenants and Residents' 
Association (TDTA). Support for original funding applications was forthcoming 
from RCT, although most of this was done by Kay Quinn in association with 
TDTA. 
• The original allocation of funds to the project consisted of £512,000, which was 
earmarked for the building of a community centre and as such was not time 
limited. ERDF and other funds which were hoped to be matched had time 
constraints, dependent upon the completion of stage one and stage two of the 
centre. 
• Duration of funding never became a particular problem for the initiative; the scale 
of funds and the restrictions which were attached to the funds were far more key 
to determining the failure of the initiative. 
• Due to a failure of an original ERDF application, this left the centre with no 
revenue funds as all SDS funds were ring-fence and had been put into capital 
expenditure. The result was institutional sclerosis, as it could not meet basic 
needs and aspirations. 
B. Targets set by the initiative; output-led funding 
• The Trebanog/ Waun Wen initiative was a broad community development and 
community economic development scheme which incorporated 3 phases. 
• However, the actual focus- had to be changed due to lack of revenue funds-
therefore reducing the scale and scope of the initiative's operations. 
• The initiative closed down for a second time in 1997- RCT had to re-open the 
initiative to avoid claw back of £384,000 
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C. Governance of the Initiative 
• The Strategic board comprised members of the TDTA, RCT (Local Authority); 
Legal representatives and Community education agencies. 
• Some autonomy was give to the to manager, but tension existed in this 
relationship. The relationship did not work at all and the TDTA became 
'enmeshed' in the day-to-day running of the initiative. The formal decision-
making process therefore was not adequately defined. 
• Day-to-Day decisions were made by the centre manager, but mostly done by 
members of the TDTA; it was those members who held real power in the 
initiative. Internal decision-making was therefore made on an ad-hoc basis; 
finances were under the control of the TDTA team and Kay Quinn, but these 
small funding packages were mostly tied up in ongoing expenditures in cafe and 
running the centre as opposed to being available for decisions. 
• Board met monthly; from the outset this was more a coping strategy rather than a 
long-term planning board. There was little lee-way to take long-term strategic 
decision due to the uncertainty of funding and the future of the centre. 
• Little community consultation occurred prior to the application for funding and 
the opening of the community centre. No audits, no formal data collection. This 
should have been done with the aid of a community development worker had the 
funds been available, result was a narrow definition of the aims of the centre. 
• Provision therefore suffered, as the strategic board became involved in crisis 
management. I f there had been adequate funds, the TDTA would have perhaps 
been able to take amore hands-off approach. As such, the TDTA became too 
embedded within the day-to-day management of the centre, with little scope for 
other decisions. The TDTA was effectively too embedded and invested in their 
time and effort in the centre. This resulted in a particular rationale for the centre's 
running, to aid the particular interests of that group. 
D. Community embeddedness 
• The initiative lacked any great sense of being embedded in the community. It was 
regarded as being a centre in which the TDTA participated in their own activities 
while freezing out the rest of the community. Eventually, TDTA left an office 
they had taken up in the building-which was regarded as good as its members 
were becoming enmeshed in the day-to-day running of the centre 
• One of the major disappointments for everyone was a perceived lack of support 
from the local community. Eventually, the centre was burgled on several 
occasions and an arson attach gutted the building when closed. This contrasts to 
nearby Gilfach Goch, where around 300 people use their community centre 
throughout the week and is rarely damaged. 
E. Role of Agency in Enhancing the Initiative. 
• Individuals involved with the initiative had a significant impact in precipitating 
the failure of the imitative. The TDTA was regarded as an elite group and as a 
result had little identification with many others on the estate the centre was 
proclaiming to help. In particular, there was little identification with the needs of 
young people on the estate beyond primary school, leading to barriers being 
created on both sides as tensions mounted. 
• Tension in the community and the centre were related to clashes of personalities 
which became associated with the centre itself. Externally, the estate was riven by 
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the presence of two family groupings who were not keen to share the centre. 
Extreme tensions were associated with disruptive teenagers, who were barred 
from the centre and subsequently caused trouble outside the centre itself. 
• Internal tensions with managers and many of the centre users led to the centre 
again being regarded as elitist. Internal tensions also emerged between the 
manager and the day-to day management board, who were perceived to be 
meddling. One temporary manager was brought in, which turned out to be 
disastrous not least because of the clash of personalities and inappropriate 
alliances. Consequently, there was an over-reliance on particular individuals, who 
held to much sway at the day-to-day level; the initiative would have benefited 
from a flattened hierarchy. 
• There were no formal or informal mechanisms to address such tensions, and as a 
result the situation became internalised within the initiative. Youth members lost 
interest and eventually became yet more disruptive and intimidated by other 
youths hanging around outside. 
• Gloria Williams, head of the TDTA, became to be referred to as the 'equaliser' in 
the community due to her propensity to call the police. Because it was known she 
talked to police she had her windows smashed several times. Eventually, the 
members of the TDTA who had fought hard for the funding to set up the 
initiative became disillusioned with the initiative to the extent that Gloria 
Williams states, 'they should bulldoze the place down as far as I 'm concerned 
because on this estate the people just don't care". 
F. Relationship With External Partners 
• RCT were regarded as being little help with planning applications, thus delaying 
the initial build of the centre by 8 months at an estimated cost £42,000. A 
generally poor relationship was cemented by the building of the Dai Davies day 
centre in nearby Porth, causing accusations that the local authority was 
attempting to continue with their own projects while leaving Waun Wen in the 
lurch. 
• TECs gave £12,000 to help with the original opening of the centre, but there were 
few other links with the local governance institutions. Private sector funds were 
due to become involved with phase 2 of the development, although this was never 
achieved. No other substantial linkages with the private sector; little private 
sector involvement in the area due to limited disposable incomes. 
G. Position relative to other service providers 
• The initiative aimed to cater for the whole community, with the hope of achieving 
a holistic community development/ community economic development remit. 
• No 'mainstream' provision was undertaken; RCT had little impact in the area 
beyond the housing department. The initiative was therefore attempting to 
develop the estate socially and eventually economically, but this was never 
achieved in the period 1996-7 
• The initiative attempted to f i l l a niche which had been neglected- few social 
initiatives existed on the estate, where they were badly needed. Services for the 
local population were clustered towards other parts of the ward, away from the 
Rhiwgarn estate. RCT regarded Waun Wen as a means to stimulate the 
development of the estate. 
» It has been seen that RCT has taken over the running of the centre, suggesting 
this form of provision should have been previously done by the local authority. 
However little funds were available to the local authority and so the problems of 
the estate were not considered feasible to engage. There was an acceptance of the 
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need to develop the social and economic development of the estate 
H. Institutional Learning 
o The initiative, having been reopened in 2000, is now de-personalised with the 
RCT owning and running the centre. The centre is now used by a broader section 
of the community, and is not a focus for derision and tension. This demonstrates a 
positive top-down influence, but all the while the community are involved with 
the initiative as part of a concerted outreach program. 
• The 4/6 month opening periods meant the initiative did not have adequate time 
for the evolution of the initiative; too much emphasis was placed on crisis 
management rather than institutional learning. 
Formal Interviews with managers, beneficiaries and volunteers 
Gloria Williams TDTA and Waun Wen Ltd 
Alma Cogan TDTA and Waun Wen Ltd 
Stuart Jones Worker in drugs drop-in centre; 
also researcher at University of 
Glamorgan 
Sarah Leyshon Current Centre co-ordinator, 
employed by RCT 
Kay Quinn Independent Consultant 
involved in the development of 
Waun Wen Ltd 
Other related interviews: 
Michelle Lenton-
Johnson 
Rhondda Cynon Taf f County 
Borough Council 
Steve Cranston Manager, the Arts Factory, 
also head o f the Development 
Trusts Association, Wales 
Meurig Brookes Rhondda Cynon Taf f County 
Borough Council 
David Adamson University o f Glamorgan 
Ruth Hopkins Director, Interlink (RCT) 
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Appendix 1.4. 
Amman Valley Enterprise (AVE) 
1. General Information on the Initiative 
Origin and Aims of Initiative: 
Amman Valley Enterprise (AVE) was not originally established as a social 
economy project but was established to support and train local women in the aftermath of 
the 1984-5 miner's strike and the subsequent closure of the mining industry in South 
Wales. AVE combines community development, education and training with the 
encouragement of enterprising activities in the social, economic, educational, leisure and 
environmental fields. The project has been developed to provide an holistic range of 
services, delivered through community businesses that are run by and for local people, 
which meet the full range of needs for the local community. Activities include formal 
training, childcare, catering, youth work, health initiative, forestry and environmental 
services, a community arts project, a local minibus and consultancy work with other 
projects in the area. 
AVE is an holistic community co-operative which caters to a very wide range 
of local needs. The local area was already marked by social deprivation, poor housing 
and low income prior to the closure of the local coal industry which had been the main 
employer. The first pit closed in 1988 the last in 1993 leaving only large, opencast 
developments providing limited, low paid, short-term work. Many other local employers 
were attracted to rate-relieved sites along the M4 motorway corridor. Communities that 
had been built around the coal industry were left isolated with little or no employment 
and high rates of long term ill-health. 
AVE began in October 1987 when a group of five local women moved into 
semi-derelict offices in the village of Tairgwaith donated by the National Coal Board. The 
set-up period of the project consisted of the renovation of the offices, through voluntary 
work, help in kind and some one-off charitable grants, and the establishment of contacts 
in the community. The first classes were held in the building at Easter 1988. The courses 
brought more women into contact with the project and expanded the range of volunteers 
available to provide services. This method of growth, through gradual and progressive 
involvement of local people through training courses and on into employment has 
remained constant throughout the initiative's lifetime. 
Key Partners and Funding Bodies: 
• Neath Port-Talbot (Unitary) 
• Carmarthenshire Council 
• Swansea Council 
• ERDF funding 
• Environment Wales 
• Arts Council Wales 
• University Wales Swansea 
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Local Data: 
Gwaun-Cae-Gurwen: Indices of Deprivation 2000 
NB: Though AVE operates in areas beyond Gwaun-Cae-Gurwen, this ward includes the 
original locality of the initiative in Tairgwaith and as such indicates the degree of 
deprivation in the locality. 
Index of multiple deprivation score 37.78 
Rank of index of multiple deprivation rank 107 (out of 865 divisions) 
Employment domain score 23.11 
Rank of employment domain 134 (out of 865 divisions) 
2. Outputs and Outcomes from the initiative: 
Quantifiable Outputs: (1999) 
Total Jobs created/safeguarded: 35 Part-Time 
lOFull-Time 
Individual Recruitments into Training 348 
Total Enrolments onto Training Courses 415 
Non -quantifiable outputs: 
Social effects; community and individual confidence. 
• The broader changes in the local economy, and a number of social and 
community arts projects instigated by the initiative have no doubt increased the 
confidence of both individuals and the community as a whole, by creating new 
optimism for business and social interactions. However, these effects are still 
fragile due to the weakness of the private sector and declining banking facilities 
in the locality. To address this, AVE is seeking to set up a LETS scheme. 
• The impact of the community arts and music projects have been regarded as 
having a significant impact upon the lives of some individuals in the locality, 
most notably young people. However, there have also been impact across the age 
range as part of a number of policies which promote full engagement. 
Development potential of the area 
• The effect of the initiative on the community has changed since it was 
established. In the first instance the main client group were local women who 
took up the training opportunities to improve their employment potential 
following a sharp rise in male unemployment. AVE now caters to as many men 
as women. 
• AVE has established a number of CED projects which operate in the private 
economy, but which produce funds for attempts to develop the area's 
development potential. Added to the effects of the extra funding being brought 
into the area a number of initiatives act to increase the development potential, 




• The work of AVE has undoubtedly contributed to the regeneration of the 
community and has empowered local people by giving them a stake in something 
concrete. The project has deliberately sought to replace some of the communal 
functions that developed around the coal industry, working men's clubs, chapels 
and so on, with new forms of community involvement that bring people together 
in constructive and positive ways. 
• AVE has heightened interest in the possibilities of the social economy and 
community economic development as opposed to the previous reliance upon 
mining jobs. 
Environmental impact 
• Through a range of projects under Fforestwr Woodland management, local 
children have been learning about the various skills involved in woodland 
management. Fforestwr has also won grass cutting contracts for Llanedi 
Community Council. 
Assessment/Evaluation of Initiative 
Key factors in success of the initiative 
Mechanism of provision 
• AVE was set up by local people to provide an accessible centre for education and 
training and a general community resource. It now also develops the potential of 
the local social economy by establishing community businesses that could meet 
local needs and provide jobs and training. The project currently consists of a core 
business, handling administrative, management and personnel functions, 
departments established to deal with particular projects and Education and 
Training and subsidiary businesses run semi-independently. The subsidiary 
companies are either community businesses in their own right, offering childcare 
and catering for example, or are responsible for the establishment of further 
community enterprises. 
• The structure of the initiative allows for great flexibility in terms of service 
provision, the maximisation of income through the establishment of internal 
markets and the constant development of new projects. AVE is able to share its 
experience of community economic development with neighbouring communities 
through consultancy and outreach work. 
Governance 
• AVE is a large organisation and as such requires a formal organisational 
structure. AVE itself is a core company with a number of projects and wholly 
owned subsidiaries. The governance structure allows for the development of 
individual projects and community business within the whole enterprise, thus 
allowing for suitable directions and local decision making for each part. 
• Through the efforts of individual workers, AVE has been able to involve a 
number of outside agencies from public, private and third sectors to enhance the 
scale and scope of provision in AVE. 
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External Environment 
• The closure of the mines left the male workforce with very little labour through 
large companies as had been traditional in the area. Women took most of the 
part-time, office based jobs available in the area whilst the men predominantly 
became self-employed, often in the construction industry. The jobs lost by the 
closure of the mines, however, have not been replaced by new inward investment. 
A tradition of working for large employers and/or benefit dependency created a 
degree of apathy, ill-health and low expectation in many local people which has 
been a problem for AVE to overcome. 
• AVE has helped overcome this by promoting CED and entrepreneurship, as well 
as broader community engagement as a means to revitalise the local economy. 
Key failings of the Initiative: 
• While AVE has been able to generate nearly half its turnover from community 
business, this has not been sufficient to allow for long-term financial 
sustainability. As such, AVE still relies on a variety of grants and funding 
streams. 
Lessons for transferability? 
• AVE is a key example of what is regarded as 'best practice', developing a holistic 
community development and community economic development initiative in the 
Amman valley. However, this is dependent upon a great deal of work over 14 
years to develop this, while the template may be transferable, this is not a quick 
fix and has developed in accordance with the needs and values of the area. 
3. Processes 
A. Funding/Financial situation 
• Of AVE's turnover of roughly £300,000 annually, nearly half comes from sales 
of services- more than any other case study here. The various parts of the project 
are evaluated individually and together, depending on the funder and the nature 
of the work carried out. Individual projects and subsidiary companies are 
evaluated by statutory bodies and other local organisations to ensure conformance 
to national standards of service delivery. 
B. Targets set by the initiative; output-led funding 
• Some funding, particularly that attracted through training contracts with local 
colleges, is linked to specific performance indicators such as attendance and 
teaching quality. Other funds, such as those for capital building programmes are 
subject to value for money criteria and completion deadlines. 
C. Governance of the Initiative 
• Day-to-day decisions on the initiative are taken within each individual part of the 
initiative, to help ease of process. The organisational structure is therefore 
represented by a number of heads of operation who oversee different part of the 
initiative's operation. 
• AVE has a complex and dispersed structure centred on a core company - AVE 
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itself. AVE Ltd is responsible for Policy, Finance, Management, Strategic 
Planning, Administration, Personnel, Buildings, the Resource Centre, 
Consultancy Services and Community Enterprise and Development for the entire 
group. AVE has two standing committees concerned with Policy and Resources 
and Personnel. The central AVE also runs, through separate committees 
individual projects (the Health Initiative, Community development in various 
surrounding villages Community Arts Project and Youthwork) and the Education 
and Training section. In addition there are a series of wholly owned subsidiary 
companies within the group set up as community businesses by AVE. These are: 
1. Amman Valley Community Business Ltd., which in turn runs the Amman 
Centre, Lotus Outside Catering, Gwyliau Hwylus (after school care), the 
Hale-Bopp Diner, Tairgwaith Cafe and the local Minibus. 
2. Bandcheck Ltd., which runs the Lots of Tots Day Nursery. 
3. Fforestwr, a company that provides work experience in forestry, gardening, 
charcoal-making, woodland management, fencing and hedging for the 
unemployed. 
4. Cakemagic Ltd. a catering company that is also responsible for 'Classic 
Catering' at nearby Betws. 
D. Community embeddedness 
• The policy of employing local people that have started as trainees with the project 
ensures that it remains rooted in the community. Outreach and consultative work 
both formally and through informal networks helps to ensure that services on 
offer are relevant to local needs. There is extensive internal monitoring by the 
group as a whole to ensure overall quality and relevance and to get feedback from 
the community. 
E. Role of Agency in Enhancing the Initiative. 
• The role of individual change agents is regarded as being crucial factor in the 
original development of AVE. However, as the initiative has grown and 
developed, the impact of key agents upon the whole of the initiative has 
diminished. The impact of organisational structure has now become just as 
important as the role of individual agents in achieving goals in AVE 
• However, original members of AVE still remain at the initiative, and have 
successfully led AVE to becoming one of the largest Community Economic 
Development initiatives in the country. Individual agents are also responsible for 
a number of micro-scale impacts upon users and beneficiaries in projects and 
businesses under the auspices of AVE. 
F. Relationship with external partners 
• AVE maintains strong links to a very wide variety of other organisations 
including local schools and colleges, local authorities, local doctors and health 
organisations, local businesses, national networks of community enterprises and 
other community projects in the immediate area. These relationships take a 
variety of forms ranging from informal contacts to established partnerships. 
• AVE is well-established and enjoys good long-term relations with funding bodies 
and sponsors. The project is actively seeking new sponsors among local 
businesses to develop community enterprises further. 
• AVE is in a particular geographical situation, which means it is situated on the 
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cuss of 3 local authorities- Neath Port Talbot, Carmarthenshire, and Swansea. 
The result is a potential for AVE to match funds from each local authority, 
although often funds are less forthcoming due to the ring-fenced nature of many 
local authority grants. 
G. Position relative to other service providers 
• Amman Valley works alongside a plethora of other service providers in an 
attempt to develop a holistic partnership framework in the area. This has two 
functions. First, AVE is able to enhance the provision of mainstream services 
provided by partners in the locality. Second, this produces a number of 
Partnerships within AVE which secure funding and support for a range of 
activities. However, AVE is careful to ensure the range of activities and 
community projects it offers are in addition to those which ought to be provided 
by statutory bodies to avoid duplication. 
H. Institutional Learning 
• The change towards the development of the social economy came in 1989 after 
changes in funding priorities meant that greater continuity could be achieved 
through changing the emphasis of the project from education towards community 
economic development. In 1989-1990 a feasibility study was conducted to 
establish whether the creche, which had been run on a voluntary basis, could be 
turned into a sustainable community business. This led to seed funding being 
sought from the Welsh Development Agency's Community Enterprise Unit. The 
catering businesses grew out the expressed desire of local elderly people to have 
a lunch club in the area. Both were set up under a separate company to the 
charity - Amman Valley Community Business Ltd. 
• AVE has evolved gradually in direct response to local need and has been forced 
to adapt to changing conditions in the labour market. It has managed to do so by 
using action research to remain in contact with community needs and by 
identifying opportunities, such as the establishment of the catering business, 
which had the potential to grow. Although the particular structure of AVE is 
therefore unique, the method of its growth and the way in which it relates to the 
community is transferable. 
Formal Interviews with managers, beneficiaries and volunteers 
Derith Powell Operations manger, Gwaun-
Cae-Gurwen 
Len Preece Volunteer manager, art, 
community and music 
projects 
Cheryl James Financial manager, 
Tairgwaith 
Maggi Dawson Former manager and 
founding Member 
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Other related interviews: 
Colin Ede Economic Development, 
Neath Port-Talbot BC 
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Appendix 1.5 
Dulais Opportunities for Voluntary Enterprise 
(DOVE) Workshop. 
1.General Information on the Initiative 
Origin and Aims of Initiative: 
The Dulais Opportunities for Voluntary Enterprise (DOVE) workshop was 
established by local women by a group of women from the Miners' Support Group in the 
Dulais Valley after the 1984/85 miners' strike to, with setting up a co-operative and 
offering education and training opportunities to women returners in valley communities 
as the main objectives. To support this initiative, a skill centre was established in order to 
give women confidence and an opportunity to realise their full potential through training 
or further education and to enable them to compete effectively in the labour market. The 
Centre is a partnership between DOVE, Onllwyn Community Council and the University 
of Wales Swansea. The workshop is located in Banwen, a former mining community and 
is based in a building previously owned by the National Coal Board. 
The Banwen Community Centre has successfully developed as a community 
based education and training centre where the DOVE Workshop is based. It is also where 
the University of Wales Swansea's Department of Adult Continuing Education provides 
its part time degree programme (Community University of the Valleys CUV) and related 
provision. Neath College provides its further education courses and Community 
Education Services (Life Long Learning) of Neath Port Talbot County Borough Council 
provides its franchised courses with Neath College. New developments include the 
Dovecote Nursery and Dulais Valley out of School Club. 
Key Partners and Funding Bodies 
• Relevant Local Authority: Neath Port Talbot CBC (Unitary) 
• University of Wales, Swansea 
• Community University of the Valleys 
• Neath College 
• Glyn-Neath Training Centre 
• Onllwyn Community Council 
• ERDF 
Local Data: Indices of Deprivation (2000) 
Onllwyn 
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Onllwyn adjoins to the Workshop location in Banwen at the head of the Upper 
Dulais Valley. 
Index of multiple deprivation score 53.69 
Rank of index of multiple deprivation rank 34 (out of 865 divisions) 
Employment domain score 31.06 
Rank of employment domain 19 (out of 865 divisions) 
2. Outputs and Outcomes from the Initiative: 
Quantifiable Outputs: (1999-2000) 
Employment created (direct) 9 part/full time workers, 8 female and one 
male. Tasks include administering the 
finances with particular reference to 
ESF/ERDF; administering a community 
business; organising education and training 
providing a day nursery, courses 
Non -quantifiable outputs: 
Social effects; community and individual confidence. 
• There is an acceptance that quality learning and broad cultural opportunities in 
schools, villages and towns, accessible to all ages throughout the valleys. Are part 
of the economic solution to the problems of the area. .The initiative has most 
significantly had an impact upon the social standing of women in the community 
as this has helped to transcend the more traditional male/female roles in the past. 
Interviews therefore suggest that the DOVE has succeeded in increasing the 
confidence of individuals, and more broadly the community, within a backdrop of 
declining employment and social provision. 
Development potential of the area 
• DOVE Workshop runs a creche and caters for children up to the age of five. It is 
extremely well-equipped with fully qualified staff but places are limited. I f you 
are a Community University students can bring children to the creche when you 
have classes, i f space allows, and the cost is met by the College. The creche also 
operates outside teaching hours the rates are very reasonable, but you do need to 
book in advance. Consequently, DOVE increases the training and skills level of 
the area, to promote the basis for inward investment i f it were to arrive. The 
initiative also helps to create micro-economy in the area, by keeping funds in the 
local economy from childcare, thus meeting local needs with local resources. 
Changing culture 
• There has been the growing importance of women, as community activists and in 
a significant way as major contributors to the labour market. There is also a 
growing understanding in the valleys that quality education and training 
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throughout life, in or out of work, is the prerequisite for a stable and just society 
and economic development. It is therefore part of a new era with the demise of 
coal as a major employer, and the decline of patriarchal society, to create the 
conditions for the emergence of "new" social movements - green, peace and 
women. This has led to new ways of thinking about the ways work, leisure, 
childcare, learning and the whole way of living. 
Environmental impact 
• N / A 
Assessment/Evaluation of Initiative 
Key factors in success of the initiative 
Mechanism of provision 
• DOVE has achieved a great deal of success through the provision of education 
and training, originally to groups of women who were less inclined to enter into 
education beyond schooling the period before the 1980s. The combination of a 
number of interesting courses, allied to the local situation of the site of the 
Banwen centre, has permitted DOVE to develop while not leaving its roots. Most 
crucial in the initiative's success has been its relation to local people with a 
number of key agents living and working in the villages of Banwen or Onllwyn, 
with the resulting embeddedness and friendliness which has pervaded the 
provision entered into by DOVE. 
Governance 
• The initiative has been successful in creating a governance structure which allows 
individuals to succeed at the rate at which they set for themselves. The 
governance structure also allows the free movement of information throughout 
the initiative, both formal and informal. The day-to-day management of the 
initiative is controlled by one person, while a number of other workers are 
involved in the decision-making process. 
• The strategic management process is almost completely locally controlled, while 
decisions involving funding are taken with the knowledge of local authorities and 
service providers 
External Environment 
• DOVE is well integrated into the local third sector and educational networks, 
with its model of success being seen as 'good practice' within the region. 
Relationships with local authorities are strong, both at working level and 
interpersonal level. 
• The local economy is in severe decline, although the training centre hopes its 
activities wil l be able to stimulate third sector and local private sector growth in 
the communities around Banwen. 
• The local community is in support of the initiative, and there are no tensions. 
While a 'social capital' of the locality is hard to distinguish, this was influenced 
in the past by the local mines and the social structures which existed around 
them. The removal of the older institutional structures and the male domination 
of the social sphere consequently led to an emancipation of the local female 
population, who set up and developed DOVE. This has taken many cues from the 
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female (and subsequently male) activism present within the social structures of 
the mining community. 
Key failings of the Initiative: 
• The initiative has as yet failed to create substantial employment within the 
community, although the creche has created several full and part-time jobs. 
• The initiative is still a relatively mainstream educational provider. While this has 
been achieved within a community based structure which has offered a 
significantly different mode of operation to mainstream educational and training 
establishments, DOVE accepts its complementary role as opposed to being 
something significantly new. However, this in itself is not a failing for the 
initiative. 
Lessons for transferability? 
• DOVE is particularly situated in an ex-mining community where the role of 
social structures associated with the mine held strong sway in the locality. The 
instigation of the project sought to capitalise on both the emancipation of women 
as the older structures declined and the presence of activists who wished to 
change the roles and perceptions of women in the community. As such, the 
template is in many ways transferable to other groups in other localities, although 
the crucial role of a community-based set of activists led the initiative to success 
soon after its inception. 
3. Processes 
A. Funding/Financial situation 
• Funding received from the European Regional Development Fund, Neath 
Borough Council, British Coal, Onllwyn Community Council, and University of 
Wales Swansea was used to enlarge the Centre at Banwen which now has two 
large lecture rooms, a guidance and counselling room, a computer lab, and a well 
stocked and purpose built library. The Community University of the Valleys was 
launched in 1993, thus enabling adults to study for a degree in their local 
community 
• Funding is administered in-house, with yearly audits. Accounting documents are 
presented at strategic board meeting to ensure some scrutiny. The accountable 
body for European funds is the local authority, NPT. While a lot of time is spent 
on funding applications, a degree of support for this is forthcoming as NPT 
regard DOVE as a crucial part of the regeneration of the upper Dulais valley 
alongside the DVP (appendix 1.6). 
B. Targets set by the initiative; output-led funding 
• The stated aims of the initiative are relatively narrow, although these have 
broadened as the initiative has developed. Funding for educational projects and 
courses is ring-fenced to achieve these aims; programmes bending is limited. 
Income from creche and other small-scale consultative, and private-sector 
training contracts produce extra funds which can subsequently be utilised to 
develop more alternative forms of social provision as part of a broader 
community development and community economic development initiative. 
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C. Governance of the Initiative 
• The governance of DOVE is based upon a formal hierarchy which aims to be as 
flat as possible in accordance with the aims of the initiative, tension are rarely 
encountered and the day-to-day decision-making process is relatively informal, 
but it is held to account by the number of partners in the strategic board. 
D. Community embeddedness 
• DOVE is based in the community in an old NCB building, and the workers in the 
initiative are members of the community itself, the initiative has grown to 
becomes a key part of the community life, and is held in high regard within the 
locality and beyond. This has been cemented by the role that DOVE has played in 
developing the local community economically, educationally and socially. 
E. Role of Agency in Enhancing the Initiative. 
• Agency had been key to the development of the initiative both in the past and 
currently. However, the presence of well-skilled women to set up the initiative 
has created- a framework in which other women are developing as the initiative 
grows, thus creating the conditions for the long-term stability of the initiative. 
The initiative does not rely upon the presence of outside professionals, although 
experts are required in the case of specialist teaching. Some lower-scale courses 
are gradually being taken over by people who have been through courses at 
DOVE. 
• There is a significant level of identification with the users and workers in the 
initiative, as most come from the village. This also sets the initiative as different 
from mainstream providers as it is valued due to its identification as a tool to 
encourage participation and subsequent embeddedness of the initiative within the 
community. 
F. Relationship with external partners 
• The Workshop collaborates with such organisation as the Department of Adult 
Continuing Education at the University of Wales Swansea, Neath College, and 
the Workers Education Association (WEA). It is also a member of IRIS, the 
European Network of Women's Training. 
• Close relationships are held with other local third sector initiatives, most notably 
the sister initiative in the neighbouring valley, the Glyn-neath training centre. 
DOVE also accepts recommended trainees from the initiative at Ystalyfera in a 
neighbouring valley (see appendix 1.7). The relationship with local authorities is 
good, although this is not too close as DOVE secures significant funds from 
national and European bodies outside the auspices of the local authority. 
G. Position relative to other service providers 
• The target groups of users were originally the women of the communities of 
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Banwen and Onllwyn, though this has broadened out to become the whole 
community. The initiative fills a previously unfilled niches in that educational 
establishments, including the WEA, which were more associated with the mine, 
became less able to exert influence and provide suitable educational opportunities 
for the community. There was therefore a need for the provision of adult learning, 
community development and community economic development due to the 
dearth of public or voluntary sector provision in the area. 
H. Institutional Learning 
• The initiative has evolved significantly over the 15 years of operation, although 
the essential basis remains the same. Ambitions to becomes fully self-sustaining 
and independent, and with a degree of economic sustainability through 
community enterprises and through initiating private sector business, remains a 
goal. Mentions are made of the model of the AVE, which was set up at a similar 
time, as a means through which to potentially develop the basis for sustainability. 
Formal Interviews with managers, beneficiaries and volunteers 
Mair Francis Initiative Co-ordinator 
Julie Bibby Part-Time financial and 
Admin Worker 
Lesley Smith Part-Time worker. Educated 
at DOVE 
Moira Lewis Founder- member 
Sharon Dickson DOVE user 
Other related interviews: 
Colin Ede Economic Development, 
Neath Port-Talbot BC 
Carolyn Lewis Neath Port-Talbot College 
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Appendix 1.6 
Dulais Valley Partnership (DVP) 
1. General Information on the Initiative: 
Origin and Aims of the Initiative 
The Dulais Valley Partnership was also set up in 1996 to address the economic 
and social problems witnessed in the valley in the post mining years and accordingly, a 
'Strategy For Regeneration' was developed. Nant-y-Cafn Inward Investment Site had 
been established as an element of this strategy, and phase I of development is now 
complete. The local authority (Neath Port Talbot County Borough Council), are the lead 
agency in terms of the marketing and promotion of the Nant-y-Cafn Site, however, the 
DVP and partnership organisations are supportive of the phase II development. 
The Dulais Valley has traditionally been an agricultural and industrial area. The 
target comprises the 3 communities of Onllwyn, Seven Sisters and Crynant. The decline 
in the mining industry caused large scale closures with Blaenant Colliery being the last pit 
to close in May 1990. Since this time, a number of different agencies have been brought 
together to stimulate economic activity in the area. The Target area population is roughly 
5,800, of whom the Resident labour force is roughly 1700-1800. Unemployment is at 
over 12%; 75 % of the unemployed are male, of whom the majority are long-term 
unemployed. There are low levels of self employment, while valleys businesses remain 
small. However, there is still significant local employment from drift and open-cast 
mining, coalmining once dominant; this is unable to meet local employment needs now. 
New industry failed to move in to meet the employment deficit. The result is the 
requirement for an intensive and long-term community-based approach targeting social 
and economic deprivations. The vision is therefore to create a vibrant valley community 
which is rejuvenated, resilient and self-sustaining in economic, social, educational and 
environmental terms. 
Key Partners and Funding Bodies 
o Neath Port Talbot County Borough Council 
• Swansea University 
• Neath college 
• West Wales TEC 
• Business connect NPT 
• DOVE workshop 
Local Data: Indices of Deprivation (2000) 
NB: The DVP covers 3 wards and as such a variation is seen from the lower valley 




Index of multiple deprivation score 
Rank of index of multiple deprivation rank 
Employment domain score 
Rank of employment domain 
53.69 
34 (out of 865 divisions) 
31.06 
19 (out of 865 divisions) 
Crynant 
Index of multiple deprivation score 
Rank of index of multiple deprivation rank 
Employment domain score 










Index of multiple deprivation score 
Rank of index of multiple deprivation rank 
Employment domain score 
Rank of employment domain 
39.52 
97 (out of 865 divisions) 
25.49 
76 (out of 865 divisions) 
2. Outputs and Outcomes from the Initiative: 
Quantifiable Outputs: (1999) 
Clients into employment and jobs safeguarded: 9 
Clients into careers consultation: 76 
Clients into training and education-
in association with D O V E workshop 31 
Non -quantifiable outputs: 
Social effects; community and individual confidence. 
• DVP produces some evidence of an increased community confidence, 
although this is limited to those particular individuals who have been 
involved in employment or training as opposed to the community as a 
whole. DVP has yet to engage fu l ly with the community, and there is little 
cohesion in the target communities. 
• DVP's arts and history projects have helped to revitalise a sense of 
belonging in what is a very deprived area. 
Development potential of the area 
• As yet, some beneficial moves have been created with the joint working 
the Crynant business park to create employment and reining opportunities 
for residents o f the upper Dulais valley. Hopes are that the DVP w i l l help 
to promote such opportunities. However, this is crucially dependent upon 
private sector investment. 
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Changing culture 
• Some new initiatives have been stimulated by the DVP to promote a 
culture of training and enterprise. However, residents o f the Dulais valley 
remain stubbornly attached to the idea of big employers and the mine as 
the sole route to employment. 
• The DVP has helped to engender a sense of community in some scale 
projects without this remains sporadic and patchy. 
Environmental impact 
• In the future, DVP hopes to be able to promote environmental regeneration 
projects as part o f an attempt to improve training facilities and 
environmental improvement in the area. 
Assessment/Evaluation of Initiative 
Key factors in success of the initiative 
Mechanism of provision 
• The mechanism involves 4 strands o f action: 
1. Employment and business development 
2. Community resources and social development 
3. Tourism and environment 
4. Transportation and accessibility 
• Together, these offer a potential set o f activities to meet many of the 
residents o f the upper Dulais valley. This however has not been carried out 
an adequate scale to fu l ly impinge on the development o f the valley. 
Governance 
• The hierarchical division o f power is essentially top-down, as Lynette 
Newington and Brian Aherne are both employees. As such these workers 
take their cues f rom above- funders, local authority and the strategic board. 
Lynette Newington possesses day-to-day executive control; Brian Aherne 
is responsible for other elements o f provision including jobs clubs. At the 
time o f writing no significant tensions had surfaced; this also produced a 
propitious working relationship. 
• The governance o f the initiative is therefore essentially top-down. 
Consultation occurs, but this is not fu l ly embedded in the governance 
structure. This w i l l change over time as the initiative attempts to becomes 
more embedded within the target community 
External Environment 
• The external environment o f the DVP is characterised by a number o f 
social problems: 
1. Ageing and retired population 
2. Out-migration o f younger and better-qualified people 
3. Low mobility 
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4. Relatively high household size 
• This has limited the DVP's ability to engage the community due to a 
relative dearth o f skills and abilities to bring to the third sector. 
• The DVP has good relations with the local authority and other mainstream 
service providers in education and employment, but has yet to engage fu l ly 
with its target community. As such, many of the services on offer suffer 
from both sub-optimal usage and a lack o f innovative community input 
Key failings of the Initiative: 
• The DVP is yet to be fu l ly embedded in the target community, as it is 
regarded as being a top-down initiative and has yet to engage fu l ly with 
the existing population groups. It is still accepted that the initiative needs 
to have more engagement, or to become more bottom-up. 
Lessons for transferability? 
« The DVP has yet to distinguish adequate impact to draw transferable 
lessons. However, the use of existing premised as part o f an attempt to 
minimise initial cost outlay has been successful. 
3. Processes 
A. Funding/Financial situation 
• The management o f funding is f rom a series o f local authorities, TECs and 
private partnerships, also the Welsh Office and Assembly. The local 
authority acts as the accountable body- 6 monthly reports required. 
Evaluation and accountability done by reports; the partnership is audited 
yearly. Funding applications are mostly done in-house, also a significant 
level o f support f rom Neath Port-Talbot borough council. 
• Funds f rom NPT, the local authority, are on a 5-year basis. There are also 
some discretionary funds f rom NPT. Many other smaller, project-based 
funds o f varying duration; these are dependent upon the discretionary 
powers o f the funding bodies. 
B. Targets set by the initiative; output-led funding 
• DVP has holistic aims, within these many employment and training-related 
outputs. This broad vision and mission lead to some confusion; this is 
justified by the essentially broad needs o f the 3 Dulais valley communities. 
The partnership aims to be as holistic as possible, but therefore encounters 
some confusion as resources and funds are stretched. More attempts w i l l 
be made to address this in future, wi th concerted efforts to advertise the 
role o f the partnership within the locality and spread word of mouth. 
• The outputs specified are dependent upon each project and funder. Most 
are local authority-controlled, and are therefore less dependent upon 
results. There is some acceptance o f non -measurable outputs and 
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outcomes as part o f the CED /CD process. The employees admit that some 
programme bending has to occur; this is due to the needs which appeared 
which the partnership feels it ought to address as part o f the holistic 
development scheme. However, programme bending only operates at a 
small scale, and therefore there are no significant problems. Funders 
regard this as a desirable use o f discretionary funds to address needs as 
part o f a more holistic development package. 
C. Governance of the Initiative 
• The communities o f the valleys work together and in partnership with key 
organisations f rom the publics, private and voluntary spheres to maximise 
opportunities, solve problems and meet the needs o f the communities. 
Inaugural board-
o Local residents, one from each o f the 3 communities. 
o NPT county borough council-member for each o f 3 local wards and 
chairman o f the development and consumer services committee, 
o Community councils- one member f rom each o f the 3 local 
community councils, 
o Voluntary organisation forum-3 representatives, 
o Local agent o f the local MP. 
o Swansea University, 
o Neath College, 
o West Wales TEC. 
o Business connect NPT. 
o DOVE workshop. 
• The partnership was still operating at a small scale, therefore decision are 
taken ad-hoc, as and when they are needed by Lynette Newington and 
Brian Aherne. However, close consultation with the local authority and 
other partners produces s key elements in moving forward together. There 
is an acceptance that although informal at the moment, the decision-
making process may need to be formalised in the future. 
• The day-to-day decision making process is essentially informal, within the 
bounds set by the funders. Control over petty cash rests with the 
employees; however, larger funding bids have to be submitted to NPT or 
the TEC, dependent upon the nature o f the funding being sought. Strategic 
decision-making is taken through a range o f partners. They meet monthly 
at the time of writing. The local authority holds much power as the 
authority is the key funding partner. However, there are also indications 
that the community is becoming more involved in the process, with close 
associations with other organisations such as DOVE. 
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D. Community embeddedness 
• Pre-partnership consultation and evaluations of the Dulais valley's economic and 
social problems occurred. This involved a 10% household survey funded by 
British telecom and the community development foundation; needs and 
opportunities analysis; public consultation exercise in 3 communities 
• There have also been significant local studies under the auspices of the 
partnership, and a constant re-evaluation of the impact of the partnership. Brain 
Aherne regards informal consultation as also part of his job; " to get to know 
what people want, what people think about the place, and to act on it". Periodic 
formal consultation occurs, but there is no strict mechanism for this. DVP still 
remains essentially top-down, although with gradually a more responsive, 
community orientation. As a result, DVP is still subject to the structures which 
set up the partnership. In time the hope is for a more community input (as seen at 
Ystalyfera) to influence decision-making and make it more responsive. 
• The partnership office is situated in a small ex-BT property in Seven Sisters, on 
the main road through the 3 main communities of Onllwyn, Seven Sisters and 
Crynant. This is adequately central, although the target area is such that distances 
may still be considerable to reach the partnership's offices. 
• There is a perception of the DVP as a local authority initiative, rather than being 
fully embedded. 
E. Role of Agency in Enhancing the Initiative. 
• Original members are key actors; however, neither employee lives in the 
community, and as such there is a detachment from the community itself. Some 
identification in that the partnership has been active within the community itself, 
thus helping it to become embedded and accepted as a valued part of the 
community. As Lynette Newington states, " we still have lot of work to do get 
known, to really get us appreciated" 
• No tensions identified between workers or users internally to the initiative. 
F. Relationship with external partners 
• The Dulais Valley Partnership works closely with the Crynant Business Centre 
and the Dove Workshop, Banwen in order to ensure a collaborative approach to 
identify new business and training opportunities and also to support existing 
businesses located in the valley. The Business Forum provides an opportunity for 
networking and joint marketing and comprises a group of individuals drawn from 
the local business community. 
• A good relationship exists with the local authority, with lots of support and use of 
networks. Lynette Newington used to be a local authority employee. This 
enables the initiative in the short-term to be able to use the resources of the local 
authority. In the long-term, there is acceptance that this may be a limiting factor 
on the initiative i f genuine community involvement is not fostered. Some 
tentative links have been formed with the Development Trusts Association; this is 
regarded as being a good 'talking shop' and useful elements come out of this. 
However, still feels that the partnership is more closely bound with the local 
authority as key partners. 
• Private sector partnerships are yet to be created (see also Low Simonside, 
appendix 1.11); There are associations with Crynant business park- to create 
employment and training 
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G. Position relative to other service providers 
• Effectively much of the work performed by the DVP is that which could be done 
by the state. However, a seen with the St Simon's Community Project (appendix 
1.12), many of the projects succeed precisely because the mode of operation is 
regarded as separate from state services. The partnership seeks to act as an 
umbrella group in an enabling role to help provide the possibilities for 
community engagements. The actual running of the initiative is very top-down, 
although hopes are that this wil l change over time to become more bottom-up as 
it becomes more embedded within the community. However, DVP is 
organisationally different from the state and has been accepted to some extent as 
different. 
Formal Interviews with managers, beneficiaries and volunteers 
Lynette Newington Project manager 
Brian Aherne Project Deputy; job club 
co-ordinator 
Lesley Smith DOVE and also member o f 
Steering committee, DVP 
Barry Roberts Job club user 
Other related interviews 
Colin Ede Economic Development, 
Neath Port-Talbot BC 
Jane Elliott Community University o f the 
Valleys 
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Appendix 1. 7 
Ystalyfera Development Trust 
1.Genera! Information on the Initiative 
Origin and Aims of Initiative: 
Ystalyfera Development Trust is a community regeneration partnership that 
brings together the community, local businesses and the local authority to improve the 
social and economic well-being of a Welsh speaking village in the Swansea Valley. The 
general aim of YDT is to improve conditions for the entire town by regenerating the 
economy and providing an asset base for the future. YDT aims to regenerate the 
physical, social and economic well-being of the village of Ystalyfera. The town has 
experienced high rates of unemployment and other forms of social deprivation since the 
running down of traditional industry in the area. The town of Ystalyfera has a population 
of3,500. 
YDT was established in 1994 as an exit strategy to manage and develop the assets 
purchased by an Urban Regeneration Strategy Partnership between West Glamorgan 
County Council, Lliw Valley Borough council and the West Wales TEC. This had begun 
the physical improvement of the town with a grant of £750,000 to purchase of buildings 
in the town and establish community businesses within them. Through a partnership with 
the Family Housing Association TEC Challenge funds were secured for the first two 
years. The initiative was unsuccessful in a bid to secure SDS funds from the Welsh 
Office but was able to obtain additional funds under ERDF Objective 2 which enabled it 
to continue. 
Key Partners and Funding Bodies 
• Neath Port-Talbot BC 
• ERDF 
• W C V O 
• Neath College 
• West Wales TEC 
• Workers Education Association 
• Development Trusts Association 
Local Data: Indices of Deprivation (2000) 
Ystalyfera 
Index of multiple deprivation score 50.12 
Rank of index of multiple deprivation rank 48 (out of 865 divisions) 
Employment domain score 29.93 
Rank of employment domain 29 (out of 865 divisions) 
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2. Outputs and Outcomes from the Initiative: 
Quantifiable Outputs: (1999) 
Clients into employment, including direct .29 
indirect: 9 in community enterprises 
Clients into training- 30 people attend recreational and return to 
learn courses on a regular basis 
Non -quantifiable outputs: 
Social effects; community and individual confidence. 
• YDT is involved in a number of community development projects which aim to 
increase engagement by a number of groups within the village. This has led to a 
significant degree of community engagement, particularly a number of trustees 
who had lost jobs from mining and local industry. YDT also aims to develop 
community spirit through the Gwyl Festival. 
• The cafe Y Gegin Fach, which is now located in a YDT property, is deemed to 
have had a significant impact, particularly for the elderly, as a meeting place and 
social institution. 
Development potential of the area 
• Through its ownership of many rented workspaces, the YDT has been able to 
promote commercial activities within the village. This has attracted 3 small 
businesses, which may otherwise have had difficulty in finding premises within 
the village. 
• Over the period 1994-1999, YDT was able to attract approximately £3m of new 
investment in the locality and has seen the creation of 39 new jobs 
• The Tiddlywinks Nursery, is now operational and creates a facility for parents 
who wish to take up work. YDT's extensive training is also hoped to bring 
employers to the area in the future. 
Changing culture 
• Ystalyfera demonstrated the typical attributes of an ex-mining and industrial 
community which has struggled to come to terms with the loss of its primary 
employers. There is still an engrained attitude which views self employment and 
enterprise sceptically. However, the members of the trust have demonstrated a 
keenness to be involved in the educational services ad courses provided by YDT. 
The trust hopes in the future, to develop community democracy to empower local 
people by providing them with information. The aim is to replace the functions 
performed by Chapels and Workers Institutes through community consultation, 
outreach and the Internet. The trust has also revived the local Gwyl festival (now 
in its 6 t h year) under the auspices of the trust and in partnership with other 
institutions. This aims is to create an event through which to engage the local 
population and beyond, to restore the vibrant social structures which existed in 
the period of full employment. 
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Environmental impact 
• YDT has already been able to help reduce crime in the area, has begun the 
process of physically regenerating the town centre. This was badly needed after 
several years of decline which saw the fabric of the once vibrant village become 
run-down. YDT has attracted local authority partners to enhance their range and 
scale of environmental services in the village. 
Assessment/Evaluation of Initiative 
Key factors in success of the initiative 
Mechanism of provision 
• YDT is a development trust and partnership organisation that aims to regenerate 
the physical, social and economic well-being of the village of Ystalyfera. The 
town has experienced high rates of unemployment and other forms of social 
deprivation since the running down of traditional industry in the area. This has 
therefore sought to bring about a holistic change in the community by addressing 
a number of needs. 
• YDT aims to promote sustainable development in the village by identifying and 
providing information about community needs, acting as a focal point for the 
community, representing the village to the local authority, creating opportunities 
for regeneration through the refurbishment of properties and the provision of 
relevant training and assisting in the establishment of community businesses. 
• YDT now owns a number of properties in the town that are used in various ways 
as venues for community enterprises, social housing or as means of securing 
income through commercial leases. Much of the work of the Trust is carried out 
by its commercial arm, Regeneration Through Partnership Ltd., which underpins 
the regeneration process and acts as the holding company for the Trust's assets. 
This has assisted the development of funds for core YDT activities. 
Governance 
• YDT employs a small core staff of 4 and as such day-to-day governance issues 
are dealt with at a relatively informal basis, weekly meetings are used to decide 
key financial and strategic moves. 
• The community are directly involved in the planning and running of YDT, with 
an increasing number of places on the strategic management board. This works 
well in co-ordination with the day-to-day management employees to produce a 
coherent vision for the YDT and agrees a means to do this. 
• The transition from top-down partnership to 'bottom up' development trust has 
been key in the governance oaf the initiative. The strategic management is a 
strong board, which comprises community members, partners and workers. This 
therefore provides a coherent basis for the trust to develop. 
External Environment 
• Ystalyfera has a strong community identity and a tradition of local political 
activism and involvement. There are numerous community groups which are also 
present, and associated with the trust to provide a coherent response to local 
needs as they are identified. The social capital of the locality therefore represents 
a more vibrant base on which to develop the locality, despite the relatively poor 
economic situation of the village. This willingness to become involved is cited as 
a key element in the trust's development so far. 
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• Other initiatives include the development of community democracy to empower 
local people by providing them with information. The aim is to compensate for 
the functions performed by Chapels and Workers Institutes through community 
consultation, outreach and the Internet. 
Key failings of the Initiative: 
• YDT demonstrates few failings, although this has been achieved with the input of 
roughly £1.5m over 5 years to develop the trust, this has enabled the trust to buy 
properties, although the trust is still far from being able to achieve sustainability 
as the trust requires constant funding to underwrite its activates. 
Lessons for transferability? 
• YDT has demonstrated the possibility of an extremely top-down initiative 
becoming community-based as part of an exit strategy, and as such has the 
potential to transfer powers from statutory agencies to local communities is 
demonstrated by Ystalyfera. However, the YDT has been the beneficiary of a 
number of large funding streams to develop such a organisational framework, not 
least through the purchase of 5 properties within village. 
3. Processes 
A. Funding/Financial situation 
• YDT is closely monitored by funding bodies, particularly concerning ERDF 
funds. Since all the Trust's buildings are in occupation assessment has been very 
favourable from Europe. The Local Authority has a representative on the board of 
trustees and thus is able to monitor directly the progress of the project. 
• YDT has a dedicated financial administrator with several years experience. The 
trust benefits from a number of funding streams, mostly from Europe, to develop 
its activities. With a large capital input from the exit strategy, this also allowed 
funds to be concentred on revenue streams. 
B. Targets set by the initiative; output-led funding 
• The project offers a variety of vocational and non-vocational courses. YDT has a 
broad remit which aims to regenerate the community as a whole. To that end it 
combines community enterprise development, normal commercial activity and 
the provision of needed social services. Al l of these activities are designed to 
work together and to involve local people. 
• In combination with the physical refurbishment of the town centre the community 
is given a focal point around which broader social aims and economic 
development can be achieved. 
• The extent to which funding is dependent on outcomes varies according to the 
purpose for which it has been secured, Since all the buildings owned by the Trust 
are occupied either by small businesses or by housing or both, YDT has fulfilled 
ERDF requirements. The Local Authority is represented on the board of Trustees 
so they have a stake in the running of the project as well as its funding. 
C. Governance of the Initiative 
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• YDT acts as the core of the community regeneration partnership, developing new 
projects and co-ordinating funding. It is a membership organisation which 
currently has over 160 members drawn from the local community. 
• There is a board of trustees which consists of representatives of the local 
community, local authority, local churches and other professional agencies. 
• The core project has a small staff consisting of a Manager, a Community 
Development Worker and an Administrator. 
• The commercial arm of the project, Regeneration Through Partnership Ltd. 
(RTP), is responsible for the Trusts assets and for the support of the community 
businesses. It owns the Trust's five properties in the village which are let as a 
mixture of Commercial, Community and residential units. 
• YDT also carries out extensive local consultation through focus and discussion 
groups and through informal networks in the community. 
D. Community embeddedness 
• As it has developed, YDT has changed from being an essentially top-down 
initiative to being properly community led with a high level of community 
membership and involvement. 
• Ystalyfera has a wide range of social problems associated with the economic 
deterioration of the village which means that YDT must meet a variety of 
differing social needs. The numbers involved vary over time as the initiative is 
able to branch out into new areas of work. 
• The community are directly involved in the planning and running of YDT. 
Community needs are identified through discussion workshops and community 
audits and the Trust supports 16 groups in Ystalyfera. The initiative has moved 
from having a traditional and rather paternalistic organisation established by 
service and local government professionals to a properly integrated community 
project. Ystalyfera has a strong community identity and a tradition of local 
political activism and involvement. 64% of the local population are Welsh-
speaking which adds to the sense of community and identity. 
• YDT has over 160 members in the locality, each of whom receive a bilingual 
newsletter and other project literature. YDT also carries out extensive local 
consultation through focus and discussion groups and through informal networks 
in the community. 
E. Role of Agency in Enhancing the Initiative. 
• The trustees and directors of the initiative are volunteers drawn largely from the 
local area and are directly involved in the running and management of the 
initiative. Individual agents are key in developing the embeddedness of the trust 
within the community, although the trust has been able to cope with a number of 
personnel changes though its relatively robust organisational framework which 
has a number f partners in funding streams. 
F. Relationship with external partners 
• YDT has close partnership arrangements with several other local and national 
bodies, including: the Development Trusts Association, the Small Firms 
Association, the Workers Educational Association, the Family Housing 
Association, the Wales Council for Voluntary Action, Business in the 
Community, the local TEC and the Local Authority. This has allowed YDT to 
take advantage of these institution's resources and networks, thus allowing it to 
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form partnerships in funding applications for which it has profited. 
G. Position relative to other service providers 
• YDT is developing new projects such as Ystalyfera Economic Support Services 
(YESS) which will offer support to new businesses in the town, and the 
Ystalyfera Telecentre. YDT wil l offer the self-employment option through the 
New Deal Pathfinder Area in which it falls. YDT is therefore in a position to be 
complementary to the mainstream service providers, but regards this as a means 
to develop a more holistic development scheme. 
Formal Interviews with managers, beneficiaries and volunteers 
Chris Owen Trust Director 
Clive Thompson Community Access Point Co-
ordinator 
Judith Bevan Former head of the YDT form 
its inception as an exit strategy 
from the Urban Regeneration 
Strategy Partnership. 
Alyn Llewellyn Board member of YDT and 
Chair of Tiddlywinks Nursery 
Gareth Davies IT course Trainee 
Adrian Davies Manager, Y Gegin Fach 
Cafe; trustee and committee 
member, Ystalyfera 
Development Trust 
Other related interviews 
Tony Potts West Wales TEC 
Colin Ede Neath Port-Talbot BC 
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Appendix 1.8 
Sherburn Road Regeneration Initiative 
1. General Information on the Initiative 
Origin and Aims of Initiative: 
The Sherburn Road Regeneration Initiative began 1996, as a top-down 
regeneration initiative. The aim, in partnership with local residents, is to bring about the 
regeneration of the area through a comprehensive, multi-agency and integrated strategy. 
This comprised a number of partnerships with locally existing agencies to produce small-
scale projects within the estate to achieve an holistic set of aims including the 
improvement of the environment, social, housing, economic and crime situation in the 
estate. To do this, the SRRI incorporates a number of initiatives, including: Milestones, 
Flying start, Rapid response squad, Top and bottom furniture project, a child care project, 
and Community economic development and business start-up. 
The SRRI was set up under the leadership of Durham City Council (the local 
district Council) and the partnership is essentially top-down. The Sherburn Road 
Regeneration Initiative represents by far the largest investment by far of the case studies 
looked at here, comprising £4.2m SRB funding and £9.0 million other funding over the 
period 1996-2003. This allows the concentration of funds and more impact to be made in 
a short period of time. The Sherburn Road Estate on which the partnership is based lies 
IVi miles east of Durham city centre. The estate comprises 600 dwellings and 2000 
people. 
Key Partners and Funding Bodies 
• Durham City Council 
• Durham County Council 
• Leach Homes 
• Three Rivers Housing Association 
• Groundwork Trust 
• Durham Constabulary 
NB: The Sherburn Road Estate itself is too small to warrant its own ward-level statistics 
and as such has been merged with the broader area of Gilesgate Moor. 
Local Data: Indices of Deprivation (2000) 
Gilesgate Moor: 
Index of multiple deprivation score 
Rank of index of multiple deprivation rank 
Employment domain score 
20.37 
3485(out of 8414 wards) 
12.38 
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Rank of employment domain 2311 (out of 8414 wards) 
2. Outputs and Outcomes from the Initiative: 
Quantifiable Outputs (1999-2000) 
Clients into employment 10 jobs created ( + 9 lifetime) 
Jobs have been created for residents: 
Rapid response squad 
Housing improvements: local labour: 
Top and Bottom Furniture project: 
Community development assistants: 
New business start-ups: 
Clients into training-
Community enterprise start-ups: 
6 jobs 
8 jobs 
1 job and more expected 
3 jobs 
2 (6 in total) 
23 obtaining qualifications 
8 
Unemployment fell from 24% in 1991 to 18% 1998 
Non -quantifiable outcomes: 
Social effects; community and individual confidence. 
« There has been an increase in social interactions within the estate; those 
interviewees who have experienced training and employment regard the 
SRRI as having been of great benefit individually. 
Development potential of the area 
• The development potential o f the area has been significantly increased by 
the actins o f the partnership, although this has been limited a relatively 
micro-scale impact. However, the partnership hopes to take advantage o f 
the Sherburn road estate's position on the edge of Durham city, with its 
administrative and educational functions. Employment f rom industry near 
the estate which has disappeared is gradually being replaced by service 
functions. 
Changing culture 
• Mixed views; some residents feel a new start has been made by the estate; 
others feel the same mix o f people w i l l lead to an eventual degeneration o f 
l iving conditions once funding has left the estate. However, as the impact 
o f the SRRI has significantly changed the external perception o f the 
estate. Crime has dropped dramatically. 
Environmental impact 
• Significant improvements to the fabric o f the estate, with landscaping, 
children's play areas, gardening and fence reconstruction; also traffic 
calming measures. 
• There have also been a number o f new homes built in the estate by private 
contractors, Leach Homes, which has improved the mix o f tenures on the 
estate. 
• The area is cleaner and tidier, thanks to the Rapid Response Squad, an 
environmental task force employing residents. 
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Assessment/Evaluation of Initiative 
Key factors in success of the initiative 
Mechanism of provision 
• The Sherburn Road Regeneration Initiative is essentially a top-down 
partnership o f a number o f agencies to promote a holistic development 
framework for the estate. This has focused upon multiple objectives to 
enhance training, educational and employment prospects. 
• This has therefore had an impact across a number o f sectors in the 
Sherburn road estate, while remaining dependent upon broader labour 
market conditions to improve significantly the chance o f employment for 
residents. 
• Individual targets are: 
1. Improve the local economy 
2. Improve housing conditions 
3. Improve the environment 
4. Reduce crime and improve community safety 
5. Improve the quality of life for local people and build a stronger community 
Governance 
• The partnership approach appears to have worked well , with co-ordination 
of a number o f agencies. This involved a hub and spoke design- which 
allowed the central co-ordination o f a number o f outside agencies. Despite 
the top-down nature o f the partnership, this has still allowed some 
community input through official channels, though this has resulted in 
only a minor influence upon decision-making. 
• Money has always been available; the partnership has not had to address 
questions o f looking for funds. Many of the targets which had been 
allocated were achievable due to the fragmented nature o f the partnership 
process, thus giving responsibility to a particular agency. 
• The SRRI enjoys good relations wi th Durham City Council, wi th many of 
the employees o f SRRI formerly working for the council. The SRRI has 
therefore been able to tap into many of the city council's resources. 
External Environment 
• Before the inception o f the partnership, the estate was lacking confidence, 
with a number o f disaffected youths and many drug problems. 
Environmentally it was poor, with a reputation for joblessness and crime. 
The estate, while lacking many of the features o f social capital suggested 
in the literatures, nonetheless had a sense o f community referred to by 
locals. The turnover o f population in the estate was not as rapid as was the 
case with Trebanog/ Waun Wen (appendix 1.3); the demographic split was 
more towards the older end. 
• People did not talk in terms o f an industrial social capital; any memory o f 
mines had disappeared well before the period in question. The estate was 
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built an evolved into a part o f the wider auspices o f Durham City and the 
employment functions within that. There are generational aspects of the 
social capital; interviewees talk o f a more fixed community in the past, and 
note a general disregard o f the younger generation. However, the initiative 
did intend to engage younger people in the development o f activities, job 
creation and training. 
Key failings of the Initiative: 
• Value for money: the Sherburn Road Regeneration Initiative has spent a 
considerable sum on a relatively small area, with observable results. 
However the impact has been more o f a kick-start than a long-term 
solution to the problems o f the area. Some community businesses have 
been created, ( most notably the Top and Bottom Furniture Recycling 
Group). However, many of these are still dependent upon the formal 
economy to continue the development o f the estate. Many of the projects 
within the partnership also failed to reach the more disaffected o f the youth 
population in the estate. 
• Outside private sector development is a key part o f the long-term needs o f 
the SRP, which the limited lifespan o f the key funding streams may fail to 
address i f no coherent exit strategy is formed. Job creation has aided the 
development of the partnership and succeeded in smoothing the 
partnership's progress. 
Lessons for transferability? 
• The SRRI acted as a large-scale regeneration fund, and as such the lessons 
are limited due to the size o f funding available. However, the ability o f 
agencies to work together towards common goal within a framework 
which is co-ordinated at the centre may demonstrate a potential manner for 
other partnerships to operate inter-agency responses. 
3. Processes 
A. Funding/Financial situation 
• Funding is significant in scale; £ 13.2m over 5 years. Due to the nature o f 
funding the accountable bodies were widespread, although Sherburn Road 
Regeneration Initiative has to produce evaluation documents to ensure the 
proper use a o f funds for which it was accountable. 
• Break-down of funding: Partnership led by Durham City council 
SRB £4.2 m 
Private £4.5 m 
Estate Challenge - used by 3 
Rivers Housing Association to 
improve properties, matched 
with own resources 
£3.2m 
Other public £1.1 m 
ESF/ERDF (Obj 2 /priority 4) £0.2 m 
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Total funds £13.2 mil l ion 
B. Targets set by the initiative; output-led funding 
• Each target was set by the individual funding agency, relevant to the 
particular stream of operation. The result has been funding which is 
directly related to outputs form the initiative, although these have been 
seen to have variable relation to the individual stream funded. There has 
been some discretion shown by elements o f the partnership in that it funds 
have now been used to meet less tangible targets where this has been 
appropriate. However, this has still depended upon the meeting o f formal 
targets. 
C. Governance of the Initiative 
• The Sherburn Road Regeneration Initiative involves multi-agency 
approach very much at the institutional level, with a degree o f co-
ordination and support for many of the individual projects. Lots o f 
institutional support, is present, through local authorities and the presence 
of interested parties as part o f a broader remit. 
• Essentially top-down; a multi-agency partnership approach as dictated and 
advised by the government. 
• The partnership has the support o f many in the local authority, Durham 
City Council. SRRI demonstrates a multi-agency approach which did not 
produce any problems with duplication or conflict within the partnership. 
Community engagement in the management o f the partnership has been 
limited; the aim was to provide a framework into which the long-term 
development o f the estate could f i t . 
D. Community embeddedness 
• Consultation was embedded within the partnership, and the community 
development workers installed as part o f the partnership offered a conduit 
for information. However the sheer scale o f the partnership meant that a 
lot o f the information could not be acted upon. Residents had the feeling 
o f something being imposed which they could jo in , rather than something 
which was under their control. However, many of the residents expressed a 
great deal o f thanks at the work that had been done. The improvements to 
street lighting, CCTV (though some regarded this as intrusive) and traffic 
calming were very much appreciated - interviewees therefore suggest the 
need for observable results. The more f lu id , ambiguous developments 
were mentioned less. 
E. Role of Agency in Enhancing the Initiative. 
• While individual agents have been important in the creation o f particular 
streams of operation, the overall assessment o f the partnership is that 
individuals have had a relatively limited impact upon the initiative. The 
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partnership is far more concerned with institutional co-ordination rather 
than individual input. 
F. Relationship with external partners 
• The SRRI has a strong relationship with other service providers. Indeed 
this is the very nature o f the partnership. These are summarised above. The 
nature o f this relationship is concerned with partnership working, and 
represents a hub and spoke mechanism to facilitate this 
G. Position relative to other service providers 
• Many o f the services and inputs created in the Sherburn Road 
Regeneration Initiative are those which could be done by mainstream 
service providers. However, there are a number o f projects which have 
been specifically tailored to the estate, most notably the police efforts to 
improve crime detection through CCTV and extra police in the area. 
• Only the Top and Bottom Furniture Recycling Scheme demonstrates a 
potential third sector community business in that it meets the needs o f the 
population in terms of cheap furniture through the use o f local unemployed 
labour in the restoration process 
Formal Interviews with managers, beneficiaries and volunteers 
Ernest Dobson Leader o f the Sherburn 
Road Regeneration 
Initiative 
Dave Hall Local co-ordinator, Rapid 
Response Squad 
Nigel Dowd Trainee, Rapid Response 
Squad 
Rena Howe Top and Bottom furniture 
recycling project 
Sue Syson Community development 
worker employed by SRRI 




Spennymoor Training Initiative 
1.General Information on the Initiative 
Origin and Aims of Initiative: 
The Spennymoor Training Initiative began in 1994 on the Bessemer Park estate in 
Spennymoor, with a number of concerned residents who identified the need for 
community based training providing on-the doorstep training to meet their needs and 
enabling them to access wise range of community based education and training 
opportunities which could lead to employment. A Skills survey carried out which 
identified, giving impetus to the conversion of a former British gas depot (the 'gasworks 
site' into the original premises of the initiative. As part of the original aims of the STI, 
training and employment creation featured as part of remit to enhance the educational and 
economic standing of the estate. As part of this, the STI sought to both improve access to 
training opportunities and seek to create the conditions for self- employment through 
training and community business, However, the focus on the elements of community 
economic development were allowed to decline as it was realised that there was 
significant need for the development of individuals before the step could be made into 
self- employment or community business. 
Partnership working was crucial although the vision of a training initiative was 
the idea of residents, a large number of public and third sector agencies were involved, 
most notably Bishop Auckland College. 
Key Partners and Funding Bodies 
• County Durham TEC 
• Bishop Auckland College 
• Spennymoor Town Council 
• Spennymoor Youth and Community Centre 
» Sedgefield Borough Council 
Local Data: Indices of Deprivation (2000) 
Spennymoor: 
Index of multiple deprivation score 
Rank of index of multiple deprivation rank 
Employment domain score 
Rank of employment domain 
22.78 
3041 (out of 8414 wards) 
12.65 
2228 (out of 8414 wards) 
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2. Outputs and Outcomes from the Initiative: 
Quantifiable Outputs: (1998-1999) 
Jobs Safeguarded: 2 
People trained and obtaining Qualifications: 433 
Residents in Spennymoor accessing 
employment through training: 20 
People trained obtaining jobs: 31 
Young People benefiting f rom personal 
and social development projects 332 
Non -quantifiable outputs: 
Social effects; community and individual confidence. 
• The courses and opportunities for social interaction, particularly in the 
past, significantly increased the confidence o f individuals who have been 
involved in the initiative. This impact has been continued through into the 
current period, with interviewees noting the role the STI plays in 
integrating people into the local community through contacts made in the 
training initiative. 
• This role o f individual development has also been continued in the 
presence of a set o f courses which intend to promote the personal and 
social development o f young people, with consequent impacts upon the 
local community. 
Development potential of the area 
• The STI has increased the development potential o f the area through 
training; however this has not translated into increases in the development 
of the area, due to a lack o f employment creation. TSI has essentially led 
to a supply-side solution to the problem o f the estate, as opposed to the 
creation o f demand and meeting local needs through community 
enterprise. 
• Although the STI soon shelved attempts to directly create community 
businesses, documentation reveals that the STI has indirectly led to the 
creation o f two businesses by previously unemployed people who trained 
at the STI. 
Changing culture 
• The STI has shifted the culture to some extent regarding attitudes towards 
learning and training. However as the STI only reaches a small percentage 
o f its original target population, the result has now been to skim o f f the 
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cream of those in the locality. As such, this relied on trickle-down effects 
to change the whole estate. 
Assessment/Evaluation of Initiative 
Key factors in success of the initiative 
Mechanism of provision 
• The STI provides a number of courses from mainstream educational 
establishments, f rom simple taster courses to NVQs. The mechanism is 
one which provides educational and training courses within an 
organisation which offers a more flexible approach to learning and training 
compared to more formal educational institutions. This mechanism has 
become narrowed over time as the STI has become more mainstream in its 
vision and mission, thus seeking to offer education but in a qualitatively 
different manner. 
Governance 
• The partnership o f agencies has demonstrated a well-functioning 
governance structure, wi th local authorities and educational institutions 
playing fu l l roles. There is also a considerable level o f consultation within 
the initiative, although this no longer reaches out to the broader 
community. 
® The executive decision-making powers of the initiative have effectively 
been passed the management group, due to the need to take decisions in 
response to the needs o f the users, this also reflects the narrow aims o f the 
initiative, and as such, the managers hold power above the strategic board 
and users. 
• The partnership arrangements with Bishop Auckland College have been 
very f ru i t fu l for the STI, which has now become fu l ly formalised under the 
auspices o f the college. 
External Environment 
• There were a number o f key individuals who were able to bring together 
the partnership, under the auspices o f one umbrella group. However, the 
broader community has still to be engaged and included in the STI's 
activities. As such, the community did help to create the STI but have 
since lost control; the impact o f the social capital o f the area, while at one 
point relevant in that it provided a set o f interested individuals, has now 
narrowed to the educational needs o f the target area, which is now much 
wider. 
Key failings of the Initiative: 
• The STI has become essentially unrecognisable f rom many similar 
education and training initiatives in that it has become professionalised, 
formalised under the auspices o f Bishop Auckland College. 
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• As such, the STI now fails to meet the need o f many of the most 
underprivileged on the Bessemer Park Estate. The STI has effectively 
become a mainstream education and training provider, and as result it has 
taken on a role which should be done by mainstream service providers and 
lost much of the rationale which led to it s foundation in the first place. By 
concentrating merely upon education as opposed to a more holistic 
community development agenda, the initiative has added little to the 
demand side o f employment problems in the Bessemer Park estate and the 
broader Spennymoor area. 
Lessons for transferability? 
• Lessons are present in the manner in which a community was able to 
develop and bring in other agencies in a partnership. STI therefore 
originally succeeded as a pressure group. However, this is limited in the 
way the STI has been able to offer a significantly alternative form of third 
sector development. 
• In many ways, the Spennymoor Training Initiative represents a successful 
model o f growth and development, to provide education, training and 
hence employment opportunities for people o f the Bessemer park estate. 
However, with growth the initiative has moved both physically and 
psychologically away f rom the estate on which it was created. As such, 
while the crude number o f people educated and trained is on the increase 
there are concerns that the 'value added' by each output is in decline as the 
initiative no longer reaches its core community. As such, there are 
discussions as to the need o f the STI to create an outreach programme and 
go back to its geographical and demographic roots in the deprived areas o f 
Sedgefield and Spennymoor. 
3. Processes 
A. Funding/Financial situation 
• The funding for STI comes mostly f rom contracts to run education and 
training courses under the auspices o f Bishop Auckland College. The 
process involved in accounting for funds is therefore different to the 
majority o f the TSEIs studies here in that virtually all funds are ring-
fenced, therefore allowing little lee-way for the STI to engage in more 
experimental provision types. 
• SRB funds which were won to construct a new premises on the Merrington 
lane 2 years into the development o f the initiative. This has bee put almost 
entirely into the new building, the Sedgefield Borough Training Centre. 
B. Targets set by the initiative; output-led funding 
• Funding for the STI f rom the SRB fund went almost exclusively into the 
construction o f the new Sedgefield borough training centre site on 
Merrington lane. As such, this funding was ring-fenced and specifically 
related to the construction process. Other funds from Bishop Auckland 
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College are related specifically to outputs and trainee numbers, as these are 
funded through local education authority schemes. 
• Private sector finance is injected in to the centre through the provision o f 
particular training schemes for workers in local businesses. The targets set 
by the STI are almost exclusively output-led in that they reflect the 
throughput o f training and educational qualifications. 
C. Governance of the Initiative 
• The governance of the initiative is determined by the relationship with the 
external partners, most notably Bishop Auckland College. While there is a 
degree o f f lexibil i ty in the search for outside contracts, the provision o f 
many o f the courses is dependent upon the search for enrolments. This 
subsequently relegates the role of management towards one which is 
working within a very narrow and structured framework rather than one in 
which management actively creates that framework. 
• Likewise, the strategic management steering committee, which meets b i -
monthly, has been channelled towards the provision o f particular types o f 
courses and the possibility o f the initiative taking radical courses o f action 
has diminished. Strategic management has therefore become path-
dependent and as such many of the decisions which influence the STI may 
now be made by the management group which advises the steering 
committee and oversees the operational activities o f the initiative. 
Consequently, the strategic steering committee has become relatively weak 
and has become more o f a rubber-stamping exercise. 
• However, within this structure there is a degree o f flexibil i ty and the views 
of the beneficiaries form the initiative's courses are encouraged to 
participate in weekly user consultation sessions. These are acted upon to 
tailor the mechanism of provision and maintain the level o f enrolments in 
the initiative. 
D. Community embeddedness 
• The embeddedness o f the STI within the community o f the Bessemer Park 
Estate has shifted significantly over the lifespan o f the initiative. The STI 
was originally a response to needs as identified by local residents and 
which led to the generation o f a partnership to address this need. This was 
crucially dependent upon the input o f a number o f volunteers to promote 
the initiative development o f the initiative. 
• While even at the earliest stage the STI was chaired by a local councillor, 
the leaders and workers were accountable to a body of residents, thus 
embedding the initiative within the community. 
• The community spirit and collective action which set the initiative up 
have largely disappeared as a factor in the future development o f the STI. 
Although some older users refer to this, this is generational; informal 
interviews with the younger clientele did not possess much knowledge 
regarding the set-up of the initiative and the gasworks site, even. The STI 
was simply regarded as a more informal alternative to school. 
• The STI has failed to keep track o f the needs o f its original target 
population by moving away from its original premises on the Bessemer 
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Park estate. This has created both a physical and mental separation form 
that original community, and thus the perception (now true) that the STI is 
not a community project 
E. Role of Agency in Enhancing the Initiative. 
• The role of individual agents in promoting and developing the STI has become 
subsumed by the broader organisational framework required by the formalisation 
of the provision on offer. While interviewees note the influence of the initiative's 
manager, Julie Cook, in creating a particularly welcoming atmosphere in the 
initiative, this is now less relevant as the initiative seeks to provide more 
homogenous training and educational opportunities for its members. The 
relationship of manager and user has thus become more arms-length 
F. Relationship with external partners 
• The relationship with the external partners has been crucial in developing the 
initiative from its roots. Although the vision of a training initiative was the idea 
of residents, a large number of public and third sector agencies were involved in 
gaining funding. However, the key partnership has been that with Bishop 
Auckland College, which has been formalised over a number of years so that the 
STI has now lost much of the community input into its actions. 
G. Position relative to other service providers 
o The STI has become essentially unrecognisable from many similar education and 
training initiatives in that it has become professionalised and formalised under 
the auspices of Bishop Auckland college. The result is to essentially question 
STI's categorisation as a third sector operation. At its outset, the initiative had an 
organisational distinctiveness which set it apart from formal sector operations. 
However, the impact of funds and the desire to grow has led to a formalisation of 
the operations. The STI does still maintain a niche in that its geographical 
proximity to Spennymoor marks it out as a key further education provider in the 
near area; it also manages to retain a more 'friendly' atmosphere than the more 
formal school/college environments of the Bishop Auckland college. 
Formal Interviews with managers, beneficiaries and volunteers 
Julie Cook Training Initiative Co-
ordinator; Julie was appointed 
to the STI in 1994. 
Rachel Burns Bishop Auckland College 
B i l l Nelson Beneficiary o f the STI 
George Turnbull Beneficiary o f the STI 
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Other related Interviews 
Gillian Spry Sedgefield Borough Council 




1 .General Information on the Initiative 
Origin and Aims of Initiative: 
The initiative began in 1995. It started as a group of residents concerned with 
impending millennium celebrations and what could be done by the community itself to 
improve the situation. Trimdon 2000 rapidly grew far beyond this aims ( millennium 
celebrations were shelved ) to become a far- reaching regeneration initiative concerned 
with the social, environmental and economic regeneration of Trimdon and its environs. 
The community appraisal was carried out 1995; a questionnaire was offered to all 
residents of Trimdon (3500); 47% response rate. This identified key areas of concern for 
residents. From the appraisal, an action plan was drawn up and turned in to a package for 
funding which was accepted by Sedgefield Borough Council BC as part of the borough's 
EU objective 2 package. 
Key within the development of the initiative has been the refurbishment of 
premises which now house a community business, Call centres Durham, This is a 
teleworking centre which aims to provide funds for the rest of T2000's activities in the 
medium to long tern. 
Key Partners and Funding Bodies 
• Sedgefield Borough Council 
• Durham County Council 
• British Telecom 
• Groundwork East Durham 
• Durham Rural Community Council 
• East Durham Community College 
• Trimdon Community College 
Local Data: Indices of Deprivation (2000) 
Old Trimdon 
Index of multiple deprivation score 
Rank of index of multiple deprivation rank 
Employment domain score 
Rank of employment domain 
51.35 
514 (out of 8414 wards) 
24.56 
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2. Outputs and Outcomes from the initiative: 
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Quantifiable Outputs: (1995-1999) 
Clients into employment 
Clients into training- out of centre 
out 
Clients into training- in centre 
15 at call centre; 8 elsewhere 
11 through ESF funding; carried 
by EDCC. 2nd round beginning, 
yet to commence 
Non -quantifiable outputs: 
Social effects; community and individual confidence. 
• Some social effects have been seen, particularly for those who have benefited 
from training schemes: June Pearce states, with regard to her son, "as I say, I 
don't think he'd be working today i f it hadn't been for Trimdon 2000" 
• Community based events have some involvement in bringing disparate parts of 
community together. 
Development potential of the area 
• T2000 hopes that the Development potential of the area will increase i f it 
continues to be successful. Within the group, an aim is to retain income within 
the Trimdon economy to help it recirculate. 
Changing culture 
• There is a significant change in the institutional culture within the region. Key to 
the successes of the initiative, the institutional inadequacies have been 
highlighted. 
• The niche filled by the Miners' welfare and colliery systems were a natural place 
for T2000; works-based social action is no longer appropriate. The Working 
men's club re-opened 1994 as the Labour club. This political background is a 
burden for T2000, which aims to be apolitical (though still some who regard it as 
the a Labour party institution ) 
• Considerable concern within Trimdon 2000 regarding other villages who do not 
have the networks and capacity available to T2000. 
Environmental impact 
• A millennium green is still in the process of creation. A sculpture on the arterial 
road at the entrance to the village has also been erected. Key environmental 
improvements still at the planning stage. 
Assessment/Evaluation of Initiative 
Trimdon 2000, with its very nature as an inclusive multi-agency project, has 
demonstrated the need and requirement of statutory agencies to re-evaluate their roles as 
service providers. The initiative sees itself as pushing the community development 
agenda within Sedgefield and County Durham. Call Centres Durham, only set up in 1999 
with a £55,000 grant, has yet to produce any significant revenues due to payments in 
arrears. However, it has achieved targets of contract fulfilled and in the medium term 
should provide sustainability to the social and environmental works of the project. Long-
term sustainability wil l depend upon the ephemeral nature of call centre businesses and 
adaptation to new technology. 
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Key factors in success of the initiative 
Mechanism of provision 
• The mechanism comprises a broad, community-based vision for Trimdon; appraisals 
are used as a key to the needs and hopes of residents. 
• Call Centres Durham are relatively capital un-intensive; this can therefore can 
respond to changing nature of the business and market. T2000 will require to become 
more business oriented in the future. 
Governance 
• The governance of T2000 is democratic with an emphasis on outreach. However, 
T2000 still demonstrates considerable failings through not being able to increase 
embeddedness of the initiative. 
• The aims of succession by individuals is stymied by lack of interest, the initiative 
relying on key members. 
• Members of T2000 involved have high capacity and skills; this creates a suitable basis 
for exploration of possibilities. A large number of statutory and non-statutory partners 
have been involved by T2000 members to ease the burden of provision within 
Trimdon. 
• T2000 operates on a multi-agency approach which has seen a reworking of roles and a 
reappraisal of the needs and requirements of the community 
External Environment 
• T2000 has highlighted and played upon the existing network structures within the 
region. The external environment, whilst not supportive, has been channelled to 
enhance the potential and reality of Trimdon village. The local attitudes towards 
Trimdon suggest a general degree of ambivalence, with T2000 struggling to ensure 
full engagement with the whole community. However, hopes remain that T2000 will 
become more embedded in the future. 
• T2000 has benefited from a number of well-educated individuals; it has also drawn on 
the resources of the local Labour Party. 
Key failings of the Initiative: 
• There is too much reliance upon agency and lack of succession structure. 
• There has also been a failure to enthuse residents more, despite outreach in community 
events and in the form of the millennium messenger. 
• Slow progress on issues highlighted in appraisal. 
e Potential short-term prospects of Call Centres Durham. 
Lessons for transferability? 
Trimdon 2000, by the nature of the project as resting upon the capacities of individuals to 
achieve the successes so far seen, has little to offer as a whole for other community 
groups. However, some key elements can be seen as transferable: 
• Outreach (though this is less successful than imagined), a newspaper, the millennium 
messenger. This requires significant investment of time and energy. 
• Multi-agency approach, thus channelling the resources of existing agencies into the 
needs of the community. 
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3. Processes 
A. Funding/Financial situation 
• EU funds are paid in arrears, to bank account. T2000 Depends upon these funds, 
yet must pay monies out before get reimbursed; this is a burden for an 
organisation with little cash throughput. 
• T2000 also received a Nat West £55,000 grant for Call Centres Durham which 
was paid up front. 
• T2000 has a Treasurer ( Anne Timothy) the initiative is audited yearly with 
introduction of charity status. 2 or 3 signatures are required to sign cheques. Key 
financial decisions are submitted via committee. T2000 as a whole is accountable 
to funding bodies; most EU funds for a millennium green are administered direct 
from the EU. Objective 2 have been gained funds as part of borough-wide 
strategy through SBC as accountable body. Some support is given for funding 
applications from Sedgefield Borough Council (SBC) objective 2 bid. 
• However, it is suggested that SBC are only interested at larger-scale funds, and 
alternative institutions needed to provide joined-up support. Frank Hoban states, 
"the borough council had been very supportive all the way through and had given 
great advice; they told me that I couldn't do it without a partnership. I trusted 
their advice and got a partnership, and lo and behold they started to take 
ownership of the scheme" 
B. Targets set by the initiative; output-led funding 
• The stated aim of T2000 is broad; to enhance the social, economic and 
environmental well-being of the people of Trimdon and its environs. This allows 
T2000 to tackle the remit on many fronts. This has however led to some 
confusion of aims. 
• Funding is related to specific outputs; the aim of community business to be self-
supporting and to provides basis for other activities. I f outputs are not achieved, 
the Community business may quickly become loss-making. However, the nature 
of the business means overheads beyond staffing costs are quickly reduced to low 
levels. A roof for the local shopping centre improvement is a key element of 
environmental improvements as defined by appraisal. Refusal of ERDF funds to 
support centrepiece due to sourcing from outside the region led to other elements 
had to be scrapped alongside this. 
• There is no difference between stated aims and actual outcomes, despite broad 
aims. The ring fencing of funds occurs, to maintain the distinctions between 
funding streams 
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C. Governance of the Initiative 
• T2000 aims to be non-hierarchical. Each sub-group has leader; when there are 
just 4 members per group, the dominant personality comes to the fore. 
• Call Centres Durham has one sub-group; day-to-day decision-making is reliant 
upon the manager, a secondee from BT. 
• T2000 itself does not make day-to-day decisions; this is left to Sub-groups. 
• Partnership meetings and monthly meetings provide forums for strategic 
consultation and progress reports. Strategic planning related to 1995 appraisal 
(see below) 
• The strategic board has been reliant on Peter Brookes (leader) and networks 
associated with people involved. 
• SBC are the key players in EU Objective 2 funds. Partnerships are in operation, 
but considerable bureaucracy is imposed by Sedgefield Borough Council and 
ONE NorthEast. 
• Consultation is based on a community appraisal carried out 1995 in which a 
questionnaire was offered to all residents of Trimdon (3500); 47% response rate. 
This identified key areas of concern for residents. 
• The appraisal remains a key area of consultation referred to as part of strategic 
aims of the initiative 
• The aims of T2000 are closely related to the appraisal, therefore representing a 
configuration of capacity, need and interest. 
D. Community embeddedness 
• Just 20-30 people turn up to monthly meetings, demonstrating a lack of 
embeddedness. Some members of the community regard T2000 as part of the 
labour party. T2000 is therefore struggling to enthuse people within the 
community, despite outreach in the form of millennium messenger and events; a 
great deal of apathy exists. 
E. Role of Agency in Enhancing the Initiative. 
• Peter Brookes acts as the chairman. There is a great deal of reliance upon small 
number of active and very well- connected members of T2000. Without this, 
initiative would never have achieved successes and status. The key original 
players in T2000 are still present, though the aim is to create succession to ensure 
embeddedness. 
F. Relationship with external partners 
• The committee structure of the local authority remains a stumbling block when 
dealing with applications. T2000 receives no direct funding from SBC; the 
relationship is that of partners in package. Some financial aid does exist where 
cash flow is a problem. SBC regards itself as being subject to tight fiscal controls. 
o The local authority believes its role is to bring realism to proceedings, 
particularly where large sums of money are involved. The aim is not to dash 
hopes, but to make these hopes real. The SBC appreciates it is cast as villain, but 
feels that this will be appreciated in the long term. 
• Trimdon 2000 includes a large number of external partners, who have become 
part of the steering committee. 
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G. Position relative to other service providers 
• The projects aims see the whole population of Trimdon as a target, as it attempts 
to ameliorate the social economic and environmental capacity of the village. 
• There is a tendency for projects not to be so well supported or embedded within 
the whole community; some, particularly environmental projects, may be 
considered as expensive outlays considering the amount of community benefits 
that incur. 
• T 2000 does fill a different niche, to other service providers, although this is 
dependent upon the scale of operations. 
• T 2000 has challenged the received wisdom with regard to the mechanism of 
service provision. It aims in the long-term to become statutorily funded, or to 
have changed remits of agencies to become more responsive to community 
needs; demonstrates how agencies could become more embedded. 
Formal Interviews with managers, beneficiaries and volunteers 
Peter Brookes Chairman, T2000 
Anne Timothy Head of Durham Call Centres 
committee 
Frank Hoban Retired LA worker; T2000 
secretary 
June Pearce A recent member. Her son has 
taken training from T2000. 
John Davies Durham Rural Community 
Council and member of steering 
committee 
John Burton Steering Committee Member, 
Trimdon 2000 
Other related Interviews 
Gillian Spry Sedgefield Borough Council 
Richard Prisk Sedgefield Borough Council 
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Appendix 1.11 
Low Simonside Employment Initiative 
1. General information on the Initiative: 
Origin and Aims of Initiative: 
The Low Simonside Employment Initiative was set up in 1991 as an experimental 
project to assess the possibility of a multi- agency approach to the employment and social 
problems on the Low Simonside estate in South Shields. The initiative originated in work 
carried out by STMBC, who saw a need for an experiment in multi-agency working at the 
local level in South Tyneside. Low Simonside is part of an ex- shipbuilding community 
which is gradually coming to terms with significant job losses within the locality. South 
Tyneside itself has suffered significantly from deprivation resulting form job loss in the 
district. 
The main idea behind the LSEI was to co-ordinate agencies who were delivering 
national, regional and sub-regional programmes to benefit the area as far as possible by 
ensuring they were being delivered effectively at the very local level. Low Simonside was 
identified as a typical area with significant and potentially intractable problems. The 
initiative was described as 'action research' in that the lesson would help to pinpoint what 
would needed to be done at a very local level. 
The LSEI was planned as a 3- year project with an exit strategy to continue the 
initiative, although this lasted only 3 months after the proposed completion of the project 
and funding. 
Key Partners and Funding Bodies: 
• Local authority: South Tyneside MBC (Unitary) 
• Employment Service 
• Tyneside TEC 
• South Tyneside College 
Local Data: Indices of Deprivation 2000 
Tyne Dock and Simonside 
Index of multiple deprivation score 56.30 
Rank of index of multiple deprivation rank 355 (out of 8414 wards) 
Employment domain score 28.49 
Rank of employment domain 159 (out of 8414 wards 
2. Outputs and Outcomes from the Initiative: 
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Quantifiable Outputs: (1991-1994) 
Clients into employment 





N.B. exact records were destroyed at the end of the project's life to maintain 
confidentiality for users. Time-series data therefore unavailable to original evaluation 
team. There is no evidence that initiative the key element in achieving employment; only 
2 of 11 surveyed thought that the initiative was most important factor in getting a job. No 
data exists on the overall impact on unemployment with the area. This lack of data has led 
to the inclusion of many interview quotes and an evaluation report ( Bradley Consulting, 
1995) as key reference point for the case study outline presented here. 
Non -quantifiable outputs: 
Social effects; community and individual confidence. 
• Increases in individual confidences were seen. Due to nature of targets, any boost 
to individual morale counted as a successful outcome. 2/3 of the people 
interviewed in the final evaluation report thought the initiative significantly 
improved the quality of their lives. The final evaluation report suggests that "it 
was felt that the initiative had helped to foster an increasing sense of 
community." 
Development potential of the area 
• Although some jobs had been found for residents and some training outcomes 
achieved, the initiative failed to capitalise on this and significantly increase the 
development potential of the area. 
Changing culture 
• The evaluation report states that the initiative 'did not foster a training culture 
within residents'... "where courses did result in a degree of 'progression', these 
courses are believed to have been 'horizontally' rather than 'vertically' layered." 
Environmental impact 
• N / A 
Assessment/Evaluation of Initiative 
The Low Simonside Employment Initiative had some successes in achieving its 
aims to provide employment guidance and community development during its lifetime of 
1991-1994. However, the initiative struggled against a background of inadequate and 
inflexible funding, a lack of embeddedness within the community, and a bureaucratic 
governance structure which denied the initiative a supportive, co-operative environment. 
It is mostly through highlighting these pitfalls, with the subsequent creation of the 
training and enterprise network, which is the legacy of the LSEI. 
Key factors in success of the initiative 
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Mechanism of provision 
• The mechanism of delivery, incorporating in-depth but informal job-search 
facilities as a community development process, demonstrated some success in 
achieving the goal of recovering the most disenfranchised back into the labour 
market. 
Governance 
o Route to Chief Executive's department in South Tyneside MBC was regarded as 
a key factor in the governance of the initiative. However, this is contested as the 
relationship to this department also created tensions within the local authority. 
• The LSEI led to acceptance by large agencies involved that this type of activity. 
The initiative assisted them rather than being in competition with them or a 
criticism of them, therefore fostering propitious relationships. Many of the 
agencies are reported to have taken up outreach themselves after learning from 
the Low Simonside Initiative. 
External Environment. 
• The local environment did not help to engender a successful outcome of the 
LSEI, due to an initial lack of trust and acceptance of the initiative and its aims. 
This subsequently has led to attempts to produce more community based as 
opposed to 'parachuted in' help for such communities. However, by the end of 
the Low Simonside Employment Initiative, it had become accepted locally by 
both the community and the local authority, thus representing an output in itself. 
Key failings of the Initiative: 
• Unsuitable location 
e Lack of resources; short lifespan of urban programme 
• No history of community development 
• Restricted by size of target population. 
• Poor links with employers. 
• Governance structure creating tensions and obstructive environment 
Lessons for transferability? 
• The initiative demonstrated through its life the potential successes and failings of 
a multi-agency approach, as configured within a local authority environment. As 
such, the lessons which have been learned and have been put into practice in the 
rest of South Tyneside, particularly with TEN, thus forming a key legacy of the 
initiative. 
3. Processes 
A. Funding/Financial situation 
• Funding came purely from the local authority, administered through invoices then 
paid by treasurer's department. Very little petty cash was allowed. The Local 
authority treasurer's department was the accountable body, leading to problems 
with gaining access to funds at short notice. Very little financial control existed at 
the project level due to control from above. This lack of petty cash and inability 
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to purchases supplies was a constraint; it took up to one year to receive computer 
for essential work from local authority 
• An exit strategy was built into the project, but little funding was sought for this. 
A lack of embeddedness was demonstrated by the folding of the initiative just 
months after the end of the 3-year pilot period. 
B. Targets set by the initiative; output-led funding 
» The primary aim of the initiative was 'to assist residents of Low Simonside into 
employment'; the secondary aim: 'to improve the quality of life for Low 
Simonside residents'. Outputs were determined by these targets, and these were 
expected to be run in conjunction with aims as set out in ante-post evaluation. 
However, there was a significant need for programme bending. 
• Jayne Mills stated, "Well, the original objectives of the project had been about 
tackling unemployment in the low Simonside area. But I saw right from the 
outset that wasn't possible. It wasn't going to be possible to do, given the 
resources we had, which was 60,000 a year for 3 years, to significantly reduce 
unemployment in that time. So we re-wrote the objectives with a greater 
emphasis on community development." 
C. Governance of the Initiative 
• The initiative was managed directly by the chief executives' department, so a 
direct line from Jayne Mills to Steven Howells, policy co-ordinator for South 
Tyneside MBC, to the chief executive. This represented a very short route to the 
top. Jayne Mills states that: " I think from a strategic point of view that worked 
quite well, that Lynda and I were there on the ground, that we could channel 
information up very quickly to a strategic level and therefore influence policy 
across the borough". 
® Day-to day decisions were taken as necessary, with the key decision-making 
process in the hand of the project leader, Jayne Mills). Very little financial 
control existed at the project level, so this decision-making role was reduced. 
Long-term strategic decision-making was in the hands of the steering committee. 
This Consisted of: STMBC, Tyneside TEC, TEDco, South Tyneside college, 
government departments and the local community. Unfortunately, this multi-
agency approach led to problems that the steering group was "too large to enable 
focused discussion and effective policy making and forward planning. The group 
functioned more as a 'talking shop' with over-long meetings and a lack of focus" 
(Bradley consulting, p 13) 
• Some informal consultation occurred with the community, but no formal 
consultation channels existed. Community presence on steering group was 
regarded as 'tokenistic', and the emphasis of the preliminary work appears to 
have been rather too 'top-down' with relatively little community or employer 
involvement or consultation. 
• The internal governance of the initiative allowed some flexibility for the project 
leader and administrator. The alliance to the chief executive's department in the 
local authority and its small management group gave the project some flexibility 
to change the stated aims once they had been seen as unattainable. However, the 
short-term nature of the project defined that there was also an inherent lack of 
flexibility due to the need to meet aims as stated in the ante-post evaluation. 
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D. Community embeddedness 
• The initiative originated in work carried out by Chris Clarke and Steven Howells, 
who saw a need for an experiment in multi-agency working at the local level in 
South Tyneside: Chris Clarke explains this as, "the main idea behind it was that 
we had a lot of agencies who were delivering things according to national or 
regional type programmes- sub-regional in some cases. But we were concerned to 
see whether they were being delivered effectively at the very local level. And 
whether at the local level they were seen as a coherent package, fulfilling all the 
requirements. So we wanted to pick a typical area, well, a typical area with 
problems. But to use that to see whether what was being done by the main 
agencies i f you like, was meeting all needs. And i f not, what would needed to be 
done at a very local level." 
• The geographical location placed the initiative within the Low Simonside 
community hall, at the time run by the local community association. 
• The perception of the project within the community was not as good as hoped in 
that "although it was aimed at community development in a very loose sense, the 
LSEI was very top-down in that Jayne was appointed by a number of large 
agencies, and parachuted into the community association who never accepted any 
great sense of ownership themselves for their project" Chris Clarke 
E. Role of Agency in Enhancing the Initiative. 
• The key workers (Jayne Mills and/Linda Rutter) had a significant role within the 
initiative, and indeed personal changes significantly altered the effectiveness of 
the initiative. The initiative lost its focus and administrative structure during its 
later stages as a result of a number of staff changes. The Final Evaluation report 
states that "This could have been remedied by clearer organisational lines of 
responsibility and improved management of the initiative in terms of bureaucratic 
procedures imposed by the local authority and its relationship with the 
community centre" 
o Jayne Mills, as a professional from outside the area, was unable to break down 
some crucial barriers with user of the initiative. Linda Rutter, as administrator, 
was much better placed to gain trust of residents 
F. Relationship with external partners 
• Constant contact with the local authority, but tensions between the Chief 
Executive's dept and education became highlights. Jayne Mills states, "the local 
staff of the education department were unsupportive. And at worst they were 
actually quite hostile to what we were trying to do. So when they took the project 
on towards the end of its life it never really had a chance." 
» Jayne Mills states, " I think that the education department, and particularly the 
community education project in which we were based, felt quite threatened- to an 
extent we were treading on their toes and we were there saying, look at ell this 
community development work that needs to be done before you can think about 
getting people employed. And that in a way, is criticism of what had not been 
done prior to that by the education department. But I think as well as that the 
project had always had a quite high profile and the education department perhaps 
felt that it's work had not such a high a profile. So I think the relationship 
between ourselves and the community centre in which we were based, which was 
part of the education department, was never terribly good. And I think that was 
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partly to do with the way it was introduced -that it was sort of, they were more or 
less just told that this was happening." 
• The initiative had few links with employers, and did not achieve aims of 
galvanising support for employing locally-based workers. A key failure of the 
initiative 
G. Position relative to other service providers 
• Target users were the unemployed of Low Simonside. There was a realisation 
that the most long-term and disillusioned, would require significant confidence-
building to make them work-ready. This differed from mainstream provision as it 
provided a holistic service from basic community development work to 
employment-related advice. However, there was some confusion of roles between 
the initiative and the education department. 
• The initiative filled a niche not currently provided at a suitable scale nor in a 
suitable manner by the employment service. It also encompassed significant 
advance in terms of the mechanism of service delivery. Chris Clarke states, "that 
was all very well i f you wanted to sign up to some very structured course 
somewhere, but in terms of just ordinary people living their lives in low 
Simonside, the vast majority of them were completely on a different plane, really, 
and probably never saw themselves as candidates of the type of formal provision 
who was going on elsewhere." 
• The initiative filled a vacant niche. The multi-agency approach aimed to highlight 
institutional deficiencies at the time 1991-94 and learn from the experience in 
what Chris Clarke referred to as 'Action Research'. 
Formal Interviews with managers, beneficiaries and volunteers 
Jayne Mills Project Manager 
Chris Clarke Project originator. Now at 
STMBC 




St Simon's Community Project 
1. General Information on the Initiative 
Origin and Aims of Initiative: 
The initiative originated in work carried out by three of the current employees. 
With money surplus to requirements for Taskforce in 1993, discussions were organised 
by the then local councillor and it became clear that there was a real need to tackle the 
significant unemployment problem within Simonside. From this, the initiative was set up 
in the St Simon's church hall. The initiative drew on many of the lessons which were 
being learned from the Low Simonside Employment initiative, and set out immediately to 
become as holistic as possible in the areas of job search. St Simon's, despite local 
authority backing at the outset, is community-led, with members of the community 
working together to bring in funding and develop the initiative. 
Simonside and Low Simonside are communities on the banks of the river Tyne, 
whose local economies are bound up with the fortunes of the shipbuilding industry. In 
parallel with mining communities in the North-East, the shipbuilding ahs undergone 
severe decline in the region and as such there is legacy of unemployment which is seen 
throughout South Shields. Attempts to attract inward investment have had limited 
success. 
Key Partners and Funding Bodies: 
• South Tyneside MBC 
• Whitbread in the Community 





• Henry Smith's Charity 
• Church Urban Fund 
Local Data: Indices of Deprivation 2000 
Tyne Dock and Simonside 
Index of multiple deprivation score 56.30 
Rank of index of multiple deprivation rank 355 (out of 8414 wards) 
Employment domain score 28.49 
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Rank of employment domain 159 (out of 8414 wards 
2. Outputs and Outcomes from the Initiative: 
Quantifiable Outputs: (1999) 
Clients into employment 
Clients into training- out o f centre 




N.B. some multiple accounting due to nature of short-term employment tenures. 
Non -quantifiable outputs: 
Social effects; community and individual confidence. 
• Significant increases in individual confidence have been seen by workers 
and volunteers at the centre. Due to nature o f targets, any boost to 
individual morale counts as a successful outcome. Jen Fettis illustrates 
this, by stating, "there was one fella, an ex-docker, who came in and we 
had to work with him for about 3-4 months (SC: yeah) to get him on a 
training course eventually. He lacked s much confidence, but he was a 
really big fella, just not able to cope with being out of work for the first 
time. So we could tell he wasn't here for job to start with- he just had lots 
of problems- his wife died- and so we just sat there and talked about it-
well, listened, really- for ages (to SC: you spent a whole morning with him 
once, didn't you?). We just listened and that helped. So seeing him now, 
when he's back on form... its bloody marvellous. He comes in now and 
again to say hello and he's fu l l o f beans, just brilliant. And he's the one I 
can think o f that we've really seen change while they've been coming 
here. There have been others, but he's the one who, when I ' m not feeling 
great or things aren't going too well , I think o f him and I remember why 
I ' m doing this." 
Development potential of the area 
• By producing a better trained and more confident workforce, the initiative 
encourages development. However, job vacancies are in such short supply 
that even a better-trained workforce is not guaranteed jobs. 
Changing culture 
• There is some evidence o f a returning work ethic for some clients 
previously requiring recovery into the labour market. However, there is no 
data or evidence o f those who have been forced back into the labour force 




Assessment/Evaluation of Initiative 
St. Simons' community project, by virtue of its raw outputs, appears to have been 
successful in finding employment for those users who wish to be helped into 
employment. This success is achieved in a context of high unemployment and a degree of 
mis-match between the skills of the unemployed and the jobs available. Alongside this, 
the acceptance that a number of users are substantially distanced from the labour market 
poses a problem; the initiative therefore is used to f i l l niche which would not be filled by 
statutory or private agencies. It is these non-quantifiable outputs produced by this 
function which ensure the project has a role as adding value to its clients. 
Key factors in success of the initiative 
Mechanism of provision 
• Service provision, while narrow, is clearly defined and related to the needs of the 
community served. 
• The niche filled by St. Simon's is considered to be different to that of the 
employment service. 
• The mechanism of delivery, incorporating in-depth but informal job-search 
facilities, has proven particularly successful in achieving the goal of recovering 
the most disenfranchised back into the labour market. 
Governance 
• Internal governance structures appear to be suited to maintaining the flexibility 
required by both users and workers to achieve the outputs. As such, the 
informality of the project, backed up with a high degree of trust, is key to 
producing the particular outcomes and cementing its niche. However the same 
informality may act as a barrier to the project ever becoming more widespread. 
• The project, while part of a close network of other projects, remains autonomous 
and at arm's length to funders and state networks. As such, this allows the 
internal governance mechanism to retain a degree of financial and policy 
independence which other projects, notably Low Simonside, did not have. 
External Environment 
• St.Simon's works within the local environment in that it attempts to develop on, 
and to some extent replace, the older institutions which were closely related to the 
shipbuilding industry. As such, St. Simon's draws upon this pool of social capital 
and its networks to develop its services. 
Key failings of the Initiative: 
• The St Simon's project has yet to tap into the full community, although its aims 
in appointing a women's development worker suggests a commitment to outreach 
towards as many potential beneficiaries as possible. This is considered a 
significant failing, one which partly reflects the client base but also the industrial 
and social culture of the area regarding working practices. 
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• Over its lifetime, no significant improvement in the level of unemployment has 
been witnessed in South Tyneside or Simonside. This is in part a reflection of the 
broader economic forces against which the initiative is set; no conclusive data are 
available regarding the potential situation had the initiative been in existence, 
However, this represents a failing in the initiative: through working within the 
confines of the market, albeit in an innovative community- based manner, the 
initiative has no power to alter the prospects of the residents in terms of tangible 
job creation. As such, although it represents a part solution to the institutional 
inadequacies of the post-industrial community, it i f inevitably subject to forces 
beyond its control. 
Lessons for transferability? 
• The transferability o f the initiative is largely dependent upon the locality 
and people involved in any new centre. Data collected demonstrate that the 
key to St Simon's success is the role o f agency and the standing o f the 
workers within he community. I f this embeddedness were to be removed, 
the essence of the initiative may be removed. Similarly, although the 
initiative has flourished up to now, it has yet to undergo any key staff 
changed which could potentially destabilise the internal dynamics. The 
crucial lesson is that although the mechanism employed is potentially 
transferable, it is the organic nature o f the initiative's development and the 
workers which provides its strength. 
3. Processes 
A. Funding/Financial situation 
• Funding comes from various bodies (significant funds from national lottery, 
Henry Smith's Charity) mostly administered directly from hinders; there is no 
'staging-point' from which money is kept and then released to the initiative. Most 
is issued 'up-front', not in arrears. Some monthly administration is required by 
funders; typically 3 months from lotteries board. 
• There is no independent accountable body; this is done direct to funders. As a 
result, there are relatively few reports and accounting requirements. This, as 
suggested, is key to avoiding the problem of over-concentration on accounting 
procedures. A full-time position in place to act as book-keeper maintain the 
financial position. An independent audit occurs once-yearly. There is the 
possibility of financial problems i f accounts are not audited stringently enough; 
inevitably in an organisation of this size, financial control is concentrated in the 
hands of one person. 
• Little support comes from local authority for funding applications, although 
significant connection with the STEP board in South Tyneside to co-ordinate 
funding applications. Feelings from members of the steering committee suggest 
that support for funding applications would not be taken up even i f offered, due 
to the view that any outside party would not have an adequate understanding of 
the project. 
• Lottery funding of 196,000 over 3 years was granted ion 1998. Previous rounds 
of funding came from Taskforce and the Church Urban Fund, both limited to one 
year. The granting of the lottery application, whilst still relatively short-term, 
allows the project to finally plan for the future in a more coherent manner than 
before. In 1999 3 new workers were hired to enhance the scope and quality of the 
produce services. Before lottery funding became available, planning for the long-
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term was impossible and short-term planning was mostly restricted to small-scale 
capital acquisitions. I f subsequent funding applications are successful, the project 
aims to extend and enhance its premises. 
B. Targets set by the initiative; output-led funding 
• The stated aim of the initiative is relatively narrow: providing access to work and 
training for unemployed persons of South Shields. As a result, there is little 
confusion as to the final outcomes intended. However, the process which leads 
towards these objectives are sufficiently flexible to allow the project to undertake 
any case on its merits. As a result, the means by which aims are achieved (or not 
achieved) are broad-ranging, tailored on a case-to-case basis to each individual. 
o No quantitative targets have as yet been set, allowing a flexibility to pursue 
intensive work with individuals where needed without the need to achieve 
unrealistic targets. 
• Very little of St Simons' funding is specifically dependent on the production of 
particular outputs, although significant funding is required to be spent solely on 
capital equipment rather than on running costs. 
• There is no reason to suspect a difference between the stated aims and targets 
within the initiative. Some discrepancy may occur as the methods employed to 
achieve the stated aims due to the broader aims of recovering people back into the 
workforce after a period of inactivity or disillusionment. 
C. Governance of the Initiative 
• Informal decisions are taken as needed; management meetings including all staff 
take place every week; steering group every 3 months. The governance of the 
project, whilst involving a hierarchical structure is based on communication 
between the various workers. The project leader remains approachable and does 
not have an individual office 
• Day-to day decisions are taken as necessary, key decision-making process in the 
hands of the project leaders. Any capital purchases of over £100 are referred to 
the chairman of the steering group; purchases of £1000+ are referred to the 
steering committee. Relatively few decisions have to be made, and are usually 
consulted with other workers informally to ensure compliance. 
• Long-term strategic decision-making is in the hands of the steering committee, 
within the constraints imposed by funding requirements. 
• Members of steering group (1998-9) 
o A l l workers 
o Mike hall (chair) 
o Dan Dowling 
o Parish vicar 
o Employment service representative 
o STEP representative 
• The vision and mission within the project appears to remain with those directly 
involved; other members of the steering group are broadly pragmatic and 
interested in monetary affairs and development. 
• Communication between most members of the steering group continues beyond 
the committee meetings on a far less formal basis. This ensures a stability and 
durability of the governance mechanism which may not be supported through the 
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governance structure itself. This requires significant trust on the part of the 
participants. 
• The project leader remains the key decision-maker, due to her standing amongst 
all the group members. This role appears to be augmenting as the capacity of the 
individuals within the project increases, and the prospect of greater autonomy 
becomes possible. 
• No formal mechanism for including the wishes of users is built into the 
governance mechanism, something which was not considered necessary by the 
project leader. However, informal contact with the users, which occurs for all 
members of staff every day, is extensive and considered an adequate mechanism 
through which to glean ideas regarding the future development, failings and 
needs of the initiative. Periodic consultation does occur, particularly with the aim 
of use within evaluation reports. 
• The internal governance of the initiative, allied to the mechanism through which 
the users are aided, allows for the achievement of the outputs and outcomes. The 
feeling of the workers and users is that i f the status and methods employed by the 
initiative, allied to its relaxed atmosphere, were changed it would lose its focus, 
and lose the respect of the users. As such, the particular configuration leads to the 
particular outputs, which are complementary to the mainstream provision. 
D. Community embeddedness 
• The origin of the initiative is above all rooted within the locality and draws 
strength from its relationship with the people it serves. As such, it is deeply 
embedded within the community, although it acts only to serve a particular 
segment of the community 
» The geographical location is situated on an accessible arterial road through 
Simonside. Although not at the heart of the area, its geographical location is still 
adequately central not to pose too significant a barrier for those wishing to attend 
the initiative. 
• The project appears to be held in high esteem within the community it serves. 
Known as a 'drop-in', St Simons has a role well beyond the pure job search 
activities which form part of its core aims. 
• Crucial to its success is the atmosphere created: a welcoming environment in 
which mutual help and self-development are key themes. Beyond this, there is an 
emphasis on intensive personal development and confidence building where 
required appears to play a significant role in maintaining a willingness to attend. 
• Interviews suggest that most come to the centre not just for the job search 
activities, although this may be the spur to encourage the first step. Subsequently, 
the role of the centre as both community centre and employment initiative 
combine to promote a sense of belonging. Several users come to the centre every 
day, the institution therefore offering a role for the unemployed which may have 
been previously filled by the work-related institutions such as the workingmen's 
Club. St Simon's therefore represents a key element in the social fabric of the 
locality, replacing some of the previous institutions which were embedded. 
E. Role of Agency in Enhancing the Initiative. 
• The originators of the project are still its key actors, and as such have been key to 
the initiative's beginnings and development over 6 years. As such, the 
accumulated knowledge has stayed within those who have been associated with 
the project. I f those who were key to the project were to leave, serious questions 
would be raised as to the continuation of activity. 
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• Mike Hall states, " I think also what's quite characteristic of the borough is that 
people are prepared to invest any amount of their personal time and resources. I 
mean, you look at St Simons and there are people who are working not only in 
the drop-in but also working for the church and doing a lot of activities associated 
with the youth centre that contribute to the community. And that's all done due 
to a belief in the community that they're part o f . 
• Being based within the community and locally known, the project leaders act as 
figureheads both inside the project and outside in the wider community. The 
reliance upon these key actors can be seen in that their presence and attitude 
creates an atmosphere throughout the initiative which removes as many social 
barriers as possible. This creates an atmosphere of trust and co-operation which 
in turn helps to lead to a productive, welcoming environment. Under other 
circumstances, or with other non-local actors at the helm, it is potentially possible 
that the atmosphere may not be as conducive to constructive development. 
Interviews also suggest that the fact that all employees are women can have a 
constructive effect on new clients, as they appear less threatening than male 
workers may do. 
F. Relationship with external partners 
• St Simon's has little contact with the local authority. As such, whilst the initiative 
does not enjoy the stability of funding or technical support associated with the 
local authority, constraints are not present. 
• The association with the STEP partnership has had a significant role in 
supporting the activities of the initiative. This has provided a supportive 
framework in which to operate, in particular with the association with the 
Training and Enterprise Network's activities in South Tyneside. The governance 
context is broadly supportive of the activities at St Simon's, although without the 
weight of the local authority. As a result, the relationship to the third sector 
institutions provides a basis for support which could be transferable. 
• St Simon's also seeks to work with the private sector, easing opportunities into 
work by creating shipyard database to match unemployed workers with job 
opportunities. 
G. Position relative to other service providers 
• Target users are unemployed of Simonside and South Tyneside, particularly the 
most long-term and disillusioned, who require significant confidence-building. St 
Simon's differs from mainstream provision as provided by the employment 
service due to the atmosphere and willingness to work intensively with clients. 
The initiative therefore fills a niche not currently provided at a suitable scale nor 
in a suitable manner by the employment service. 
• The processes through which the initiative helps its clients give it a distinct 
flavour to mainstream provision. As such, there is a fear that any increased state 
involvement, with the associated regulations, would destroy the essential basis on 
which the project ids run, presenting problems for both leaders and clients. 
However, there is a contention that similar projects should be run, or at least 
funded by the state rather than relying on community associations to fulf i l their 
role. 
• Jen Fettis, project leader, states, "The employment service could do what we do, 
but I don't know i f they'd have the same success. You see what they do, and it's 
all really formal stuff about getting people straight into any job. That's OK for 
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those who are confident enough, but not for a lot of the people we see here-
they've just got no respect for the employment service any more. So, we do 
something that's different. We probably are being used a bit, but this is our role-
we've got funds now so we're OK, and happy with that. I just don't think they 
could do our job." 
Formal Interviews with managers, beneficiaries and volunteers 
Jen Fettis Project leader 
Sue Callendar Development worker 
Lilian Banks Development worker 
Mike Hall TEN, and chairman of St Simon's 
Dan Dowling TEN, steering committee member 




Other related interviews 
Andrew De'ath South Tyneside MBC 
Steve Muse GO-NE 
Seth Pearson Tyneside TEC 
Keith Hodgson ONE NorthEast 
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Appendix 1.13 
South Tyneside Training and Enterprise 
Network (TEN) 
1. General Information: 
Origin and Aims of the Initiative 
TEN was launched as a result of the efforts of local people, local churches and 
members of the local authority to try to find new ways of dealing with the persistently 
high unemployment and consequent social deprivation of many south Tyneside 
communities. The area had formerly depended on a combination of coal-mining, 
shipbuilding and engineering industries, all of which had declined very rapidly during the 
1970s and 1980s. Various European and UK government funding initiatives were 
established in the area to try to create employment, but which often worked in an 
uncoordinated and haphazard way (see the Low Simonside Employment Initiative, 
Appendix 1.11). The creation of TEN in 1994 was intended to give greater coherence to 
the regeneration effort in South Tyneside and to develop new services within and across 
local communities. 
TEN is a charity established to coordinate efforts to improve the employment 
and training opportunities of the South Tyneside area. The project is multi-faceted and 
incorporates innovative practices in terms of network building, multi-agency working and 
community involvement. TEN works to improve access to employment and training both 
by providing facilities and advice based in communities and by giving small grants to 
help work-ready clients with travel, clothing and equipment costs. The use of targeted 
initiatives such as the Force TEN fund (a two year training fund), the TEN Capital 
Development fund (a four year fund intended to provide equipment of all kinds to 
community and voluntary groups) and the TEN Coalfield Development Fund have been 
particularly effective. TEN works with employers and with a range of other agencies to 
encourage exchange of information as to the kinds of jobs available and the training or 
equipment needed to secure them for local people. TEN runs Drop-in Centres in four 
communities in the South Tyneside area (Boldon, Jarrow, Hebburn and South Shields) 
where unemployed people can have access to information and advice free of charge and 
can apply for small grants through the TEN Access Fund. 
Key Partners and Funding Bodies 
• South Tyneside MBC 
• Employment Service 
• Church Urban Fund 
• Lottery Funding 
• ERDF/ESF 
• South Tyneside College 
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District Data: South Tyneside Indices of Deprivation (2000) 
TEN is a borough-wide operation, and as such the application of individual ward-level 
indices of deprivation scores and ranks are misleading. However, the District-wide 
indices of deprivation (2000) demonstrate the extent of deprivation in the borough: 
Rank of average of Ward scores 15 (out of 3 54 districts) 
Rank of average of Ward ranks 13 (out of 3 54 districts) 
2. Outputs and Outcomes from the Initiative: 
Quantifiable Outputs: (1999) 
Clients into employment (target) 404 (305) 
Clients into training- (target) 266 (13 7) 
Clients counselled and advised (target) 658 (350) 
N.B. some multiple accounting possible; counselling overall figure of usage. 
Non -quantifiable outputs: 
Social effects; community and individual confidence. 
• The impact on community confidence is hard to assess, as Dan Dowling notes: 
"It's hard to tell; since we're operating a bit more at what you might call the 
'hard end' in here, we tend to deal with those who have already got enough 
confidence. I mean, making the trip here and coming up the stairs here- I ' l l admit 
it's not the most welcoming entrance- that shows that people are already driven 
when they get here. I do wonder how many get to the door and turn around, 
though." 
• Some of the clients who attend Drop in Centres are so lacking in confidence that 
they have to be worked with over a long period of time to give them the 
confidence to go on and do something more formal or job-related. The input of 
the drop-ins as part of the network therefore acts as outreach which then filters 
through into people's own perceptions of themselves. 
Development potential of the area 
• TEN is only part of a number of third sector and statutory agencies in the 
borough so few direct influences upon the development potential of the area can 
be discerned. However, hopes are that the impact made by TEN will eventually 
lead to the encouragement of employers to invest in the area, while also allowing 
local employers to develop their businesses with a pool of trained labour. 
Changing culture 
• TEN operates a two-pronged impact in changing the culture of the area, by 
focusing on training and through the reintegration of unemployed people into the 
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world of work. However, TEN also hopes that its activities in drop-in centres will 
also hep to stimulate a sense of self-help within the community as opposed to a 
culture of handouts from the employment service. 
Environmental impact 
• N/A 
Assessment/Evaluation of Initiative 
The South Tyneside Training and Enterprise Network demonstrates raw outputs 
which demonstrate a success in finding employment for its clients beyond the original 
aims of the project. Through its (depleting) network of drop-in centres and the TEN 
office, the initiative has been able to maintain a level of limited outreach to underpin the 
main direction of the employment and training consultation and advice given. 
Key factors in success of the initiative 
Mechanism of provision 
• TEN has well-defined aims and structure to achieve this. 
• TEN fills a niche which is complementary to that of the existing statutory 
agencies, therefore providing a more holistic approach to the problems of the 
unemployed within the borough. 
• The mechanism of grants, advice and counselling in an informal gateway allows 
TEN to act as a first (or last) step on the employment ladder for users. 
• Grants and financial aid are crucial in TEN's success at promoting encouraging 
involvement and usage by the community. 
Governance 
• Internal governance is formal, but with a degree of flexibility that allows non-
crucial decisions to be taken as and when they are needed. The small staff base 
allows the project to be responsive, but has the disadvantage of being a burden 
when staff are unavailable. 
• The initiative, while part of a close network of other agencies, remains 
autonomous and at arm's length to funders and state networks. As such, this 
allows the internal governance mechanism to retain a degree of financial and 
policy independence which other projects, notably Low Simonside (appendix 
1.11), did not have. TEN is able to find the most suitable solution to a problem 
for a particular client through networking with statutory and non -statutory 
agencies. 
External Environment 
• The development of TEN is dependent upon the employment and labour force 
characteristics in South Tyneside. The initiative does not depend particularly on 
the elements of social capital within the locality to develop its provision, although 
the drop-in centres rely upon volunteers from church members to develop. This 
has also benefited recipients as a means to promote social interaction in 
comparison to older industrial-based institutions. 
Key failings of the Initiative: 
• TEN lacks embeddedness within the community it serves. TEN fulfils a niche as 
an intermediate institution, but it is not fully integrated within the population. 
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Drop-ins are a crucial feature of outreach, yet are open just one afternoon per 
week. 
• Over its lifetime, no significant improvement in the level of unemployment has 
been witnessed in South Tyneside. This is in part a reflection of the broader 
economic forces against which the initiative is set; no conclusive data are 
available regarding the potential situation had the initiative been in existence, 
However, this represents a failing in the initiative: through working within the 
confines of the market, albeit in an innovative community- based manner, the 
initiative has no power to alter the prospects of the residents in terms of tangible 
job creation. As such, although it represents a part solution to the institutional 
inadequacies of the post-industrial community, it is inevitably subject to forces 
beyond its control. 
Lessons for transferability? 
• The initiative's multi-agency approach should be transferable, not least in its 
ability to get agencies to work together in a joined-up fashion. The network of 
headquarters and drop-ins provide a more complete service than before; however 
the short opening hours of the drop-ins have caused some ambivalence towards 
their real value. There is a need for TEN to be more responsive with consultation. 
3. Processes 
A. Funding/Financial situation 
• TEN is financially self-governing. Funding flows direct to project from funders; 
in the case of EU funds this is in arrears. Lottery funds and SRB now provide a 
significant proportion of funds, comprising a total of 8 separate funds with aims 
and outputs attached. 
• The local authority (South Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council) acts as the 
accountable body for funds and financial evaluation. TEN also receives a yearly 
visit from an independent evaluator. One half position is employed to maintain 
financial scrutiny. Few financial decisions may be taken unilaterally by the 
group. Evaluation criteria act as a significant constraint on activity due to funding 
collated from several sources, and evaluation forms are a particular bugbear with 
workers with regard to the time and effort involved; this is regarded as taking 
energies away from the real focus of activity. 
• Funding applications are mostly done in-house, (by a grants administrator) 
though with a great deal of consultation within the South Tyneside Enterprise 
Partnership (STEP) board. 
• During the first 3 years of existence, statutory and charity funding was used to 
cover costs; now TEN is reliant mostly upon SRB (until 2001) and lottery 
funding. The implication of this change in funding is that the initiative is now 
more stabilised, and can afford to invest in employment officer and plan for long-
term. However, Mike hall states, "but it's still just 3 years that we've got 
currently; you can't change the world in that time. I wish we could, but it's 
probably asking a bit too much even of us". 
B. Targets set by the initiative; output-led funding 
• The aims of the initiative, according to its mission statement, are: 
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1. To work with the unemployed residents of south Tyneside identifying 
and accessing resources to help to meet employment and training needs. 
2. To work within local partnerships that serve the unemployed residents of 
south Tyneside 
3. To identify the gaps in the mainstream provision for the unemployed and 
to identify and refer clients and client groups to the most appropriate 
training and enterprise centres. 
4. To promote the take-up of employment and vocational training 
opportunities and to assist the take-up of voluntary work opportunities. 
5. To provide advice, guidance, support, encouragement and resources to 
enable individuals and community and voluntary groups to access and 
enhance training and enterprise opportunities. 
• These aims are regarding as being clear. Dan Dowling states, "People, I think, 
know what we're here for. We've a clear goal and that's good for us. We really 
work on getting people out there, letting them know what we do and how we can 
help them. I think the aims are specific enough, but built in within that there's a 
level of flexibility which sets us apart from the other statutory agencies." 
C. Governance of the Initiative 
• Day-to-day decisions are made by the consultant and project leader, in 
consultation with steering group as/when required. Monetary grants made in 
consultation with management committee, along guidelines drawn up as part of 
TEN's constitution. As noted above, some funds earmarked through particular 
funding streams, therefore some confusion exists as to the exact nature of grants 
when given. The Day-to-day mechanism relies upon Dan Dowling and Mike Hall 
as key players. Decisions are "taken when and when they are needed", with both 
consulting each other. 
• Decisions with regard to money/small grants are taken by chairman and 
committee, i f they meet criteria for funding. This is done weekly, or as required. 
• TEN has a past of rapidly changing personnel in key positions A few tensions 
have arisen recently, due to the nature of key workers. These actors tended to 
work around problems and form an adequate consensus, but this is also due to 
strong leadership meaning few others challenge such decisions when taken. 
• Drop-ins are an integral part of the network, but they work in partnership at arm's 
length. An original group of 12 have now been forced to be reduced to 6, due to 
factors involving funding and time commitments. Drop-ins have never been 
statutorily funded and did not produce outputs as desired due to the ad-hoc nature 
of timings. Tensions which have arisen due to problems are mostly put down to 
the inappropriate organisational framework. There is an acceptance that the 
original configuration of drop-ins required more formalisation to make them 
integral parts of the communities served. 
• A broad-based steering group meets 3-monthly, comprising up to 16 members 
and TEN representatives. Key powers therefore reside with the workers 
themselves; in some ways the strategic board is a reporting/rubber-stamping 
exercise. Only informal consultation occurs with users, which may have bred 
some form of arrogance at the centre: Dan Dowling states, "well, we're 
successful in what we do: that's proof that we're doing the right thing". 
• No formal channel of consultation exists from the drop-ins to TEN HQ. Informal 
contact exists, but reports from each drop-in are now discussed at strategy 
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meetings. 
D. Community embeddedness 
• The initiative originated as part of the South Tyneside Taskforce; Mike Hall is 
interested as member of church committee; there is also relevance to lessons 
learned form LS initiative failings. The drop-in network is more community-
based, but also church-related. Therefore the whole community not necessarily 
served; the influence in traditional industrial institutions is limited (see also St. 
Simon's Community Project, appendix 1.12). 
• TEN HQ is situated within South Shields town centre; and thus relatively 
accessible but not embedded within residential areas for ease of informal use. 
Drop-ins are situated in churches within sectors of the community. Now, due to 
reduced numbers, these are forced to cover wider areas. The lack of full-time 
staffing of drop-ins acts a barrier; the services not always present when needed. 
• Users appear to have positive view of the role of the TEN, but some confusion 
regarding its status as an independent organisation, separate from the 
employment service. 
E. Role of Agency in Enhancing the Initiative. 
• 4 team leaders were used in the period used 1995-1999; the mere fact that TEN 
has survived demonstrates a solidity of the set-up. However, tensions have arisen. 
Some allusions to acrimonious dealings have emerged, though these were not 
elaborated upon in interviews. 
• Individual actors are key at drop-in level, where they can be identified with TEN 
as a first step into the reintegration process. 
• Identification of the initiative and users is often at arm's length in the TEN 
headquarters. This is perceived as more formal than drop-ins. Bill Chambers, a 
user, states, " you come in here and it's a bit more like an office or something-
you know, there's desk s and stuff and that really can put you off when you've 
just been to the drop in. But they're nice enough lads, a bit naive, i f you know 
what I mean. Err... I wouldn't be likely to go out for a drink with then or see them 
in the club, though" 
F. Relationship with external partners 
• Local authority support and funding was crucial at the outset; this was as a 
development from the Low Simonside Employment Initiative (see appendix 
1.11), following a period of consultation. The relationship with the local authority 
is currently described as 'healthy, but not too close'. 
• A close relationship to STEP board and members exists 
• Aims of TEN at inception were to, like Low Simonside, foster a relationship with 
the private sector in partnership to secure jobs locally. Subsequently this has 
proven to be neglected, as an unattainable part of the original aims of TEN. 
G. Position relative to other service providers 
• The target groups of users are unemployed and disadvantaged sections of the 
community. TEN sees its role as distinct from that of the employment service. 
Low Simonside (appendix 1.11), according to interviews and received wisdom, 
demonstrated the need for agencies like TEN. As a pieced of action research the 
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consultation inherent within it paved the way for TEN. 
• The initiative fills a vacant niche which should be filled by the state: Dan 
Dowling states, " err, yeah, I suppose it should be, and possibly could be done by 
the state i f it was doing its job properly. But you look at the role taken by the 
statutory agencies and there's nothing like us to fill the gap that's there at the 
moment. And there is a gap, no question. What we do is to provide a service to 
the people who need it, direct, with no strings attached. We're not going to drop 
them to the employment service or anything like that, because we know that 
anyone who walks through that door has made a conscious effort to do so in order 
to help themselves." 
Formal Interviews with managers, beneficiaries and volunteers 
Mike Hall TEN Project Leader 
Dan Dowling TEN Project Leader 
Ron Waters Grange Road drop-in co-
ordinator 
B i l l Chambers User o f TEN services 
Paul Smith User of TEN services 
Other related interviews: 
Andrew De'ath South Tyneside MBC 
Steve Muse GO-NE 
Seth Pearson Tyneside TEC 
Chris Clarke South Tyneside MBC 
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Appendix 2: Full List of Key Formal Interviews 
This list summarises all key formal interviews which took place during the 
course of the research. However, in addition to this a large number o f informal 
soundings were made, particularly with users and beneficiaries of the TSEIs 
studied where the use o f tape recording was deemed inappropriate. There is also 
some under-reporting o f interviews where individual was interviewed more than 
once. 
This list also requires cross-tabulation with each case study in Appendix 1; 
many interviews are relevant to more than one case study. Where appropriate, the 
role or title o f each interviewee has been noted; this refers to that position at the 




Adamson, David BCR, Waun Wen University o f Glamorgan 
Aherne, Brian DVP Project Deputy, job club co-
ordinator, Dulais Valley 
Partnership 
Banks, Lilian St. Simon's CP Development worker, St 
Simon's CP 
Bevan, Judith Y D T Former head o f the Y D T 
form its inception as an exit 
strategy from the Urban 
Regeneration Strategy 
Partnership. 
Bibby, Julie DOVE Part-Time financial and 
Admin Worker, DOVE 
Workshop 
Brookes, Meurig Waun Wen, 
Blaenllechau 
Rhondda Cynon T a f f 
County Borough Council 
Brookes, Peter T2000 Chairman, T2000 
Brown, David St. Simon's CP Centre beneficiary, St 
Simon's CP 
Burns, Rachel STI Bishop Auckland College 
Burton, John T2000 Director, Trimdon 2000 
Callendar, Sue St. Simon's CP Deputy Project co-
ordinator, St Simon's 
Community Project 
Castle, Barbara PEP Ex-project manger; 
originally a local authority 
employee, who was asked 
to return to work in 
Penywaun after the initial 
consultation. 
Chambers, Bi l l TEN User o f TEN services 
Clarke, Chris Low Simonside; Project originator. Now at 
TEN STMBC 
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Cogan, Alma Waun Wen T D T A and Waun Wen Ltd 
Cook, Julie STI Training Initiative Co-
ordinator; Julie was 
appointed to the STI in 
1994. 
Cranston, Steve BCR, PEP, Waun Manager, the Arts Factory, 
Wen also head of the 
Development Trusts 
Association, Wales 
Dan, Dowling TEN, St. Simon's 
CP 
TEN Project Leader 
Davis, John T2000 Durham Rural Community 
Council and member o f 
steering committee 
Davies, Adrian, Y D T Manager, Y Gegin Fach 
Cafe; trustee and committee 
member, Ystalyfera 
Development Trust 
Davis, Shelia BCR, PEP Economic Development 
Director, Rhondda Cynon 
Taf f County Borough 
Council 
De'ath, Andrew St. Simon's CP, Development and 
TEN community service, South 
Tyneside M B C 
Dickson, Sharon DOVE DOVE user 
Dimmock, Steve PEP South-East Wales TEC 
Dobson, Ernest SRRI Leader o f the Sherburn 
Road Regeneration 
Partnership 
Dowd, Nigel SRRI Trainee, Rapid Response 
Squad 
Ede, Colin Y D T , A V E , DVP Economic Development, 
Neath Port-Talbot BC 
Elliott, Jane DOVE, DVP Community Univerisyt o f 
the Valleys 
Evans, Allison BCR Current Centre Manager, 
resident o f Blaenllechau 
Fettis, Jen St. Simon's CP Project leader, St Simon's 
Community Project 
Foreman, Gary PEP Project manager, PEP 
Francis, Mair DOVE Initiative Co-ordinator, 
DOVE Workshop 
Gibson, George St. Simon's CP Beneficiary o f 
unemployment services 
Gooding, Julie PEP Local Volunteer, PEP 
Hall, Dave SRRI Local co-ordinator, Rapid 
Response Squad, SRRI 
Hoban, Frank T2000 Retired, T2000 secretary 
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Hodgson, Keith St. Simon's CP, 
TEN 
ONE NorthEast 
Hopkins, Ruth PEP, Waun Wen, 
Blaenllechau 
Director, Interlink (RCT) 
Howe, Rena SRRI Top and Bottom furniture 
recycling project 
James, Cheryl A V E Finance co-ordinator, 
Amman Valley Enterprise 
Jones, Betty SRRI Member o f the local 
women's group 
Jones, Mick BCR Ex-miner; original member 
of the committee which 
initiated the creation o f 
BCR 
Jones, Stuart Waun Wen Youth worker at 
Trebanog/Waun Wen ltd; 
University o f Glamorgan. 
Jones, Sue BCR Centre manager, now 
departed, BCR 
Kilmurray, Brent T2000; SRRI Durham County Council 
Lenton-Johnson, 
Michelle 
BCR, Waun Wen, 
PEP 
Rhondda Cynon Taf f 
County Borough Council 
Lewis, Carolyn DOVE, Y D T Neath Port-Talbot College 
Lewis, Moira DOVE, DVP Founder- member, DOVE; 
member o f DVP steering 
Committee 
Leyshon, Sarah Waun Wen Co-ordinator, Trebanog 
Community Centre (post-
1999) 
Llewellyn, Alyn Y D T Trustee o f Y D T and Chair 
o f Tiddlywinks Nursery 
Mayze, Sarah, PEP Financial assistant and local 
resident, PEP 
Mckinnon, Neil , St. Simon's CP Beneficiary o f 
unemployment services 
Mike, Hall TEN, St. Simon's 
CP 
TEN Project Leader, 
committee member, St. 
Simon's 
Mil ls , Jayne Low Simonside Project manager, Low 
Simonside Employment 
Initiative 
Mortimer, Peter BCR, PEP Rhondda Cynon T a f f 
County Borough Council 
Muse, Steve St. Simon's CP, 
TEN 
GO-NE 
Nelson, B i l l STI Beneficiary o f the STI 
Newington, Lynette DVP Project manager Dulais 
Valley Partnership 
Owen, Chris Y D T Trust Director, Y D T 
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Pearce, June T2000 A recent member. Her son 
has taken training f rom 
T2000. 
Pearce, June T2000 Trimdon 2000 
Pearson, Seth TEN, St. Simon's 
CP 
Tyneside TEC 
Potts, Tony Y D T West Wales TEC 
Powell, Derith A V E Operations manger, Gwaun-
Cae-Gurwen 
Preece, Len A V E Volunteer manager, art, 
community and music 
projects 
Prisk, Richard T2000, STI Sedgefield Borough 
Council. 
Quinn, Kay Waun Wen Independent Consultant 
involved in the 
development o f Waun Wen 
Ltd 
Richard, Chris PEP Princes Youth Business 
Trust (a t Y D T ) 
Roberts, Barry DVP Job club user 
Robinson, Fred SRRI, TEN University o f Durham; also 
produces evaluations for a 
number o f North-East 
TSEIs 
Smith, Alan St. Simon's CP Centre Beneficiary 
Smith, Lesley DOVE, DVP Part-Time worker, DOVE 
and also member o f 
Steering committee 
Smith, Paul TEN User o f TEN services 
Spry, Gillian T2000 Sedgefield Borough 
Council 
Syson, Sue SRRI Community development 
worker employed by SRP 
Thompson, Clive Y D T Community Access Point 
Co-ordinator, Y D T 
Timothy, Anne T2000 Head o f Durham Call 
Centres committee, T2000 
Turnbull, George STI Beneficiary o f the STI 
Waters, Ron TEN Grange Road drop-in co-
ordinator 
Williams, Gloria Waun Wen Trebanog and District 
Residents' Association 
(TDTA); former chair o f 
Waun Wen Ltd 
Wood, Karen Low Simonside Former employee of Low 
Simonside; now works at 
STRIDE 
Young, Peter TEN, St. Simon's South Tyneside Enterprise 
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CP Partnership (STEP) 
In addition, the fol lowing interviews were undertaken which do not refer 
to particular projects: 





Rhondda Cynon Taf f BC 
Kearney, John Making Music Work, Consett 
Johnson, Dave Trevithin Community 
Project, Torfaen 
Harding, Peter National Assembly, Wales 
Gray, Allan Welsh Development Agency 
Benfield, Graham Wales Council for Voluntary 
Action 
